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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 869 (HP)

Nimmo Devi v. Punjab Roadways Transport Corporation

2016-05-20

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR

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JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this appeal is the award dated 29th June, 2009, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II), Kangra at Dharmshala (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’), in M.A.C. Petition No. 47-G/06, titled as Smt. Nimmo Devi & another versus Punjab Roadways Transport Corporation & another, whereby the claim petition was dismissed (hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned award’). 2. Claimants, being victims of the motor vehicular accident, filed claim petition before the Tribunal for grant of compensation to the tune of 6,00,000/- as per the breakups given in the claim petition. 3. The respondents contested the claim petition on the grounds taken in their memo of objections. 4. Following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal: “1. Whether the respondent No. 2 was driving the offending bus bearing No. PB-07-P-8451 owned by respondent No. 1 in a rash and negligent manner on 13.04.2006 and because of his rash and negligent driving he had caused death of the deceased Ashok Kumar? …OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from whom? …OPP 3. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? If so who is necessary parties? …OPR 1 and 2 4. Whether the deceased was not bonafide passenger, therefore, the petition is not maintainable in the present form? If so its effect? …OPR 1 and 2 5. Relief.” 5. The claimants examined five witness and one of the claimants, namely, Smt. Nimmo Devi also appeared herself in the witness box as PW-3. Respondents examined Padam Parkash (RW-2), Malkiyat Singh (RW-3) and Jala Masih (RW-4). Driver Raj Kumar also appeared in the witness box as RW-1. 6. The Tribunal after scanning the evidence, oral as well as documentary, held that the claimants have failed to prove that driver, namely, Raj Kumar, had driven the offending vehicle, i.e. bus bearing registration No. PB-07-P-8451, rashly and negligently on 13.04.2006 and accordingly, decided issues No. 1 & 4 against the claimants and has not returned findings on other issues in view of the findings returned on issues No. 1 & 4. Issue No.1. 7. FIR No. 38 of 2006, dated 13.04.2006, under Sections 279 & 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (Ext. Issue No.1. 7. FIR No. 38 of 2006, dated 13.04.2006, under Sections 279 & 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (Ext. PW-1/A) was registered against driver Raj Kumar in Police Station Haripur, investigation was conducted and final charge-sheet came to be presented before the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Court No. 1, Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P. Driver Raj Kumar faced trial and ultimately, landed in acquittal after a lapse of about four years. He has earned acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt. It is apt to reproduce para 16 of the judgment dated 05.07.2010, passed in Criminal Case No. 45-II/2007, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh versus Raj Kumar, by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Court No. 1, Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P. herein:- “In view of the forgoing discussions, the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that on the noon of 13.04.2006, around 2.30 p.m., at place Haripur Dosarka near Bankhandi, accused was driving bus No. PB-07P-8451 on the public highway rashly and negligently, which resulted in causing death of Ashok Kumar when he fell down from the window of the bus, rather, the entire case of prosecution is shrouded under the shadow of doubt, the benefit of which deserves to be given to the accused. Accordingly, point No. 1 is decided in negative.” 8. It is a beaten law of the land that standard of proof in criminal and civil cases is altogether different as in claim petition, prima facie proof is required. 9. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. Versus M. Karumai Ammal and others etc., reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1354. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 3 of the judgment herein: “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specifically when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. Accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their “neighbour”. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." (Emphasis Added) 10. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case titled as Oriental Insurance Co. versus Mst. Zarifa and others, reported in AIR 1995 Jammu and Kashmir 81, held that the MV Act is Social Welfare Legislation and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act. It is profitable to reproduce para 20 of the judgment herein: “20. Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way of Award to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. It is profitable to reproduce para 20 of the judgment herein: “20. Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way of Award to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. These people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kins are killed, are necessarily to be provided such relief in a short span of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act, under which such compensation is to be paid to such claimants.” 11. It would also be profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 12 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as Sohan Lal Passi versus P. Sesh Reddy and others, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2627, herein: “12. ..................While interpreting the contract of insurance, the Tribunals and Courts have to be conscious of the fact that right to claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds. Unless it is established on the materials on record that it was the insured who had willfully violated the condition of the policy by allowing a person not duly licensed to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, the insurer shall be deemed to be a judgment-debtor in respect of the liability in view of sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act. It need not be pointed out that the whole concept of getting the vehicle insured by an insurance company is to provide an easy mode of getting compensation by the claimants, otherwise in normal course they had to pursue their claim against the owner from one forum to the other and ultimately to execute the order of the Accident Claims Tribunal for realisation of such amount by sale of properties of the owner of the vehicle. The procedure and result of the execution of the decree is well known.” 12. The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in (2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 646 has laid down the same principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 13. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 14. The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in (2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 646 has laid down the same principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 13. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 14. A Single Judge of this Court in FAO No. 127 of 1999, titled as Bimla Devi and others versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, decided on 22.08.2005, held that the claimants have to prove the case by leading cogent evidence and applied the mandate of the Code of Civil Procedure, for shot ‘the CPC’ read with the Evidence Act, was questioned before the Apex Court by the medium of Civil Appeal No. 2538 of 2009, titled as Bimla Devi & Ors. versus Himachal Road Transport Corpn. & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 4298, and the Apex Court set aside the said judgment and held that strict proof is not required. It is apt to reproduce paras 2 and 12 to 15 of the judgment herein: "2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in FAO No. 127 of 1999 whereby and whereunder an appeal preferred against a judgment and award dated 28.10.1998 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II [MACT (I), Nahan] in MAC Petition No. 21-NL/2 of 1997, was set aside. xxx xxx xxx 12. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimants predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 13. The deceased was a Constable. 13. The deceased was a Constable. Death took place near a police station. The post mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of a constable has taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus stand and near a police station. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 14. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the First Information Report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." 15. There is sufficient prima facie proof on the record to the effect that the driver had driven the offending vehicle, rashly and negligently, at the relevant point of time and had caused the accident, in which the deceased sustained injuries and succumbed to the same. Accordingly, Issue No. 1 is decided in favour of the claimants and against the respondents and the findings returned by the Tribunal on the said issue are set aside. Issue No. 4. 16. It is not known why deceased Ashok Kumar was not a bonafide passenger. It is recorded in the FIR (Ext. PW-1/A) that Ashok Kumar sustained injuries in the accident and succumbed to the same in Civil Hospital Dehra, details of which are given in paras 2 & 3 of the judgment passed in Criminal Case No. 45-11/2007 supra. Thus, the findings returned by the Tribunal on Issue No. 4 are set aside and the same is decided in favour of the claimants and against the respondents. 17. Before I deal with issue No. 1, I deem it proper to deal with Issue No. 3. Issue No. 3. 18. It was for the respondents to prove that the petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, has failed to do so. 19. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short ‘the Act’ has gone a sea change and sub section (6) to Section 158 and sub section (4) to Section 166 of the Act have been added, whereby the Claims Tribunal can treat report of accident forwarded to it under Section 158(6) of the Act as an application for compensation. Thus, it cannot be said that the claim petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Accordingly, Issue No. 3 is decided in favour of the claimants and against the respondents. Issue No. 2. 20. Admittedly, the age of the deceased was 35 years at the time of accident. Thus, it cannot be said that the claim petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Accordingly, Issue No. 3 is decided in favour of the claimants and against the respondents. Issue No. 2. 20. Admittedly, the age of the deceased was 35 years at the time of accident. The claimants have specifically averred in the claim petition that the income of the deceased was Rs.6,000/- per month, at the time of accident. It can safely be held that the income of the deceased could not have been less than Rs. 4,000/- per month at the time of accident. After deducting one-third towards the personal expenses of the deceased, it can be held that the claimants have lost source of dependency to the tune of Rs.3000/- per month. 21. The multiplier of ‘14’ is applicable in this case, in view of the 2nd Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act read with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another, reported in AIR 2009 SC 3104 , upheld by a larger Bench of the Apex Court in a case titled as Reshma Kumari & others versus Madan Mohan and another, reported in 2013 AIR (SCW) 3120 read with the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in case titled as Munna Lal Jain & another versus Vipin Kumar Sharma & others, reported in 2015 AIR SCW 3105. 22. Accordingly, the claimants are held entitled to the tune of Rs. 3,000/- x 12 = Rs.36,000 x 14 = Rs.5,04,000/- under the head ‘loss of dependency’. 23. Keeping in view the recent judgments of the Apex Court, the claimants are also held entitled to a sum of Rs.10,000/- each, under the heads ‘loss of love and affection’, ‘loss of consortium’, ‘loss of estate’ and ‘funeral expenses’. 24. Having said so, it is held that the claimants are entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.5,04,000/- + Rs.40,000/- total amounting to Rs. 5,44,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization. Respondent No. 1 is saddled with the liability. 25. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed. 26. Respondent No. 1 is directed to deposit the awarded amount within eight weeks from today. 5,44,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization. Respondent No. 1 is saddled with the liability. 25. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed. 26. Respondent No. 1 is directed to deposit the awarded amount within eight weeks from today. On deposit, the same be released in favour of the claimants through payees’ account cheque or by depositing the same in their accounts. 27. Send down the records after placing a copy of the judgment on the Tribunal’s file.