JUDGMENT & ORDER : R.R. PRASAD, J. This Application is directed against the order dated 14.6.04 passed by the Commandant, 2nd Bn. Manipur Rifles, Imphal who having found charges being proved during enquiry, dismissed the petitioner from service. 2. The charges, upon which the petitioner who was serving as Rifleman in the 2nd Bn. Manipur Rifles, was put to a departmental proceeding, were as follows: (i) on 29.8.1995 while the petitioner was on sentry duty at O.P. No.5 for the security of the Bn., gave away his Rifle entrusted to him for his duty and also the live cartridges to unknown extremists without there being any resistance on his part nor did he alert other sentry which is unbecoming of rifleman and thereby he committed a great misconduct. (ii) Even after giving away the arms and ammunitions, the petitioner did not disclose the said fact to his superior until he was asked to produce the arms and ammunitions and thereby the motive was to support extremists indulging themselves against security of the Manipur State. 3. The Memorandum of charges along with the documents and also the list of witnesses were served upon the petitioner who, on receiving the same, did not plead guilty and thereby he was put to departmental proceeding for which an Enquiry Officer as well as Presenting Officer were appointed even a Defence Assistant was provided to the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer, having examined the witnesses produced by the department, gave opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence which the petitioner did not choose to lead any evidence. Thereupon the Enquiry Officer having appreciated the evidences adduced found both the charges being proved. Thereupon, the petitioner, on being served with the enquiry report, was asked to submit his second show cause. Upon submission of it, the disciplinary authority (respondent No.4) passed the impugned order whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service. 4. Being aggrieved with that order, an appeal was preferred which also got dismissed. It would be worthwhile to state here that for the said charges, upon which the petitioner was put to departmental proceeding, a criminal case had also been lodged against him which had been registered as SPT PS Case No.33(8)95 u/s 409 of IPC. The petitioner, on being put to trial, was acquitted of the charge vide judgment and order dated 29.12.2005. The petitioner, on being put to trial, was acquitted of the charge vide judgment and order dated 29.12.2005. However, the petitioner being aggrieved with the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority, has preferred this writ application. 5. Mr. Tarunkumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while assailing the impugned orders, submits that no chance was given to the petitioner for cross examining the witnesses examined in the proceeding and that the delinquent not being versed in the legal matter, was never informed that he is entitled to have defence assistant to defend the petitioner and that from the enquiry report it does appear that the Enquiry Officer himself played role of Presenting Officer and thereby on account of all these reasons one can easily come to the conclusion that there has been gross violation of the principles of natural justice and that where Enquiry Officer himself plays the role of Presenting Officer, the proceeding gets vitiated. In support of his submission the learned counsel has referred to a decision rendered in a case of State of Uttaranchal vs. Kharak Singh (2008) 8 SCC 236 wherein it has been observed that the Enquiry Officer acting as Investigator, Prosecutor and Judge is opposed to principles of natural justice. 6. The learned counsel, coming to the main plank of his submission, highlighted that when the petitioner has been acquitted honourably by the trial court for the charge upon which the petitioner has been found guilty by the disciplinary authority, the order dismissing the petitioner from service is not sustainable in law in view of the decision rendered in a case of S. Bhaskar Reddy & Anr. Vs. Superintendent of Police & Anr. reported in (2015) 2 SC 365. On the aforesaid ground, it was submitted that the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority getting approval by the appellate authority is fit to be set aside and consequently the petitioner be directed to be reinstated in service. 7. As against this Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Sr. Vs. Superintendent of Police & Anr. reported in (2015) 2 SC 365. On the aforesaid ground, it was submitted that the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority getting approval by the appellate authority is fit to be set aside and consequently the petitioner be directed to be reinstated in service. 7. As against this Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Sr. G.A. submits that a submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner with respect to petitioner being not provided with Defence Assistant and that Enquiry Officer himself played role of Presenting Officer and that the petitioner was not afforded with opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses are all incorrect and as a matter of fact it was the Presenting Officer who did conduct the case for the department and even the defence assistant provided to the petitioner had cross examined some of the witnesses in presence of the delinquent and thereby all the norms and procedures laid down for holding departmental proceeding were observed meticulously and as such question of violation of the principles of natural justice does not arise. Mr. Reisang, learned Sr. G.A. goes on submitting that it is true that the petitioner has been acquitted by the Criminal Court of the charges which was subject matter of the proceeding but the criminal case is decided on the principle of charges being proved beyond all reasonable doubts whereas the principles on which the departmental proceeding is decided, is preponderance of the probabilities and thereby even if the charges would have been the same in both the proceedings, the decision rendered in criminal proceeding will have no bearing upon the departmental proceeding. Mr. Reisang, in support of his submission, referred to two decisions, one rendered in case of Inspector General of Police Vs. V. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598 and other in a case of Baljinder Pal Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in (2016) 1 SCC 671 . The learned Sr. G.A. further submits that the application is barred by delay and latches and thereby it is not fit to be entertained. In support of his submission, learned Sr. G.A referred to a decision rendered in the case of A. Obangmenla Jamir Vs. State of Nagaland & Ors. (2014) 2 GLT 266. 8. The learned Sr. G.A. further submits that the application is barred by delay and latches and thereby it is not fit to be entertained. In support of his submission, learned Sr. G.A referred to a decision rendered in the case of A. Obangmenla Jamir Vs. State of Nagaland & Ors. (2014) 2 GLT 266. 8. This submission was countered by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner by submitting that all the cases where delay occurred in preferring the writ application cannot be thrown out rather the cases, where there happens to be gross violation of the principles of natural justice, are always being entertained by the Court. The learned counsel, in this regard, has referred to a decision rendered in the case of Thimmappa & Anr. Vs. Chairman Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India and Anr., (2001)2 SCC 259 . 9. Lastly, it was pointed out by Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Sr. G.A. that in a similar case wherein charges were also there that a constable of Manipur Police allowed the arms and ammunitions to be taken away by the extremists has been pleased to dismiss the writ application whereby the order of termination had been challenged. 10. At the outset, it be stated that Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down the parameters for the Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of the matter relating to judicial review of the order passed by the disciplinary authority. In this regard, we may refer to a decision rendered in case of Govt. of India & Anr. Vs. George Phillip (2006) 13 SCC 1 laying down principles that the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution is not hearing an appeal against the decision of a disciplinary authority imposing punishment upon the delinquent employee. The jurisdiction of High Court, in exercise of judicial review, extends to the cases where there has been a substantial non-compliance with the rules or procedure or a gross violation of rules of natural justice which has resulted in miscarriage of justice or that punishment is shockingly disproportionate. 11. The jurisdiction of High Court, in exercise of judicial review, extends to the cases where there has been a substantial non-compliance with the rules or procedure or a gross violation of rules of natural justice which has resulted in miscarriage of justice or that punishment is shockingly disproportionate. 11. Further, we do find that to sustain allegation of violation of principles of natural justice one must establish that the prejudice has been caused to him for non observance of the principles of natural justice which proposition has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syndicate Bank & Ors. Vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati (2006) 3 SCC 150 . 12. Here, in the instant case though plea has been taken on behalf of the petitioner that it was the Enquiry Officer who did act as Presenting Officer and that Defence Assistant was never provided nor opportunity has been given to the delinquent to cross examine the witnesses but all these allegations do not find support from the records as the records rather the enquiry report itself indicates that the Presenting Officer had been appointed to assist the defence and in fact he, in presence of the delinquent, had cross-examined the witnesses. That apart, a Presenting Officer who had been appointed had conducted the case for the department and therefore the submission to the effect as stated above is devoid of any merit. However, since important point has been raised which crops up invariably relating to the departmental proceeding, we thought it proper to deal with the issue relating to onus being put upon the delinquent to prove the factum of prejudice when a plea is taken with respect to violation of the principles of natural justice and non observance of the rules and procedures particularly non appointment of Presenting Officer and Enquiry Officer playing the role of Prosecutor. 13. In this regard, we may straightway refer to a decision rendered in a case of State Bank of India at Patiala & Ors. Vs. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 wherein their Lordships have been pleased to enunciate the principles and circumstances where the delinquent needs to prove the case of prejudice and where he needs not to do it. In this regard, we may refer to para 33 of the decision rendered in the aforesaid case which reads as follows: “33. Vs. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 wherein their Lordships have been pleased to enunciate the principles and circumstances where the delinquent needs to prove the case of prejudice and where he needs not to do it. In this regard, we may refer to para 33 of the decision rendered in the aforesaid case which reads as follows: “33. We may summaries the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee): (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance of the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/ employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under-"no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz. whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/ or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice in such cases. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/ government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, in a case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/ employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) here-in-below is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the persons proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/ employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the appropriate adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/ employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the appropriate adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/ regulations/ statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action- the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram pattern) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/ "no hearing" and "no fair hearing", (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the later cases, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/ employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.) (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/ tribunal/authority must always bear in the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the court may have to balance public/ State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.” 14. Further, it would be profitable to refer to another decision rendered in a case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha reported in (2010)2 SCC 772 wherein their Lordships has been pleased to observe as follows: “28. The enquiry officer acting a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/ Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved.” Thus, we may reiterate that submission advanced on behalf of the delinquent petitioner regarding non observance of rule and procedures as well as principles of natural justice, is devoid of any merit. 15. Now, coming to the main plank of the submission to the effect that on account of acquittal of the petitioner in a criminal case on the same charge, order of dismissal cannot be sustained. The learned counsel in support of his stand, has referred to a decision rendered in the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy (supra) holding therein that if there has been ‘honourable acquittal’ of the delinquent by the trial court on the same charge on which the delinquent was put to departmental proceeding, the same will have bearing upon the order of dismissal. Their lordships while holding so have taken notice of the expression, “honourable acquittal” expressed in detail in case the case of Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 where their Lordships in para 24 have observed as follows: “24. The meaning of the expression ‘honourable acquittal’ came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994)1 SCC 541 . S. Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 where their Lordships in para 24 have observed as follows: “24. The meaning of the expression ‘honourable acquittal’ came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994)1 SCC 541 . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquittal of blame,’ ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal ‘Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression ‘honourably acquitted.’ When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” 16. It be stated that their Lordships, while coming to the conclusion as aforesaid, have been pleased to take notice of the decision rendered in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd reported in (2015) 2 SCC 679 wherein their Lordships at para 34 and 35 have been pleased to lay down the circumstances in which the order of acquittal will have bearing upon the departmental proceeding. It reads as follows: “34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts namely, 'the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom.' The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the 'raid and recovery' at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings, to stand. 35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.” 17. Their lordships have, further, taken notice of a decision rendered in the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat (2006)5 SCC 446 wherein their Lordships have laid down the aforesaid principles in para 20, 30 and 31 which read as follows: “20......Likewise, the criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant for the alleged charges punishable under the provisions of the PC Act on the same set of facts and evidence. It was submitted that the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar (verbatim) set of facts and evidence. The appellant has been honourably acquitted by the competent court on the same set of facts, evidence and witness and, therefore, the dismissal order based on the same set of facts and evidence on the departmental side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. 30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law......It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant’s residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” (emphasis laid by this Court). It be stated that their Lordships, while laying down the law in the aforesaid case of S. Bhaskar Reddy (supra) had taken notice of the said two decisions rendered in the case of Capt. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” (emphasis laid by this Court). It be stated that their Lordships, while laying down the law in the aforesaid case of S. Bhaskar Reddy (supra) had taken notice of the said two decisions rendered in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) and G.M. Tank (supra) wherein it has been categorically held that where the charges as well as the evidence are the same, then in that eventuality order of acquittal may have bearing upon the order of termination. But, at the same time what emerges out explicitly which appears to us is that where charges though are the same, but evidences are different then the principles laid down to the effect that ‘honourable acquittal’ will have bearing upon the termination order would not be applicable. 18. We, in our view, are supported with the decision rendered in the case of Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 wherein it has been observed in para 26 as follows: “26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.” 19. Regard being had to all the cases referred to above, when we do examine the facts of the present case, we do find that though the charges more or less are the same, but evidence laid during the departmental proceeding as well as before the trial court do not appear to be the same. We may indicate that during departmental proceeding 6(six) witnesses namely - I. Shyamjai Singh, PW-1, (ii) Shri I. Dwijen Singh PW-2, (iii) Shri D. Sani Mao, PW-3, (iv) Shri T. Pachuau, PW-4, (v) Shri Durka Tamang, PW-5 and (vi) Konthoujam Ponchom, PW-6 had been examined. Of them, only 3 witnesses i.e. PWs-3, 2 and 5 who are common were examined in criminal case whereas other material witnesses, i.e. PWs-1 and 6 have not been examined before the criminal trial court and thereby one can never come to the conclusion that the charges and the evidences were same before the trial court as well as during the departmental proceeding. In such event, we, keeping in view the decisions rendered in the case of Inspector General of Police (supra) and also the other decisions rendered in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony as well as in the case of G.M. Tank (supra) are of the view that the order of acquittal will have no bearing on the impugned order of termination as well as order passed by appellate authority which orders in the facts and circumstances stated above, never warrant to be interfered with. 20. Coming to the other aspect of the matter, it be stated that order of dismissal has been issued in the year 2004 whereas the appellate authority rejected the appeal in the year 2006 and in between the order was passed by the trial court acquitting the delinquent in the year 2005. 20. Coming to the other aspect of the matter, it be stated that order of dismissal has been issued in the year 2004 whereas the appellate authority rejected the appeal in the year 2006 and in between the order was passed by the trial court acquitting the delinquent in the year 2005. Thus, there appears to be delay of 6 years if we count from the date of rejection of the appeal. But, we do not find any reasonable/logical explanation for such delay. Thus, the delay remains unexplained. In that event the writ application is also liable to be dismissed on this ground of delay in view of the decisions rendered in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. & Anr. Vs. Jabar Singh & Ors. reported in (2007)2 SCC 112 and also in the case of A. Obangmenla Jamir (supra) we may be failing in our duty not to refer to the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this regard. The learned counsel, in this regard, by referring to a decision rendered in the case of K. Thimmappa & Ors. (supra) submits that on the ground of latches the petition filed under article 226 is not liable to be rejected. Such proposition has been laid down on the fact that the matter relates to violation of fundamental rights. But here in the instant case question of involvement of fundamental right is not there. Thus we do find that the application also suffers from latches and delay. Accordingly, the application, being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed.