JUDGMENT : The instant suit is filed at the instance of the developer and promoter for declaration that the plaintiff is a sole and absolute owner of its allocation in respect of a building situated at CF-3 (Plot AA-1C) in Block CF, Street Nos. 178 and 173, New Town, Rajarhat, District – North 24 Parganas interms of the development agreement dated 20th September, 2007 and letter of allocation dated 18th October, 2010 and that the six deeds of lease as rectified and the mortgage created therein are illegal, null and void. With consequential reliefs in the form of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from giving any effect or further effect to the said six deeds of lease for the mortgage created therein and from alienating, encumbering, transferring and/or selling any part thereof without first refunding to the plaintiff the security deposit of Rs. 2 crores with interest. 2. The facts stated in the plaint as evident therefrom are that one National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Limited (NAFED), a Multi-State Co-operative Society was sole and absolute owner of a plot of land measuring more or less 1 acre being premises No. CF-3 (Plot AA-1C) in Block CF, Street Nos. 178 and 173, New Town, Rajarhat, District – North 24 Parganas. The said co-operative society sold transferred and conveyed the said plot of land to nine different companies including the respondent No. 1 by an indenture dated 18/09/2007. After becoming the owner thereof the said nine companies decided to develop the said property by constructing a multi-storied building there at. An agreement was entered into on 20th September, 2007 with the plaintiff herein for development of a multi-storied building named “Xtra” on the strength of a plan sanctioned by the competent authority and the said agreement was executed in the office of the advocates representing the plaintiff which is within the jurisdiction of the Court. The plan was resubmitted to the competent authority with certain modifications and was resanctioned on 9th May, 2008. The remodified plan would show that the competent authority sanctioned the construction of a building having basement, ground floor and six upper floors with central atrium across the ground to 3rd floor and the other upper floors was sanctioned for commercial and office place. 3. The remodified plan would show that the competent authority sanctioned the construction of a building having basement, ground floor and six upper floors with central atrium across the ground to 3rd floor and the other upper floors was sanctioned for commercial and office place. 3. The agreement dated 20th September, 2007 provides that 42% of the total constructed area in newly constructed multi-storied building shall belong to the said nine companies and the remaining 58% shall belong to the plaintiff. A security deposit of Rs. 2 crores was paid by the plaintiff to the said nine companies which was agreed to be repaid upon the construction of the said building and making over 42% allocated area. A power of attorney was executed in favour of two individuals, controlling and managing the plaintiff company, for the purpose of implementing or giving effect to the said development agreement and it is stated that the said power of attorney was executed in the office of the said learned advocate within the jurisdiction of this Court. Further power of attorney was executed on the same date authorising the said constituted attorney to transfer, register the plaintiff’s allocation upon completion of the construction in the said property. 4. A scheme of merger was sanctioned by this Court on 4th March, 2009 amalgamating the aforesaid four companies with the respondent No. 1 and therefore the owner’s allocation is to be given to the said respondent No. 1. It is stated that the development agreement was duly implemented and a construction was undertaken by raising a building to be used as shopping mall cum commercial building. Upon completion thereof respondent No. 1 and the plaintiff proceeded to identify and allocated the areas in terms of their respective allocated shares and the same has been reduced in writing by causing a letter dated 18th October, 2010. Under the said letter it would transpire that the 4th floor of the building was allocated to the respondent No. 1 while 5th and 6th floor of the building were identified as the allocation of the plaintiff. The ground floor to third floors were agreed to be used as a mall and shall remain in possession of the parties as per their agreed percentage of allocation and shall not be separately divided. The ground floor to third floors were agreed to be used as a mall and shall remain in possession of the parties as per their agreed percentage of allocation and shall not be separately divided. It would further reveal there from that the income earned from the sale thereof or otherwise earned from the said mall premises would be divided in the said ratio and all documents in relation thereto shall be executed jointly by them the contents of the said letter dated 18.10.2010 was further confirmed and ratified by another letter dated 3rd May, 2011 issued by the respondent No. 1. However, a dispute was raised subsequently on identification of the definite allocation of the plaintiff and the allocated area was confirmed by the respondent No. 1 in the said letter dated 16th May, 2011. The parties aforesaid were facing difficulty in finding out the suitable buyers for the mall areas and approached the concerned authority in the month of July and August, 2010 seeking permission to use the mall areas for commercial/office/hotel purposes as well as for retail outlets. The concerned authority permitted the utilization of the maximum 50% of the total built up area of the building for other compatible use including the retail outlets in the letter dated 6th September, 2011. 5. It is stated that in order to protect their newly constructed building from being trespassed, security guards were appointed by the plaintiff. On 28th March, 2014, the respondent No. 8, Vijaya Bank issued a notice under Rule 8(1) of the Security Interest Rules, 2004 alleging that the security interest in respect of a portion of the said building created in its favour by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 by way of several lease deeds had not be paid. The said notices are challenged by the plaintiff before the Debt Recovery Tribunal which gave rise to registration of SA No. 654 of 2014 and the parties are not in dispute that an interim order has been passed therein. 6. Subsequently, a letter dated 3rd April, 2014 was issued by the plaintiff via electronic mail ascertaining that the entire premises was in physical possession of the security guards appointed by it and therefore the alleged action of granting lease of any portion thereof is illegal and void. 6. Subsequently, a letter dated 3rd April, 2014 was issued by the plaintiff via electronic mail ascertaining that the entire premises was in physical possession of the security guards appointed by it and therefore the alleged action of granting lease of any portion thereof is illegal and void. The plaintiff could able to obtain the certificate copies of the said purported lease deeds wherever it appears that the respondent No. 1 had created the aforesaid purported lease deeds specifying the undivided portions of ground to third floors in favour of the several other respondents except the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 by creating a mortgage. It is sought to contend that the other respondents are the alter ego of the respondent No. 1 and are administered, managed and controlled by the same set of persons or entities. It is, thus, stated that the creation of a mortgage behind the back of the plaintiff is not only fraudulent but contrary to the agreed terms of the aforesaid agreements and the reliefs as indicated above have been claimed in the instant suit. 7. On the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, an application for temporary injunction has been taken out and was pressed for an interim order on 22nd December, 2014. The Court refused to pass an ad-interim order of injunction after observing that the action taken by the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 under the SARFAESI Act is a subject matter before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the restraint order has been passed therein with regard to enforcement of such notices. 8. It was categorically observed in the said order that the declaration in respect of a property admittedly situated outside the jurisdiction of the Court, more particularly, prayer (a) to the plaint, prima facie shows that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant such relief and unless such prayer is abandoned or waived the interim order should not be passed. The Court, however, directed the parties to file their respective affidavits and the matter was to be listed as adjourned motion. 9. On the next date when the matter appeared, the Court noticed that the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 have managed to secure a loan on the strength of the alleged six deeds of lease which are admittedly created in respect of mall areas which was agreed by the parties to remain undivided. 9. On the next date when the matter appeared, the Court noticed that the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 have managed to secure a loan on the strength of the alleged six deeds of lease which are admittedly created in respect of mall areas which was agreed by the parties to remain undivided. An impression was created in the mind of the Court that by such circuitous way the banks, who are dealing with the public money have aided and abetted in lending the money, the realization thereof would be cumbersome and difficult one. 10. The learned advocate representing the Central Bureau of Investigation was requested to remain present before the Court and this Court feels that the matter should be investigated having clear and definite impression that the public moneys are diverted with the aid and assistance of some unscrupulous officials of the bank and therefore some directions should be passed to curve, avoid and check the advancing of loans to such persons. The matter was thereafter listed on several occasions and it was uniformly submitted before the Court that the parties are exploring possibilities of settlement between them and on such pretext and at the behest of the learned advocates representing the parties including the banks the matter was adjourned from time to time. Ultimately, the parties could not arrive at the settlement and proceeded to argue the matter before the Court. 11. The defendant Nos. 1 to 6 are very much vocal on a preliminary point that the instant suit is essentially “a suit for land” and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. It is ardently submitted that even if the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is granted at the time of presentation of plaint, there is no impediment on the part of the defendants/respondents to pray for revocation of such leave and invite the Court to revoke the same after entering appearance. In support of the contention that the defendant has no role to play at the time of granting leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and that there is no fetter in applying a revocation of such leave, the reliance is placed on a judgment of this Court in case of Bimal Singh Kothari & Anr. Vs. Muir Mills Company Ltd. & Ors. reported in 56 CWN 361. 12. Vs. Muir Mills Company Ltd. & Ors. reported in 56 CWN 361. 12. The aforesaid respondents submit that there is a clear distinction between the leave under Clause 12 and Clause 14 of the Letters Patent as in case of former it is granted in absence of the defendant, but, in later case the High Court shall invite the defendant to show cause why such leave should not be granted. Such distinction has been succinctly noticed in case of Kamal Srimal Vs. Padam Chand Sindhar reported in 82 CWN 39. 13. The aforesaid respondent vehemently submit that Clause 12 of the Letter Patent clearly provides that the Court shall not receive, determine or try the suits in which such leave is necessary unless such leave is obtained first. In other words, it is sought to be contended that such leave cannot be granted after the presentation of the plaint as held by the Bombay High Court in case of Noorjahan wdlo Atlaf Ahmed and Ors. Vs. Sadrunnisa wdlo Haji Fatehulla Khan and Ors. reported in 1993 MhLJ 208 wherein the ratio laid down in case of Lakshmi Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs. Bengal National Textile Mills Ltd. and Others reported in AIR 1992 Cal 278 was not accepted. By placing reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in case of Eden Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Eden Realty Ventures Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 2015 Cal 18 . Learned advocate representing the said respondents would contend that if the adjudication of the issues involved in the suit requires the adjudication of right, title and interest in respect of a land or other immovable properties situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, it would be a “suit for land” and therefore the leave under Clause 12 should not have been granted by the Court. 14. The learned advocate has however contended that the similar view has been expressed by the Madras High Court in case of Thamiraparani Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Meta Films Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2006) 1 CTC 270 . 14. The learned advocate has however contended that the similar view has been expressed by the Madras High Court in case of Thamiraparani Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Meta Films Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2006) 1 CTC 270 . It is thus submitted that since a declaration of right, title and interest in respect of the immovable property is sought in prayer (a) of the plaint which is admittedly situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the instant suit is a suit for land and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction and the leave under Clause 12 should not have been granted. In other words, the aforesaid respondents pray for revocation of leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. 15. On the point of power of the Court to direct investigation by Central Investigation Bureau (CBI) it is contended that it can only be granted in rarest of rare cases and the inherent power should not be utilized and used by the Court and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Divine Retreat Center Vs. State of Kerala reported in AIR 2008 SC 1614 and of this Court in case of Sm. Parul Bala Roy Vs Srinibash Chowmal & Ors. Reported in AIR 1952 Cal 364 . So far as the merit of the instant application is concerned it is submitted that having agreed to demarcate the areas in commensurate with the respective shares, there is no impediment on the part of the aforesaid respondents to deal with their allocated portions and therefore the plaintiff cannot succeed in getting the order of injunction as prayed for. 16. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the plaintiff submits that the suit is primarily based on the commission of fraud which invalidates all the action therefore, the suit is maintainable on such ground. It is further submitted that the entire cause of action presented in the plaint is based upon the commission of fraud by the defendants in executing 6 (six) deeds of lease in respect of an undivided common portion without performing its obligations under the agreement and therefore it cannot be treated as a suit for land. It is strenuously submitted that no title is claimed in respect of the immovable property situated beyond the peripheral jurisdiction of this Court and the suit is quite competent under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It is strenuously submitted that no title is claimed in respect of the immovable property situated beyond the peripheral jurisdiction of this Court and the suit is quite competent under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Daulat & Anr. reported in (2011) 7 SCC 698 to support the contention that if the relief claimed does not relate to title or delivery of possession it would not be a suit for land. 17. The learned Advocate for the petitioner vehemently submits that the suit based on fraud having committed or made known within the jurisdiction of this Court does not offend the provision of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. In other words, it is sought to be contended that the fraud is viewed seriously by the Court and if its commission is within the jurisdiction of a particular Court, the suit is maintainable before the said Court. Lastly, it is submitted that a person shall not be allowed to reap the benefit from the act of fraud and the Court must injunct such person and protect the right of a person, who is victim of such fraud. 18. At the very outset, this Court must record that at the time of presentation of plaint, this Court refused to grant leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on 25th September, 2014. However, the leave was granted under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the plaint was admitted subject to the scrutiny by the department. 19. The ad interim order of injunction was also refused by the Court as the petitioner has already initiated a proceeding before the Debt Recovery Tribunal impugning the notices issued under Rule 8(1) of the Security Interest Rules, 2004 wherein an order of restrain had been passed by the said Tribunal with regard to the enforcement of such notices. It was further noticed that a declaration in respect of a property situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court is also prayed for and is dependant upon the cloud being removed and such right being established in trial. 20. It was further noticed that a declaration in respect of a property situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court is also prayed for and is dependant upon the cloud being removed and such right being established in trial. 20. Subsequently, a matter appeared on 1st February, 2016 and it was noticed that the banks who are arraigned as defendants in the suit have accepted the mortgage of the impugned deeds of lease in either reconstructing the loan or granting further loan to the contesting defendants and a notice was issued upon the learned Advocate who normally appears for the Central Bureau of Investigation in this Court. The matter was thereafter taken up from time to time and the parties advanced their arguments as noted above. It is submitted on behalf of the contesting defendants that the Court cannot direct the investigation by CBI in exercise of inherent powers enshrined under Section 151 of the Code. It was further argued that investigation by CBI can only be directed in rarest of rare cases and not otherwise. 21. There cannot be any quarrel to the proposition as stated above. Equally, this Court cannot overlook that the Public Sector Banks are dealing with the public money and it would not be wrong to say in the perspective of the recent reporting in the newspaper that there are large number of defaulters who failed and neglected to repay such loans. The officers responsible are to act vigilantly, cautiously more particularly in case of a mortgage of an immovable property. The mortgage property must be sufficient enough to make up the default by putting on sale in the open market or otherwise. The property which may not fetch value in case of a default should be guarded against and the reason for accepting the same as collateral security or by way of a mortgage can be well imagine. There is no clarity and/or transparency in the instant case and the reason assigned in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by one of such bank does not appear to be plausible. 22. Investigation by CBI should not be directed in routine manner, which is within the exclusive domain of the State. The power of the Court to direct CBI has not been taken away in absolute terms yet the Court should not invoke such power except the circumstances warrants such action. 22. Investigation by CBI should not be directed in routine manner, which is within the exclusive domain of the State. The power of the Court to direct CBI has not been taken away in absolute terms yet the Court should not invoke such power except the circumstances warrants such action. I am not oblivion of the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Divine Retreat Center Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2008) 3 SCC 542 wherein it is held that the inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to the whimp or caprice but to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Yet, this Court feels that the higher officials of the concerned bank must be made aware of the facts which may not in normal course of business be expected to be within his notice, so that an appropriate step or action can be taken. 23. This Court, therefore, directs the respective counsels representing the bank to bring in the notice of the director of the respective banks the facts recorded herein above and it shall be within its wisdom to take appropriate steps or not to take any steps. The aforesaid direction is passed keeping in mind the larger interest of the public, which should not be construed as mandate upon such higher official to act in a particular way. 24. Reverting back to the core issue involved in the instant application, there is no hesitation in my mind that one of the many reliefs claimed in the plaint relates to declaration of right, title and interest in respect of the immovable property situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. the authority cited by both the parties are uniform that if any interest or title to the immovable property either directly or incidentally involved in the suit, when such property is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, it would be treated as a suit for land and the suit must fall under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Admittedly, the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was refused by this Court at the time of presentation of the plaint and the said order is still staring at the face of the plaintiff/petitioner. Admittedly, the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was refused by this Court at the time of presentation of the plaint and the said order is still staring at the face of the plaintiff/petitioner. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that such leave was not necessary as no claim is based on title in the immovable property is laid in the plaint. Taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Adcon (Supra) it is submitted that the suit is maintainable before this Court if there is no claim over the title or the possession of the immovable property. The decision rendered in the above report is required to be considered in the perspective of the facts and issues involved in the instant suit. In the said case a suit for specific performance of an agreement was filed without any relief for recovery of possession envisaged under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act. The Apex Court noticed the said provision which provides that the decree for recovery of possession cannot be passed unless claimed and held that once the party chose not to claim the relief of possession the suit cannot fail and it would not be treated as a suit for land. 25. The case in hand proceeds that a development agreement was entered into by and between the respective parties for construction of an integrated pleading to be used for the purpose of mall and to cater office spaces to the intending buyers. It is further stated that by executing six Deeds of Lease by which the undemarcated portion was demised unto and in favour of the respective lessees therein are outcome of fraud. The plaint further contents the statement relating to action taken by the banks under Rule 8(1) of the Security Interest Rules, 2004 and such action has been challenged before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. It is undeniable that an interim protection is extended to the petitioner by the said Tribunal which is still in force. Precisely, for such reason this Court declined to pass an ad interim order of injunction at the initial stage of the instant suit. 26. It is undeniable that an interim protection is extended to the petitioner by the said Tribunal which is still in force. Precisely, for such reason this Court declined to pass an ad interim order of injunction at the initial stage of the instant suit. 26. It is somewhat settled in law that in order to ascertain whether the suit is for land the statements made in the plaint are required to be looked into. If the Court finds from the meaningful reading of the averments made therein that the reliefs claimed therein though not in express terms relates to the title to the property yet such adjudication has to be gone into, it would partake the characteristics of a suit for land. The petitioner was conscious that the undivided portion has been demised by way of a lease treating the same to be an exclusive portion allotted under the agreement between the parties and such action has been branded as fraudulent and sham. One of the core issues involved herein is whether such portion is an exclusive portion of the defendant nos. 1 to 4 or remained common with the plaintiff and for such purposes the Court should venture to enter into the right, title and interest of the respective parties incident. 27. In Moolji Jaitha & Co. Vs. Khandesh Spinning and Weaving reported in AIR 1950 FC 83 it is held that where the nature of the suit is such that in substance it involves a controversy about land or immovable property and the Court is called upon to decide such conflicting claims, that suit can be said to be in respect of land or immovable property. The support can be usefully lend to the Division Bench decision of this Court in case of Tridandeeswami Bhakti Kusum Sraman Maharaj & Ors. vs. Mayapore Sree Chaitanya Math & Ors. reported in AIR 1983 Cal 420 , where somewhat identical questions were raised when the challenge was made to several deeds which according to the plaintiffs therein were fabricated. The immovable property to which those deeds relate was admittedly situated beyond the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court. In Paragraph 15 thereof it is held:- “15. reported in AIR 1983 Cal 420 , where somewhat identical questions were raised when the challenge was made to several deeds which according to the plaintiffs therein were fabricated. The immovable property to which those deeds relate was admittedly situated beyond the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court. In Paragraph 15 thereof it is held:- “15. In our opinion, the question whether, out of several reliefs in the plaint, the claim for the grant of a particular relief which does not relate to title to, or possession, control or management of land or buildings or other immoveable property, is the primary object of the suit or not, has to be decided by applying the test whether such relief claimed to be the primary object of the suit can be granted to the plaintiffs without the necessity of any adjudication on the question of title to any land or buildings or other immoveable property, or pos session, control or management thereof. If the relief stands the test, the suit will not be a suit for land or other immoveable property within the meaning of Cl. 12 of the Letter Patent, although the grant of such relief may indirectly affect land or other immoveable property. If, however, by applying the test it is found that such relief cannot be granted without deciding the question of title to, or possession, control or management of land or other immoveable property, the claim for the grant of such relief cannot be the primary object of the suit and, in that case, the suit will be a suit for land or other immoveable property within the meaning of Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent.” 28. It is therefore manifest therefrom that if the reliefs which apparently did not relate to title or possession of land or building or other immovable property if can be decided without necessity of any adjudication on the question of title, it would not be a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It is therefore manifest therefrom that if the reliefs which apparently did not relate to title or possession of land or building or other immovable property if can be decided without necessity of any adjudication on the question of title, it would not be a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It would be profitable to notice in the instant case that one of the reliefs claimed in the plaint relates to declaration of title to the immovable property situated beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that one of the primary reliefs claimed in the plaint relates to declaration of title in respect of the land or immovable property and therefore it is a suit for land. 29. In view of the categorical findings relating herein above and having observed that it is a suit for land, the other questions relating to granting the leave under Clause 12 after the institution of the suit becomes academic and need not be decided. Suffice to say, once the leave under Clause 12 was refused by this Court and there being no challenge to the said order, the judicial discipline does not warrant granting the leave at the subsequent stage of the suit. 30. In view of the observations recorded above let the plaint be returned to the Advocate on Record of the plaintiffs to be presented to the proper Court. 31. Both the applications are disposed of.