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2016 DIGILAW 875 (KER)

Firosh v. Palakkad District Cricket Association

2016-10-18

P.B.SURESH KUMAR

body2016
JUDGMENT : The petitioners are members of the first respondent, the Palakkad District Cricket Association (‘the Association’ for short). The Association is a body affiliated to the Kerala Cricket Association. Exhibits P3 to P6 notices, by which the Association has prevented the petitioners from participating in its activities and Exhibits P11 to P14 notices by which the Association has called upon the petitioners to show cause why they shall not be removed from the membership of the Association, are under challenge in this Writ Petition. 2. When the Writ Petition came up for admission, the respondents entered appearance and opposed the admission on the ground that the Writ Petition is not maintainable. The parties were, accordingly, heard on the question of maintainability of the Writ Petition. 3. A writ of certiorari is sought in this matter to quash Exts.P3 to P6 and P11 to P14 notices issued by the Association. The contention of the respondents is that the Association is neither a State nor an instrumentality of a State and that therefore, it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The fact that the Association is neither a State nor an instrumentality of a State is not disputed by the petitioners. But, according to them, the Association is the last word as far as cricket is concerned in Palakkad District and in that sense, it discharges duties akin to public duties like selection of the District Cricket Team etc., and therefore, it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioners rely on the decisions of the Apex Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 ), as also Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar (2015) 3 SCC 251 ), in support of their contention. 4. Paragraph 31 of the decision of the Apex Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd.(supra) in which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, reads thus: “31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some duties like the selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players and others involved in the game of cricket. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some duties like the selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players and others involved in the game of cricket. These activities can be said to be akin to public duties or State functions and if there is any violation of any constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely because it or he is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for the violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much wider than Article 32.” It is seen that later in Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra), the Apex Court held, in the context of the Board of Control for Cricket in India, that bodies discharging public functions by holding monopoly over the game of cricket, but not amounting to State, are amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court had occasion to deal with a similar contention as to the maintainability of the Writ Petition against the Kerala Cricket Association in W.P.(C) No.19455 of 2008. In the said case, it was held that the benefit of paragraph 31 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), can be availed of only if the Association acts in violation of the statutory rights of the citizens. Paragraph 4 of the said judgment reads thus: “4. In my view, the objection taken by the learned counsel for the first respondent deserves to be upheld. The tests highlighted by the Apex Court, in so far as BCCI is concerned, are equally applicable to the first respondent also, which is a society registered under Travancore Cochin Libterary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955. In my view, the objection taken by the learned counsel for the first respondent deserves to be upheld. The tests highlighted by the Apex Court, in so far as BCCI is concerned, are equally applicable to the first respondent also, which is a society registered under Travancore Cochin Libterary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955. In so far as paragraph 31 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, in my view, the same can be applicable only if the first respondent acts in violation of any statutory right of any citizen. In this case, the right what is claimed by the writ petitioner is the right for participation in the meeting convened by the first respondent Association. This is a statutory right, and at best, it is a right available under the bye-laws of the first respondent. Therefore, Writ Petition is not the remedy that is available to the petitioner.” 5. The case of the petitioner in the said case was concerning his right to participate in the meetings of the Association and this Court took the view that the said right being a right contemplated by the bye-laws of the Association, this Court is not the forum for enforcement of the same. A similar view has been taken by this Court in W.P.(C) No.17867 of 2009 as well. 6. Coming to the facts of the present case, as in the case dealt with by this Court in W.P.(C) No.19455 of 2008, what is sought to be enforced by the petitioners is their right to continue as members of the Association. It is trite that the rights of the members of Associations in the nature of the Palakkad District Cricket Association stem from the bye-laws of the Association. In other words, the dispute in the instant case is also one for enforcement of the right of the petitioners under the bye-laws. In a disciplinary action initiated by a private body like the Association against its members, no public duty of any nature is involved. In the said circumstances, I am of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to seek a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned notices issued by the Association. The decisions of the Apex Court relied on by the petitioners have no application to the facts of the present case. In the said circumstances, I am of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to seek a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned notices issued by the Association. The decisions of the Apex Court relied on by the petitioners have no application to the facts of the present case. The Writ Petition, in the circumstances, is not maintainable and the same is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.