ORDER : B.S. Patil, J. In all these writ petitions, common question arises for consideration. Facts leading to these writ petitions are also common. The respondents have taken a common stand by filing statement of objections. Hence, all these cases are clubbed, heard together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. By a Notification dated 04.12.2012 produced at Annexure-A applications were invited for the post of Junior Officer (Mining). Requisite qualification and experience, as stated in the notification, being that he must be a holder of degree in Mining Engineering from a recognised University with minimum of one year experience or three years Diploma in Mining Engineering from a recognised institute with five years experience in the relevant field, with Foreman Certificate of Competency. Pursuant to the notification, all the petitioners applied to the post of Junior Officer in Mining. A written test was conducted. After the petitioners were qualified in the written test held on 23.06.2013, they were called upon to attend the interview. Thereafter, having regard to their performance in the written test and interview, by separate communications issued, they were appointed subject to being medically found fit. 3. Petitioners were on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment. Annexure-D appointment order dated 05.09.2013 makes it clear that during the period of probation their services could be terminated by giving one month's notice in writing or by paying one month's salary in lieu of notice without assigning any reason. 4. On 15.06.2015, by an order produced at Annexure-E in the case of Sri Khajababu Sheik-petitioner in W.P. No. 105480/2015, (similar orders are produced by other petitioners), petitioner was informed that on verification of documents submitted it was found that petitioner failed to submit original year-wise marks-sheets and original experience certificates for different periods. Inviting the attention of the petitioner to Clause 11 of the offer of appointment, it was alleged that he was required to produce original experience certificate and original year-wise marks-sheet which, according to the respondent-National Mineral Development Corporation Limited ('NMDC' for short), petitioner had failed to submit. Inviting the attention of the petitioner to Clause 11 of the offer of appointment, it was alleged that he was required to produce original experience certificate and original year-wise marks-sheet which, according to the respondent-National Mineral Development Corporation Limited ('NMDC' for short), petitioner had failed to submit. It was further alleged that he had committed misconduct as per Rule 5(4) of the NMDC Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1978 (for short the 'NMDC Conduct Rules') for furnishing false information regarding qualification, previous service germane to the employment in terms of Clause 14 of the offer of appointment letter dated 30.09.2013; the Appoint Authority had, therefore decided to terminate the appointment of the petitioner with immediate effect. Thus, petitioners were informed their services were terminated with immediate effect in terms Clause 8 of offer of appointment letter dated 30.09.2013 and a sum equivalent to one month's salary, in lieu of notice period, had been credited to their account. It is this order of termination that is challenged by each one of the petitioners in this batch of writ petitions. 5. Petitioners have filed rejoinder along with additional documents. Respondents have filed statement of objections enclosing several documents. The relevant rules of NMDC are made available by the Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-Corporation Sri K. Raghavacharyulu. 6. Main contention urged by the Learned Counsel for petitioners is that without providing an opportunity of hearing and on the basis of allegations of misconduct, which are factually incorrect, respondent-Corporation terminated services of petitioners after a lapse of nearly 1 year 8 months' of their entry into service. They have contended that they had not suppressed any fact pertaining to their qualification or experience and had indeed made available original certificates for perusal of the authorities and only thereafter they had been appointed being satisfied about the requisite qualification Possessed and experience undergone by them. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has Vehemently contended that order terminating the services of petitioners as been issued strictly in accordance with the terms of the order of appointment. He urges that as per contractual terms of appointment, having found that petitioners had not produced original certificates and had not possessed requisite experience, order of termination was passed. It is his submission that order of termination is a termination simpliciter and not stigmatic or punitive, therefore, there was no requirement of holding any departmental enquiry. 8. He urges that as per contractual terms of appointment, having found that petitioners had not produced original certificates and had not possessed requisite experience, order of termination was passed. It is his submission that order of termination is a termination simpliciter and not stigmatic or punitive, therefore, there was no requirement of holding any departmental enquiry. 8. Learned Counsel for both sides relied on several judgments, which will be referred to in the course of this order. Particular attention of the Court has been drawn by the Learned Counsel for the respondents to the judgment in H.F. Sangati Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka and Others, (2001) 3 SCC 117 (paragraphs 8, 10 and 11) and the judgment in the case of Bishanlal Gupta Vs. The State of Haryana and Others, (1978) 1 SCC 202 , to support the contention that impugned order amounts to discharge simpliciter and has been passed in accordance with the rules framed and the terms of the appointment order. 9. In the light of the above contentions, the only point that arises for consideration is: Whether the impugned orders tantamount to discharge simpliciter of probationers or termination for alleged misconduct resulting in punitive and stigmatic order requiring a detailed enquiry before such termination? 10. It is not in dispute that all the petitioners were on probation. The order of appointment produced at Annexure - D makes it clear that petitioners were on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment which could be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the management. During the period of probation, services of the petitioners could be terminated by giving one month's notice in writing or by paying one month's salary in lieu of notice. 11. An argument, based on Clause 8 of the appointment order, has been advanced by the Learned Counsel for respondents that management had reserved absolute right to terminate the appointment at its discretion after giving three months' notice or on payment of three month's salary in lieu of notice. 11. An argument, based on Clause 8 of the appointment order, has been advanced by the Learned Counsel for respondents that management had reserved absolute right to terminate the appointment at its discretion after giving three months' notice or on payment of three month's salary in lieu of notice. It is also urged, by referring to Clause 11 of the order of appointment, that the candidate was required to produce original certificates such as certificates possessing educational and other technical qualification and experience certificate etc., and as per Clause 14, if any declaration given or information furnished by the candidate was proved to be false or if the candidate was found to have wilfully suppressed any material information, he would be liable to be removed from service and for such other action, as the company might deem fit and/or necessary. By referring 10 these clauses i.e., Clause 8 and 14, respondent-Corporation has Passed this order of termination which is sought to be justified by the beamed Counsel for the respondents stating that order passed is strictly in accordance with the terms of appointment and hence cannot be interfered with. 12. At the outset, it has to be stated that careful perusal of the order of termination produced at Annexure-C discloses that allegations were made against the petitioners of not producing original experience certificate and/or original year-wise marks-sheet. This omission on the part of the petitioners has been characterised as misconduct under Rule 5(4) of the NMDC Conduct Rules because they had furnished false information regarding qualification and previous service at the time of employment and therefore, under Clause 14 of offer of appointment, Appointing Authority claimed that it had decided to terminate their appointment with immediate effect. Clause 14, as already adverted above, makes it clear that in case any declaration given or information furnished by the candidate is 'proved' to be false or if the candidate is 'found' to have wilfully suppressed any material information, he would be liable to be removed from service and for such other action as the company may deem fit. 13. It cannot be said that action under Clause 14 of the order of appointment could be taken without holding any enquiry or without providing any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. 13. It cannot be said that action under Clause 14 of the order of appointment could be taken without holding any enquiry or without providing any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. The requirement to be satisfied for removing an employee by resorting to Clause 14 of the appointment order is that declaration given or information furnished by the candidate has to be 'proved' to be false or must be 'found' to have been wilfully suppressed. In order to prove that any declaration or information furnished was false or in order to find that any information was wilfully suppressed, person against whom the order is proposed to be passed has to be provided an opportunity of being heard. The words 'proved' or 'found' used in Clause 14 amply demonstrate that employer must hold that declaration given or information furnished was proved to be false. The employer cannot hold so unless he records a finding after giving an opportunity to the employee. Therefore, even if impugned action has been taken by the employer in terms of Clause 14 for not furnishing required documents or for suppressing certain material information, employer cannot dispense with opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. 14. Clause 8, which has been invoked in the penultimate paragraph of the order of termination, has no application to the case on hand because the action taken is not as per Clause 8 but it is indeed as per Clause 14. 15. Be that as it may, well-established principle governing discharge of a probationer due to his unsuitability is that whatever be the motive behind such order of discharge if the foundation for passing the order of discharge is not anchored in the misconduct alleged against the probationer, the same cannot be characterised as punitive requiring an enquiry. If the foundation for the order of termination is the allegation of misconduct levelled against the employee, then even if the order of termination is couched in an innocuous language, it will certainly have a stigmatic effect on the character of the employee and will affect his future prospects. Hence, such order of termination cannot be passed without affording an opportunity of being heard and without conducting an enquiry. Indeed, a long line of judgments on this aspect rendered by the Apex Court have consistently declared this position of law. Hence, such order of termination cannot be passed without affording an opportunity of being heard and without conducting an enquiry. Indeed, a long line of judgments on this aspect rendered by the Apex Court have consistently declared this position of law. Useful reference can be made to the judgments in the cases of H.F. Sangati Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka and others (supra), Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India, 1958 SCR 828 and Registrar, High Court of Gujarat and another Vs. C.G. Sharma, (2005) 1 SCC 132 Observations made in paragraphs 43 and 45 of the judgment in the case of Registrar, High Court of Gujarat (supra), on which both sides have placed reliance can be usefully extracted hereunder: "43. But the facts and circumstances in the case on hand is entirely different and the administrative side of the High Court and the Full Court were right in taking the decision to terminate the services of the respondent, rightly so, on the basis of the records placed before them. We are also satisfied, after perusing the Confidential Reports and other relevant Vigilance files etc. that the respondent is not entitled to continue as a Judicial officer. The order of termination is termination simpliciter and not punitive in nature and, therefore, no opportunity needs to be given to the respondent herein. Since the overall performance of the respondent was found to be unsatisfactory by the High Court during the period of probation, it was decided by the High Court that the services of the respondent during the period of probation of the respondent be terminated because of his unsuitability for the post. In this view of the matter, order of termination simpliciter cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution of India. The law on the point is crystalised that the probationer remains probationer unless he has been confirmed on the basis of the work evaluation. Under the relevant Rules under which the respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge, there is no provision for automatic or deemed confirmation and/or deemed appointment on regular establishment or post, and in that view of the matter, the contentions of the respondent that the respondent's services were deemed to have been continued on the expiry of the probation period, are misconceived. 45. This Court in the case of H.F. Sangati Vs. 45. This Court in the case of H.F. Sangati Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka held as under: (SCC p. 121, para 8) "It is well settled by a series of decisions of this court including the Constitution Bench decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India, 1958 SCR 828 and seven Judge Bench decision in Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1974 (2) SCC 831 that services of an appointee to a permanent post on probation can be terminated or dispensed with during or at the end of the period of probation because the appointee does not acquire any right to hold to continue to hold such a post during the period of probation. In Samsher Singh case, it was observed that the period of probation is intended to assess the work of the probationer whether it is satisfactory and whether the appointee is suitable for the post; the competent authority may come to the conclusion that the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other similar grounds not involving moral turpitude. No punishment is involved in such a situation. Recently, in Dipti Parkash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose, National Centre for Basic Sciences having reviewed the entire available case law on the issue, this Court has held that termination of a probationer's services, if motivated by certain allegations tantamounting to misconduct but not forming foundation of a simple order of termination cannot be termed punitive and hence, would be valid. In Satya Narayan Athya Vs. High Court of M.P., 1996 (1) SCC 560 , the petitioner appointed on probation as a Civil Judge and not confirmed was discharged from service in view of the non satisfactory nature of his service. This Court held that the High Court was justified in discharging the petitioner from service during the period of probation and it was not necessary that there should have been a charge and an inquiry on his conduct since the petitioner was only on probation and it was open to the High Court to consider whether he was suitable for confirmation or should be discharged from service."" 16. The stand of the respondents is that a CBI enquiry was held into the allegation of fraud played at the level of some Officers of the Corporation in the matter of recruitment and that a charge-sheet has been filed based on the report submitted by the CBI. Therefore, it clearly emerges from the discussion made above that specific allegation of grave misconduct of not furnishing the required certificates showing their qualification/experience and active suppression of the same has been the foundation for terminating the services of petitioner by resorting to Clause 14 of the appointment order. As per Rule 5(4) of the NMDC Conduct Rules referred to supra, furnishing false information regarding qualifications, previous certificates etc. has been termed as 'misconduct'. For such misconduct, penalties that could be imposed has been stated in Rule 23 which include minor and major Penalty. It is true, explanation to Rule 23 which pertains to penalties, in Clause (vi)(a) states that termination of service of an employee appointed on probation during or at the end of the period of probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of the Rule. But, as held above, this is not a termination simplictor of a probationer by finding him unsuitable or for any other reason which does not cast stigma on his character. This is a case of termination based on the satisfaction of the employer that it was found and proved that petitioners had suppressed certain materials and had not produced the required documents while obtaining employment. Therefore, this cannot be a case of discharge simplictor. Hence, as held by the Apex Court in the judgments referred above, such action cannot be taken without holding an enquiry. Impugned orders, therefore, deserve to be set-aside and are accordingly set-aside. Writ petitions are allowed. Petitioners are directed to be reinstated into service with back wages and other consequential benefits. Liberty is reserved to respondent-Corporation to conduct necessary enquiry and take appropriate action in accordance with law. Writ Petitions are allowed.