ORDER : H.P. SINGH, J. 1. This is an application filed under Section 378(3) & 378(1) of Cr.P.C., seeking leave to present an appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 18.05.2015, passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Tikamgarh, District Tikamgarh (MP), in Special S.T. No. 15/2014, acquitting the accused/respondents for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(1) of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "IPC" for short) and Section 3/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as 'POCSO' Act for short). The case of prosecution is that on 5.7.2014, at about 2:00 PM, when prosecutrix, aged about 15 years, had gone to answer the call of nature, accused/respondent No. 1 came there, covered her mouth with a cloth, kidnapped and taken her on a motorcycle and committed rape upon her. On 6.7.2014, father of prosecutrix (PW/4) reported the matter about her missing to Police Station Mohangarh. On 12.7.2014, prosecutrix was recovered from the residence of Pawan at Village Bhakora, a son of 'Bua' of prosecutrix. Her statements were taken and Crime No. 111/2014 was registered by the police Mohangarh vide Ex. P/21 for offences punishable under Sections 366, 376(1) of IPC and Section 3/4 of POCSO Act, against accused/respondent No. 1, whereas, offence punishable under Sections 363, 366/368 of IPC has been registered against the accused/respondent No. 2. 2. Further, case of the prosecution is that on 13.7.2014, prosecutrix (PW/4) was medically examined as per Ex. P/3 by Dr. Megha Khare (PW/3) after obtaining her consent and consent of her mother, and it was found by doctor Khare that hymen of prosecutrix was ruptured and there was no bleeding or redness found on the private part of prosecutrix. Two vaginal slides were prepared and sealed samples were handed over to lady Constable. There was no definite opinion given by this witness about rape. After arrest on 9.7.2014, the accused was also medically examined by Dr. D.S. Chourasiya (PW/2) and according to him, accused/respondent was capable of performing sexual intercourse. After investigation, the accused/respondents were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences. 3. On the basis of the charge-sheet, trial Court framed charges against the accused/respondents for aforesaid offences. Accused/respondents abjured the guilt. 4. The trial Court after considering the plea of the accused/respondents, disbelieved the testimony of various prosecution witnesses and acquitted the accused/respondents. 5. Learned Govt. After investigation, the accused/respondents were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences. 3. On the basis of the charge-sheet, trial Court framed charges against the accused/respondents for aforesaid offences. Accused/respondents abjured the guilt. 4. The trial Court after considering the plea of the accused/respondents, disbelieved the testimony of various prosecution witnesses and acquitted the accused/respondents. 5. Learned Govt. Advocate for State submitted that impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is wholly erroneous in law as well as on facts. Learned trial Court committed error in holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the allegations without proper appreciation of the material available on record in its true perspective. 6. Now the question that arises for consideration before this Court is, whether the evaluation of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from illegality, manifest error or perversity? 7. It is settled law that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence-There is no limitation, restriction or condition for the exercise of such powers and the appellate Court may draw its own conclusion on all questions of fact and law. However, the reversal of acquittal can be made only if the conclusions recorded by the trial Court did not reflect a possible view, that is to say a view which can reasonably be arrived at. In the case of acquittal, the judgment of the trial Court may be interfered with only where there is absolute assurance of guilt of the accused/respondents on the basis of evidence on record and not merely because the High Court can take another possible or a different view. 8. In this regard, first question which is required to be considered, is whether the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of incident? 9. On the basis of the medical opinion given by Dr. Megha Khare (PW/2) and on the basis of entry in her mark sheet in the Govt. Primary School Kanchanpura, Mohangarh, District Tikamgarh, learned trial Court inferred that it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of the incident, the prosecutrix had not completed the age of 18 years. Perusal of mark sheet of the prosecutrix, reflects that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 15.12.1999. Primary School Kanchanpura, Mohangarh, District Tikamgarh, learned trial Court inferred that it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of the incident, the prosecutrix had not completed the age of 18 years. Perusal of mark sheet of the prosecutrix, reflects that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 15.12.1999. Accordingly, on the date of incident on 6.7.2014, the age of the prosecutrix was 15 years, 5 months & 9 days. So far as the date of birth recorded as 15.12.1999, in the mark sheet is concerned, the Headmaster of school, namely, Mukesh Meena (PW/15) has stated that he had issued age certificate on the basis of entry made in the admission register of the school and he does not know that who had made that entry in the said admission register. He further stated that there is no such entry in the school register to show that who had made the same. He further stated that he cannot say that the date of birth written in the register is right or wrong. Mother of prosecutrix has stated that admission of the prosecutrix had been done by father of the prosecutrix Dharmdas, who had stated that the admission of the prosecutrix was done by his elder brother Sudama Prasad. It is pertinent to note here that said Sudama Prasad was not examined by the prosecution. In this way, the date of birth recorded in the school register, in the absence of definite and cogent evidence is of not much evidentiary value. So far as evidence of ossification test is concerned, Dr. Megha Khare (PW/2) has stated that on the basis of examination of X-ray, she has concluded that the age of prosecutrix at the time of examination of prosecutrix was about 17-19 years. In these circumstances, learned trial Court has committed no error in refusing to place reliance upon the mark-sheet and learned trial Court concluded rightly, that the age of the prosecutrix could not be held to be less than 18 years on the date of the incident. 10. The main witness of the prosecution prosecutrix (PW/4), has stated that on receiving information from one Kallu that Ravi had called her, she went to the house of Kallu where accused/respondent No. 1 was already present. There he offered her water for drink. 10. The main witness of the prosecution prosecutrix (PW/4), has stated that on receiving information from one Kallu that Ravi had called her, she went to the house of Kallu where accused/respondent No. 1 was already present. There he offered her water for drink. Thereafter, she felt drowsiness and due to call of nature, she went to case herself towards hilly area, where accused/respondent No. 1 and one other accused came. The accused/respondent No. 1 had taken the prosecutrix in the residence of his mother-accused/respondent No. 2 at Mauranipur, where he had committed rape upon her and left her. Thereafter, accused/respondent No. 2, carried prosecutrix to her relatives for about eight days. She kept prosecutrix in a rented house near railway station Mauranipur. 11. From the statement of the prosecutrix (PW/4), it is clear that accused/respondent No. 2 had permitted prosecutrix and accused/respondent No. 1 to live in her house even after knowing that she had been kidnapped and she will be compelled to illicit intercourse. That apart, from her evidence it is clear that she was taken to different places by the accused/respondents and she went along with them without any protest. Moreover, she met number of persons, but did not tell or narrate to anyone about the kidnapping or rape. Had she been forcibly kidnapped by the respondents, there were numerous occasions on which she could have had easily raised an alarm and invite intervention of others. However, she singularly failed to do so, which, as per the trial Court leads to the inescapable conclusion that she was a consenting party and had accompanied the respondent No. 1 on her own free will and accord. As stated above, prosecution has failed to prove that at the time of the incident, the prosecutrix was less than 18 years of age and thus, the charges levelled against the accused/respondent No. 1 for offences punishable under Sections under Sections 366, 376(1) of IPC and Sections 3/4 of POCSO Act and against accused/respondent No. 2 for offence punishable under Sections 363, 366/368 of IPC, have not been proved and rightly held so by the trial Court. 12. In the aforesaid circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, trial Court has considered the entire material evidence on record against respondents in its entirety and on a proper appreciation of evidence and after assigning detailed and cogent reasons, has acquitted the respondents. 12. In the aforesaid circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, trial Court has considered the entire material evidence on record against respondents in its entirety and on a proper appreciation of evidence and after assigning detailed and cogent reasons, has acquitted the respondents. Unless the judgment of acquittal is palpably wrong and grossly unreasonable, interference in a case against acquittal is not called for in view of the law settled by the Supreme Court in the catena of decisions. Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that if the evaluation of the evidence by the trial Court does not suffer from illegality, manifest error or perversity and the main grounds on which it has based its order is reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal even if another view is possible. Therefore, no interference by this Court with impugned judgment is warranted, in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the matters Bhagwati and others v. State of U.P. [1976 SCC (Cr.) 338), Chandrappa & others v. State of Karnataka [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 ], Ashok Rai v. State of U.P. and others (:2014 AIR SCW 3406) and Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(2006) 4 SCC 357]. 13. The application for leave to appeal against acquittal of the accused/respondents has no merit and substance and accordingly is hereby dismissed in limine at the stage of admission itself. Let record of the trial Court be sent back with a copy of this order without delay.