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2016 DIGILAW 888 (CAL)

Belal @ Radheshyam Mondal v. State of West Bengal

2016-11-18

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, SANKAR ACHARYYA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Sankar Acharyya, J. 1. On 20.03.2009 learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, 6th Court, Malda delivered the judgment of conviction of the accused-appellant (hereinafter called as impugned judgment) of an offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (in short I.P.C.) and of acquittal of another accused Durgesh Mondal of the charge under Section 376 (2) (g) of the I.P.C. in Sessions Trial No. 01/09. In that judgment the convict-appellant was sentenced on 21.03.2009 to suffer imprisonment of ten years for the offence under Section 376 of the I.P.C. and to pay compensation of Rs.10,000/- in default to suffer imprisonment for one year. Said judgment of conviction and sentence is under challenge in this appeal. We have been apprised by the learned counsel for the parties that no appeal has been preferred against acquittal of Durgesh Mondal and the appellant is in judicial custody. 2. In the trial Court charge was framed against both the accused (appellant and Durgesh Mondal) as on or about the 29th day of May, 2007 at Krishnapur Shyamtola on a jute field behind Anchal office both of them committed gang rape upon the victim girl (named) at about 8 p.m. and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 376 (2) (g) of the Indian Penal Code. In the charge form it was not recorded whether the accused persons pleaded guilty or not guilty to the said charge. However, the trial commenced on 20.01.2009 as if there was plea of not guilty taken by both the accused persons. 3. The case was initiated at Baishnabnagar Police station registering a first information report (in short FIR) on 29.05.2007 at 1:05 p.m. under Section 376 (2) (g) of the I.P.C. Father of the victim girl lodged the FIR informing that his 15 years old daughter was returning home from the house of his next door neighbour Raj Kumar Mondal S/o Chittaranjan Mondal after ‘Bidi’ binding on 28.05.2007 at about 8:00 p.m. when both the accused gagged her mouth by cloth and took her to the jute field of Arup Mondal behind panchayat office. Then the accused appellant committed rape on her while the another accused was guarding. Anyhow the victim girl fled away and returning home narrated the whole incident. 4. According to recorded FIR (Exhibit-1/2) the police station (P.S.) is about 10 km. Then the accused appellant committed rape on her while the another accused was guarding. Anyhow the victim girl fled away and returning home narrated the whole incident. 4. According to recorded FIR (Exhibit-1/2) the police station (P.S.) is about 10 km. away from the place of occurrence in short P.O. and the occurrence of 8:00 p.m. of 28.05.2007 was reported on 29.05.2007 at 01:05 p.m. when Baishnabnagar P.S. Case No. 59/07 under Section 376 (2) (g) of the I.P.C. against the appellant and Durgesh Mondal as accused was registered and sub-inspector Gopal Pandey was entrusted with the investigation of the case. Said investigating police officer was examined and cross-examined as PW 17 during trial. As per his examination-in-chief, during investigation, he visited the P.O., drew rough sketch map (Exhibit-9), examined available witnesses and recorded their statements under Section 161, Cr.P.C. arrested the appellant accused, arranged for recording statement of the victim girl under Section 164, Cr.P.C. (Exhibit-3), seized one undergarment of victim girl with stain of semen under a seizure list (Exhibit-2/1), got the victim girl and the appellant medically examined and collected reports (Exhibits 5 and 4 respectively), collected semen of accused appellant under a seizure list (Exhibit-8/2), collected vaginal swab of the victim girl under a seizure list (Exhibit-7/3), sent the seized articles to Forensic Science Laboratory (in short FSL) for examination and collected report (Exhibit-10) during investigation. After completion of investigation the PW 17 submitted charge sheet against two accused. 5. Date of occurrence was mentioned as 29.05.2007 instead of 28.05.2007 at the time of framing charge against the accused persons which date was palpably erroneous. At the time of hearing this appeal learned advocate for the appellant argued that since the said date 29.05.2007 is contrary to the date of alleged occurrence as claimed by witnesses of prosecution during trial the trial was vitiated in view of the provision under Section 212, Cr.P.C. On the other hand, learned advocate for the State argued that due to such error in mentioning the date of occurrence as 29.05.2007 instead of 28.05.2007 at the time of framing charge cannot vitiate the trial specially when the accused persons contested against the case of prosecution about the occurrence which took place on 28.05.2007. He submitted that under Section 464, Cr.P.C. mere mistake of the learned Judge in the trial Court cannot be a ground to invalidate the trial. 6. He submitted that under Section 464, Cr.P.C. mere mistake of the learned Judge in the trial Court cannot be a ground to invalidate the trial. 6. In the matter of defect in framing charge learned counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Main Pal vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 130 and a decision of Calcutta High Court in Mamfru Chowdhury and Others vs. King Emperor, reported in AIR 1924 Cal 323. Having gone through the cited decisions and the facts and circumstances of the case under this appeal we are of the view that the instant case is dissimilar to the cited decisions and therefore, the principles of law discussed in the cited decisions do not fortify the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant. On close scrutiny on the materials brought by prosecution during trial we find that the appellant was never misled about the facts alleged and the substance of the offence charged against him in the trial Court due to the error of the learned Judge in mentioning the date of occurrence at the time of framing charge. Therefore, following the guiding principles of law laid down in Section 215 of the Cr.P.C. we are of the opinion that the error in mentioning date in the charge has not occasioned a failure of justice. Consequently, we accept the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the state and we hold that the trial was not vitiated by the error took place in mentioning the date by mistake in the charge in view of the provisions under Section 464 of the Cr.P.C. 7. In the trial Court, the appellant claimed himself innocent and also took ‘alibi’ that at the time of alleged incident he was in Bombay. He did not adduce any evidence to establish his alibi. Witnesses of prosecution were cross-examined on behalf of appellant so that prosecution would not get success in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. It seems to us that in trial the appellant appeared to fight with his shield to resist the attack of prosecution for proving the charge against appellant and with sword of ‘alibi’ to use for counter-attack to prosecution if necessary to prove himself as innocent. But in the fight he used his shield only and did not use his sword. It seems to us that in trial the appellant appeared to fight with his shield to resist the attack of prosecution for proving the charge against appellant and with sword of ‘alibi’ to use for counter-attack to prosecution if necessary to prove himself as innocent. But in the fight he used his shield only and did not use his sword. In our opinion, in a criminal trial prosecution case cannot be treated as proved for not proving ‘alibi’ of accused. It is the settled principle that in order to bring home a charge of penal offence against accused the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubts on the strength of its own and not on any lacunae of the accused. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that specific case of the prosecution made out in FIR by PW 1 that the victim girl was returning from the house of Rajkumar Mondal S/o Chittaranjan Mondal just before the alleged occurrence but during trial prosecution deviated from such plea and withheld said vital witness Rajkumar Mondal during trial without any explanation for which adverse inference ought to have been drawn against prosecution under Section 114 (illustration–g) of the Evidence Act in the impugned judgment. In support of his arguments he relied upon a composite decision of the Supreme Court in two appeals of Iswar Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and of Ilam Singh and Others vs. State of U.P. reported in (1976) 4 SCC 359. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State argued that the I.O. was examined as PW 17 and during his cross-examination on behalf of the appellant he was not ask for any explanation of non-examination of said Rajkumar Mondal and so there cannot be any adverse inference under Section 114 (illustration–g) as argued on behalf of the appellant. For the sake of convenience of discussion we like to discuss this matter in latter part of this judgment. 9. Since there is no appeal against acquittal of appellant’s co-accused Durgesh Mondal we are not taking that aspect of the impugned judgment under our consideration in this judgment. Relating to the proof of charge of committing rape of the victim girl the learned Judge of the trial Court considered the victim girl (PW 4) as the best witness. 9. Since there is no appeal against acquittal of appellant’s co-accused Durgesh Mondal we are not taking that aspect of the impugned judgment under our consideration in this judgment. Relating to the proof of charge of committing rape of the victim girl the learned Judge of the trial Court considered the victim girl (PW 4) as the best witness. In the impugned judgment the trial Court mostly found the appellant guilty of committing rape on the victim girl relying on the principles that a girl victim of rape is not accomplice and court should not seek corroboration rather if it is found that the victim girl is worth of credence, conviction can be recorded only relying upon the oral testimony of the victim. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that in the impugned judgment serious miscarriage of justice has been occasioned due to placing reliance on the sole, solitary, uncorroborated and unreliable oral testimony of PW 4 and ignoring the evidence on record contrary to her testimony. He further submitted that expecting corroboration to PW 4 the prosecution examined PW 2 and PW 3 but they did not corroborate and they were also not declared hostile by prosecution. Learned counsel for the State submitted that in the impugned judgment the appellant was rightly found guilty relying upon the evidence of the victim girl (PW 4). He advanced his arguments that in a case of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code if the evidence of the victim girl inspires confidence of the Court then further corroboration are not required for. According to him, in the present case the victim girl during her examination gave a vivid description of the offence and she was cross-examined at length but nothing could be elicited from her evidence which goes against prosecution case. He submitted that it is evident from the prosecution case that just after the occurrence within a reasonable time the victim was produced before the learned Magistrate (PW 7) who recorded her statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. 11. We do not differ with the principle that in appropriate case with charge under Section 376, I.P.C. conviction of accused may be recorded on the basis of evidence of victim only provided her evidence is worthy of credence and if there is no reason to suspect her truthfulness. We do not differ with the principle that in appropriate case with charge under Section 376, I.P.C. conviction of accused may be recorded on the basis of evidence of victim only provided her evidence is worthy of credence and if there is no reason to suspect her truthfulness. Our further opinion is that in such a case the standard of proof should be of such extent that corroboration is absolutely unnecessary and any evidence contradicting her on material point is absent on record. In that view of the matter let us consider as to whether the evidence of PW 4 is capable of inspiring confidence in the mind of the Court. 12. At first, we like to record the substantive part of translated version (from Bengali language) of PW 4 about the description of the occurrence given by her before learned Magistrate on 31.05.2007 (vide Exhibit-3/1) as follows:- “Day before yesterday in the night at 8:00 hours I was returning to our own house from the house of Raju of our village after binding Bidi. Then two boys whose names are Belal Mondal and Durgesh Mondal pressed my mouth with napkin and lifting me took to the jute field behind Anchal office. Going there Belal repaed me, Durgesh was guarding. After committing rape on me by Belal both of them went away therefrom. I rose and came to house. Then I narrated everything to ‘Didi’ (In deposition clarified as grandmother) on her interrogation.” 13. In her deposition PW 4 stated that she was binding ‘bidi’ in the house of Mousumi. The PW 2 Mousumi Sarkar stated that she manufactures ‘bidi’ but PW 4 does not work under her and she knows nothing. This PW 2 was not declared hostile by prosecution. PW 4 deposed as if Mousumi and Raju came to the house of PW 4 in the fateful night and PW 4 narrated the incidents to them. Such statement might have been corroborated but there is no corroboration by Mousumi or any witness named Raju. It is also not clear who is this Raju. 14. Although PW 4 stated in Exhibit-3/1 that the appellant and Durgesh lifted her and took her to jute field and in examination-in-chief she stated that Belal and Durgesh took her forcefully behind Anchal office gagging her mouth with napkin from the road but during her cross-examination she stated “Belal gagged me with napkin. 14. Although PW 4 stated in Exhibit-3/1 that the appellant and Durgesh lifted her and took her to jute field and in examination-in-chief she stated that Belal and Durgesh took her forcefully behind Anchal office gagging her mouth with napkin from the road but during her cross-examination she stated “Belal gagged me with napkin. Thereafter Belal took me behind the panchayat office. Durgesh was with Belal but he did not touch me.” Referring to her said statements learned counsel for the appellant submitted it as an improbable story because as per total version of PW 4 her hands and legs were free but there is no statement of PW 4 that she tried to resist the appellant with her hands and legs. He also submitted that it is a cock and bull story of PW 4 that she was taken away from a public road forcibly by appellant alone. According to him, only such testimony of PW 4 and her description of the incident of sexual intercourse by appellant as stated in her deposition cannot be said as capable of inspiring confidence in the mind of Court to find the appellant guilty of committing rape on PW 4 specially when the medical evidence and forensic report do not support her. In support of his arguments learned counsel for the appellant cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 92 . 15. In paragraph- 9 of the (2006) 10 SCC 92 (supra) it was held: “It is true that in a rape case the accused could be convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is capable of inspiring confidence in the mind of the Court. If the version given by the prosecutrix is unsupported by any medical evidence or the whole surrounding circumstances highly improbable and belie the case set up by prosecutrix, the court shall not act on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix. The courts shall be extremely careful in accepting the sole testimony of the prosecutrix when the entire case is improbable and unlikely to happen.” 16. In this case under appeal after the date (28.05.2007) of alleged occurrence the victim girl (PW 4) was medically examined by PW 9 Dr. Rudrendu chatterjee on 30.05.2007. The courts shall be extremely careful in accepting the sole testimony of the prosecutrix when the entire case is improbable and unlikely to happen.” 16. In this case under appeal after the date (28.05.2007) of alleged occurrence the victim girl (PW 4) was medically examined by PW 9 Dr. Rudrendu chatterjee on 30.05.2007. He stated, that during examination he did not find matching of pubic hair with semen or like substance and he did not find any vulval injury or vaginal injury and found the vagina admits two fingers and hymen ruptured. He also did not find any foreign body inside vagina. During cross-examination he stated that in case of forcible intercourse if there is any resistance injury is a must on the genital organ and when two fingers are admitted inside the vagina it can be said that the girl experienced sexual intercourse. Exhibit-5 corroborates the examination-in-chief of PW 9. As per Exhibit-5 the PW 9 examined PW 4 at 2:00 p.m. on 30.05.2007. Said medical evidence does not suggest any forcible sexual intercourse on PW 4 before 42 hours of her medical examination although at that time she had experience of sexual intercourse. In the impugned judgment it has been held: “It is correct that PW 9 opined that in case of forcible intercourse if there is any resistance, injury on the genital organ is bound to take place, but mere cessation of genuine resistance does not signify consent even mere submission does not amount to consent as there is no whisper regarding voluntary participating on the part of the victim girl.” 17. In this matter we cannot agree with the said finding of learned trial Court because the basic principle which is to be followed ordinarily in a criminal trial that entire burden of proving a fact beyond reasonable doubt is with the prosecution and there is no burden of proving/disproving any fact/plea barring ‘alibi’ or special defence is with the accused. Accused may establish his defence by preponderance of probability. 18. In the instant case there is no allegation against the appellant that he obtained consent of PW 4 against her will exercising fraud or undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion or duress etc. on her. Accused may establish his defence by preponderance of probability. 18. In the instant case there is no allegation against the appellant that he obtained consent of PW 4 against her will exercising fraud or undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion or duress etc. on her. There is no whisper that PW 4 was frightened by appellant using any word or showing any weapon for which she could not utilize her free hands and legs to resist him or to make her mouth free from gagging with napkin at the time of lifting her from public road and taking her to place of occurrence and also at the time of committing sexual intercourse on her by the appellant only. It is also not the case of PW 4 that she was so puzzled that her four limbs could not act for resistance. Such circumstance creates a doubt against the allegation of appellant’s committing sexual intercourse on PW 4 without her consent. In the eye of law, in order to bring home a charge of rape against the accused, it is the burden of prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the requirements of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code are present against the accused. Section 375 of the I.P.C. reads as:- “375. Rape – A man is said to commit ‘rape’ who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following description: First – Against her will. Secondly – Without her consent. Thirdly – With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly – With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly – With her consent, when at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly – With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Sixthly – With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation – Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception – Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.” 19. In the impugned judgment, learned Judge believed that the appellant committed sexual intercourse with PW 4 and observed that there was no whispering regarding voluntary participation on the part of the victim girl. With such finding the appellant was found guilty of committing rape. The medical evidence does not approve any forcible sexual intercourse on PW 4 or sign of any recent sexual intercourse on PW 4 on examination after about forty two hours of alleged incident. PW 17 seized panty (undergarment) of PW 4 alleging with stains of semen under a seizure list (Exhibit-2/1) claiming that at the time of incident PW 4 was wearing it. FSL report (Exhibit-10) speaks that no semen could be detected on the panty. Such evidence also does not approve any sexual intercourse on PW 4 as alleged. In the impugned judgment said evidence was not properly appreciated before believing sexual intercourse on PW 4 which is a mistake on the part of learned Judge of trial Court. 20. The victim girl described the incident in her deposition. If her version is believed it may be said that only the appellant gagged her mouth with napkin on the road between the houses of PW 2 and of PW 4 intervened by 4/5 houses and took PW 4 to the place of occurrence which is a jute field behind Panchayat office. Appellant laid down PW 4 there and sitting there appellant removed his pant using one hand and holding PW 4 by another hand he forcibly put off the panty of PW 4. Then he ravished PW 4 penetrating his penis into her genital organ forcibly. She felt pain but did not bleed. Then appellant removed the napkin from the mouth of PW 4 after committing rape and left the place. PW 4 returned her home crying and narrated the incident to her parents and grandmother. Then he ravished PW 4 penetrating his penis into her genital organ forcibly. She felt pain but did not bleed. Then appellant removed the napkin from the mouth of PW 4 after committing rape and left the place. PW 4 returned her home crying and narrated the incident to her parents and grandmother. The story as appears in her oral testimony about committing sexual intercourse by appellant forcibly sitting on the ground with jute plants when PW 4 was lying on jute plants and her hands and legs were free appears to us improbable. It is improbable that the appellant laid PW 4 on jute field and PW 4 remained lying calmly without trying to remove the napkin from her mouth or to resist the appellant who committed the wrong sitting there as described by PW 4. 21. It is significant to note that according to PW 1, the vehicles ply and pedestrians walk through the road beside panchayat office and the jute field (alleged place of occurrence till 10:00 – 10:30 p.m. wherefrom PW 4 was lifted and taken by appellant to the jute field gagging her mouth by napkin at 8:00 p.m. as alleged. As per deposition of the I.O. (PW 17) height of the jute plants in the place of alleged incident of rape was about one foot only. In FIR in an unambiguous statement PW 1 complained that PW 4 was taken away from road on her way of returning home from the house of Rajkumar Mondal son of Chittaranjan Mondal who is next door neighbour of PW 1. Surprisingly, no such Rajkumar Mondal was cited or examined as a witness by prosecution. Location of any house of Rajkumar Mondal son of Chittaranjan Mondal has also been shown in the sketch map (exhibit- 9) prepared by PW 17 during investigation. There is no explanation on the part of prosecution about non-examination of said FIR named Rajkumar Mondal son of Chittaranjan Mondal as a witness. At the time of recording statement of PW 4 by PW 7 under Section 164, Cr.P.C. the PW 4 stated that she was coming home from the house of their co-villager Raju after binding ‘bidi’. There is no explanation on the part of prosecution about non-examination of said FIR named Rajkumar Mondal son of Chittaranjan Mondal as a witness. At the time of recording statement of PW 4 by PW 7 under Section 164, Cr.P.C. the PW 4 stated that she was coming home from the house of their co-villager Raju after binding ‘bidi’. In her deposition as PW 4 she stated that she was preparing ‘bidi’ in the house of Mousumi and she was told by Mousumi at about 8:00 p.m. for returning home and she was returning home through road. She also stated that she narrated the incidents to Mousumi and Raju. One Mousumi Sarkar wife of Amaresh Sarkar (PW 3) was examined as PW 2 by prosecution but she did not corroborate the PW 4. She was also not declared hostile by prosecution. PW 3 Amaresh Sarkar son of late Achinta Kumar Sarkar is the husband of PW 2. He also did not say that PW 4 narrated any incident to him. He was also not declared hostile by prosecution. We are not unmindful that PW 1 in his deposition described the PW 3 as Rajkumar Sarkar @ Amaresh Sarkar, husband of Mousumi Sarkar (PW 2) and tried to establish that PW 4 was returning from house of PW 2 and PW 3. By no stretch of imagination we can consider that the PW 3 Amaresh Sarkar alias Rajkumar sarkar son of Late Achinta Kumar Sarkar was mistakenly described in written information (Exhibit-1/1) as Rajkumar Mondal son of Chittaranjan Mondal or that PW 3 and FIR named Rajkumar are names of same and identical person. Therefore, we accept the arguments on behalf of the appellant that prosecution deliberately withheld the FIR named witness Rajkumar Mondal who might have given evidence to unfold the truth and accepting that argument adverse inference is drawn by us under Section 114 (illustration–g) of the Evidence Act. We do not think it necessary to discuss about flaws of investigation which were pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant. In the case reported in (1976) 4 SCC 355 (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “Of course, non-examination of some witnesses would not matter if the witnesses examined unfolded the prosecution case fully. But it is well established that witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based must be examined.” 22. In the case reported in (1976) 4 SCC 355 (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “Of course, non-examination of some witnesses would not matter if the witnesses examined unfolded the prosecution case fully. But it is well established that witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based must be examined.” 22. Like that reported case in the instant case under appeal we are of the view that non-examination of FIR named witnesses Rajkumar Mondal S/o Chittaranjan Mondal acquires a special significance in view of the material discrepancy between the FIR and the version of PW 1 and PW 4 specially when PW 2 and PW 3 do not admit the version of PW 1 and PW 4. Be it noted that said PW 1 and PW 4 deviated from the earlier version of PW 1 recorded in written information (FIR) and version of PW 4 recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bibhishan vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2007) 12 SCC 390 . It was held in that cited judgment: “We have gone through the judgment of both the courts below and also perused the necessary record. As per evidence of doctor, there was no injury on the body of the prosecutrix Anita. There was no sign of semen on the private part of the body. Neither her clothes were torn nor there was presence of hair of the accused on the private part of the prosecutrix. The doctor after examining the prosecutrix deposed that the girl was habituated to sexual intercourse. In view of this evidence, we are of the opinion that the High Court as well as the Trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence and has wrongly convicted the accused appellant. The accused who has been charged under section 376 read with Section 511 IPC is entitled to benefit of doubt.” 24. Following the aforesaid principle and the principle laid down in Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe vs. State of Maharashtra and Another (supra) we are satisfied to hold and therefore, we hold that it is a fit case for extending the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused appellant. 25. Following the aforesaid principle and the principle laid down in Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe vs. State of Maharashtra and Another (supra) we are satisfied to hold and therefore, we hold that it is a fit case for extending the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused appellant. 25. As a result, the appellant Belal Mondal is found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376, I.P.C. for which he was convicted and sentenced in the impugned judgment and also of the charge under Section 376 (2) (g) of the I.P.C. which was framed against him in the trial Court. 26. In consequence, this appeal is allowed. Accused-appellant Belal Mondal is set at liberty. Let him be released from custody forthwith if his further detention is not required in any other case. 27. A copy of this judgment alongwith LCR be sent to the trial Court promptly for information and necessary action. I agree – Aniruddha Bose and Sankar Acharyya, JJ.