JUDGMENT : R.P. Dholaria, J. 1. This is an appeal of acquittal preferred by the State of Gujarat under Section 378 (3) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 10.8.1993, recorded by the City Session Judge, Ahmedabad City, in Sessions Case No. 61 of 1993. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that accused No. 1 Manoj had married one Minaben and has two sons out of the said marriage. Accused No. 1 with his wife Minaben and children was staying in the Chawl known as Ram Chawl in Khokhra Mehmedabad area, Amraiwadi, Ahmedabad. Accused No. 1 used to ply hired auto rickshaw. Since last about three years Manoj developed illicit intimacy with Savitaben, wife of Parbatsinh Thakore staying nearby. Accused No. 2-Baluben-mother of Manoj used to call Savitaben to her house and arrange her meeting with Manoj and quarrel used to take place on this issue between Minaben and Manoj and Baluben. Because of this, Manoj used to physically beat Minaben. Baluben used to say that his son Manoj would keep any number of ladies. How is she concerned? Balurben used to instigate Manoj against Minaben. On 6.10.1992, Manoj did not come to the house for supper and Minaben was waiting for him. As Manoj did not come upto 10.00 p.m. and as he was in illicit intimacy with Savitaben wife of Parbatsingh Thakore and used to remain at her house, Minaben went to the house of Savitaben and found Manoj taking dinner in the house of Savitaben and Mawas told to come to their house for supper whereupon Manoj got excited and started abusing Minabean and was given a push. Minaben returned to her house at about 10.30 p.m. She was followed by her husband Manoj and he started beating Minaben saying as to why she had come to house of Savitaben to call him. At that time, Baluben also came to their house and instigated Manoj to beat Minaben. Thereafter she left for her house at about 10.45 p.m. Due to permanent harassment of her husband and mother-in-law and the mental and physical cruelty inflicted on her by them she poured kerosene on her body and set fire with match-stick to her clothes. Thereafter her husband and other people from neighborhood tried to extinguish fire by putting quilt on her. Thereafter her husband and other people from neighborhood tried to extinguish fire by putting quilt on her. One Jagdishbhai Ishvarbhai Patel brought her to L.G. Hospital for treatment of burn injuries sustained by her in the incident. On 16.10.1992 at about 7:00 a.m., Minaben succumbed to the injuries received by her in the incident of 6.10.1992. 3. In pursuance of the aforesaid complaint, the Police recorded statement of complainant and other witnesses and after completion of investigation, filed chargesheet which came to be committed to the learned Sessions Judge and learned Additional Sessions Judge after conclusion of trial and hearing, acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against them. Therefore, the present appeal. 4. Heard Mr. Darshan P Dave, learned advocate for the respondent-accused and Mr. Rutvinj Oza, learned APP for the State. 5. At the out set, it is required to be noted that during pendency of this appeal, respondent No. 2-Baluben died. Consequently therefore, appeal against respondent No. 2 is abated vide order dated 8.12.2015 by this Court. In that view of the matter, the appeal is heard against the sole respondent-Manoj. 6. Mr. Rutviz Oza, learned APP has argued that though the dying declaration at Exh:17 is on record, the trial Court has failed to appreciate its evidentiary value in its proper perspective and has wrongly recorded the order of acquittal which requires to be reversed as such. He has further argued that prior to recording, the aforesaid dying declaration, Yadi was sent to the Executive Magistrate wherein endorsement containing that the patient is in conscious, is made. In that view of the matter, when her dying declaration recorded, she was in a fit condition. He has further argued that there are some other corroborative evidence available relying upon the same, which has been overlooked as such by the learned trial Court. 7. Whereas, Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent has argued that the judgment rendered by the learned trial Court is very elaborate and detailed discussion has been made in it. Mr. Dave has also submitted that her parents as well as other relatives have not supported the case of the prosecution. 7. Whereas, Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent has argued that the judgment rendered by the learned trial Court is very elaborate and detailed discussion has been made in it. Mr. Dave has also submitted that her parents as well as other relatives have not supported the case of the prosecution. In view thereof, the case was rested upon solitary evidence of dying declaration and in that view of the matter, upon appreciation of evidentiary value, the learned trial court has rightly not placed reliance upon the said dying declaration and has rightly acquitted the accused as such, which calls for no interference by this Court. 8. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 8.1 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 8.2 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 8.3 Even in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under; "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 8.4 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. State of MP reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 8.5 In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors, (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in paras-10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 8.6 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookkiah and Anr. v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 9. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 9. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981, SC 1417, wherein it is held as under: "...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 : AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 9.1 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Shivasharanappa and others v. State of Karnataka, JT 2013 (7) SC 66. Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the judgment and order of learned trial Court as well as paper book, there appears no dispute that the deceased set herself on fire after pouring kerosene and got burn injuries on 6.10.1992 and due to which ultimately, she succumbed to her injuries on 16.10.1992 i.e. after ten days. There is no dispute that the deceased has committed suicide therefore, death of deceased is indisputably proved to be suicide. The prosecution has put up the case before the learned trial Court that as the accused subjected her to cruelty due to which she poured kerosene over herself and set fire by alighting match stick and due to which she sustained injuries and ultimately succumbed to her injuries. Precisely, as the respondent No. 1 was having affair with another lady, namely, Savitaben due to which both the respondents subjected her to cruelty and on the date of incident i.e. on 6.10.1992, respondent Manoj did not come to the house for dinner. Precisely, as the respondent No. 1 was having affair with another lady, namely, Savitaben due to which both the respondents subjected her to cruelty and on the date of incident i.e. on 6.10.1992, respondent Manoj did not come to the house for dinner. The deceased waited for him till 10.00 p.m. and ultimately, the deceased went to the house of Savitaben and found Manoj in the house of Savitaben and told him to come to their house due to which Manoj got angry and started abusing the deceased due to which she felt insulted and thereafter, she poured kerosene and alighted herself. 11. In order to prove the guilt against the present respondents, the prosecution has examined ten witnesses. PW-1 Anandiben-mother of Minaben has been examined at Exh:8, who has deposed that Minaben got married with the respondent No. 1 for about seven years before the incident. She was declared hostile and thereafter she has admitted in her cross-examination that the deceased-Minaben was not in a position to speak due to unconsciousness. PW-4-Shantaben Jivrambhai Prajapati has been examined vide Exh:18. She is neighbour of deceased and has deposed that the deceased as well as respondents were happily residing nearby her house. She has not supported the case. PW-5 and PW-6 Pareshbhai Narandas Prajapati and Jashvantsinh Pratapsinh are also neighbour of the deceased and they have also deposed on the similar line. In view of aforesaid nature of evidence neither the neighbours nor the parents of the deceased-Minaben has supported the case of the prosecution. Consequently therefore, the case of prosecution rested solely upon the dying declaration which came to be recorded by the learned Executive Magistrate at Exh:17. 12. On going through the contents of the dying declaration at Exh:17, it is noted that the dying declaration of the deceased-Minaben was recorded by Shri P.N. Limbachiya, Executive Magistrate on 7.10.1992 at about 2:45 a.m. and it was completed at 3:10 a.m. In the aforesaid dying declaration, she narrated that the particulars of incident that as her husband was having illicit intimacy with one Savitaben, due to which she was subjected to cruelty and therefore, she poured kerosene over herself and alighted by match stick. 13. In order to prove the aforesaid dying declaration at Exh:17, Executive Magistrate, Shri P.N. Limbachiya has been examined as PW-3. 13. In order to prove the aforesaid dying declaration at Exh:17, Executive Magistrate, Shri P.N. Limbachiya has been examined as PW-3. He has deposed that on 7.10.1992 during nocturnal hours at about 2:00 a.m., he received Yadi for recording the dying declaration and he visited L.G. Hospital for recording dying declaration. Thereafter, he put up some preliminary questions and recorded the dying declaration and then he obtained signature upon the paper. In cross-examination, he has admitted that in the dying declaration at Exh:17, he has not made any note as regards the mental and physical condition of the deceased. He has also admitted that he has not taken any endorsement as regards the fitness from the concerned doctor. 14. The prosecution has also examined the doctor-Sandip Attavar as PW-8. He has deposed that on 6.10.1992 and 7.10.1992, he was on duty as second resident doctor in L.G. Hospital, Ahmedabad, when the injured-Minaben was admitted to the hospital on 6.10.1992 during the nocturnal hours. He examined her and found there was burn injuries to the extent to 94% and he has also deposed that he has made endorsement over the yadi prepared by the Police Sub-inspector to the Executive Magistrate for recording dying declaration that the patient is conscious at around 2:00 a.m. on 7.10.1992. He has admitted that she was admitted at around 12:30 a.m. and she was administered sedative drugs through intravenous as her hands were burned and therefore, bandage was put on her fingers, thumb up to her wrist. He has also admitted that due to aforesaid medicine, she may be semi-conscious and she may be feeling grave pain and she may not be in a position to record her statement. He has also admitted that in the Yadi, it has been indicated that the patient was in conscious at around 2:00 a.m. but he has not certified her mental and physical condition. He has further admitted that he has never certified her mental and physical condition in between 2:45 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. on 7.10.1992 during which, the dying declaration came to be recorded by the Executive Magistrate. He has further admitted that the sedative drugs administered remains effective for about six hours and it was administered at 12.30 a.m. 15. He has further admitted that he has never certified her mental and physical condition in between 2:45 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. on 7.10.1992 during which, the dying declaration came to be recorded by the Executive Magistrate. He has further admitted that the sedative drugs administered remains effective for about six hours and it was administered at 12.30 a.m. 15. The prosecution has also examined the medical case papers which shows that the deceased has suffered 94% burn injuries and the deceased is in a condition of shock. At certain intervals, her general condition is described as poor. In view of the aforesaid evidence on record, it is clearly emerging out that while recording dying declaration at Exh:17, neither the Investigating Officer nor the Executive Magistrate has taken due care and caution to consider general physical condition of the deceased. The physical and mental condition is also required to be certified by the concerned treating doctor. The evidence on record clearly indicates that while recording dying declaration at Exh:17, no fitness certificate was obtained from the doctor. Even the endorsement that the patient is conscious recorded in the Yadi also appears to be the position as at about 2:00 a.m. However, as she was administered sedative drugs, which remains effective for about six hours as per the deposition of concerned doctor, under effect of sedative drugs, the aforesaid dying declaration was recorded. At that time, her mental and physical conditions were not ascertained by the writer of dying declaration. In that view of the matter, the learned trial Court has rightly not put reliance over the aforesaid dying declaration at Exh:17, which is in accordance with the settled position of law and calls for no interference by this Court. 16. On overall appreciation of the evidence on record, the findings recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is in accordance with law which calls for no interference by this Court. In view of the above, the present appeal being devoid of any merits deserve dismissal and accordingly stands dismissed and the impugned judgment and order is confirmed. Bail bond stand cancelled. No order as to costs. The Registry is directed to return the R & P, if any, forthwith to the lower Court.