JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Michael Zothankhuma, J. 1. Heard Mr. F. Lalengliana, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. B. Lalramenga, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The appellant by way of the second appeal has challenged the legality of the order dated 29.05.2015 passed by the Court of the Additional District Judge-I, Aizawl in RFA No. 24/2014 arising out of HC No. 54/1994. 3. The appellant's counsel submits that land covered by LSC No. 562/1977 was originally owned by one Mrs. Vanlalchhuangi. Mrs. Vanlalchhuangi had three daughters and two sons, who are as follows: (1) Lalrinngheti born on 1975 (2) Lalfakawmi (respondent) born on 1976 (3) Lalnuntluangi born on 1979 (4) Lalrindika born on 1981(died within a year) and (5) Lalzarliana (appellant) born on 1984. 4. The appellant's counsel submits that Mrs. Vanlalchhuangi died on 18.7.1982. Thereafter, an application was made by Lalrinngheti for issuance of Heirship Certificate in favour of the appellant in the Court of the Subordinate District Council Court, Aizawl in respect of the LSC No. 562/1977. The Magistrate 1st Class Subordinate District Council Court, Aizawl issued Heirship Certificate No. 54/1994 dated 14.2.1994 as follows: "Subordinate District Council Court: Aizawl Heirship Certificate No. 54 of 1994 Whereas Vanlalchhuangi, Sub-Inspector of Police died on 18th July, 1992 her son Lalzarliana 10 yrs is hereby declared as legal heir of the deceased Vanlalchhuangi in respect of LSC No. 562 of 1977 only. And whereas Lalzarliana is a minor his sister Lalrinngheti is also appointed as legal guardian of the minor heir Lalzarliana. Sd/- K.L. Liana, Magistrate 1st Class, Sub-District Council Court, Aizawl. Memo No. SDCC/HC-54/94/308 Dated Aizawl, the 14th Feb, 1994." 5. The appellant's counsel submits that the respondent, who is the married sister of the appellant thereafter filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional District Judge-I on 3.9.2014 challenging the Heirship Certificate No. 54/1994 issued in favour of the appellant. The appeal was registered as RFA No. 24/2014. The main challenge made in RFA No. 24/2014 against Heirship Certificate No. 54/1994 (HC No. 54/1994 in short) was that the respondent had not been given reasonable opportunity of being heard before issuance of the Heirship Certificate. 6. The Court of the Additional District Judge-I, Aizawl thereafter passed order dated 29.5.2015 in RFA No. 24/2014, wherein it upheld HC No. 54/1994. 6. The Court of the Additional District Judge-I, Aizawl thereafter passed order dated 29.5.2015 in RFA No. 24/2014, wherein it upheld HC No. 54/1994. However, it also distributed a portion of the property covered by the LSC No. 562/1977. The property was distributed not only to the respondent but also to the appellant's sister Lalnuntluangi who was not a party to the proceedings in RFA No. 24/2014. 7. The appellant being aggrieved with the order dated 29.5.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge-I, Aizawl in RFA No. 24/2014 has preferred this regular second appeal for setting aside the impugned order dated 29.5.2015. 8. The appellant's counsel submits that the impugned order dated 29.5.2015 is liable to be set aside on the ground that the appeal was decided by the First Appellate Court without the respondent filing any condonation of delay application along with the RFA No. 24/2014. The appellant's counsel submits that the respondent having filed RFA No. 24/2014 beyond the limitation period of 30 days, the same was liable to be dismissed on the ground of Limitation. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant also submits that as per Mizo Customary Law, inheritance of property can devolve only through the male line and no woman can inherit property while there is a son to inherit a property. 10. The appellant's counsel also submits that the learned First Appellate Court erred in distributing the property covered by LSC No. 562/1977 to the respondent and to his sister Lalnuntluangi who was not a party to the RFA No. 24/2014, while at the same time upholding the Heirship Certificate No. 54/1994 issued by the Sub-District Council Court, Aizawl. 11. The appellant's counsel thus submits that due to the reasons stated above, the impugned order dated 29.5.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge-I, Aizawl in RFA No. 24/2014 should be set aside. 12. Mr. B. Lalramenga, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the issuance of HC. No. 54/1994 became known to the respondent only in July, 2014 and as such, the respondent after utilising some time for obtaining necessary documents filed RFA No. 24/2014. The respondent counsel submits that though the respondent did not file a separate condonation of delay application while filing RFA No. 24/2014, the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal has been mentioned in the RFA No. 24/2014. 13. The respondent counsel submits that though the respondent did not file a separate condonation of delay application while filing RFA No. 24/2014, the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal has been mentioned in the RFA No. 24/2014. 13. The respondent counsel also submits that no separate application for condonation of delay is required as held by the Apex Court in the case of Davinder Pal Sehgal and Another v.Partap Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd and Others reported in (2002) 3 SCC 156 . 14. The respondent counsel submits that Mizo Customary Law is silent on distribution of a woman's property and that property in the name of a woman could also be inherited by a woman. 15. The respondent counsel has also submitted that RFA No. 24/2014 was not dismissed. It was only disposed of. He submits that the impugned order dated 29.5.2015 passed in RFA No. 24/2014 only gives life-estate to the respondent and to Lalnuntluangi to stay in the said house covered by LSC No. 562/1977. He submits that the title to the property has not been given to the respondent and Lalnuntluangi and that the title still remains with the appellant as per the impugned order dated 29.5.2015. 16. At this stage, the appellant's counsel submits that though the impugned order dated 29.5.2015 upholds HC No. 54/1994, the observation of the First Appellate Court in the impugned order is to the effect that the respondent and Lalnuntluangi could approach a competent Court for obtaining Heirship Certificate for the distributed portions of the property. The appellant's counsel thus submits that this observation amounts to giving title to a portion of property covered by LSC No. 562/1977 to the respondent and Lalnuntluangi. 17. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the LCRs. 18. This Court had formulated the following substantial questions of law, which are as follows: (i) Whether the law of limitation is applicable to the present case, (ii) Whether the property covered by LSC No. 562 of 1977 could have been distributed to the appellant sisters in view of the fact that the Mizo Customary Law requires inheritance to devolve only through the male lineage, (iii) Whether the Suit property can be distributed to the appellant sisters while dismissing the RFA No 24 of 2014 and up holding the heirship certificate given to the appellant in 1994. (iv) Whether relief can be granted to a person, Lalnuntluangi who was not a party to the proceedings. The first question that has to be decided is whether the RFA No. 24/2014 was filed within the limitation period and whether the First Appellate Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It is no doubt true that limitation will start running from the date the aggrieved person comes to know about the adverse effects on his rights on the basis of an order of the court or authority. In the present case, RFA No. 24/2014 was filed on 03.09.2014. The respondent in his appeal petition has stated that he came to know of HC No. 54/1994 in July, 2014. Assuming that the respondent came to know of HC No. 54/1994 on 31.04.2014, the respondent was to have filed the RFA No. 24/2014 on or before 30.08.2014, as the limitation period for filing an appeal against the HC No. 54/2014 was 30 days. However, there has been a delay of 33 days in filing RFA No. 24/2014. 19. A perusal of the appeal petition filed by the respondent in RFA No. 24/2014 shows that the respondent has not made any averment in his appeal petition to the effect that there was any delay in filing the appeal. It is also an admitted fact that there was no separate application for condonation of delay filed by the respondent in filing RFA No. 24/2014. In the case of Devinder Pal Sehgal and Another (Supra), it has been held at paragraph 7 as follows: "7. We have perused the restoration application as well as petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the same. It appears that in the application for restoration, all relevant facts have been stated not only to show that the plaintiffs had sufficient cause for non- appearance on 24-8-1988 but also to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application. This is the reason why in the petition for condonation of delay, it has been simply stated that facts stated in the restoration application may be taken into consideration for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application. This is the reason why in the petition for condonation of delay, it has been simply stated that facts stated in the restoration application may be taken into consideration for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application. Therefore, merely because in the order of the trial court, specifically, there is no reference to petition for condonation of delay, it cannot be said that it did not consider the same." 20. The above case is not applicable to the case of the respondent in filing RFA No. 24/2014, inasmuch as, no reason has been given or averment made by the respondent to the fact that there was a delay in filing the first appeal. Consequently, there is no order of the First Appellate Court in condoning the delay in filing the RFA No. 24 of 2014. Accordingly, I hold that the RFA No. 24/2014 could not have been decided by the First Appellate Court in the absence of condonation of delay of 33 days in filing the first appeal. Besides the above, the respondent's mother had expired on 18.07.1992. The respondent could have filed the application for Heirship any time after 18.07.1992 if the respondent had any claim/right to the property. However, for reasons best known to the respondent, the respondent has not claimed LSC No. 562/1977 till filing of RFA No. 24/2014 in the year 2014. It may also be noted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J. Thansiama v. State of Mizoram in Civil Appeal No. 3536/2008 has held vide its judgment dated 8.9.2015 that the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable in the State of Mizoram. 21. The next question that has to be decided is whether the property covered by LSC No. 562/1977 could have been distributed to the respondent and Lalnuntluangi in view of the fact that the Mizo Customary Law requires inheritance to devolve only through the male lineage. In the case of Ralliani & Others v. Kaithuami & Others reported in 2008 (Suppl) GLT 820, this Court has held at paragraph 15 as follows: "15. The law of inheritance thus explicitly excludes woman if the deceased is survived by son. In the present case there is no dispute that Thanhnuna was the only surviving son when his father P.S. Dahrawka died on 5.3.1978. The inheritance or title to the properties of a person does not stand or hang on his death. The law of inheritance thus explicitly excludes woman if the deceased is survived by son. In the present case there is no dispute that Thanhnuna was the only surviving son when his father P.S. Dahrawka died on 5.3.1978. The inheritance or title to the properties of a person does not stand or hang on his death. It starts to flow automatically with the death and rests on the person who is the legal heir in accordance with the law applicable. It does not depend on issue of any heir-ship certificate. Such a certificate is issued only to formally recognize, modify and update the records of rights in the changed situation after the death of the owner of a property." 22. The further question is as to whether the customary law is silent in distribution of a woman's property. The customary law cannot be said to be silent upon the distribution of woman's property as the Mizo customary law of inheritance would also apply to inheritance in respect of landed properties being held by a woman. It would also exclude a woman if the deceased mother (property owner) is survived by a son . It is only in the absence of a male lineage that the rights of a woman to inherit a woman's property come into play. In the present case, the appellant being the only surviving son of Vanlalchhuangi and being the youngest son, there was no wrong committed in the issuance of HC No. 54/1994 in respect of the properties covered by LSC No. 562/1977 in favour of the appellant. 23. The other issue that has to be decided is whether the learned First Appellate Court could have passed an order which was contradictory. The impugned Order dated 29.05.2015, while upholding the HC No. 54/1994 has distributed a portion of the properties covered by LSC No. 562/1977 to the respondent and Lalnuntluangi, who was not a party to the proceedings. A perusal of the impugned Order 29.05.2015 shows that the impugned Order dated 29.05.2015 is self-defeating. The learned First Appellate Court cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. The further fact is that the respondent is a married woman. As per the Mizo Customary Law, a married woman enters into the family of her husband. A perusal of the impugned Order 29.05.2015 shows that the impugned Order dated 29.05.2015 is self-defeating. The learned First Appellate Court cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. The further fact is that the respondent is a married woman. As per the Mizo Customary Law, a married woman enters into the family of her husband. In that view of the matter, the respondent could not have given a portion of the ancestral property to the appellant's sisters. In the present case, the appellant is the youngest surviving male son of Vanlalchhuangi. No right of inheritance accrues to a married woman in the presence of a brother unless it is by way of a Will. The question of granting a portion of the properties covered by LSC No. 562/1977 to Lalnuntluangi by the impugned Order dated 29.05.2015 does not arise for the simple reason that Lalnuntluangi was not a party to the proceedings in RFA No. 24/2014. No right to inherit the property accrues to her as per the Mizo Customary Law and no claim has been made by her or on her behalf for the said property. The First Appellate Court has also not given any basis under any law for which the respondent and Lalnuntluangi could be given a portion of the property covered by LSC No. 562/1977. 24. In view of the reasons stated above, I uphold HC. No. 54/1994 and direct that all the properties covered by LSC No. 562/1977 shall be the property of the appellant. No right of title or interest can devolve upon the respondent or Lalnuntluangi. Consequently, the impugned order dated 29.5.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge-I, Aizawl in RFA No. 24/2014 is upheld to the extent where it upholds the HC.No. 54/1994. The other directions and observations given in the impugned order dated 29.5.2015 in RFA No. 24/2014 are hereby set aside. 25. The above being stated, the appellant should also consider whether he would like to give a place of residence to the respondent and Lalnuntluangi till the time they are owners of their own houses. This is completely left to the discretion of the appellant as the respondent and Lalnuntluangi are his sisters. 26. 25. The above being stated, the appellant should also consider whether he would like to give a place of residence to the respondent and Lalnuntluangi till the time they are owners of their own houses. This is completely left to the discretion of the appellant as the respondent and Lalnuntluangi are his sisters. 26. It is also to be noted that the Judgment and order passed today does not take into account the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 as the subject matter in issue pertains to the Mizo Customary Law only. 27. Send back the LCR.