JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. In this petition, the petitioner workman has challenged order dated 23.9.2010 passed by the learned Industrial Court, Ahmedabad in Appeal (IC) No. 1 of 2008 whereby the learned Industrial Court (learned first Appellate Court) partly allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 24.5.2001 passed by the learned Labour Court in T Application No. 444 of 1988. The learned Labour Court had, vide its order dated 24.5.2001, directed present respondent No. 3 to pay 100% backwages to the workman and the learned Industrial Court, while partly allowing the appeal, modified the said judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 and directed the respondent No. 3 to pay 50% backwages from the date of termination i.e. from 16.9.1988 to 6.2.1997. 2. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record and rival submissions that the workman raised industrial dispute against alleged termination of his service w.e.f. 16.9.1988. The workman filed T Application under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The said application was registered as T Application No. 444 of 1988. 2.1 The claimant workman filed his statement of claim in the said T Application No. 444 of 1988 and alleged, inter alia, that he was working with the company i.e. New Swadeshi Mills since last 9 years and that he was paid salary @ Rs. 15 per day and that he was required to perform duties as extra worker and any other benefit except salary @ Rs. 15 per day was not granted. He also alleged that at the time when his service was illegally terminated, he was posted in mechanical department. According to the claimant's allegation, his service was terminated on and from 16.9.1988 without any fault on his part and without following any procedure prescribed by law. He also alleged that after his termination, he had served notice under Section 42(4) of the BIR Act which was received by the company on 22.9.1988, however, neither any reply was given nor he was reinstated and that therefore, he initiated the proceedings. 2.2 In response to the notice issued by the learned Labour Court, the company filed reply and opposed the maintainability of the application on diverse grounds. It was contended that the application was filed after prescribed period of limitation and therefore, it was not maintainable. 2.2 In response to the notice issued by the learned Labour Court, the company filed reply and opposed the maintainability of the application on diverse grounds. It was contended that the application was filed after prescribed period of limitation and therefore, it was not maintainable. It was also claimed that the claimant workman was an employee of the company and he was never appointed by the company as its regular workman. It appears from the record that the company (i.e. New Swadeshi Mills) where the claimant was originally appointed, according to his allegation, was closed down and thereafter it was taken over under the Gujarat Close Textile Undertaking (Nationalization) Act, 1986 by the State Textile Corporation. It also appears that according to the claimant's allegation, the State Textile Corporation had, thereafter, reinstated the workmen who were working with the company prior to illegal closure and that the claimant was also reinstated. From the reply filed by the company, the said details do not come out but the said details have emerged from the evidence of the workman who had, at the relevant time, placed on record the pay receipt issued by the State Textile Corporation. So far as the reply filed in the proceedings before the learned Labour Court is concerned, the company, through its reply denied the allegations by the claimant and also denied the claim that the employee was entitled to be reinstated and/or he was entitled for any consequential benefits. 2.3 After the stage of pleadings was concluded, the deposition of the workman was recorded at Exh. 6. In his deposition, the workman claimed that he was made to work in different departments and his presence was marked on separate sheet. He also alleged that his salary was paid under a printed receipt and during the period from 1.1.1987 to 31.1.1988, his presence was marked as extra worker. 2.4 During his deposition the workman claimed that under the instruction from his superior he had entered in the water tank for certain repairing work and without any prior intimation suddenly flow of liquid starch started and consequently his both feet and part of his body upto his waste received serious burn injuries. He also claimed that one Mr. Mohanlal (a Feeder) and one Mr. Ishwarbhai (a Helper) pulled him out of the tank and he was taken to Dr. Indravadan. He also claimed that one Mr. Mohanlal (a Feeder) and one Mr. Ishwarbhai (a Helper) pulled him out of the tank and he was taken to Dr. Indravadan. He also alleged that he was told by his superior officer that if he would refrain from initiating litigation then he would be paid medical expenses and he would also be made permanent in the service. However, subsequently the company resiled from the promise and on the ground that his feet were injured and he would not be able to perform his duty, he was not allowed to resume his duty. He also urged that for about 8 months the company did not allow him to resume work on one ground or other and even the compensation for injury was not paid and on 16.9.1988 he was orally informed that his service was not required and he should not report for duty. He claimed that on 19.9.1988 he served notice demanding reinstatement which was received by the company on 22.9.1988 however, the company neither replied the notice nor allowed him to resume his duty. 2.5 The company presented one Mr. P.K. Panchal, Senior Asst. Engineer as its witness. His examination in chief was recorded however said witness did not remain present at the time of cross examination hence, the said evidence was discarded. It appears that during the proceedings before learned Labour Court the advocate for the company filed purshis and raised objection that the company was managed and run by the corporation however in view of the order passed by the High Court in Company Petition No. 205 of 1998 the corporation was ordered to be wound up vide order dated 6.2.1997 passed in said Company Petition No. 205 of 1998. 2.6 In view of the said purshis filed by the advocate representing the company/corporation, notice to the official liquidator was issued and the official liquidator appeared in the proceedings through learned advocate Mr. Soni. 2.7 After the stage of evidence was closed, learned Labour Court heard the submissions by learned advocates and after considering the material on record learned Labour Court passed order dated 24.5.2001 and directed that the opponent i.e. corporation should pay backwages to the claimant/workman. Soni. 2.7 After the stage of evidence was closed, learned Labour Court heard the submissions by learned advocates and after considering the material on record learned Labour Court passed order dated 24.5.2001 and directed that the opponent i.e. corporation should pay backwages to the claimant/workman. In the judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 learned Labour Court observed that since winding up order is passed any direction with regard to the claim for reinstatement is now not required to be and cannot be passed. 2.8 Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 the company/corporation filed appeal which was registered as Appeal (IC) No. 1 of 2008. 3. The appeal was opposed by the workman. It was contended that the appeal was filed after expiry of period of limitation and therefore it cannot be entertained. It was also contended that the appellant has paid undisputed amount payable as per the order of the Court and that therefore the question of setting aside the order passed by learned Labour Court does not survive. It was also claimed that there was no error in the judgment of the learned Labour Court. 3.1 Learned appellate Court considered rival submissions and also considered the facts and circumstances of the case as well as evidence on record and by judgment and order dated 23.9.2010 learned Industrial Court partly allowed the appeal. Learned Industrial Court reached to the conclusion that the termination of the service of the claimant from 16.9.1998 is illegal, unreasonable and cannot be sustained. 3.2 Learned Industrial Court, consequently set aside the termination order. Learned Industrial Court also accepted the fact that the company/corporation is ordered to be wound up vide order dated 6.2.1997. Learned Industrial Court accordingly directed the corporation/liquidator to pay 50% backwages for the period from 16.9.1988 to 6.2.1997 i.e. from the date of termination until the date of order of winding up. The workman felt aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by learned Industrial Court reducing the quantum of backwages upto 50% and therefore filed present petitions. 4. Mr. Vasavada, learned advocate for the workman contended that the G.I.D.C. who was appointed as liquidator agent for the purpose of winding up process was not party before learned Labour Court and therefore it could not have filed appeal before Industrial Court against judgment of the learned Labour Court. 4. Mr. Vasavada, learned advocate for the workman contended that the G.I.D.C. who was appointed as liquidator agent for the purpose of winding up process was not party before learned Labour Court and therefore it could not have filed appeal before Industrial Court against judgment of the learned Labour Court. 4.1 So far as the said contention is concerned, it is necessary to mention at the outset, that Mr. Vasavada, learned advocate for the workman after making submissions to certain extent, in respect of the said contention submitted that the petitioner does not press the said contention/objection against the appeal which came to be decided by learned Appellate Court vide judgment and order dated 23.9.2010 (which is impugned in present petitions) and the said contention/objection against the appeal is dropped and not pressed. 4.2 In view of the said submission, stipulation and statement by learned advocate for the petitioner, it is not necessary to deal with the said contention/objection and/or to deliberate and record detailed reasons and conclusions with regard to the said contention. Suffice it to say that since the said contention is dropped, it does not survive. 4.3 Learned advocate for the workman raised only one contention/objection against the impugned judgment and order passed by learned Industrial Court inasmuch as he contended that the learned Industrial Court accepted all reasons and conclusions by learned Labour Court and that therefore in absence of any strong reason or justification, learned Appellate Court could not have reduced the quantum of backwages originally awarded by learned Labour Court only on the ground that the corporation was ordered to be wound up. He submitted that it is the only ground on which learned appellate Court reduced quantum of backwages to 50% and therefore said direction is unjustified, unauthorized and arbitrary. 5. Per contra Mr. Nagarkar, learned advocate for the respondent No. 3 submitted that the petitioner worked only as casual workman. He submitted that the petitioner was not even badli worker and that therefore he had no right to appointment or he had no right to continue in the employment and he had also no right to claim reinstatement and/or backwages. Per contra Mr. Nagarkar, learned advocate for the respondent No. 3 submitted that the petitioner worked only as casual workman. He submitted that the petitioner was not even badli worker and that therefore he had no right to appointment or he had no right to continue in the employment and he had also no right to claim reinstatement and/or backwages. He submitted that despite the fact that claimant was not an employee appointed and employed by erstwhile company or even corporation, the corporation has already paid the amount to the claimant according to the judgment by learned Industrial Court and the workman - respondent has accepted and that therefore there is no justification to challenge the judgment and order passed by learned Industrial Court after having accepting the amount payable as per the judgment. 6. I have considered the submissions by learned advocate for the workman and the learned advocate for the corporation. I have also considered the material available on record and the judgment and orders passed by the learned Labour Court as well as learned Industrial Court. 6.1 At the outset it is relevant and necessary to mention that in its judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 learned Labour Court, unfortunately did not record specific and express conclusion with regard to the alleged termination. The judgment and order does not speak and does not declare that the claimant's service was terminated by the opponent employer and/or termination was illegal and/or that the workman was entitled for any benefits. 6.2 In the judgment dated 24.5.2001 in paragraph No. 3 learned Labour Court has recorded the details from the written statement, in paragraph No. 4 learned Labour Court has taken note of the application for production of documents submitted by the applicant, in paragraph No. 5 learned Labour Court has taken note of the documents placed on record by the applicant, in paragraph No. 6 learned Labour Court has recorded that the applicant got his oral evidence/deposition recorded at exh. 11, in paragraph No. 7 of the judgment the learned Labour Court has recorded that the company examined one Mr. 11, in paragraph No. 7 of the judgment the learned Labour Court has recorded that the company examined one Mr. P.K. Panchal as its witness however, since the witness did not remain present for cross examination his deposition came to be cancelled and dropped out of the record, in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment learned Labour Court has recorded the details about purshis submitted by the learned advocate for the opponent/employer whereby the fact about winding up order was placed on record, in paragraph No. 9 learned Labour Court has recorded the facts about notice to the official liquidator and appearance of the official liquidator, in paragraph No. 10 of the judgment learned Labour Court has taken note of the fact that the applicant tendered written arguments whereas the learned advocate for the opponent made oral submissions and in paragraph No. 11 of the judgment the learned Labour Court has taken note of the gist of the evidence of the applicant and in subsequent paragraph which is also numbered as paragraph No. 11, learned Labour Court has taken note of the fact that the applicant claimed that he made attempts to secure another job but he did not get any other employment and then without discussion or without appreciation of evidence or without recording any conclusion and findings of fact, learned Labour Court passed final orders/directions. 6.3 Thus, any finding of fact and/or conclusions are not recorded in the judgment. Without recording any conclusion learned Labour Court passed order directing the opponent No. 2 i.e. official liquidator to pay backwages to the claimant workman. In this context learned Labour Court did not clarify the period for which the backwages were to be paid. In absence of any findings that the service of the claimant was terminated by the opponent and in absence of the findings that the termination of the claimant's service was illegal and that the claimant was entitled for reinstatement and backwages the judgment and order is, as such, defective. In absence of any findings that the service of the claimant was terminated by the opponent and in absence of the findings that the termination of the claimant's service was illegal and that the claimant was entitled for reinstatement and backwages the judgment and order is, as such, defective. 6.4 It is also necessary to mention that but for the observations and conclusions recorded by the learned Industrial Court in the operative part of the judgment and order dated 23.9.2010 declaring the action of discontinuing the claimant as illegal, the direction passed by the learned Labour Court would have been rendered defective and unsustainable for want of any specific conclusion and for want of reasons in support of the conclusion and for want of any clear and specific direction. However, since the judgment and order passed by learned Industrial Court contains certain other reasons and reflects the conclusion whereby the termination is set aside and that therefore in light of the judgment and order dated 29.3.2010 passed by Industrial Court the Court is not inclined to allow the defect in the judgment by the learned Labour Court stand in the way of deciding present petition which is essentially filed against the judgment dated 29.3.2010 passed by Industrial Court. 6.5 Even otherwise, in view of the fact that the judgment and order passed by learned Industrial Court is passed in statutory appeal, the judgment and order passed by learned Labour Court stands merged with the order of Industrial Court and therefore what is now required to be taken into account is the judgment and order passed by the learned Industrial Court. 6.6 In the judgment and order dated 23.9.2010 the learned Industrial Court has accepted the workman's claim that his salary was Rs. 15/- per day at the time when his service was terminated and that his service was terminated w.e.f. 16.9.1988 and that the opponent employer had failed to establish that the claimant had not worked for 240 days. In light of the documents placed on record by the claimant viz. pay receipt for the month of July 1987 and August 1987 which reflected that the claimant was paid salary by the corporation, learned Industrial Court rejected the objection by the opponent employer that the claimant was not employee of the company/corporation and that he had not worked with the corporation and that he was not entitled for any benefits. pay receipt for the month of July 1987 and August 1987 which reflected that the claimant was paid salary by the corporation, learned Industrial Court rejected the objection by the opponent employer that the claimant was not employee of the company/corporation and that he had not worked with the corporation and that he was not entitled for any benefits. The said conclusion by learned Industrial Court cannot be faulted. 6.7 Learned Industrial Court also took into account the fact that the application was submitted by the workman calling for document (viz. attendance register) for the period from January 1987 to January 1988 however the corporation did not place on record the said documents. 6.8 Learned Industrial Court also took into account the order dated 11.5.2007 passed by the Company Court in Company Application No. 174 of 2007 and directed present respondent No. 3 to pay undisputed claim amount to the petitioner and the fact that in view of the said order the respondent No. 3 has paid amount to the claimant. Learned Industrial Court also recorded that the claimant had worked continuously and in September 1998 the claimant was discontinued from service and was not allowed to resume his duty. 6.9 After having recorded such findings and observations learned Industrial Court considered rival submission with regard to the direction to pay backwages. Learned Industrial Court found that the order directing the respondent No. 3 to pay 100% backwages was not justified in view of the fact that the company/corporation is ordered to be wound up. Except the said reason any other reason or justification to reduce the quantum of backwages is not mentioned by the learned Labour Court in the impugned judgment. 7. Of course Mr. Nagarkar, learned advocate for the respondent No. 3 contended that the petitioner worked only as casual workman and that therefore the order passed by learned Industrial Court is not erroneous but in the facts of the case said order is justified. 8. When the petitioner's objection against the direction reducing backwages to the extent of 50% is considered, it comes out from the record that before the date of alleged termination the petitioner had worked for about 9 years with the corporation. It also appears that the petitioner was paid salary @ Rs. 15/- per day and that the petitioner was engaged as casual workman. It also appears that the petitioner was paid salary @ Rs. 15/- per day and that the petitioner was engaged as casual workman. 8.1 However, from the record it does not come out that the respondent No. 3 or the erstwhile company, before discontinuing the petitioner and before stopping the petitioner from his duty, had followed any procedure prescribed by law for terminating the service of the employee. 8.2 In view of the fact that before discontinuing the petitioner from service, any procedure prescribed by law for relieving the employee from service or discontinuing his service any procedure prescribed by law was not followed, normally, the consequence of such defective action would be in nature of direction to reinstate the workman and to pay appropriate backwages. 9. The learned Industrial Court modified the judgment and reduced the quantum of backwages to 50% in light of the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court that the direction for payment of backwages should not be passed mechanically only because the action of the termination of service is held to be illegal. 9.1 In recent decision in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) (2013) 10 SCC 324 Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that in cases where the termination of service of workman is found to be illegal, then compelling circumstances are established, the direction to reinstate the workman should follow. In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that:- 38.1 In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. 38.2 The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. 38.3 Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. 38.3 Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averments about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments. 38.4 The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages. 38.5 The cases in which the competent Court or Tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman, then the concerned Court or Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. 38.5 The cases in which the competent Court or Tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman, then the concerned Court or Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior Courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same. The Courts must always be kept in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages. 38.6 In a number of cases, the superior Courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer, i.e., the employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited v. Employees." It would also be appropriate to take into account the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Surendra Kumar Verma vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court ( AIR 1981 SC 422 ). Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited v. Employees." It would also be appropriate to take into account the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Surendra Kumar Verma vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court ( AIR 1981 SC 422 ). In paragraph No. 6 of the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- 6. We do not propose to refer to the cases arising under section 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act or to cases arising out of references under sections 10 and 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Nor do we propose to engage ourselves in the unfruitful task of answering the question whether the termination of the services of a workman in violation of the provisions of S.25F is void ab initio or merely invalid and inoperative, even if it is possible to discover some razor's edge distinction between the Latin 'Void ab initio' and the Anglo-Saxon 'invalid and inoperative'. Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of 795 mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. 'Void ab initio' 'invalid and inoperative' or call it what you will, the workmen and the employer are primarily concerned with the consequence of striking down the order of termination of the services of the workmen. Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums: the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court to make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court to make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The Court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the Court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted. 9.2 In present case, the company/corporation is ordered to be wound up. Therefore, the question of direction to reinstatement the workman cannot be passed and the claim for reinstatement in service would not survive. 9.3 This leaves behind the option to direct the respondent to pay backwages or lump sum compensation. 9.4 The period in question is about 9 years, i.e. from 16.9.1988 to 6.4.1997. 9.5 The learned Industrial Court has mentioned in the judgment that the petitioner's service was discontinued with effect from 19.9.1988 and the said action of the company/corporation was illegal. The learned Industrial Court set aside the said action. However, the learned Industrial Court reduced the quantum of backwages on the ground that the company was ordered to be wound up. Merely because the company is ordered to be wound up, it could not be employed as ground for reducing quantum of backwages, though it may be good ground to reject the claim for reinstatement. If, in light of the facts of the case the claim for backwages is found justified then for reducing the quantum of backwages, there ought to be sufficient, satisfactory and cogent reason. On examination of the order passed by the learned Industrial Court, it does not come out that respondent No. 3 had brought to the notice of the Court that during interregnum the petitioner was gainfully employed. Any other exceptional circumstances are not made out. On examination of the order passed by the learned Industrial Court, it does not come out that respondent No. 3 had brought to the notice of the Court that during interregnum the petitioner was gainfully employed. Any other exceptional circumstances are not made out. In absence of any evidence that the claimant was gainfully employed and/or in absence of any other reason justifying denial of backwages of reduction in quantum of backwages, the claim for full backwages, as observed by Hon'ble Apex Court, ought not have been passed. In this view of the matter and having regard to the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court following order is passed. 9.6 The learned Industrial Court's conclusion that the action of discontinuing the service of the petitioner was illegal, is confirmed. The decision of the learned Industrial Court that in view of the fact that the company is ordered to be wound up the claim for reinstatement does not survive and cannot be granted, is also confirmed. However, so far as the order reducing quantum of backwages or the order restricting the quantum of backwages of 50% is concerned, is set aside and respondent No. 3 is directed to pay full backwages to the petitioner from the date of termination till the date the respondent reached age of superannuation or the date of the order of winding-up, whichever is earlier. With the aforesaid clarifications and directions, the petitions are partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.