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Allahabad High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 892 (ALL)

Sumitra Devi v. State of U. P.

2016-03-09

D.Y.CHANDRACHUD, YASHWANT VARMA

body2016
JUDGMENT The appellant a constable in the police challenged an order of termination dated 07.05.2010 passed by the fourth respondent. The order of termination was affirmed by the appellate authority vide his order dated 21 August 2010 as also by the revisional authority by his order dated 4 November 2010. The challenge to these orders in writ proceedings having not found success has led to the filing of the instant Special Appeal. 2. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on 2 February 2016 holding that the charge of the appellant having consumed alcohol while on duty stood duly proved in the enquiry proceedings. The learned Single Judge found no merit in the submissions urged before him that the charge of intoxication could not have been established or proved unless a blood and urine examination had been performed. 3. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant has reiterated the above submission and has contended that the medical evidence which was gathered in the course of the enquiry was clearly inconclusive and could not have been formed the basis for holding the appellant guilty and his consequential termination. 4. The incident itself is stated to have occurred on 23 July 2009 while the appellant was on security duty near the premises of a Bank. He was found in a state of intoxication and taken for medical examination to a nearby hospital. A medical report was drawn up which recorded that he had consumed alcohol but was not intoxicated. On 24 July 2009, the appellant was suspended pending disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. He was subsequently charge-sheeted on 30 November 2009, where after a regular departmental enquiry was conducted in which the appellant was afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence and cross examine witnesses. The enquiry report was submitted on 7 April 2010 and after taking into consideration the said report as also the response of the appellant thereto, the order of termination came to be passed on 7 May 2010. 5. From a perusal of the order of termination, the enquiry report and the material gathered in the departmental proceedings it is apparent that on 23 July 2009 upon information being received that the appellant was in an inebriated state, he was immediately taken to a nearby hospital and subjected to a medical examination. 5. From a perusal of the order of termination, the enquiry report and the material gathered in the departmental proceedings it is apparent that on 23 July 2009 upon information being received that the appellant was in an inebriated state, he was immediately taken to a nearby hospital and subjected to a medical examination. More than one witness in the course of the enquiry proceedings corroborated the fact that the appellant was in a drunken state. The learned counsel however has, as he so did before the learned Single Judge, contended that the charge could not have been held to be proved against the appellant unless he had been subjected to a blood and urine examination. 6. We find that the learned Single Judge while negativing the said submission has placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. And others, 2011 (9) SCC 94 . Samar Bahadur Singh too was a constable in the police who was found in a state of intoxication while on duty and consequently dismissed from service. The medical report submitted in his case too recorded that he had consumed alcohol but was not intoxicated. The Supreme Court further refused to accept the submission made by the appellant before it that he had consumed certain medicines whose odor had led to the employer presuming that he had consumed alcohol. We may note that the appellant before us had also raised a similar defense before the fourth respondent, namely, that he had consumed homeopathic medicines and it was the odor of the medicine which had led the respondents to believe that he had consumed alcohol. The Supreme Court on identical facts ultimately held that the satisfaction arrived at by the disciplinary authority did not commend interference. The order of dismissal was upheld. 7. We may only note that it is a settled principle of law that charges levelled in disciplinary proceedings are to be established on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and not on the strength of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The degree of proof required in a disciplinary proceeding is not the same as required for establishing guilt of an accused in a criminal case. The degree of proof required in a disciplinary proceeding is not the same as required for establishing guilt of an accused in a criminal case. In our opinion, bearing in mind the medical report as well as the statement of witnesses who were examined in the course of the disciplinary proceedings, there existed on record sufficient material to establish the charge levelled against the appellant. The disciplinary proceedings were conducted by the respondents consistent with the principles of natural justice, the appellant was made aware of the material against him and also granted the opportunity to cross examine witnesses. Bearing in mind the parameters of judicial review which the learned Single Judge was exercising while testing the validity of the orders impugned in the writ petition, we find no ground meriting interference with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge. 8. We accordingly find no merit in the present Special Appeal which shall consequently stand dismissed. Appeal dismissed.