JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant-assessee has preferred the present appeal by raising three questions of law, but, in our view the question really arises for consideration can be formulated as under: “Whether the product of the petitioner as vegetable fat spread can be said as included in Entry No.32 of the III Schedule or not?” If the answer is negative it will necessarily fall in the residuary category. If the answer is in the affirmative it would fall under Entry 31 for chargeability of tax. 2. The present appeal is directed against the decision of the Advance Ruling Authority whereby the Advance Ruling Authority has found that the product of the petitioner, ‘vegetable fat spread’ (hereinafter referred to as the “product in question”) would not fall in Entry No.31 but it is a different product and hence, would fall in the residuary category. 3. The relevant facts are that the appellant is manufacturing the product in question and is marketing the said product accordingly. The Circular was issued by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes vide Order dated 31.1.2015 for the product of nutralite clarifying that the said product is different than edible oil. The applicant made an application to the Advance Ruling Authority under the Karnataka Value Added Tax(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for clarification. The Advance Ruling Authority ultimately interalia observed at Paragraph5 which reads as follows: “In the instant case, as admitted by the applicant and as could be seen from the ingredient contents of the said commodity, ‘vegetable fat spread’ is a type of fat spread and is manufactured using several ingredients including edible oil and vegetable fat content. Here, edible oil is one of the ingredients, etc. In case of milk fat spread, milk is one of the major ingredient, but the commodity cannot be treated on par with milk which is exempt from tax. Similarly, vegetable fat spreads cannot be considered as edible oils, just because of the fact that the edible oil is one of the ingredients of vegetable fat spreads. In case of milk fat spread, milk is one of the major ingredient, but the commodity cannot be treated on par with milk which is exempt from tax. Similarly, vegetable fat spreads cannot be considered as edible oils, just because of the fact that the edible oil is one of the ingredients of vegetable fat spreads. Entry 31 of the Third Schedule to the KVAT Act, 2003 reads as under: “Edible oils (No refined and refined), but excluding coconut oil sold in sachets, bottles or tins of 200 grams or 200 mili litre each or less, including when such consumer containers are sold in bulk in a common container, oil cake” On plain reading of the above entry, it can be seen that vegetable fat spreads are not falling under any of edible oils. Fat spread is a different commodity prepared through a process with the help of different ingredients with edible oil as one of such ingredients. Generally, edible oils are either in liquid form or saturated form which can be converted into liquid form for consumption. Whereas the fat spreads are consumed in a form like butter only. Further, edible oils are commonly used for cooking and not consumed directly, whereas the fact spreads are consumed directly. Hence, on the usage theory also, vegetable fat spreads cannot be categorized as the commodities on par with edible oils.” Thereafter, the Advance Ruling Authority clarified that the product is an unscheduled commodity and therefore, tax at the rate of 14.5% would be chargeable. Under the circumstances, the present appeal before this Court. 4. We have heard Mr. G. Rabinathan, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.T.K.Vedamurthy, learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 5. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant was that for the identical product, being marketed as margarine, the Apex Court found that it is made of edible oil and therefore, it should be treated as edible oil. He submitted that for edible oil Entry No.31 is already provided. Once the product of the appellant falls under Entry No.31, it cannot be termed as unscheduled commodity and therefore, the decision of the Advance Ruling Authority is erroneous and calls for interference. 6. Whereas Mr.T.K.Vedamurthy, learned Addl. He submitted that for edible oil Entry No.31 is already provided. Once the product of the appellant falls under Entry No.31, it cannot be termed as unscheduled commodity and therefore, the decision of the Advance Ruling Authority is erroneous and calls for interference. 6. Whereas Mr.T.K.Vedamurthy, learned Addl. Government Advocate contended that the decision of the Apex Court cannot be applied to upset the decision of the Advance Ruling Committee because after examining the composition and the nature of the product at par like butter, on the basis of usage theory, the finding is recorded that it is an unscheduled product and would not fall in Entry No.31. The learned Addl. Government Advocate submitted that this Court may dismiss the appeal. 7. Before we examine the contention, we may at the outset record that it is by now well settled, for interpretation of Entry in any taxing statute that the first test will be identity of the product in the market parlance. If the product is found to be distinguishable in the market parlance, it cannot be included just on a mere composition. 8. In the event, after applying the test of market parlance, if the product is not separately identifiable then one may further examine the composition of the product in order to find out as to whether such product can be included in the respective particular entry or schedule or not. In the event, after applying the second test there is any further doubt about the meaning of the entry, then one may gather the meaning by referring to dictionary meaning or scientific expression as the case may be. 9. If the facts of the present case are examined keeping in view the aforesaid broad principles for interpretation of any entry in the Taxing Statute, Entry No.31 which is already reproduced earlier includes edible oils and it excludes coconut oil. Therefore, on the first blush one may gather that all edible oils are included. But, further scrutiny shows that there is entry No.98 in the very Schedule which reads as under: “Vegetable oil including gingili oil, bran oil and castor oil excluding vegetable oil used as toilet article and edible oil.” meaning thereby that though bran oil and gingili oil are two types of edible oil, but for such category of vegetable oil, though edible oil, separate entry has been provided. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is considered as it is to include all types of edible oils barring coconut oil in Entry No.31, the other Entry No.98 referred to herein above would be redundant. We may, further record that in the very schedule there are two entries namely Entry No.56 for ‘khova’ which is a concentrated dehyderated form of milk fat and another entry as Entry No.86 which also provides for “cottage cheese” together with the other items namely skimmed milk powder and UHT milk. 10. The aforesaid two entries show that when any product or commodity is taking a different marketability as that of khova made out of milk or cottage cheese made out of milk and used as spreader they are shown in separate entries as provided. If the intention of the legislature was to include all milk products or milk concentrates culminating into cottage cheese or khova, it would not have provided for two separate entries. 11. The aforesaid over all picture of the commodities mentioned in the schedule clearly shows that the prime consideration is the marketability of the product separately identifiable which is popularly known as market parlance test and on account of the same, aforesaid different entries are provided irrespective of their composition. 12. At this stage, we may make useful reference to the decision of this Court in the case of Rasna Private Limited, Yelachenahally Village, J.P. Nagar Post(Kanakapura Road Cross), Bangalore, .vs. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Karnataka, Bangalore, and more particularly the observations made at Paragraphs15 to 20 which reads as under: “15. The aforesaid would lead us to examine the merits of the matter. Entry 3 of the Third Schedule of the Act for ready reference is reproduced and the same reads as under: “3.All processed fruit and vegetables including Fruit jams, jelly, pickle, fruit squash, paste, fruit Drink and fruit juice(whether in sealed container Or otherwise).” On a plain reading of the aforesaid entry, it transpires that all processed fruits and vegetables including fruit jams, jelly, pickles, fruit squash, paste, fruit drinks and fruit juice(whether sealed in container or otherwise) are included in the said entry. The basis of the aforesaid entry is that the items contained therein must be processed fruit or processed vegetables. The basis of the aforesaid entry is that the items contained therein must be processed fruit or processed vegetables. Further, if the colour or the meaning of the expression “processed fruit or vegetables” is to be considered, one may be required to consider the other parts of the entry which may throw light on the intention of the Legislature. Jams, jelly, pickles, squash, paste, drink, juice, would show such processed foods may be in liquid or semiliquid form or in the form of a paste in contradistinction to the concentrated power form. 16. The attempt made on the part of the learned counsel for the appellant is that when the words used are “all processed” it would include all form of processed fruit and vegetables and it is not necessary that it should be in the form of liquid, semiliquid, paste or squash or in power form. Therefore, the submission was that concentrated powder form would also get included in the entry. It was also contended in furtherance thereto that the definition is an inclusive definition and an expansive one and hence widest meaning may be given to the entry and if widest meaning is given, then concentrated power of any fruit or vegetable would also get included in the entry. 17. The contention may prima-facie of substance and attractive but upon further scrutiny, it appears that whenever any entry is to be interpreted, the said entry is to be read as a whole and not by segregating the entry into different parts and by picking up certain words from the entry meaning cannot be stressed. 18. In our view, if the earlier part of the entry viz., “all processed fruit and vegetables” is to be considered and given meaning, one has to also keep in mind and the other words following the aforesaid expression used by the Legislature for inclusion of certain specified items. It is true that the items which are specified in the entry may not be exhaustive but the character and composition of those items included have a commonality. It is on an understanding of the common features of those specified items an appropriate meaning can be given to the earlier portion of the entry “all processed fruit and vegetables”. Thus, the meaning of the aforesaid expression is restricted by the words, which follows it. It is on an understanding of the common features of those specified items an appropriate meaning can be given to the earlier portion of the entry “all processed fruit and vegetables”. Thus, the meaning of the aforesaid expression is restricted by the words, which follows it. Further, if the meaning as understood in common parlance which is one of the prime tests for interpreting any entry is considered, then concentrated powder form of any fruit which is marketed is always different in comparison to any liquid or semiliquid or paste form of any fruit or vegetable. Not only that, if the composition and form of any processed fruit or vegetable is considered as liquid or semiliquid or paste or squash form of any fruit or vegetable, it is different from the concentrated powder form of any fruit or vegetable. 19. Further, in order to test the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, the other entries in the Third Schedule itself could be considered so as to interpret the intention of the Legislature. The other schedule providing for the other entries can be considered at this stage. Entry 7 provides for arecanut and powder, which is a processed or powder form of arecanut. Entry 24 provides for coffee beans and seeds, green tea leaf and chicory. Entry 31 provides for edible oils which are extracted from nuts. Entry 45 provides for husk and bran of cereals and pulses extracted after a process from vegetable plants. If certain entries are considered of the First Schedule which is for exempted goods then Entry 25 provides for fresh plants, saplings; Entry 30 provides for jaggery which is made out of sugarcane juice; entry 33 provides for leaf plates which is made out of plants; Entry 51 provides for toddy, neera and arrack which is extracted from fruit. If the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is accepted, the resultant effect would be, that all such aforesaid entries would be redundant if the said items are included in Entry 3 of the Third Schedule, unless exempted from the payment of tax. 20. Under the circumstances, we find that unless a strict meaning is given to the expression “all processed fruit and vegetables” in the form of liquid, semiliquid paste or squash form, they would not get included in Entry 3 of Third Schedule. 20. Under the circumstances, we find that unless a strict meaning is given to the expression “all processed fruit and vegetables” in the form of liquid, semiliquid paste or squash form, they would not get included in Entry 3 of Third Schedule. In any case, concentrated powder form, by applying the common parlance test would stand on an altogether different position than any fruit or vegetable found in liquid or semiliquid, paste or squash form. Under circumstances, the contention raised that “all types of processed fruit and vegetables” would also include concentrated form of power cannot be accepted.” 13. If the market parlance test is considered, we do find that the product as vegetable fat spread is having separate marketability and different use hence cannot be said as same as that of the edible oil. Hence, we find that applying the market parlance test, the product of the petitioner-appellant cannot be considered as falling under Entry No.31. 14. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is further considered to trace the composition of product then also as stated by the appellant himself the product contains 80% of edible oil. In addition thereto the product also contains starch, not less than 10 ppm and not more than 150 ppm, as per the standard prescribed by Food Safety and Standard Authorities of the Ministry of Family Welfare. Therefore, it is not that the product of the appellant contains only vegetable oil. When the product contains addition of starch and other items may be in the residuary 20% in contradiction to 80% being the vegetable oil and other edible oils, then also it is difficult to conclude that the product of the appellant can be termed as only of edible oil. The aforesaid coupled with the aspects that the meaning of any Entry is to be considered it is to be read in comparison and in contradiction to other entries in the very schedule. As recorded by us hereinabove for certain type of oils which are also used as edible oils separate entries are provided and for certain types of concentrates of the milk used as spreader (cottage cheese) separate entries are provided. As recorded by us hereinabove for certain type of oils which are also used as edible oils separate entries are provided and for certain types of concentrates of the milk used as spreader (cottage cheese) separate entries are provided. Under these circumstances, we do not find that the second test of composition of the product even if applied with the product of the appellant in comparison to the contents of the edible oils or in comparison with the product of edible oil commodity would meet with the test so as to include the product under Entry No.31 of the Schedule. 15. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Aluva Sugar Agency .vs. State of Kerala reported at (2011) 45 VST 1 (SC) upon which a great reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant proceeds on the basis that the produce is made only from vegetable oils as stated by the appellant and borne out from the records. Further in the said decision, the Apex Court had no occasion to consider and interpret the entry by applying market parlance test. Under the circumstances the said decision is of no help to the learned counsel for the appellant. 16. If the aforesaid aspect is considered and read with the reasons recorded by the Advance Ruling Authority which are reproduced hereinabove, we find that the view taken by the Advance Ruling Authority cannot be said to be erroneous. Hence, the question formulated needs to be answered in negative. 17. As a consequence thereof, the product of the appellant would fall in the category of unscheduled product as held by the Advance Ruling Authority. 18. In the result, the appeal fails and hence the same is dismissed.