Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 893 (KER)

Avirah v. Board of Directors of the Canara Bank

2016-10-21

K.HARILAL

body2016
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner was an employee in the service of the Canara Bank. The said Bank is a Nationalised Bank under Central Act 5 of 1970. When he was working as Manager, he had compulsorily retired with effect from 21/10/1986 as the result of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him by Ext.PI. The petitioner had preferred an appeal and the Appellate Authority by order dated 16/3/1999 allowed pension and other retirement benefits. While so, the Canara Bank introduced Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 (hereinafter called ‘the Regulations’). As per Clause 3(l)(a) of the said Regulations, employees who were in service of the Bank on or after 1/1/1986; but had retired before 1/11/1993 are entitled to get pension subject to option provided under Clauses (b) and (c) and the petitioner had exercised the said option; but the petitioner received Ext.P3 letter from the 2nd respondent stating that in terms of Clause 33(1) of the Regulations, the officer employee who have compulsorily retired on or after 1/11/1993 is only eligible for pension and since the petitioner had compulsorily retired prior to 1/11/1993, he is not eligible to get pension. Though, the petitioner had made several representations, the bank stood by the earlier stand and rejected” the same by Exts.P4 and P6. According to the petitioner, the fixation of cut off date as on 1/11/1993 is wholly irrational, irrelevant and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. Hence the writ petition is filed to declare that Clause 33(1) of the Regulations fixing the cut off date as 1/11/1993 for the employees compulsorily retired from service for pension is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to grant pensionary benefits to the petitioner forthwith. 2. The respondents in their counter affidavit contended that 1/11/1993 is not a cut off date; but was the date adopted from Clause 2(H) of the Ext.Rl(a) Memorandum of Settlement dated 29/10/1993, and Clause (i) of Ext.Rl(b) jointnotedated29/10/1993to accommodate who were in service as on 31/10/1993 and imposed with compulsorily retirement thereafter. 2. The respondents in their counter affidavit contended that 1/11/1993 is not a cut off date; but was the date adopted from Clause 2(H) of the Ext.Rl(a) Memorandum of Settlement dated 29/10/1993, and Clause (i) of Ext.Rl(b) jointnotedated29/10/1993to accommodate who were in service as on 31/10/1993 and imposed with compulsorily retirement thereafter. According to the respondents, the Pension Regulations, 1995 was introduced consequent on Ext.Rl(a) Memorandum of Settlement and Ext.Rl(b) joint note under S.2(p) and S.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,1957, the bipartite agreements arrived at “between the banks represented by the Indian Bank Association and the workmen of 58 banks represented by various employees’ Associations. So, Clause 33(1) of the Regulations was not incorporated arbitrarily and it cannot be altered by judicial review. The Member banks agreed to make Regulations for Pension Scheme individually for themselves in accordance with Exts.Rl(a) and (b) and Ext.Rl(c) Canara Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations was promulgated consequently. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. The sum and substance of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Clause 33(1) of Ext.Rl(d) Regulations is arbitrary, •irrational and violative of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents advanced arguments contending that the legality and propriety of the Pension Regulations is not amenable to judicial review as the same was promulgated consequent on a bipartite Memorandum of Settlement signed by the Indian Banks Association and workers represented by various employees’ Associations. According to them ‘1/11/1993’ was not a cut off date; but was the date adopted from Clause (ii) of Ext.Rl(a) Memorandum of Settlement dated 29/10/1993 and Clause (i) of Ext.Rl(b) joint note, to accommodate the employees who were in service as on 31/10/1993 and imposed with compulsory retirement thereafter. 6.In view of the rival submissions made at the Bar, the questions to be considered are: (i) Whether the Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 promulgated consequent on bipartite Memorandum of Settlement signed by the parties is subject to judicial review in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India? 6.In view of the rival submissions made at the Bar, the questions to be considered are: (i) Whether the Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 promulgated consequent on bipartite Memorandum of Settlement signed by the parties is subject to judicial review in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India? (ii) Whether the fixation of cut off date as ‘1/11/1993’ in Clause 33(1) of the Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 is arbitrary and discriminatory, as being violative of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and sans reasonable or rational basis. 7. Indisputably, the Regulations, 1995 was made and introduced in exercise of the power conferred by Clause (f) of sub-s. (2) of S.19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970 in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government The respondents contended that ‘1/11/1993’ is not a cut off date; but was the date adopted from Clause (ii) of Ext.Rl (a) Memorandum of Settlement dated 29/10/1993 and Clause (i) of Ext.Rl(b) joint note dated 29/10/1993, signed by the Association of Banks and the workers represented by various Associations and thereby it stands beyond the judicial review. According to the petitioner, the terms of a bipartite agreement cannot be altered under judicial review. The question whether the agreement which may be binding on parties, would estop therefrom challenging the Regulations on the ground that the same are void as being violative of Art. 14 or Art. 16 of the Constitution of India, was considered by the Supreme Court in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza ( (1981) 4 SCC 335 ) and held as follows: “78. In view of the authorities, indicated above assuming that the two awards are binding on the petitioners, the serious question for consideration is whether the agreement, which may be binding on the parties, would estop them from challenging the Regulations on the ground that the same are void as being violative of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel against a statute much less against constitutional provisions. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel against a statute much less against constitutional provisions. If, therefore, we hold in agreement with the argument of the petitioners that the provisions for termination and retirement are violative or Article 14 as being unreasonable and arbitrary, “the awards or the agreements confirmed by the awards would be of no assistance to the Corporations.” 8. At this juncture, it must be remembered that the specific case of the petitioners is that the exclusion of them from the Pension Regulations by a cut off date without any basis or criteria is arbitrary and discriminatory and thereby violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. In the above context, this Court of the view that the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India can never be curtailed or denied to any citizen of India under the guise of bipartite agreement or Memorandum of Settlement permitting to do otherwise, as the fundamental rights are inherently vested with every citizen of India and stands beyond the reach of interference by bipartite agreements or Memorandum of Settlement or statutory regulations made thereunder. Be the agreement ever so high; the fundamental right is above the agreement. It is to be borne in mind that where the workmen were represented by their Association in the bipartite Memorandum of Settlement and if the Association fails to protect their fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, this Court is inclined to interfere with the Memorandum of Settlement and the judicial verdict would de hors the agreement signed “by the parties “to the extent of its unconstitutionality and this Court can always, in exercise of judicial review, set right the anomaly, to render justice to the aggrieved party who suffers under such agreements. To sum up, a bipartite agreement or memorandum of Settlement which culminated in statutory promulgations is also subject to judicial review of this Court under Art.226 of The Constitution of India. 9. The second question referred above centers around Clauses 3(i)(a) and 33(1) of the Regulations which are extracted below: “3. To sum up, a bipartite agreement or memorandum of Settlement which culminated in statutory promulgations is also subject to judicial review of this Court under Art.226 of The Constitution of India. 9. The second question referred above centers around Clauses 3(i)(a) and 33(1) of the Regulations which are extracted below: “3. Application:- These regulations shall apply to employees who,- (1) (a) were in the service of the Bank on or after the 1st day of January, 1986 but had retired before the 1st day of November, 1993; and (b) x x x x x x x (c) x x x x x x x (d) x x x x x x x (e) x x x x x x x (f) x x x x x x x” “33.CompulsoryRetirement Pension.- (1) An employee compulsorily retired from service as a penalty on or after 1st day of November, 1993 in terms of Discipline and Appeal Regulations or settlement by the authority higher than the authority competent to impose such penalty may be granted pension at a rate not less than two-thirds and not more than full pension admissible to him on the date of his compulsory retirement if otherwise he was entitled to such pension on superannuation on that date. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x” 10. According to the 1st petitioner, as per Clause 3(l)(a) of the Regulations the employees who were in service of the bank on or after 1/1/1986 but retired before 1/11/1993 are eligible for pension. The 1st petitioner was in service on 1/1/1986 and had compulsorily retired with effect from 21/10/1986 i.e., before 1/11/1993. Therefore, the 1st petitioner is eligible for pension, in view of Clause 3(l)(a) of the Regulations. But, Clause 33(1) artificially and arbitrarily made another classification excluding the persons who compulsorily retired before 1/11/1993 though he was in service on 1/1/1986 and granting pension to those employees who compulsorily retired after 1/11/1993 only. The petitioners further contend that if the compulsory retirement was treated as punishment with deterrence, the employees who had compulsorily retired after 1/11/1993 also should have been excluded from granting pension under Clause 33(1) of the Regulations. Thus the cut off date as 1/11/1993 is an artificial classification in the same homogeneous group without any basis. The petitioners further contend that if the compulsory retirement was treated as punishment with deterrence, the employees who had compulsorily retired after 1/11/1993 also should have been excluded from granting pension under Clause 33(1) of the Regulations. Thus the cut off date as 1/11/1993 is an artificial classification in the same homogeneous group without any basis. The element of punishment deterrency cannot be a basis so long as those who compulsorily retired after 1/11/1993 are given pension under Clause 33(1) of the Regulations. 11. The respondents contended that 1/11/1993 is not a cut off of date; but was a date adopted from Clause (ii) of Ext.Rl(a) Settlement Deed dated 29/10/1993 and Clause (i) of Ext.Rl(b) joint note dated 29/10/1993 to accommodate who were in service as on 31/10/1993 and imposed with compulsory retirement thereafter. I am unable to countenance the aforesaid contention for the reasons given below. It is true that the said date 1/11/1993 protects the employees who were in service as on 31/10/1993 and thereafter imposed with compulsory retirement. But, it is to be remembered that” at the same time the date 1/11/1993 excludes those who were in service and imposed with compulsory retirement before 1/11/1993 also. Thus, the cut off date stands as a double edged weapon to grant pension to compulsory retirees after 1/11/1993 and to deny pension to the compulsory retirees before 1/11/1993. 12. Unfortunately, the Associations of Bank Employees who represented the employees in the bipartite Memorandum of Settlement have lost sight of the one edge of the weapon which cuts the right of the employees who had compulsorily retired before 1/11/1993. Thus, 1/11/1993 is used as a cut off date in the Clause, to grant pension to some compulsorily retired employees and to deny the same to others, in the same homogeneous group, who are otherwise entitled to get pension under Clause 3(l)(a) of the Regulations. Since the employees imposed with compulsory retirement, as a whole, are not excluded as a class or category from the application of Clause 3(l)(a) of the Regulations, the exclusion of those who had compulsorily retired before 1/11/1993 alone is arbitrary and discriminatory and thereby violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India, particularly when, Clause 3(1) (a) provides retrospective operation by granting pension to” all pensioners who retired before 1/11/1993. If the employees who compulsorily retired as punishment after 1/11/1993 is eligible to get pension, under the Regulations, certainly, those who compulsorily retired before 1/11/1993 also would have been eligible as both belong to the same homogeneous group i.e., ‘compulsorily retired employees’. As rightly contended by the petitioner, the element of punishment or deterrency cannot be a basis because those who had compulsorily retired after 1/11/1993 are given pension under Clause 33(1) of the Regulations. 13. It is the law that there cannot be a discrimination in the same homogeneous group without any rational basis. Hence I find that the cut off date as 1/11/1993 makes discrimination in the same homogeneous group without any rational basis and thereby it is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. There is no intelligible differentia between those who have compulsorily retired before 1/11/1993 and after 1/11/1993 and both fall under same class of ‘compulsorily retired employees’. Among the employees who were compulsorily retired by way of penalty; there cannot be a further classification of those who have retired prior to 1/11/1993 and those who retired after 1/11/1993, particularly when, Clause 3(l)(a) of the Regulations takes all employees who retired before 1/11/1993 under the same class. Of course, among the prematurely retired employees a further classification may also be possible on the basis of compulsory retirement by way of penalty; but such a further classification was not made under the Regulations. If that be so, there cannot be a further classification among them as those who have compulsorily retired before 1/11/1993 and after 1/11/1993. 14. Let us examine whether various provisions contained in the Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 which govern the payment of pension classify the employees who compulsorily retired before 1/11/1993, unequally and differently. This question centers around various provisions which are extracted below: “2. 14. Let us examine whether various provisions contained in the Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 which govern the payment of pension classify the employees who compulsorily retired before 1/11/1993, unequally and differently. This question centers around various provisions which are extracted below: “2. Definitions:-In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) x x x x x x x x (b) x x x x x x x x (c) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (k) “date of retirement” means the last date of the month in which an employee attains the age of superannuation or the date on which he is retired by the Bank or the date on which the employee voluntarily retires; or the date on which the officer is deemed to have retired; x x x x x x x x x x x x (y)”retirement” means cessation from Bank’s servicer- (a) On attaining the age of superannuation specified in Service Regulations or Settlements; (b) On voluntary retirement in accordance with provisions contained in regulation 29 of these regulations; (c) On premature retirement by the Bank before attaining the age of superannuation specified in Service Regulations or Settlement.” On a close examination of Clause 2(k) which defines “date of retirement it classifies and recognizes the four categories of retirees only. (i) Employees who retired after superannuation. (ii) Who is retired by bank. (iii) Who voluntarily retires. (iv) Who is deemed to have retired. 15. Similarly, according to Clause 2(y), ‘retirement’ means cessation from bank service: (a) On superannuation. (b) On voluntary retirement. (c) On premature retirement. On an analysis of the Clause 2(k), it can be said that among the four classes of retirees, there is broad category viz., an employee who is retired by the bank. Further, Clause 2(y) classifies them in a different way as premature retirees.- All the employees who are retired by the bank would fall under ‘premature retirees’. Thereafter there is no specific classification distinguishing compulsory retirees from premature retirees. In the absence of such a specific class as ‘compulsory retirees’ in the Regulations, it can be safely concluded that there cannot be a further classification among the compulsory retirees by fixing a cut off date as 1/11/1993. 16. Thereafter there is no specific classification distinguishing compulsory retirees from premature retirees. In the absence of such a specific class as ‘compulsory retirees’ in the Regulations, it can be safely concluded that there cannot be a further classification among the compulsory retirees by fixing a cut off date as 1/11/1993. 16. According to the “Pension Clause 3(1), these Regulations shall apply to employees who were service of the bank on or after 1/1/1986; but had retired before 1/11/1993. In other words, whatever be the manner of retirement, all the retirees who were in service of the bank on or after 1/1/1986 and before 1/11/1993 are entitled to get pension subject to sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Clause 3(1) and there cannot be a further classification, on the basis of the date of retirement without any rational or reasonable basis, in view of the mandate under Clause 3(l)(a) of the Pension Regulations. Thus, the classification of compulsory retirees by the cut off date 1/11/1993 is not in harmony with other provisions, particularly Clauses 2(k) and 2(y) of the Pension Regulations, which classify the retired employees. 17. The above view is further supported by Regulation 32 which provides pension to prematurely retired employees and according to Clause 20(l)(e) of the Canara Bank Officers Service Regulations, 1979, an officer employee whose services are terminated under sub-clause (a) of Clause 20 shall be paid Gratuity, Provident Fund including employees’ contribution and all other dues that may be admissible to him as per Rules “ notwithstanding the years of service rendered. So, there is no reason to confine entitlement of pension those who come and specified under Clause 33(1) only by fixing a cut off date. 18. The choice of date, being wholly arbitrary, would amount to discrimination and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and classification based on fortuitous circumstance of retirement before or subsequent to a date, fixing of which was not shown to be related to any rational principle, is nothing other than discrimination. The classification of compulsory retirees, on the basis of a cut off date into two classes, is not based on any reasonable or rational principle and if the cut off date divides the retirees with a view to give benefit to some and deny it to others, such division would be discretionary. The classification of compulsory retirees, on the basis of a cut off date into two classes, is not based on any reasonable or rational principle and if the cut off date divides the retirees with a view to give benefit to some and deny it to others, such division would be discretionary. Thus, the classification does not stand the test of Art. 14 and runs counter to Clause 3(1) (a) of the Pension Regulations. 19. Let us examine the judicial precedents which considered classification and its consequential effect on Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. 20. In D.S. Nakara v. Union of India ( (1983) 1 SCC 305 ), the Supreme Court considered the legal effect of classification of the employees for pension, in view of Art.12 of the Constitution of India. On May 25, 1979, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, issued Office MemorandumNo.F-19(3)-EV-79whereby formula for computation of pension was liberalised but made it applicable to Government servants who were in service on March 31st, 1979 and retire from service on or after that date. The above classification, on the basis of the said cut off date, was challenged alleging violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. After analyzing the impact of classification by cut off date, the court held as follows: “11. The decisions clearly lay down that though Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, viz., (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that, that differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute in question. (See Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S. R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 at P. 296: ( AIR 1958 SC 538 at p. 547)). The classification may be founded on differential basis according to objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that there ought to be nexus i.e. causal connection between the basis of classification and object of the statute under consideration, It is equally well settled by the decisions of this Court that Art. 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx 31. From the discussion three things emerge- (I) that pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer and that it creates a vested right subject to 1972 Rules which are statutory in character because they are enacted in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 and Clause (5) of Article 148 of the Constitution, (ii) that the pension is not an ex gratia payment but it is a payment for the past service rendered; and (Hi) it is a social welfare measure rendering socio-economic justice to those who in the hey day of their life ceaselessly toiled for the employer on an assurance that in their old age they would not be left in lurch. It must also be noticed that the quantum of pension is a certain percentage correlated to the average emoluments drawn during last three years of service reduced to ten months under liberalised pension scheme, its payment is dependent upon an additional condition of impeccable behaviour even subsequent to retirement, that is, since the cessation of the contract of service and that it can be reduced or withdrawn as a disciplinary measure. xxxxx xxxxx 42. x x x x x x x x x if the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme, we find no rational principle behind it for granting these benefits only to those who retired subsequent to that date simultaneously denying the same to those who retired prior to that date. If the liberalisation was considered necessary for augmenting social security in old age to government servants then those who retired earlier cannot be worse off then those who retire later. Therefore, this division which classified pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational principle and if the rational principle is the one of dividing pensioners with a view to giving something more to persons otherwise equally placed, it would be discriminatory. To illustrate, take two persons, one retired just a day prior and another a day just succeeding the specified date. Both were in the same pay bracket, the average emolument was the same and both had put in equal number of years of service. How does a fortuitous circumstance of retiring a day earlier or a day later will permit totally unequal treatment in the matter of pension? Both were in the same pay bracket, the average emolument was the same and both had put in equal number of years of service. How does a fortuitous circumstance of retiring a day earlier or a day later will permit totally unequal treatment in the matter of pension? One retiring a day earlier will have to be subject to ceiling of Rs.8,100/- p.a. and average emolument to be worked out on 36 months’ salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs.12,000/- p.a. and average emolument will be computed on the basis of fast ten months’ average. The artificial division stares into face and is unrelated to any principle and whatever principle, if there be any, has absolutely, no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by liberalising the pension scheme. In fact this arbitrary division has not only no nexus to the liberalised pension scheme but it is counter productive and runs counter to the whole gamut of pension scheme. The equal treatment guaranteed in Article 14 is wholly violated inasmuch as the pension rules being statutory in character, since the specified date, the rules accord differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of commutation of pension. A 48 hours’ difference in matter of retirement would have “a traumatic effect. Division is thus botharbitrary and unprincipled. Therefore, the classification does not stand the test of Art. 14.” 21. I have scrutinised various decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, after D.S. Nakara’s case, cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. The Apex Court recurringly referred and followed the principles in various decisions rendered subsequently, but distinguished in certain decisions. Even now the principle laid down in D.S. Nakara’s case governs the field of classification. Among the various decisions rendered subsequently, I find that the decision rendered in State of Punjab and others v. Amar Nath Goyal and others ( AIR 2006 SC 171 ) is relevant in the context of this case. In this decision, the Apex Court held that financial and economic implications are relevant and germane for any policy decision touching administration of Government. So, fixing of cut off date on the ground of financial crisis is not arbitrary. In the instant case, the respondents have no case that the cut off date was fixed to taper down or reduce financial burden or constrains. So, fixing of cut off date on the ground of financial crisis is not arbitrary. In the instant case, the respondents have no case that the cut off date was fixed to taper down or reduce financial burden or constrains. Moreover, Clause 3(l)(a) grants pension to those who have retired between 1/1/1986 and 1/11/1993. Thus, this decision is not applicable to the instant case. The precise principle enunciated in D.S. Nakara’s case has been duly explained in Krishenakumar’s case ( (1994) 4 SCC 207 ) and I do not find it necessary to repeat the same. 22. The legal position rendered by D.S. Nakara’s case was reiterated in A.I. Reserve Bank Retired Officers’ Association v. Union of India (1992 II CLR SC 89) and justice Ahmadi as His Lordship then was speaking for the Bench observed: “Whenever any rule or regulation having statutory flavour is made by an authority which is a State within the meaning of Art. 12, the choice of the cut-off date which has necessarily to be introduced to effectuate such benefits is open to scrutiny by the Court and must be supported on the touch-stone of Art. 14. If the choice of the date results in classification or division of members of a homogeneous group it would be open to the Court to insist that it be shown that the classification is based on an intelligible differentia and on rational consideration which bears a nexus to the purpose and object thereof. The differential treatment accorded to those who retired prior to the specified date and those who retired subsequent thereto must be justified on the touch-stone of Art. 14, for otherwise it would be offensive to the philosophy of equality enshrined in the Constitution.” 23. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his arguments cited the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A. No. 1076/2006 and the order passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4177/2007 dismissing the appeal filed against the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Division Bench. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his arguments cited the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A. No. 1076/2006 and the order passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4177/2007 dismissing the appeal filed against the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Division Bench. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his arguments, cited the decision laid down by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in (ILR (2002) 1 Delhi 175) and the order passed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Appeal No.15852/2002, dismissing the appeal filed challenging the decision laid down by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The aforesaid judgments show divergent views of the Division benches of the different High Courts with respect to fixation of cut off date to classify the employees for granting benefit to some and denying to others. This Court is of the view that since both decisions have persuasive value only, this Court is not inclined to follow any of the views and the same pales to insignificance, particularly when, this Court considered the issues in the light of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in D.S. Nakara’s case, which stands subsequently clarified in Krishenakumar’s case. To sum up, the aforesaid findings of this Court are justified by the judicial precedents also. 24. To sum up, according to Clause 3(l)(a), the employees who were in service of the Bank on or after the 1st day of January, 1986; but had retired before the 1st day of November, 1993 are eligible for pension. Hence it is not permissible for the bank to fix an artificial further cut off date as 1st November, 1993 to give benefit of pension to the employees who had retired voluntarily after 1st day of November, 1993 and to deny the same to the employees who had voluntarily retired before 1st day of November, 1993, without any reasonable or rational basis. In this view, It is declared that the cut off” date 1/11/1993” in Regulation 33(1) of the Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 is arbitrary, illegal, discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. 25. Consequently, the respondents are directed to grant pensionary benefits to the petitioners forthwith. The Writ Petition is allowed accordingly.