JUDGMENT : This appeal is filed by the defendant challenging the judgment and decree passed by the IV Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad (lower appellate court) in R.A.No.187/2015 (Old No.55/2012) whereby the judgment and decree dated 28.05.2012 passed by the III Addl. Civil Judge, Dharwad (trial Court) in O.S.No.653/2008 has been confirmed. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rankings before the Trial Court. 3. The facts of the case in brief are that the plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.653/2008 against the defendant for possession and mesne profits in respect of property bearing No. CTS No. 188/A/LB measuring 278 sq. yards situated at Line Bazaar, Dharwad, contending that one Hanuman Prasad Shukla gifted the suit property along with other properties in favour of father of plaintiff No.1 namely, Ramachandra Pujar under registered gift deed dated 07.02.1981; that in the partition, among the joint family members of plaintiff No.1, the suit property was allotted to plaintiff No.1. 4. The plaintiffs further contended that the heirs of late Parashuram Chidambar namely, Vasantibai and others surrendered their lease hold rights in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of properties bearing No. 192/7E, 192/1A/1A/1 on 22.11.2007; that Omprakash Balaram Tiwari surrendered lease hold rights in respect of the properties bearing CTS No.189/2A/1, 192/7G, 192/1A/7, 192/1A/11, 192/2B and 189/1 on 19.11.2007. It was further averred that the defendant is in possession of the suit property as tenant on rental of Rs.45/- per month; that they have issued notice dated 08.07.2008 terminating the tenancy but he failed to vacate the premises and hence plaintiffs have filed the suit for possession and mesne profit. 5. The defendant filed his written statement refuting the plaint averments contending inter-alia that the plaintiffs have no right over the schedule property. He denied the gift as well as surrender of tenancy rights as contended in the plaint; that the 2nd plaintiff is a builder and hence had filed the suit to seek possession; that necessary parties are not impleaded in the suit. Thus, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 6. The plaintiff No.2 examined himself as PW-1 and got marked 31 documents as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.31. The defendant did not lead any oral or documentary evidence. Thus, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 6. The plaintiff No.2 examined himself as PW-1 and got marked 31 documents as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.31. The defendant did not lead any oral or documentary evidence. The trial court decreed the suit with costs directing the defendant to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs within 60 days. The defendant being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, preferred an appeal before the Senior Civil Judge, Dharwad, in R.A.No.55/2012 which was transferred to the court of District Judge, Dharwad (renumbered as R.A.No.187/2015). The lower appellate court by judgment and decree dated 29.04.2016 dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the Lower appellate court, the defendant is in regular second appeal. 7. Sri. Murugendra Tubake, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant assailing the impugned judgment and decree would contend that Section 9 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964, (for short ‘the Act’) contemplates that a suit cognizable by the Court of Small Causes shall not be tried by any other court having jurisdiction within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Small Causes Court by which the suit is triable. It is not in dispute that the Act applies to Dharwad town. The trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The lower appellate court ought to have set aside the judgment and decree on this ground. The judgment and decree passed by the Small Causes Court without the jurisdiction is nullity in the eye of law. In the case on hand, the suit was triable exclusively by the Court of Small Causes but filed in the Regular Civil Court which had no right to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs have failed to prove their case in the manner known to law and accordingly they should have been non-suited. The courts below failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence in the right perspective while passing the impugned judgment and decree. 8. The defendant had filed an application before the lower appellate court under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC on 15.07.2013 and also an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC seeking amendment to the written statement. The said applications were required to be posted for hearing along with the main appeal. 8. The defendant had filed an application before the lower appellate court under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC on 15.07.2013 and also an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC seeking amendment to the written statement. The said applications were required to be posted for hearing along with the main appeal. The lower appellate court erroneously passed the impugned judgment and decree without making any reference to the same in the operative portion of the judgment. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court is liable to be set aside. The defendant sought to produce the certified copy of the registered sale deed dated 24.10.2008 which was necessary to resolve the matter in controversy. The defendant was oblivious of the said document, hence, he could not produce it before the trial court. The certified copy was obtained by him on 01.07.2013 and the same was sought to be produced before the lower appellate court. As such, denial of opportunity to the defendant to produce the said document results in miscarriage of justice. 9. In support of his contention, the learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of SHIVAMURTHI MALLAYYA SWAMI VS. MAHADEV UMARANE (1989 (1) KLJ 83). 10. Per contra, Sri Gangadhar J.M. the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents would contend that in the year 1981, OS No.37/1981 was field by the member of Tiwari family against the father of the plaintiff No.1, Hanumanprasad Shukla and adopted father of defendant for the relief of declaration that gift deed executed by Hanumanprasad Shukla in favour of father of plaintiffs is void and not binding on the member of Tiwari family and prayed to declare that the lease deed dated 12.12.1985 is permanent in nature. The Trial Court rejected both the prayers and upheld the gift deed made in favour of the plaintiffs and declared that the lease deed is not permanent in nature and held that Tiwari Family has no right over the suit schedule property. RA No.25/1987 came to be filed by the Tiwari family against the judgment and decree passed in OS No.37/1981. The Lower Appellate Court dismissed the said appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. RA No.25/1987 came to be filed by the Tiwari family against the judgment and decree passed in OS No.37/1981. The Lower Appellate Court dismissed the said appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. In the said proceedings, the father of the defendant filed written statement and contested the suit, as such the judgment and decree passed by the competent Court are binding on the defendant. The defendant does not have any legal right to continue with the possession of the suit schedule property. When the defendant/appellant is claiming the rights under sub-lease from the Tiwari Family, the Competent Court having already decided the issue, the defendant being sub-lessee is estopped from contending that the lease in favour of Tiwari family is permanent in nature. 11. As regards the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bangalore Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd. Vs. Soukar T. Premnath reported in ILR 2004 KAR 1998, wherein it is held that a suit for possession of an immovable property is maintainable before an ordinary Court. The learned counsel also placed reliance on judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Lala Pancham and Others, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1008 and argued that a fresh trial is not permissible under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. Accordingly, he seeks for dismissal of the appeal. 12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed on record. 13. It is discernable that the defendant is claiming the right over the suit property as sub-lessee of the Tiwari family. The judgment and decree passed in OS No.37/1981 filed by Tiwari family came to be confirmed in RA No. 25/1987, whereby it is categorically held that Parashuram Tiwari and his legal heirs are not permanent lessees in the property bearing CTS No.6912 by virtue of Kabulayath deed No.1732 A dated 12.12.1985 and Hanumantprasad Shukla had no right in the suit property except collecting rent. The registered gift deed executed in favour of father of plaintiff No.1 by Hanumanprasad Shukla was considered in the said OS No. 37/1981 and said transaction was held to be valid. In such circumstances, the defendant cannot challenge the validity of the gift deed. The registered gift deed executed in favour of father of plaintiff No.1 by Hanumanprasad Shukla was considered in the said OS No. 37/1981 and said transaction was held to be valid. In such circumstances, the defendant cannot challenge the validity of the gift deed. The plaintiff is claiming the right over the suit property on the basis of the said registered gift deed executed in favour of his father. The decided issue cannot be re-opened, the arguments advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the defendant on these points is nothing but abuse of the process of Court. 14. As regards the contention of the defendant in much as jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit for possession, it is beneficial to refer to Section 8 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 (for short, ‘the Act’) which runs thus: 8. Cognizance of suits by Courts of Small Causes.__ (1) A court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. (2) Subject to the exceptions specified in the Schedule and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five hundred rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes: Provided that the State Government, in consultation with the High Court, may by notification, direct that all suits of which the value does not exceed [twenty –five thousand rupees] shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the notification. Clause 4 of Schedule to Section 8 of the Act, contemplates that a suit excepted from the cognizance of Court of Small Causes Act, a suit for possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property is listed as one of the excepted suits, but does not include a suit for ejectment where the property has been let under a lease or permitted to be occupied by a written instrument or orally. Section 9 of the Act postulates exclusive jurisdiction of Court of Small Causes This Court in the case of Bangalore Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd. Vs. Soukar T. Premnath reported in ILR 2004 KAR 1998, while considering the said issue held at para-8 thus: 8. Section 9 of the Act postulates exclusive jurisdiction of Court of Small Causes This Court in the case of Bangalore Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd. Vs. Soukar T. Premnath reported in ILR 2004 KAR 1998, while considering the said issue held at para-8 thus: 8. Thus by a combined reading of Section 8(1) (2) and Section9 and Schedule of the Small Causes Courts Act, the jurisdiction of Small Causes Court is excluded generally in all cases of a “suit for possession of immovable property” no matter what its value or its rent is. But an exception is carved out by way of clause (4) of the Schedule viz., that in case o ‘suit for ejectment’; or where the property has been let under a lease or permitted to be occupied by written instrument or orally, then only the Court of Small Causes would be competent to take cognizance of ‘suit for ejectment’. Thus, the Small Causes Courts Act (in the schedule) itself makes a distinction between a ‘suit for possession’ and ‘suit for ejectment’. In the former case, Small Causes Courts jurisdiction is excluded and in the latter, it is included suit for ejectment, in the context would only mean cases where suits for possession are not covered. A suit for possession could only mean that in all cases where transaction is governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, the remedy of a lessor against a lessee on the determination of lease is to file only a ‘suit for possession’ before an ordinary Civil Court. Such cases cannot be construed as a ‘suit for ejectment’. Thus, Section 8 of the Small Causes Courts Act relied by the Petitioner in no way advances his case. Per contra, justifies the finding of the learned Civil Judge. 15. On conjoint reading of the provisions narrated above with judgment cited supra, it is manifestly clear that the Schedule to the Act makes a distinction between “a suit for possession” and “suit for ejectment”. In the former case, Small Cause Courts jurisdiction is excluded in the latter it is included, the jurisdiction of an ordinary Civil Court is not ousted in the cases of suit for possession. The arguments of the plaintiff on this point do not deserve any merit, accordingly fails. 16. In the former case, Small Cause Courts jurisdiction is excluded in the latter it is included, the jurisdiction of an ordinary Civil Court is not ousted in the cases of suit for possession. The arguments of the plaintiff on this point do not deserve any merit, accordingly fails. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that the Lower Appellate Court failed to address the points regarding the application for production of additional evidence and amendment of written statement in the impugned order. A perusal of the impugned order makes it clear that the Lower Appellate Court has elaborately discussed the same at paragraphs 17 to 22 before coming to the conclusion that amendment for written statement which was sought by the defendant/appellant cannot be considered. Similarly, the production of documents sought by the defendant is also held to be not necessary to adjudicate the matter. Thus, it is evident that the Lower Appellate Court has applied its mind and considered the application of the defendant and having given a finding on the points involved in the applications filed by the defendant passed the final order dismissing the appeal. In the circumstances, the contentions of the appellant on this point do not merit any consideration. The arguments of the appellant that the injunction was granted in OS No.37/1981 confirmed in RA No. 25/1987 against the plaintiff’s father, as such the suit filed by the plaintiff for possession is not maintainable is wholly untenable, since the plaintiffs have to evict the defendant only through due process of law and the same having been done by the plaintiffs cannot be said to be not maintainable. The grounds urged by the appellant/defendant in challenging the impugned judgment and decree are based on pure facts. No substantial question of arises for consideration in the appeal. Both the Courts below have considered the material evidence in extenso to arrive at a conclusion, decreeing the suit. The concurrent findings of the Courts below do not warrant any interference by this Court. 17. Appeal stands dismissed.