JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been preferred by the State against the judgment dated 5.2.1996 passed by the Distt. & Sessions Judge, Hanumangarh (for short 'the trial court' hereinafter) in Sessions Case No.34/94 (231/94), whereby, the learned trial court has acquitted the accused respondents from the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. 2. Briefly stated facts of the case are that Shah Mohd. resident of village Kikarwali, Tehsil Sangaria, Distt. Hanumangarh submitted a written report to the SHO, Police Station Hanumangarh Junction on 4.4.1994 stating therein that his elder daughter Sardara was married to Liyakat five years and six months back and at the time of her marriage, he gave five tollas of gold, one kilogram of silver, one buffalo, clothes and utensils etc. in dowry. It is stated that at the time of marriage, Liyakat, Hakam, Saddak and Ranjhe Khan had shown displeasure while saying that the dowry is less and they had demanded motorcycle and Rs.20,000/- cash. It is stated that the complainant asked them that at present he is not having that much money and, therefore, he would give more dowry after sometime. It is alleged that from time to time, the accused persons demanded dowry and on three occasions, they had thrown out his daughter from their house and for that a meeting (Panchayat) was held in the presence of Panchas namely Fateh Deen, Haji Mohd. Sadik and Ammen etc. and at that time, the accused persons agreed that they would not demand for the dowry. It is stated that thereafter the complainant got his younger daughter Arsan married to the brother of Liyakat son of Ranjhe Khan and at the time of marriage, he also gave certain dowry items including gold and silver ornaments and at that time also, the accused persons had shown displeasure while saying that the dowry is less and had also demanded Rs.20,000/- and a motorcycle. It is stated that at that time also, several villagers asked the accused persons that the dowry would be given to them after sometime. It is alleged by the complainant in the complaint that after 5-6 months, his younger daughter Arsan was thrown out of her in-laws house and for that purpose, a meeting was again held. It is stated that at that time also, several villagers asked the accused persons that the dowry would be given to them after sometime. It is alleged by the complainant in the complaint that after 5-6 months, his younger daughter Arsan was thrown out of her in-laws house and for that purpose, a meeting was again held. It is alleged that the complainant's younger daughter Arsan told her father that her in-laws used to harass her and her elder sister Sardara for demand of dowry. It is further alleged that in the meeting held in relation to Arsan, the accused persons refused to keep her at her in-laws house, however, on the assurance given by her elder daughter Sardara, they sent Arsan to her in-laws house. It is further stated in the complaint that on 2.4.1994, the complainant went to the in-laws house of his daughters, where he found that the accused persons are beating his daughter Sardara and when the complainant tried to stop them, they told him that they will do like this until their demands does not met. It is further alleged in the complaint that today on 4.4.1994, at about 6 am, the complainant was informed that his daughter has been killed by the accused persons. After receiving this information, when he reached at the in-laws house of his daughter Sardara, he saw her dead body and her clothes were smeared with blood. It is prayed in the complaint that the accused persons had killed his daughter for dowry and, therefore, action be taken against them. 3. On receiving the report, the police has lodged an FIR for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC against the persons named in the FIR and after investigation, the police has filed charge-sheet against the accused persons for the aforesaid offence. During the course of trial, the prosecution has produced as many as 12 witnesses and the statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The learned trial court after considering the evidence produced on behalf of the prosecution has acquitted the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. Hence, this appeal. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor while assailing the impugned judgment has argued that the learned trial court has failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in right perspective. Hence, this appeal. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor while assailing the impugned judgment has argued that the learned trial court has failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in right perspective. It is argued that the prosecution by producing cogent and reliable evidence has sufficiently proved the charge against the accused respondents for commission of offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, however, the learned trial court has illegally acquitted the accused respondents from the aforesaid offence. It is further argued that from the evidence of Mumtaz (PW-4) and Shah Mohd. (PW-10), it is clear that deceased Sardara was subjected to cruelty by the accused respondents soon before her death for bringing less dowry, however, the learned trial court has disbelieved the testimony of the above mentioned witnesses while citing minor contradictions and improvements in their statements in comparison to the statements recorded by the police. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor has argued that minor contradictions are insignificant, but the learned trial court has grossly erred in giving credence to such contradictions and improvements. It is also argued that from the statement of the other witnesses namely mother and sister of the deceased, it is clear that the deceased was subjected to harassment and cruelty at the hands of the accused respondents soon before her death on account of bringing less dowry. In such circumstances, the learned trial court has grossly erred in giving a finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. 6. On the strength of the above arguments, learned Public Prosecutor has argued that the prosecution has sufficiently proved by producing cogent and reliable evidence before the trial court that the accused respondents are guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, however, the learned trial court, without appreciating the evidence in right perspective, has illegally acquitted the accused respondents and, therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the accused respondents are liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused respondents has argued that the learned trial court has appreciated the evidence produced by the prosecution in right perspective and has rightly held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused respondents has argued that the learned trial court has appreciated the evidence produced by the prosecution in right perspective and has rightly held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused. It is argued that the learned trial court has not committed any illegality in acquitting the accused respondents as the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused respondents for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC and, therefore, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment. 8. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and carefully scrutinized the record. 9. So far as the power of the High Court in reversing the finding of acquittal into conviction is concerned, there is no quarrel that the High Court has power to convert the acquittal into conviction, however, it is equally true that if the trial court's judgment is based on evidence and the view taken by the trial court in favour of the accused is possible, the High Court would not be justified in interfering only on the ground that a different view could also be taken. 10. On this point, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Singh & Ors. v. State of M.P., reported in 2010 Cr.L.R. (SC) 453 has held as under: "7. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The High Court's power while converting an acquittal into a conviction is no longer a matter of speculation and debate. It is now well settled that if the trial Court's judgment is well based on the evidence and the conclusion drawn in favour of the accused was possible thereof, the High Court would not be justified in interfering on the premise that a different view could also be taken and though the High Court was entitled to reappraise the evidence there should be substantial and compelling reasons for setting aside an acquittal order and making one of conviction." 11. In Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2011 Cr.L.R. (SC) 303 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : 10. In Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2011 Cr.L.R. (SC) 303 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : 10. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi, this Court held that "the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence, cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal, the appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate Court answers the above question in the negative, the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions". 11. In Dwarka Das, this Court following the decision in Ramesh Babulal Doshi, further observed that "there 14 cannot be any denial of the factum that the power and authority to appraise the evidence in an appeal, either against acquittal or conviction stands out to be very comprehensive and wide, but if two views are reasonably possible, on the state of evidence: one supporting the acquittal and the other indicating conviction, then and in that event, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal, merely because it feels that it, sitting as a trial court, would have taken the other view. While re appreciating the evidence, the rule of prudence requires that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the views of the trial Judge. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on a wrong appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice". 12. In Chandrappa & Ors. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on a wrong appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice". 12. In Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court re appreciating the aforesaid principles, further observed that "in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Though the above principles are well established, a different note was struck in several decisions by various High Courts and even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we consider some of the leading decisions on the point". Having stated so, this Court also held that an appellate Court has full power to re appreciate, review and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable view to the accused has been taken by the trial Court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate Court." 11. In view of the principles laid down in above referred judgments, if we analyse the evidence available on record, PW-4 Mumtaz and PW-10 Shah Mohd. in their statements had specifically stated that deceased Sardara was subjected to cruelty and harassment at the hands of her in-laws soon before her death. They have stated that deceased Sardara was thrown from her in-laws house and the accused respondents demanded Rs.20,000/- and a motorcycle in dowry and for that purpose, a meeting was held in the presence of Fatehdeen (PW-5), Ismail (PW-6), Ameen Khan (PW-8) and Haji Mohd. They have stated that deceased Sardara was thrown from her in-laws house and the accused respondents demanded Rs.20,000/- and a motorcycle in dowry and for that purpose, a meeting was held in the presence of Fatehdeen (PW-5), Ismail (PW-6), Ameen Khan (PW-8) and Haji Mohd. Sadik (PW-9), however, all the aforesaid witnesses in their statements had specifically stated that a meeting was held in relation to the ill treatment given to the younger daughter of the complainant namely Arsan and was not in relation to deceased Sardara. None of the witnesses has stated that the accused persons had demanded motorcycle or Rs.20,000/- for Sardara in front of them. It is also specifically stated that there was no meeting in relation to deceased Sardara and the meeting was only in relation to younger daughter of the complainant namely Arsan. While appreciating the prosecution evidence, the learned trial court has found that the main prosecution witnesses i.e. Mumtaz (PW-4) and Shah Mohd. (PW-10) had deposed contrary to the earlier statements given by them before the police and they had improved a lot and had said many more things, which they have not stated in their police statements. 12. After carefully going through the prosecution evidence, I am of the opinion that Mumtaz (PW-4) and Shah Mohd. (PW-10) had improved a lot in their court statements and stated certain facts, which they have not stated in their police statements. Both the above mentioned witnesses had specifically stated in their statements that a meeting in relation to the fact of harassment of the deceased Sardara took place soon before her death in the presence of Fatehdeen, Ismail, Ameen Khan and Haji Mohd. Sadik, however, the above named witnesses in their court statements had specifically asserted that the meeting was not in relation to deceased Sardara, but was in relation to the younger daughter of the deceased. 13. Keeping in view the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases, if we go through the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused persons for the offence under Section 304-B IPC, I find that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial court could be a possible view which can be arrived at on the basis of the evidence produced by the prosecution. 14. 14. In such circumstances, I am of the view that the trial court has not committed any illegality in acquitting the accused respondents from the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. Hence, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial court.Accordingly, this appeal being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed. *******