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Jharkhand High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 897 (JHR)

Gopal Prasad, son of Late Bhudhar Prasad v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. through its, Chairman

2016-05-20

RATNAKER BHENGRA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Ratnaker Bhengra, J. - The prayer of the petitioner is for issuing show-cause as to how they have withheld an amount of Rs. 4,30,000/- (approximately) from the retirement benefit of the petitioner and further for direction to immediately release the amount of Rs. 4,30,000/- (approximately), which has been withheld by the respondent authorities without any authority or any order with compensatory interest. 2. Before proceeding with the matter, an initial question was raised by the respondents and needed to be settled was whether this High Court was the appropriate forum for deciding the issues involved in this case, rather it should be decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal. 3. The learned counsel for the SAIL has submitted a notification No. S.O 727(E) dated 31.3.2010 where in exercise of the powers conferred under subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985(13 of 1985), the Central Government has specified the organisation to which subsection (3) of section 14 of the aforesaid Act will apply, and in the schedule attached at serial No. 201 is the Steel Authority of India Ltd(SAIL). Learned counsel then says that by the notifications the correct forum to hear this issue is the Central Administrative Tribunal(CAT).He also produced a net copy of the order dated 7.2.2003 Alok Agrawal v. Union of India and Ors (W.P.(C) No. 6606 of 2011) decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Chhattisgarh in which a dispute with SAIL and certain employees was existing and the validity of the notification dated 31.3.2010 was questioned. The Hon'ble High Court of Chattisgarh held that there was no illegality in the notification. Another instance was cited in Rabindra Singh v. The Steel Authority of India, W.P.(C) No. 474 of 2014 decided on 18.8.2015 wherein both parties agreed that cause of action is cognisable by CAT and thus Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court gave liberty to raise the issue before CAT. Hence, this issue of lack of jurisdiction was not agreed to by the petitioner who submitted that when natural justice has been obstructed or violated, then the Hon'ble High Court can hear and decide the matter. As against this issue of jurisdictional maintainability counsel for the petitioner has countered by saying that it has been held by the Apex Court of the Land that in cases where natural justice has been violated then the High Court can indeed hear such cases. As against this issue of jurisdictional maintainability counsel for the petitioner has countered by saying that it has been held by the Apex Court of the Land that in cases where natural justice has been violated then the High Court can indeed hear such cases. The petitioner has claimed a violation of the principles of natural justice since no immediate notice or any opportunity was given to the petitioner prior to the withholding of Rs. 4,30,000/- that even no order was issued for withholding the same, but the same was simply withheld and that too from the retirement benefits of the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner has stated that there was some communication made to him on the matter dated 10.2.1999 and before but the approximate amount of Rs. 4,30,000/- was deducted from the final settlement after his superannuation on 30.6.2009 and that too without any notice, so it is clearly a violation of natural justice. They simply deducted the amount even without any order to the same. Based on these aforementioned reasons this court has thus entered into the case. 4. The facts of the case according to the petitioner is that the petitioner joined Bokaro Steel Plant on 11.12.1970. The petitioner state that the petitioner was allotted a residential quarters by the Company during his service tenure. The petitioner has availed house building advance from the respondent Company amounting to Rs. 2,00,000/-. The same was sanctioned by office order dated 05.12.1994.The said amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- was sanctioned in three instalments. 5. That the petitioner states that the aforesaid advance of Rs. 2,00,000/- was fully utilised by the petitioner for constructing his residential house. However, as the said sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- was not sufficient for the purpose of completing the house, the petitioner could not finish the electrical, water supply works and also could not arrange for other fittings and fixture. Moreover, the approach road and a bridge over a drench was not constructed by the Municipality in the locality where the petitioner had purchased the plot, the petitioner could not shift his family to his residential house and continued to occupy the residential quarters allotted by the respondent company. 6. That the petitioner states that the advance of Rs. 2,00,000/- was adjusted by the respondent company from the monthly salary and the same recovered during the service tenure of the petitioner. 7. 6. That the petitioner states that the advance of Rs. 2,00,000/- was adjusted by the respondent company from the monthly salary and the same recovered during the service tenure of the petitioner. 7. That the petitioner states that the respondent authority had directed the petitioner to vacate his residential quarters through letter dated 10.10.1996. The petitioner through letter dated 17.06.1997, was again asked to vacate his residential quarters. The petitioner again represented before the concerned authority and since his grievance was found to be genuine, the respondent authorities did not take any action in pursuance of the said letter. That the petitioner states that again through a letter dated 10.02.1999 with caution of penal rent and legal action the petitioner was directed to vacate his residential quarters. Then the petitioner replied to the same vide 20 his letter dated 20.02.1999 bringing to the knowledge of the respondent authorities the genuine difficulties faced by the petitioner. The respondents, upon verifying, found the petitioner's grievance to be genuine and hence did not take any action for vacating the quarters. The residential quarters allotted to him by the respondent Company was not cancelled. The respondent authorities did not initiate any proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972. Thus, the petitioner was never declared to be an unauthorized occupant during his entire service tenure. 8. The petitioner, ultimately, superannuated from the services of the respondent Company on 30.06.2009 as Senior Manager. No departmental proceeding was pending against the petitioner at the time of his superannuation and there was no amount to be recovered from the petitioner and this he claims from the Final Settlement Statement for separated employees 9. The respondents have released some amount of retirement benefit to the petitioner, but have withheld an amount of Rs. 4,30,000/- approximately from the retirement benefit of the petitioner. 10. That the petitioner states that however, no order has been passed by any authority for withholding the aforesaid amount. On repeated requests, the petitioner was verbally informed by the respondent no. 4 that since he had not vacated his quarters after constructing his own residential house, the amount of Rs. 4,30,000/- has been withheld towards penal rent and damages. 10. That the petitioner states that however, no order has been passed by any authority for withholding the aforesaid amount. On repeated requests, the petitioner was verbally informed by the respondent no. 4 that since he had not vacated his quarters after constructing his own residential house, the amount of Rs. 4,30,000/- has been withheld towards penal rent and damages. The petitioner has further stated that the house building advance sanctioned by the office order dated 5.12.1994 and the terms therein state that the advance was subjected to the provisions of Circular No. 134 dated 27.2.1985 read with Circular No. 22 of 1985 dated 18/31/7/1985. The Circular dated 27.2.1985 provides that the Company's quarter shall be vacated by the employee if they have constructed their own houses within the Municipal Limits of the town/city of his posting and also that the employees constructing their house within 8 k.ms radius of B.S.L. Administrative Building shall also vacate their company's accommodation within three months of the construction. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the house was constructed beyond the Municipal Limits of the township within which the company is situated. Counsel has submitted that circular dated 27.2.1985 and 18/31/7/1985 do not apply in petitioner's case. He has also submitted that the company's house building advance rules do not provide for imposition of any penalty on the employee who fail to vacate quarter, that even the office order dated 5.12.1994 to the writ petition does not provide for any penalty. Thus imposition of penalty upon the petitioner without any proceeding is arbitrary. Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that office order/circular dated 14.7.1981 (Annexure A to the counter affidavit) relied upon by the respondents does not prescribed any penalty on the employee who does not vacate the company's accommodation and neither does not have any 8 K.Ms clause and in any way his house was constructed beyond the municipal limits of the company's townships. 11. The respondents on the other hand have submitted that the house building advance for Rs. 2,00,000/- was sanctioned by the respondent Company which was utilised by the petitioner for constructing his residential house but even after construction of his house the petitioner has not vacated the quarter. 12. 11. The respondents on the other hand have submitted that the house building advance for Rs. 2,00,000/- was sanctioned by the respondent Company which was utilised by the petitioner for constructing his residential house but even after construction of his house the petitioner has not vacated the quarter. 12. The respondents charged that the petitioner even after construction of a house within 8 kilometre radius from specific centre of the township as prescribed in a circular had not vacated the company's quarter. It is important to mention here that as per House Building Loan Rule if it is taken within 8 kilometre radius the petitioner had to vacate the said quarter within or up to 18 months failing which imposing of penal house rent get started and thus penal rent and other charges as applicable to private party has been charged which came to Rs. 4,30,000/- and deducted thereafter from the final settlement of the petitioner after his superannuation. 13. The respondents informed that the petitioner has to vacate the quarter after the expiry of 18 months after obtaining the House Building Advance Loan within 8 kilometre radius but the same was not done by the petitioner hence, the quarter in question was not under lawful occupation of the petitioner and the petitioner became the unauthorized occupant. It is important to mention here that several times notices were given to the petitioner for vacation of the quarter in question. After the expiry of 18 months it was the duty of the petitioner to vacate the quarter hence question of departmental proceeding does not arise. It is stated and submitted that as per the Company's House Building Advance rule petitioner had to vacate the quarter in question after the expiry of 18 months failing which penal rent will be charged automatically had become unauthorized occupant therefore the amount has been deducted towards penal house rent and other charges from the retirement benefits. 14. The respondents informed that as per House Building Loan Rule if house is constructed within 8 kilometre radius the petitioner had to vacate the said quarter within or up to 18 months failing which imposing of penal house rent get started hence the question of giving order regarding recovery of penal rent to the petitioner does not arise. 15. 14. The respondents informed that as per House Building Loan Rule if house is constructed within 8 kilometre radius the petitioner had to vacate the said quarter within or up to 18 months failing which imposing of penal house rent get started hence the question of giving order regarding recovery of penal rent to the petitioner does not arise. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand relied on the decision in Razi Ahmad v. SAIL, Bokaro Steel Plant and Ors, W.P (S) 2881 of 2010 order dated 3.12.2013. The Hon'ble Single Judge in para 9 observed that "....in the counter affidavit it has not been disclosed by the respondents that, the penal rent has been imposed upon the petitioner as he constructed his own house and failed to vacate the official accommodation within 3 months after such construction. On a harmonious reading of the Circulars dated 27.2.1985, 21.01.1992 and 18.7.1985, I am of the view that an employee would be liable to pay penal rent for retaining official accommodation only when the employee fails to vacate the official accommodation within 3 months on acquiring or constructing a house. In the present case, I do not find any materiala on record, on the basis of which the respondents have come to a conclusion that the petitioner though constructed a house, failed to vacate the quarter and therefore, the respondents have imposed the penal rent of Rs. 1,90,542/- upon the petitioner. Mere grant of house loan is not sufficient. Moreover, no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner ...". 16. The said writ was allowed with direction to the respondents to refund the amount of Rs. 1,90,542/- subject to their right for recovery of penal rent from the petitioner after furnishing details to the petitioner. 17. He has also cited the judgment in State of Punjab and Ors v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) etc 2015 (1) JLJR (SC) 323 para 12 wherein the Apex Court has enumerated guidelines and concluded inter alia situations such as when recoveries by the employees, would be impressionable in law such as "(ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year of the order of recovery." For the aforesaid grounds in his petition and the cases he has cited petitioner has prayed that the amount from retiral dues amount approximately Rs. 4,30,000/- withheld from him be released to him. 18. Mr. Abhay Mishra learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in the case of Secretary, O.N.G.C Ltd. and Anr. v. V.U. Warrier reported in (2005) 5 SCC 245 in para 28 wherein the Apex Court held "...the respondent-petitioner before the High Court was a responsible officer holding the post of Additional Director (Finance and Accounts). He was, thus, "gold collar" employee of the Commission. He was allotted a residential quarter. He reached the age of superannuation and retired after office hours of February 28, 1990. He was, therefore, required to vacate the quarter allotted to him by the Commission. The Commission, as per its policy, granted four months' time to vacate. He, however, failed to do so. His prayer for continuing to occupy the quarter was duly considered and rejected on relevant and germane grounds. The residential accommodation constructed by him by taking loan at the concessional rate from the Commission was leased to Commission, but the possession of that quarter was restored to him taking into account the fact that he had retired and now he will have to vacate the quarter allotted to him by the Commission. In spite of that he continued to occupy the quarter ignoring the warning by the Commission that if he would not vacate latest by June 30, 1990 penal rent would be charged from him. In our Judgment considering all these facts, the High Court was wholly unjustified in exercising extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner-respondent herein and on that ground also the order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside." 19. In our Judgment considering all these facts, the High Court was wholly unjustified in exercising extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner-respondent herein and on that ground also the order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside." 19. However, in this case there was also regulation 5 framed under Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Death, Retirement and Terminal Gratuity) Regulation, 1959 which reads : "5 Recovery of Dues :" The appointing authority, or any other authority empowered by the Commission in this behalf shall have the right to make recovery of Commission's dues before the payment of the death-cum-retirement gratuity due in respect of an officer even without obtaining his consent or without obtaining the consent of the members of his family in the case of the deceased officer, as the case may be" He has also cited the decision in the case of Gauri Chakraborty v. M/s Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited through its Manger (Law) Jamshedpur (East Singhbhum) and Ors passed in L.P.A. No. 293 of 2006 on 6.8.2007 in para 29 by the High Court of Jharkhand in which the Division Bench of this Court has observed that " “The issue as to whether the appellant is liable for vacating the quarter before payment of the entire amount of gratuity became otiose, as she has already vacated the quarter and has got the amount of the gratuity. Secondly, if the object for litigating the matter is to safe guard the interest of other employees for future, nothing has been brought on record to show that the appellant has been given any such authority by other employees or she is otherwise entitled or competent to espouse the cause of other employees. Thirdly, the appeal is confined to the points involved in the writ petition, but no such purpose was pleaded before learned Single Judge. The said point is thus beyond the scope of the appeal. Fourthly, subsection 5 of section 4 of the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 recognises such rules of the employees in clear terms that the provisions of this section shall not affect the right of an employees to receive better terms of gratuity under any award of agreement or contract with the employer. Fourthly, subsection 5 of section 4 of the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 recognises such rules of the employees in clear terms that the provisions of this section shall not affect the right of an employees to receive better terms of gratuity under any award of agreement or contract with the employer. Neither the prayer has been made to declare the Company's Gratuity Rules ultra vires nor any material has been placed on record to show that the provisions of payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 have overriding effect over the Company's Gratuity Rule, and/or an employee, who opted for the benefits of the Company Gratuity Rules, can subsequently switch over to the provisions of payment of Gratuity Act,1972". 20. However, The Hon'ble High Court further observed in the end at para 30 that "In Secretary, O.N.G.C Ltd Supra, the Apex Court has held that the gratuity cannot be allowed, if an employees does not vacate the quarter. In 1988 (11) SCC 112, the Supreme Court has held that the interest is not payable on the amount of gratuity, if the same is withheld for the fault of an employee." 21. Respondent's counsel also cited the decision in Bokaro Steel Limited v. Shri Ram Naresh Singh and Ors passed in L.P.A No. 15 of 2013 on 24.1.2014, by the learned Division Bench in which the learned Division Bench set aside the order of the learned Single Judge wherein the appellant company was directed to pay the entire gratuity amount retained by them to the respondents along with interest @ 6 per cent per annum. However, in this case for retention of the quarter after retirement, the respondents voluntarily agreed to pay an amount equal to gratuity as security and to that effect, the respondent had also executed undertaking. In this case it was also noticed that the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition mainly on the ground that the appellant ought to have approached the prescribed authority for determination of the penal rent/damages/mesne profit and that the appellants have no jurisdiction to determines the same themselves and to deduct the same from the post retiral benefits without invoking the provision of the Public Premises(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971. The Division Bench of this Court in para 22 had also held that "... The Division Bench of this Court in para 22 had also held that "... The learned Single Judge was not right in saying that the appellants have no jurisdiction to determine the penal rent/damages/mesne profits. Before the Estate Officer, the appellant has filed case No. A/E 07/2011 under section 5, for eviction and under section 7, for payment of damages, of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)Act, 1971, vide order dated 29.8.2012,the Estate Officer passed the order of eviction and also quantified the damages payable by the respondent. Even though the Estate Officer passed the order on 29.8.2012, the same was not kept in view by the learned Single Judge when the writ court allowed the writ petition on 10.12.2012 and thus, the order of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside". 22. Having gone through the facts, records of the case and the arguments of the counsels and certain case laws, what emerges is that the reasons or difficulties cited by the petitioner some of which may be technically safe for him, the other reasons cited by him do not appear appropriate. From the arguments and case law presented by the respondents, there may be situations where the employee is clearly at fault, may be deliberate fault, then exercise of the extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction may be against him who is at fault. However, on the basis of other case law, including those cited in this case the petitioner is entitled for payment of the amount withheld. Petitioner in his petition has lamented that he could not finish the electrical, water supply works and also could not arrange for other fittings and fixture. Moreover, the approach road and a bridge over a drench was not constructed by the Municipality in the locality where the petitioner had purchased the plot, the petitioner could not shift his family to his residential house and continued to occupy the residential quarters allotted by the respondent company. It is not possible to believe that when the petitioner had taken loan for construction of his house in 1994, that by the time he retired in 2009, he had not constructed his house by then nor at least some year prior to 2009. It is not possible to believe that when the petitioner had taken loan for construction of his house in 1994, that by the time he retired in 2009, he had not constructed his house by then nor at least some year prior to 2009. He mentioned about a bridge not being constructed over a drench and that he could not move his family appear much too lame, because, if he could build his house for which he must have at least moved cement, sand, stone chips, bricks and machinery, then he could easily have moved his family. 23. However regarding the municipal limits and the 8 k.m distance argument he may succeed .The petitioner has in his pleading and more in his arguments insisted that he is not situated within the municipal limits or the city limits of Bokaro Steel Ltd or Bokaro Steel City. In the case cited by the petitioner Razi Ahmad (Supra), there is a reference to a circular dated 21.01.1992, apparently, it seems that for places at a distance of 8 k.m from the Bokaro Steel City, there is an Annexure 1, where such villages are listed. The petitioner has kept insisting that he is not within the municipal or city limits of Bokaro Steel Ltd or Bokaro Steel City. The respondents have not stated whether he falls within any such village or place. The petitioner insists he is in Chas not therefore within municipal limits or at 8 k.m distance. 24. Another ground raised by the petitioner has been that he was retired and the amount was deducted from his retiral dues and subsequent to that only he came to know when the petitioner made enquiry . He claims that before making any deductions or withholding any amounts he should at least have been noticed, the grounds for such deduction were not known to him and nor was there any order for deduction or withholding of the amount, and he did not even known for what the deductions were made and if for a period, then from when to when. So even for these reasons or lack of proper and informed notice such deductions are not permissible or legal. In the Razi Ahmed(Supra) case in paragraph 9 the Single Judge has observed "Mere grant of house loan is not sufficient Moreover, no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner". So even for these reasons or lack of proper and informed notice such deductions are not permissible or legal. In the Razi Ahmed(Supra) case in paragraph 9 the Single Judge has observed "Mere grant of house loan is not sufficient Moreover, no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner". In this case also the petitioner did not receive any notice. 25. In addition to the case law cited by the petitioner and respondents, few more cases are relevant. As early as 1985, with reference to pension and gratuity the Apex Court had observed in State of Kerala and Ors. v. M. Padmanabhan Nair reported in (1985) 1 SCC 429 in para 1 that "... pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Government to its employees on their retirement but have become, under the decision of this Court, valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till actual payment." 26. Then in Gorakhpur University and Ors v. Dr. Shitla Prasad Nagendra and Ors reported in (2001) 6 S.C.C 591 in para 5, the Apex Court observed that " withholding of quarters allotted, while in service, even after retirement without vacating the same has been viewed to be not a valid ground to withhold the disbursement of the terminal benefits..." 27. The court has also observed in the same paragraph that- "... The lethargy shown by the authorities in not taking any action according to law to enforce their right to recover possession of the quarters from the respondent or fix liability or determine the so called penal rent after giving prior show-cause notice or any opportunity to him before ever even proceeding to recover the same from the respondent renders the claim for penal rent not only a seriously disputed or contested claim but the University cannot be allowed to recover summarily the alleged dues according to its whims in a vindictive manner by adopting different and discriminatory standards". Then in another case N.C. Sharma v. Union of India and others reported 2004 (3) Mh. L.J 478, the Apex Court has similarly observed as aforesaid in the two cases just cited. Then in another case N.C. Sharma v. Union of India and others reported 2004 (3) Mh. L.J 478, the Apex Court has similarly observed as aforesaid in the two cases just cited. It was observed in paragraph 19 that "A debate was raised before us that the direction in this decision to recover dues for unauthorized occupancy of official quarters in accordance with law would include the Rules in question and powers conferred thereunder. We find it difficult to accept this contention. Here, the direction of the Division Bench cannot be misconstrued to mean recourse to any other mode than institution of proceedings under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorizes Occupants) Act. If the premises partake the character of public premises then the remedy provided by section 7 of this enactment coupled with the right of appeal provided thereunder would be the only remedy. In case of a doubt about the nature of occupancy and the character of the premises, civil suit is the other remedy. The moment authorities seek to recover penal damages in respect of official accommodation or its retention beyond the permissible period, then the aforesaid modes of recovery only are available. It is not permissible for the authorities to fall back on the Rules pertaining to grant Terminal benefits and effect recovery therefrom." 28. Therefore, on the basis of the aforementioned facts, arguments, records and reasoning, the respondent company is directed to release the amount of approximate Rs. 4,30,000/- @ 6% interest and to refund the same to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receiving of a copy of this order, their liberty for recovery of penal rent from the petitioner after noticing him and furnishing complete details to the petitioner remaining intact . Order accordingly.