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2016 DIGILAW 9 (CAL)

Sadhan Ghosh v. State of West Bengal

2016-01-05

DEBASISH KAR GUPTA, MD.MUMTAZ KHAN

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JUDGMENT : Debasish Kar Gupta, J. This appeal is directed against an order of conviction under Section 235(2) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.), dated December 19, 2013 passed in S.C.No.30(2)2012 by the Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.-I), Krishnanagar, Nadia. By virtue of the impugned judgment and order of conviction held the appellant guilty for commission of offence under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the I.P.C.) and sentenced the appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.5000/- in default to suffer further simple imprisonment for three years and if the above amount would realise, 50% of the same was directed to be remitted to the family of the deceased. The other accused Bikash Ghosh was acquitted holding him not guilty for the offence under Section 320/34 of the I.P.C. According to the prosecution case, on January 11, 2011 at about 16.30 hours, Samaresh @ Babu Ghosh of village-Khantura Ghosh Para, P.S.-Krishnaganj, District-Nadia, the husband of PW 1, went to the burning ghat situated at the back side of Majdia College along with others for cremation of one Dhiren Sardar. Many other people were present at the burning ghat. At that point of time Sadhan Ghosh (the appellant) abused the deceased with filthy languages due to previous grudge. An altercation took place among the appellant and the deceased. It was stopped for the time being. The appellant returned to his home and came back to the above burning ghat with other persons armed with some deadly weapons for the purpose of killing the deceased. The appellant was accompanied by Prosenjit Ghosh, Indrajit Ghosh, both son of Sadhan Ghosh, Bikash Ghosh son of Lt. Dhiren Ghosh, Kalipada Ghosh son of Lt. Dhiren Ghosh all of village-Khantura Ghoshpara, P.S.-Krishnaganj, District-Nadia and others. The appellant assaulted the deceased on his left chest with sharp cutting weapon and the other aforesaid accused persons encircled him with deadly weapons including firearms. The deceased fell down on the ground and there was profuse bleeding from the injured portion of body of the deceased. The PW 1 went to the above place of occurrence after receiving the above information from the local people and took the deceased to Krishnaganj Government Hospital for treatment. The deceased fell down on the ground and there was profuse bleeding from the injured portion of body of the deceased. The PW 1 went to the above place of occurrence after receiving the above information from the local people and took the deceased to Krishnaganj Government Hospital for treatment. In compliance of the direction of Duty Officer of Krishnaganj Police Station, Jahar Lal Chatterjee, Sub-Inspector of Police, (PW 14), attached to Krishnanagar Police Station, went to the Krishnaganj Hospital on January 11, 2011 at about 19.35 hours. The doctor of the above hospital declared the victim dead. He prepared surathal report over the dead body of deceased Samaresh Ghosh @ Babu with reference to Krishnaganj P.S. U/D Case No.1 of 2011 dated January 11, 2011. The dead body of the victim was sent to the District Hospital, Krishnagar, District-Nadia, for post mortem examination. PW 7 conducted the post mortem examination on January 12, 2011 at about 13.00 hours. According to the opinion of PW 7, the cause of death of the victim was due to shock and heamorrhage resulting from the injuries on his body as mentioned in the above post mortem report which were antemortem in nature. On January 12, 2011, a letter of complaint was submitted by one Smt. Gita Rani Ghosh (PW 1) in Krishnaganj Police Station, District-Nadia. She further stated in the above letter of complaint that the deceased (her husband) was a witness in a criminal case pending against the appellant at that material point of time. In order to get rid of the above, the appellant committed murder of the above victim (her husband). It was further stated in the above letter of complaint that she could not lodge the complaint on the date of occurrence of the offence, i.e., on January 11, 2011, because she had been mentally disturbed. The above letter of complaint was received in Krishnaganj Police Station, Nadia on January 12, 2011 at 14.15 hours. It was diarised under Entry No.425 dated January 12, 2011 at 14.15 hours. The above letter of complaint was received in Krishnaganj Police Station, Nadia on January 12, 2011 at 14.15 hours. It was diarised under Entry No.425 dated January 12, 2011 at 14.15 hours. On the basis of the above letter of complaint Krishnaganj P.S. Case bearing FIR No.11/11 dated January 12, 2011 was drawn against the five accused persons, namely, (1) Sadhan Ghosh (the appellant), (2) Prosenjit Ghosh, (3) Indrajit Ghosh, (4) Bikash Ghosh and (5) Kalipada Ghosh, for commissioning of offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the I.P.C. The aforesaid Jahar Lal Chatterjee (PW 14), was entrusted with the responsibility of the investigation of the above case. He went to the place of occurrence on January 12, 2011 and prepared one rough sketch map dated January 12, 2011 in respect of the place of occurrence of death of the victim and place of recovery of weapon of offence respectively. In course of investigation, PW 14 recorded the statements of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 4, PW 5, PW 6, Chhoton Sarkar and Mukul Sardar under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. On January 15, 2011, the appellant was arrested and the weapon of offence “Blood stained sharp cutting Hansua” was recovered leading to a search on the basis of the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Thereafter, on February 23, 2011, Sri Barun Kumar Basu, Sub-Inspector of Police, attached to the Krishnaganj Police Station (PW 13) at that point of time was engaged as Investigating Officer replacing PW 14 for conducting further investigation in the above matter. PW 13 submitted a charge-sheet dated March 26, 2011 against the appellant, Prosenjit Ghosh, Indrajit Ghosh, Bikash Ghosh and Kalipada Ghosh for commission of offence under Section 302/34 of I.P.C. The charge was framed against the appellant and Bikash Ghosh on March 5, 2012 for commission of offence punishable under Section 302/34 of I.P.C. The case against the other charge-sheeted accused was filed as they absconded. After considering the evidence of fifteen prosecution witnesses, documentary evidence, statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence were passed. It is submitted by Mr. After considering the evidence of fifteen prosecution witnesses, documentary evidence, statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence were passed. It is submitted by Mr. Milon Mukherjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the impugned order of conviction passed on the basis of the impugned judgment as also the impugned sentence are not sustainable in law on the following grounds:- (i) There were major contradictions with regard to the place of occurrence of death of the victim taking into consideration the contents of the FIR, evidence of PW 2 and PW 3. There were also contradictions in between the surathal report of PW 14 with the evidence of PW 8, PW 10 and PW 12, who were the witnesses of the above report with regard to place of occurrence. Another witness of the above surathal report, namely, Shankar Ghosh was not examined as prosecution witness. There was also contradiction with regard to the above place of occurrence so far as two rough sketch maps (Exts. 5 and 9 respectively). (ii) According to surathal report, the wearing apparels of the deceased were stained with blood. No cut mark was detected in the above apparels. But according to the evidence of PW 6, cut marks were detected on the wearing apparels (shirt and genji) of the deceased. (iii) There were contradictions with regard to the nature of weapon used for commission of offence as also regarding the place of recovery of the same. In the seizure list of weapon of offence (Ext.-4/1), as also the sketch maps prepared showing the place of recovery of the above weapon (Exts.-9 and 9/1 respectively) was mentioned as a mango garden of one Biswanath Ghosh “namely Sadhaner Ban”. According to the deposition of PW 4 in course of cross-examination, the weapon of offence “Blood stain sharp cutting Hansua” was recovered from the covered area of ground together with “Bali Jhara”, plastic container with full of mustered oil, one white coloured plastic bag containing some food particle (4/1). According to PW 9, the weapon of offence “dao” was recovered from ‘Khamcha garir math’ together with dry cover of onion, chilly and balada (balidharan). During cross-examination he further deposed that “dao”, “kanchi” and “hansua” are weapons of different natures. According to PW 9, the weapon of offence “dao” was recovered from ‘Khamcha garir math’ together with dry cover of onion, chilly and balada (balidharan). During cross-examination he further deposed that “dao”, “kanchi” and “hansua” are weapons of different natures. According to PW 10 (witness of weapon of offence) the seized weapon of offence “dao” was straight but the half portion of that “dao” was bent. Though the weapon of offence was sent for Forensic Science Laboratory. But the report of FSL report was not produced by PW 14 in Court. (iv) According to the post mortem report prepared by PW 7, prepared on the basis of the post mortem examination on January 12, 2011 at 13.00 hours rigor mortis was present in the dead body of the victim and partially digested food particles were detected in the stomach but no abnormal smell was detected in course of above post mortem examination. According to PW 2, the victim was in a drunken condition and he was not in a condition to come back home without help. He requested the PW 2 on January 11, 2011 at about 15.00 hours to bring him from the cremation ground. No mobile phone was seized to check the call lists for corroboration of the above deposition. (v) There was delay in producing the case before the lower Court without any explanation. Reliance is placed by Mr. Mukherjee on the decision of Pulukuri Kottaya vs. The King-Emperor, reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 , Bachhu Narain Singh, reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 805, Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 724 and Rebati Baidya & Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in (2014) 1 C. Cr. L.R. (Cal) 171 in support of his above submissions. Mr. Sudip Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State it is submitted that there was no impropriety or error in the impugned order of conviction passed on the basis of the impugned judgment as also the impugned sentence. With regard to the alleged contradiction of the place of occurrence of the death of the victim on January 11, 2011, it is submitted by Mr. Ghosh that PW 2 and PW 3 were eyewitnesses and PW 1 (the de facto complainant) was post occurrence witness. With regard to the alleged contradiction of the place of occurrence of the death of the victim on January 11, 2011, it is submitted by Mr. Ghosh that PW 2 and PW 3 were eyewitnesses and PW 1 (the de facto complainant) was post occurrence witness. Drawing our attentions towards the FIR, surathal report, it is submitted by him that there was no discrepancy with regard to the place of occurrence, death of the deceased on January 11, 2011 at 16.30 hours and preparation of surathal report on the same date at 19.35 hours. With regard to the post mortem report of the dead body of the deceased, it is submitted by him that the dead body of the deceased was dispatched from the place of occurrence on the same date, i.e., on January 11, 2011 at 20.55 hours. The above dead body was received for post mortem examination on January 12, 2011 at 12.45 hours from Sukuruddin Sk., No.C/148, Constable of the concerned police station. The date and time of preparation of the post mortem report were January 12, 2011 at 13.00 hours. It is also submitted that the place of occurrence was described by different prosecution witnesses using different nomenclature but a conjoint reading of the depositions of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 14 taking into consideration the documentary evidence, that is letter of complaint, surathal report as also the rough sketch maps, the place of occurrence was one and same. According to Mr. Ghosh, there was no discrepancy in between the two rough sketch maps because the first one (Ext.-5) was relating to the entire area showing the place of occurrence while the second sketch map (Ext.-9) was relating to the place of recovery of weapon of offence. According to PW 14, the place of occurrence was near the cremation ground which was corroborating with the place shown in the above rough sketch maps as also the evidence of eyewitnesses PW 2 and PW 3. So far as the place of occurrence mentioned by PW 1, she was post occurrence witness. According to PW 14, the place of occurrence was near the cremation ground which was corroborating with the place shown in the above rough sketch maps as also the evidence of eyewitnesses PW 2 and PW 3. So far as the place of occurrence mentioned by PW 1, she was post occurrence witness. With regard to the nature and type of the weapon of offence recovered from the place of occurrence on January 15, 2011, it is submitted that according to the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. (Ext.-8), it was “hansua” in the seizure list (Ext.-4/1) also the same was mentioned as “hansua”. According to PW 9, it was “dao/kanchi/hansua”. Though the weapon of offence was not produced before the Court, the recovery of weapon of offence was proved in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as Evidence Act), taking into consideration the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. corroborating with the evidence of PW 3, PW 9 and PW 10. It is further submitted by Mr. Ghosh that even in the event there are discrepancies in between the above evidence, those were minor discrepancies having no prejudicial effect on the appellant. According to him, the nature and description of the injuries sustained by the deceased as described by PW 7 was corroborating with the descriptions of those injuries recorded in the post mortem report. It is further submitted by him that the allegation of delay of three days to forward the FIR to the learned Magistrate concerned was explained by PW 14 in his deposition. According to Mr. Ghosh though the FSL report was not collected or produced before this Court and the mobile phone of the persons concern were not seized, the commission of offence was proved beyond doubt on the basis of the evidences (documentary and oral) which had been made available on record in the trial. Mr. Ghosh relied upon the decisions of Jagdish vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1981 SCC 1167, Ram Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2012) 12 SCC 339 , Magaram Bauri @ Dulal & Anr. Mr. Ghosh relied upon the decisions of Jagdish vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1981 SCC 1167, Ram Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2012) 12 SCC 339 , Magaram Bauri @ Dulal & Anr. vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in (2006) ILR (1) Cal 561, State of West Bengal vs. Alexius Tirkey, reported in 2006 (3) CHN 508 as also an unreported judgment dated September 15, 2014 passed in CRA 115 of 2006 in support of his above submissions. We have heard the learned Counsels appearing for the respective parties carefully at length and we have considered the facts and circumstances of this case on the basis of the evidence available on record for the purpose of examining the decision making process of the learned Trial Judge in passing the impugned judgment. The first contention of the appellant is the alleged failure of the learned Court below to take into consideration the major contradictions with regard to the place of commission of offence by the appellant in the light of the contents of FIR and evidence of PW 2 and PW 3. It is the time honoured proposition of law that in arriving at a conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of crime, the Court has to take into consideration the probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses to judge the evidence. The final analysis in every case would have to depend upon the facts and circumstances of the concerned case. It is true that the benefit of reasonable doubt should go in favour of the accused but the trial Court should not reject the evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on the grounds which are conjectures in nature. Reference may be made to the decision of State of Punjab vs. Jagir Singh, Baljit Singh and Karam Singh, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 277 and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” (Emphasis supplied) In the matter of State of U.P. vs. Krishna Master, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 324 , it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in appreciating the evidence of a witness, Court should read the evidence as a whole. In the event it appears to have a ring of truth, the discrepancy and the inconsistency of minor nature not touching core of the case would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. Further, the cardinal rule of analysing the evidence of the witnesses in the light of the aforesaid principles is this the Court will have to determine first whether the evidence of eyewitnesses proves the prosecution case. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- “15. Before appreciating evidence of the witnesses examined in the case, it would be instructive to refer to the criteria for appreciation of oral evidence. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is found, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. 16. . . . . 17. In the deposition of witnesses, there are always normal discrepancies, howsoever honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition, shock and horror at the time of occurrence and threat to the life. It is not unoften that improvements in earlier version are made at the trial in order to give a boost to the prosecution case, albeit foolishly. Therefore, it is the duty of the court to separate falsehood from the truth. In sifting the evidence, the court has to attempt to separate the chaff from the grains in every case and this attempt cannot be abandoned on the ground that the case is baffling unless the evidence is really so confusing or conflicting that the process cannot reasonably be carried out. In the light of these principles, this Court will have to determine whether the evidence of eyewitnesses examined in this case proves the prosecution case.” (Emphasis supplied) In this case the formal FIR was drawn on the basis of a letter of complaint dated January 12, 2011, submitted by PW 1, who went to the place of occurrence after receiving the information from the local people of assaulting her husband by the appellant along with some other miscreants. She found the body of her deceased husband lying in the cremation field. According to the prosecution case, as appears from the deposition of PW 2 (the second wife of the deceased), she went to the burning ghat under reference on receipt of a telephone call at about 15.15 hours on January 11, 2011 from the deceased requesting her to help him to return home because he was in a drunken state and he was unable to move without help. While the deceased person was returning back to home with the help of PW 2 and PW 3 the appellant took a “henso” in his hand and the other miscreants came out in front of their rikshaw van near “Sarishar Khet” at a distance of 100 yards from the above burning ghat and assaulted the victim on his left chest, resulting in profuse bleeding from the body of the deceased. They took him to Krishnaganj Hospital with the help of PW 3 and other persons present there. The victim was declared dead by the doctor of the above hospital. Therefore, the commission of offence by the appellant was examined by the learned Court below on the basis of the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 (the eyewitnesses). The PW 1 (the de facto complainant) was neither eyewitness nor her evidence was taken into consideration as adduced by an eyewitness. Therefore, we are of the opinion that there was no error in the finding of the trial Court in this regard as ignoring minor discrepancies in between the contents of FIR lodged by PW 1 or her oral evidence, if any, at all. The decision of Bachuu Narain Singh (supra) does not help the appellant in view of the distinguishable fact of presence of eyewitnesses in this case. With regard to discrepancy in between the surathal report of PW 14 and the evidence of PW 8, PW 10 and PW 12 in respect of the place of occurrence, it is the settled principle of law as decided by the Apex Court in the matter of Jeewan & Ors. vs. State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2012) 13 SCC 598, that inquest report is not a basic or substantive evidence being prepared by police personnel at the earliest stage of investigation and he is a non-medical man. Discrepancies with regard to the place of occurrence occurring therein can neither be termed to be fatal nor it would warrant a benefit to the accused resulting in dismissal of the prosecution case. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “28. In Munshi Prasad v State of Bihar this Court has also taken the view, after discussing various judgments, that some documents are not substantive evidence by themselves and it is the statement of expert or the author of the document that has the credibility of a substantive evidence. “6. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “28. In Munshi Prasad v State of Bihar this Court has also taken the view, after discussing various judgments, that some documents are not substantive evidence by themselves and it is the statement of expert or the author of the document that has the credibility of a substantive evidence. “6. … In a similar vein the inquest report also cannot be termed to a basic or substantive evidence being prepared by the police personnel being a non-medical man and at the earliest stage of the proceeding. In the wake of the aforesaid, a mere omission of a particular injury or indication therein of an additional one cannot, however, invalidate the prosecution case. The evidential value of inquest report cannot be place at a level as has been so placed by the (appellants).” The inquest report or the post-mortem report cannot be termed to be basic evidence or substantive evidence and discrepancies occurring therein cannot be termed to be fatal nor even a suspicious circumstance which would warrant a benefit to the accused and result in dismissal of the case of the prosecution.” (Emphasis supplied) So far as the alleged discrepancy in between two rough sketch maps are concerned, we find that the learned Court below correctly observed that the former one relates to the place of occurrence of the death of the victim while the latter one relates to the place of recovery of weapon of offence. Therefore, those were prepared showing the places from two different angles having no contradiction in between the same. So, the impugned judgment does not require any interference on this ground. The second contention of the appellant is that according to the surathal report, the wearing apparels of the deceased were stained with blood and there were no cut mark on the same. But according to the deposition of PW 6, there was presence of cut marks on the wearing apparels (shirt and genji) of the deceased. Apart from the cardinal rule of analysing the contents of surathal report as observed in the matter of Jeewan & Ors. But according to the deposition of PW 6, there was presence of cut marks on the wearing apparels (shirt and genji) of the deceased. Apart from the cardinal rule of analysing the contents of surathal report as observed in the matter of Jeewan & Ors. (supra), it has been be observed by the Apex Court while considering the minor variations in the evidence of witness in the matter of Ousu Varghese vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 767 that minor variations in the above nature of evidence of witnesses are found the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. Taking into consideration the evidence of PW 2, PW 3 and the injuries on the body of the deceased mentioned in the post mortem report, we are of the opinion that in view of the above discussion and observation, we do not find any fault in the decision making process of the trial Court in this regard. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “2. The Trial Court had observed that, although it could not find any specific point on which the cross-examination of Antony could be said to have shaken his testimony, yet, it thought that the accounts given by all witnesses, put together, were not natural. The Trial Court had unduly magnified minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses which are often the hall-mark of the truth of their testimony. It, however, observed that they were quite consistent in deposing about the stabbing of his father by the appellant. The High Court had rightly discarded the rather confused reasoning of the Trial Court and held that the case against the appellant, after carefully examining the evidence, to be established beyond reasonable doubt. It had, however, refrained from passing a death sentence against the appellant simply because the Trial Court had acquitted him. We need not consider the sufficiency of this reason for awarding the lesser sentence as there is no appeal against it before us. It had, however, refrained from passing a death sentence against the appellant simply because the Trial Court had acquitted him. We need not consider the sufficiency of this reason for awarding the lesser sentence as there is no appeal against it before us. As we are unable to find any infirmity in the findings of fact recorded by the High Court we affirm the convictions of the appellant as well as the concurrent sentences awarded under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, and dismiss this appeal.” (Emphasis supplied) The next contention of the appellant is contradiction in respect of the place of recovery of weapon of offence as also with regard to nature and type of the weapon of offence used in commissioning of the offence. Before examining the decision making process of the learned Court below with regard to the aforesaid contentions of the appellant we would like to repeat and reiterate the cardinal rule of appreciation of evidence of eyewitness in the light of the decision of Jagir Singh (supra), Krishna Master (supra), Jeewan (supra) and Ousu Varghese (supra), in a nutshell, that there are always normal discrepancies, howsoever honest and truthful they may be. In arriving at a conclusion about the guilt of the accused, the Court has to judge the evidence by yardstick of probabilities, in intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Final analysis in every case would have to depend upon its own facts. In the case in hand, the learned Court below took into consideration the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 (eyewitnesses) corroborating with the evidence of PW 14 (the investigating officer) and the sketch maps in respect of the place of occurrence and that of recovery of weapon of offence to arrive at a conclusion that there was no contradiction with regard to the place of occurrence in view of the evidence of PW 1 (a post occurrence witness) leading to prejudicial effect on the appellant. In Raju @ Narinder Kumar vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 636, the Apex Court took into consideration the fact of recovery of weapon of offence at the disclosure of the accused, nature of injury sustained and the post mortem report (the injury could have been caused with a sharp-edged weapon like the knife) to arrive at a conclusion that both the Court below no error in awarding life imprisonment to the appellant. Relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- “13. The injuries which were caused on the vital parts of the deceased stand fully corroborated from the evidence of PW 3 Dr Benu Gupta, who had performed the post-mortem on the three dead persons. The injuries on the persons of the deceased are at the same vital parts of the bodies, described by the aforesaid witnesses. Thus their ocular evidence is fully corroborated with the medical evidence. 14. It is also to be noted that the weapon of offence (knife) was recovered at the disclosure of the appellant, which was kept concealed in a heap of rubbish in the corner of the residential house. The said statement was duly signed by the appellant and was attested by the prosecution witnesses. At the time of recording of the evidence of PW 3 Dr Benu Gupta, the said knife was shown to her, who categorically deposed that with the aid of the said knife, the nature of injuries sustained by all the three deceased, could be caused. There is consistency in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. There is no reason to doubt their credibility or trustworthiness.” In Bakhshish Singh vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in (2013) 12 SCC 187 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court took into consideration the testimony of the doctor who had prepared the post mortem report that the injuries of the deceased had been caused by a sharp-edged weapon, to arrive at a conclusion that it was quite consistent with the use of dagger for the offence. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “27. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “27. It was further urged that the dagger which was produced in the court could not have been used as an instrument for the crime because the dagger was not shown to the doctor during post-mortem examination and the doctor has only stated that the injuries could have been through the sharp-edged weapon given in the court. We find from the testimony of the doctor that he deposed that the injuries were caused by a sharp-edged weapon, which is quite consistent with the use of dagger for the offence.” In the case in hand, the learned Court below took into consideration the statement of recovery of weapon of offence (Hansua) leading to a search on the basis of the extra-judicial statement of the appellant recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. corroborating with the evidence of PW 2, PW 3, seizure of the weapon of offence mentioned in (seizure list– 24” x 26”) the post mortem report, evidence of PW 7 (doctor) and that of PW 14 (the investigating officer) to arrive at a conclusion of recovery of weapon of offence ignoring the minor discrepancy with the evidence of PW 4, PW 9 and PW 10. Taking into consideration the above evidence, the trial Court came to a conclusion that non-production of FSL report was not fatal for the prosecution case. That apart there was bald denial only by the appellant stating that “it is a false evidence” with regard to the recovery of the weapon of offence in the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, no interference is required with regard to the above finding of the trial Court in this regard in view of the settled proposition of law as discussed hereinabove. Considering the distinguishable facts and circumstances, as discussed hereinabove, the decision of Pulukuri Kottaya (supra) and Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen (supra) are not applicable in this case. We find no substance in other contention of the appellant regarding the presence of “rigor mortis” and non-detection of any abnormal smell in the dead body of the victim in course of post mortem examination conducted after about 21 hours of the death of the deceased to cast any doubt in respect of the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 so far as the hangover condition of the deceased was concerned. Regarding the next contention of the appellant in respect of delay in lodging the complaint, we find that the learned Court below took into consideration the evidence of PW 1 (the de facto complainant). According to the PW 1, the cause of delay of about twenty-two hours was the mental shock which she had sustained due to the death of her husband. We are of the opinion that there was some delay in lodging FIR, it was fully explained by the above witness in view of the proposition of law settled by the Apex Court in Jeewan (supra). The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “33. In other cases, the Court has taken the view that mere delay in lodging the FIR may not prove fatal in all cases, but in given circumstances of a case, delay in lodging the FIR can be one of the factors which corrode the credibility of the prosecution version. Delay in lodging of the FIR cannot be a ground for throwing the entire prosecution case. In cases, where there is some delay in filing the FIR, the complaint must give explanation for the same. Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant’s case improbable when such delay in properly explained. (Ref. Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana and Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana, SCC p. 219, para 43.)” (Emphasis supplied) The decision of Rebati Baidya (supra) has no manner of application in this case in view of the distinguishable facts and circumstances with regard to explanation of delay in lodging complaint, minor discrepancy with regard to injury sustained by the deceased mentioned in surathal report, minor discrepancy in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, if any, and the observation made hereinabove with regard to recording of statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Consequent upon the discussions and observations made hereinabove, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed accordingly. Let this judgment together with the Lower Court’s records be sent back to the learned Court below expeditiously. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, on priority basis. I agree.