JUDGMENT : Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 12-7-2002 passed by the lower appellate Court, by which, the lower appellate Court has allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. 2. This appeal was admitted for hearing on the following two substantial questions of law:- "(A) Whether the first appellate Court was justified in reversing the order of the trial Court holding that the plaintiffs have not established their case of customary right under the Uraon caste? (B) Whether the first appellate Court was justified while reversing the judgment of the trial Court holding that the title of the plaintiffs could not have been decided by way of adverse possession?" 3. The facts of the case necessary for decision on two substantial questions of law are stated infra. 4. The appellant-plaintiff filed a suit seeking decree of declaration and permanent injunction in his favour and against his cousin Bhogibai, on the pleadings inter-alia that the parties are members of Uraon tribe where there exist customary law of succession, under which, the daughters are not entitled to succeed to the property of father and it is only in the case of "Ghar Jinha" that where son-in-law is allowed to reside with the father of girl then only, the daughter is entitled to succeed to the property by way of succession. The plaintiff also claimed title on the plea of adverse possession. 5. The claim of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendant-Bhogi Bai by denying any such customary law and stated that she being the daughter was entitled to succeed to the property of her father-Kanduwa, after his death. It was also stated that the defendant throughout remained in possession of the property in dispute. 6. The learned trial Court, allowed the suit, holding that plaintiff had perfected title by adverse possession and also hold that as per custom, Bhogi Bai was not entitled to succeed to property as customary law prevalent in the Uraon tribe leans in favour of patrilineal succession. On appeal being preferred, the learned lower appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by holding that custom is not proved. On appeal being preferred, the learned lower appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by holding that custom is not proved. It is also held that even decree of adverse possession could not be granted in favour of the plaintiff on the basis that the plaintiff had perfected his title by adverse possession. 7. Learned counsel for appellant argued that the appellant led cogent evidence including uncontroverted testimony not only led by the plaintiff but also by the defendant to prove that in the Uraon tribe, there existed in practise and prevalent, customary law of succession, under which, the daughter is entitled to succession only when the son-in-law is residing with the wife in parental house along with father-in-law. It is submitted that from the evidence on record, it is proved that Bhogi Bai was residing with her husband separately, therefore, according to the prevalent custom, Bhogi Bai could not succeed to the property and in that case, the appellant alone would be entitled to succeed to the property of Kanduwa. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decisions in the case of Chuiyya S/o Jhadi v. Mangari Bai, 2002 (2) MPLJ 441 and Tiwari Bai v. Sita Bai, 2010 (3) MPLJ 688 . 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents submits that the plaintiff failed to prove the custom regarding succession by leading clinching evidence by the standards as set out by the Supreme Court in plethora of decisions. He submits that specific instance of such custom having been followed has neither been pleaded nor proved by leading evidence in that regard. He submits that the judgments, which are relied upon by the plaintiff have no application in the present case. It is also submitted that in view of authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat, Village Sirthala, (2014) I SCC 669, a suit for declaration based on alleged prescription of title by adverse possession is not maintainable in law and the plea of adverse possession could be taken up as shield/defence and could not be made a basis to obtain decree of declaration of title. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the decisions in the case of Salekh Chand (dead) by legal heirs v. Satya Gupta, (2008) 13 SCC 119 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 418, Bhirnshya v. Janabi (Smt.) alias Janawwa, (2006) 13 SCC 627 and Rajmohan Dewangan v. State of C.G. 2015 (1) CGLJ 107 : 2014 AIR CC 1668. 9. Shri Ratan Pusty, learned counsel has appeared as amicus curiae in the matter and brought to the notice of this Court to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 5 SCC 125 : AIR 1996 SC 1864 to highlight that except in State of Meghalaya, tribes in other parts of the country are following patrilineal succession law. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 11. As regards, maintainability of suit for declaration of title based on adverse possession is concerned, legal position in this regard is no longer res-integra in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Gurdwara Sahib (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held:- "8. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent that the judgments of the Courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings are filed against the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/ defence." 12. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the single Bench of this Court in the case of Rajmohan Dewangan (2014 AIR CC 1668) (supra) has taken similar view that the plaintiff cannot maintain suit for declaration of title based on adverse possession and it can use his adverse possession as a shield/defence. Therefore, the first substantial question of law has to be answered in favour of respondent-defendant and against the plaintiff that the suit for declaration of title based on adverse possession is not maintainable in law. 13. The next substantial question of law is whether present is a case where the plaintiff has proved the custom. 14. In the plaint, it has been averred in the very opening paragraph that the parties belong to Uraon tribe and Hindu Succession Act is not applicable. 13. The next substantial question of law is whether present is a case where the plaintiff has proved the custom. 14. In the plaint, it has been averred in the very opening paragraph that the parties belong to Uraon tribe and Hindu Succession Act is not applicable. It has been further averred that in the matter of succession, the customary laws are applicable and since time immemorial in Uraon Tribe, customary laws of Hindu religion have been accepted and they are being followed since ancient times and according to which, in the joint family, daughters are not entitled to any share and widow is only entitled to maintenance. It has been further pleaded that Hari had two sons-Kanduwa & Nanka. Kanduwa had three issues namely Madar Sai, Tituri and Bhogi (defendant). The second son namely Nanka had only one issue Ramdev (plaintiff). According to the plaintiff, in their pleading, it has been stated that after the death of male members, the property devolved upon Ramdev being only surviving male member and Bhogi Bai is not entitled. In order to prove the aforesaid pleadings of custom relating to succession the plaintiff examined himself as P.W. 1, Ledwa Ram, RW. 2, Jagan Ram, P.W. 3 and Ram Ratan, P.W. 4. 15. Ramdev Ram, P.W. 1 has stated in paragraph 3 of his evidence that he and defendant belongs to Uraon tribe and in their tribe, girls and other women are not entitled to any share. After death of Hari, Late Kanduwa and Late Nanka, his father, were jointly cultivating the land in dispute with Madar Sai. As long as Madar Sai was alive, he was cultivating the land with Nanka. After death of Madar Sai, his father-Nanka along with cultivating the land and after death of his father, the plaintiff has been cultivating the land. It was stated that Tituri and Bhogi never cultivated the land. Bhogi was married in village Biski. Thana Dhourpur and after marriage, she was living in Village Biski. Bhogi Bai conspired with Patwari to get recorded her name in the revenue records behind his back and without any notice and knowledge. In his cross-examination, he admit the suggestion that according to "Ghar Jinha" daughters are entitled to share in their-fathers property. Bhogi was married in village Biski. Thana Dhourpur and after marriage, she was living in Village Biski. Bhogi Bai conspired with Patwari to get recorded her name in the revenue records behind his back and without any notice and knowledge. In his cross-examination, he admit the suggestion that according to "Ghar Jinha" daughters are entitled to share in their-fathers property. In para 12 of his cross-examination, he denies suggestion that Bhogi was married as "Ghar Jinha." The evidence of this witness that in Uraon tribe, there exists custom in which, daughters are not entitled to any share has remained uncontroverted in his cross-examination. 16. On the other hand, suggestion given in his cross-examination that "Ghar Jinha" (residing in parental house) daughters are entitled to share has been admitted by this witness. The suggestion given to this witness in cross-examination coupled with the uncontroverted testimony constitutes the evidence of customary law of succession leaning towards patrilineal succession mode. 17. Ledwa Ram, P.W. 2, has admitted in para 8 of his cross-examination that in his caste, the girls/daughters, who are married as "Ghar Jinha" are entitled to share in the fathers property. In para 9, he accepted the suggestion that when son is not there, in such a situation, daughters are married as "Ghar Jinha". But he denies suggestion that Bhogi Bai was married in "Ghar Jinha" form. In para 12, he has stated that Bhogi used to go to the parental house only during festivals on invitation of plaintiffs and thus, she used to visit her parental house 3-4 times in a year. 18. Jagan Ram, P.W. 3, has stated in para 4 of his evidence that Uraon tribe community follows Hindu religion and worship "Ram-Krishna" as their God and they also celebrate festivals like Hindus. He has further stated that in their caste, the daughters are not entitled to share in the father's property. This witness in para 8 of his cross-examination that after his death, his property will devolve upon his wife and after death of his wife, property would devolve upon his daughters by way of succession. In para 9, this witness has stated that after death of Kanduwa and his wife, if there would have been partition, Bhogi Bai, his daughter was entitled to succeed to his property. 19. Ram Ratan, RW. In para 9, this witness has stated that after death of Kanduwa and his wife, if there would have been partition, Bhogi Bai, his daughter was entitled to succeed to his property. 19. Ram Ratan, RW. 4, however, has not stated anything with regard to custom prevalent in Uraon tribe regarding succession. 20. Bhogi, D.W. 1 has stated in para 5 of her evidence that in Uraon tribe, daughter is entitled to her share in father's property. In para 8 of her evidence, she admits that she had given money to the Revenue Officers to get her name recorded in the revenue records. 21. Jagna, D.W. 2 has not stated anything with regard to custom. 22. Dhani Ram, D.W. 3 has stated in para 7 of his examination-in-chief that the parties belong to Uraon tribe and if there is no son in the family, daughter is entitled to share in the property of her father. 23. Lalsai, D.W. 4 has stated in para 4 of his cross-examination that "Ghar Jinha" daughter, is one, who is allowed to reside with her father in the parental house along with husband and they are not sent to matrimonial house. 24. Upon appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has proved the customary law of succession that the daughters and family members are not entitled to succession but in case of "Ghar Jinha" daughter, she is entitled to succeed to the property of her father. The learned lower appellate Court has however reversed the finding by taking a different view upon appreciation of evidence. 25. In the case of Chuiyya S/o. Jhadi (supra), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has examined the issue of custom prevalent in the Uraon tribe in the matter of succession. That was a case where the parties were resident of Raigarh District which was the part of erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh and nearer to the District, of which, the parties in the present case resided. That was a case where the parties were resident of Raigarh District which was the part of erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh and nearer to the District, of which, the parties in the present case resided. In the said case, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh taking into consideration the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Kishwar ( AIR 1996 SC 1864 ) (supra), where there is no son and son-in-law is brought to wife's house as Ghar-Jamai, the daughter was entitled to share in her father's land in dispute at least till the time she is alive. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Kishwar (supra) was also noted where the Supreme Court had considered the prevalent law of succession in tribes. 26. In the case of Madhu Kishwar ( AIR 1996 SC 1864 ) (supra), the Supreme Court had examined with great details the prevalent custom applicable to various tribes and it was held (para 31 of AIR):- 46. It would thus be seen that the customs among the Scheduled Tribes, vary from tribe to tribe and region to region, based upon the established practise prevailing in the respective regions and among particular tribes. Therefore, it would be difficult to decide, without acceptable material among each tribe, whether customary succession is valid, certain, ancient and consistent and whether it has acquired the status of law. However, as noticed above, customs are prevalent and are being followed among the tribes in matters of succession and inheritance apart from other customs like marriage, divorce etc. Customs became part of the tribal law's as a guide to their attitude and practise in their social life and not a final definition of law. They are accepted as a set of principles and are being applied when succession is open. They have accordingly nearly acquired the status of law. Except in Meghalaya, throughout the country patrilineal succession is being followed according to the unwritten code of customs. Like in Hindu law, they prefer son to the daughter and in his absence daughter succeeds to the estate as a limited owner. Widows also get only limited estate. More than 80 percent of the population is still below poverty line and they did not come on a par with civilized sections of the non-tribals. Like in Hindu law, they prefer son to the daughter and in his absence daughter succeeds to the estate as a limited owner. Widows also get only limited estate. More than 80 percent of the population is still below poverty line and they did not come on a par with civilized sections of the non-tribals. Under these circumstances, it is not desirable to grant general declaration that the custom of inheritance offends Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. Each case must be examined and decided as and when full facts are placed before the Court. 27. True it is that the Supreme Court has assumed similar laws in force in the State of Madhya Pradesh as well prevalent in other States, a categoric finding has been recorded in para 47 of the aforesaid judgment holding that except in State of Meghalaya, throughout the country, patrilineal law of succession is prevalent. It was held as under (para 32 of AIR): 47. Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, similar to Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, excludes applicability of customs to the Scheduled Tribes as defined by clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette directs otherwise. Explanation II to Article 25 does not include them as Hindu. The Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949, the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969 intend to protect the lands of the tribals and their restoration to them. Sections 7 and 8 of the Act regulate the right of Khunt-Katti raiyats. By operation of customary inheritance, the son and lineal descendants inherit the lands held by the tribes for the purpose of cultivation by himself or male members of his family. Section 76 read with Section 6 gives effect to custom, usage or customary right provided thereunder not inconsistent with or not necessarily modified or abolished by the provisions of the Act. The law exists to serve the needs of the society which is governed by it. If the law is to play its allotted role of serving the needs of the society, it must reflect the ideas and ideologies of that society. As stated earlier, it must keep pace with the march of time with the heartbeats of the society and with the needs and aspirations of the people. If the law is to play its allotted role of serving the needs of the society, it must reflect the ideas and ideologies of that society. As stated earlier, it must keep pace with the march of time with the heartbeats of the society and with the needs and aspirations of the people. As seen, even among the tribals in Bihar, the customs have now undergone advancement. They prefer both son and daughter alike though not uniformly. Succession is patrilineal; Santhals practically adapted the Mitakshara Hindu law of succession. The Hindu Succession Act modified the pre-existing law and intestate succession gives right of succession to a Hindu female. Section 14(1) has enlarged limited estate known to Shastric law into absolute right of property held by a Hindu female. In the Law of Intestate and Testamentary Succession, (1991 Edn.) at p. 21, Prof. Diwan has stated that Section 2(2) does not mean that Scheduled Tribes which were, prior to the codified Hindu law, governed by Hindu law will not, now, be governed by the Hindu law. If before codification, any Scheduled Tribe was governed by Hindu law, it will continue to be governed by it. However, it would be un-codified Hindu law that would apply to them. It is settled law that the procedural or substantive law which offend the fundamental rights are void. Sections 7 and 8 of the Act exclude women tribals from inheritance to the khunt-katti raiyati rights solely on the basis of sex and confine succession and inheritance among male descendants only. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 this Court held that reasonableness is an essential element of equality; non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14. The Court must consider the direct and inevitable effect of the action in adjudging whether the State action offends the fundamental right of the individual. This Court sustained the validity of Passport Act, 1967 by reading down the statutory provisions. Justice, equity and good conscience are integral part of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution which is the genus and Article 15 is its specie. In Harbans Singh v. Guran Ditta Singh, 1991 (1) SCR 614 this Court held that though the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 did not per se apply to the State of Punjab at the relevant time, the general principles contained therein being consistent with justice, equity and good conscience would apply. 28. In Harbans Singh v. Guran Ditta Singh, 1991 (1) SCR 614 this Court held that though the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 did not per se apply to the State of Punjab at the relevant time, the general principles contained therein being consistent with justice, equity and good conscience would apply. 28. Learned counsel for respondent heavily relied upon the various judgments of Supreme Court which alleged methods of strict proof of custom. However, in the present case, apart from the evidence which has been led by the plaintiff, the judgment of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Chuiyya S/o Jhadi (supra) and the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Kishwar ( AIR 1996 SC 1864 ) (supra) supports the case of the plaintiff and the existing customary law of succession wherein the daughters are not entitled to inherit the property of father and evidence has come on record to the effect that the daughter who are married on "Ghar Jinha" form where after marriage, she is residing in the house of father along with her husband, she would be entitled to succeed to the property. The evidence on record in the present case does not prove that the respondent-Bhogi was residing in her father's house along with her husband. In fact, learned counsel for the respondent rightly pointed out to this Court that Bhogi Bai in her evidence has stated that she was married 3-4 years after death of her father. At the time of death of Kanduwa, Bhogi was not married. If the stand taken by Bhogi is correct, the customary law as pleaded, proved and supported by the various decisions leads to irresistible conclusion in the present case that the respondent-Bhogi was not entitled to succeed to the property of her father under the customary succession laws which lean towards patrilineal succession, as prevalent in customary succession laws. 29. In view of above consideration, I have to hold that the respondent-defendant-Bhogi Bai was not entitled to succeed to the property of her father. In view of above finding, the first substantial question of law has to be answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. 30. In the result, it has to be held that the suit filed by the appellant was rightly decreed by the learned trial Court and it has been wrongly set aside by the lower appellate Court. In view of above finding, the first substantial question of law has to be answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. 30. In the result, it has to be held that the suit filed by the appellant was rightly decreed by the learned trial Court and it has been wrongly set aside by the lower appellate Court. Resultantly, the judgment of lower appellate Court is hereby set aside and the judgment passed in favour of the plaintiff by the learned trial Court is hereby affirmed. 31. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. A decree be drawn accordingly. Appeal allowed.