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2016 DIGILAW 90 (JK)

Mohd. Bhutto v. State of J&K

2016-03-08

B.S.WALIA

body2016
JUDGMENT : B.S. Walia, J. 1. Prayer in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is for quashing of Order No. 15 of 2010, dated January 4, 2010 i.e. Annexure B passed by Respondent No. 4 whereby the period w.e.f. August 17, 1998 to September 15, 1998 was treated as earned leave and period from September 16, 1998 to August 6, 2002 was treated as leave without pay as also Order No. 391 of 2012, dated October 3, 2012 i.e. Annexure F passed by Respondent No. 2 dismissing 2nd appeal filed against order dated 01.06.2011 i.e. Annexure C passed by Respondent No. 3 dismissing appeal against order Annexure B dated January 4, 2010 passed by Respondent No. 4. Facts giving rise to the instant writ petition are that the petitioner who was a constable, proceeded on 20 days earned leave duly sanctioned by the competent authority on August 17, 1998 and was to rejoin duty on September 7, 1998 but could not do sc on account of his arrest along with eight other accused by the police in a murder case registered under FIR No. 107/93 u/s. 302 RPC, dated September 3, 1998 at Police Station Reasi. 2. That on arrest, the petitioner was placed under suspension by SDPO City West Jammu vide Order No. 54/98, dated October 26, 1998. 3. That during the pendency of the criminal trial in case titled as State of J&K v. Gulshan Kumar & Ors., the petitioner was released on bail vide order dated August 7, 2002 but continued to remain under suspension till his acquittal by the Ld. Session Judge vide judgment Annexure A, dated August 8, 2008. 4. That on acquittal in the murder case, the petitioner vide Order No. 1669 of 2009, was reinstated in service by Respondent No. 4 on September 8, 2009. 5. That a departmental enquiry was also initiated against the petitioner which was entrusted to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Jammu. Session Judge vide judgment Annexure A, dated August 8, 2008. 4. That on acquittal in the murder case, the petitioner vide Order No. 1669 of 2009, was reinstated in service by Respondent No. 4 on September 8, 2009. 5. That a departmental enquiry was also initiated against the petitioner which was entrusted to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Jammu. After conduct of enquiry, the enquiry officer recommended exoneration of the petitioner of the charges levelled against him in view of his acquittal in the criminal case as also for treating the period of absence w.e.f. August 17, 1998 to September 15, 1998 as on leave, period with effect from September 16, 1998 to August 6, 2002 as dies non and period w.e.f. August 7, 2002 to October 10, 2009 as on duty. The enquiry officer also recommended that the monthly allowance if any received by the petitioner during the period he remained in custody with effect from September 16, 1998 to August 6, 2002 be recovered from the petitioners monthly salary in instalments. 6. That the recommendations of the enquiry officer were considered by Respondent No. 4 i.e. Senior Superintendent of Police Jammu who vide order Annexure B, dated January 4, 2010 while agreeing with the same ordered exoneration of the petitioner of the charges levelled against him and for treating the period w.e.f. August 17, 1998 to September 15, 1998 as on earned leave while the period w.e.f. September 16, 1998 to August 6, 2002 was directed to be treated as leave without pay. Period w.e.f. August 7, 2002 to October 10, 2009 was ordered to be treated as an duty. 7. That order Annexure B to the extent it directed the period w.e.f. September 16, 1998 to August 6, 2002 i.e. the period the petitioner remained injudicial custody under court orders as leave without pay, was challenged by the petitioner by way of statutory appeal before Respondent No. 3 on the ground that in view of his acquittal, he was in terms of Article 108-B read with Article 109 of the CSR (Civil Service Regulations) 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) entitled to full pay and allowances. The statutory appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by Respondent No. 3 vide order Annexure C, dated 01.06.2011 by upholding order Annexure B, dated January 4, 2010 passed by Respondent No. 4. 8. The statutory appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by Respondent No. 3 vide order Annexure C, dated 01.06.2011 by upholding order Annexure B, dated January 4, 2010 passed by Respondent No. 4. 8. That the petitioner challenged order Annexure C, dated 01.06.2011 passed by Respondent No. 3 by way of 2nd appeal before Respondent No. 2 who dismissed the same vide order Annexure F, dated October 3, 2012. 9. That order Annexure F, dated October 3, 2012 has been challenged on the ground that on acquittal in the criminal case and exoneration in the departmental enquiry, the basis for the petitioners suspension ceased to exist, therefore there was no reason as to why the petitioner should be denied full pay and allowances for the period he remained in custody, more so in view of the impugned orders being in derogation of Article 108-B of the Regulations as per which the competent authority was required to consider and pass specific orders regarding pay and allowances on the petitioners reinstatement for the period of his absence from duty and further as per Article 108-B(ii), if the competent authority was of the opinion that the employee had been fully exonerated or in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, then he was to be given full pay and allowances to which he would have been otherwise entitled had he not been suspended, therefore the period of absence from duty was required to be treated as period spent on duty. Reliance was also placed on Article 109 of the Regulations as per which a government servant imprisoned on a criminal charge in the event of acquittal is entitled to full pay and allowances. On the basis of the same it has been contended that the petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowances for the period in question. 10. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of this court in case titled as Gh. On the basis of the same it has been contended that the petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowances for the period in question. 10. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of this court in case titled as Gh. Ahmad Shah v. State of J&K & Ors., reported as 2014 (3) JKJ 474 [HC] to contend that once a government servant is fully exonerated and suspension is held to be wholly unjustified and such employee is reinstated, than the competent authority is under an obligation to consider and pass a specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to such government employee for the period of his absence from duty and the said period is to be treated as period spent on duty. Ld. counsel for the petitioner contended that the words "shall consider" in Article 108-B of the J&K Civil Service Regulations, 1956 casts an obligation on the competent authority to consider judiciously and pass appropriate orders in consequence thereof and that any order passed without such consideration was a negation of the mandatory provisions of regulations applicable. Ld. counsel stated that as per the aforementioned judgment, this court while taking into account the decision of a coordinate bench in Mohd. Shafi Bhat v. State & Ors., 2008 SLJ 631 : 2009 (2) JKJ 187 [HC] : JKJ Soft JKJ/23902, in which it was held that if on conclusion of the trial/appeal arising out of conviction if any, the employee was exonerated and the competent authority did not return a specific finding that the suspension was justified, then in that case the employee was entitled to full pay allowances to which he would have been entitled otherwise and that such an employee could not be asked to remain without pay for the period of his suspension and such period was to be treated as period spent on duty. Ld. counsel contended that in the circumstances the writ petition was liable to be allowed and order Annexure F, dated October 3, 2012 vide which the period w.e.f. August 17, 1998 to September 15, 1998 had been treated as on earned leave and the period with effect from September 16, 1998 to August 6, 2002 as had been treated as leave without pay was liable to be quashed and the petitioner held entitled to full salary and allowances for the said period. 11. 11. That Ld. counsel for the respondents on the other hand argued that the petitioner had not challenged the findings of the enquiry officer nor impleaded the enquiry officer and had simply impugned the orders dated October 3, 2012 passed by the Inspector General of Police, Jammu Zone, Jammu confirming the orders passed by SSP Jammu and on the said basis contended that the petitioner having accepted the recommendations of the enquiry officer, was estopped under law from challenging the outcome of the enquiry i.e. the impugned order. Ld. counsel further contended that the acquittal of the petitioner was on the basis of benefit of doubt only, therefore the competent authority in terms of Article 108-B of the Regulations had rightly treated the period of suspension w.e.f. September 16, 1998 to August 6, 2002 i.e. period of custody as "Leave without Pay". As regards Article 109, Ld. counsel contended that the same was of no avail to the petitioner since the said article was applicable only in the eventuality of acquittal being honourable and not on the basis of benefit of doubt. Counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as Union of India & Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported as 2015 (2) SCC 610 , to contend that the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot re-appreciate evidence or interfere with the conclusions in enquiry proceedings if the same have been conducted in accordance with law nor it can go into reliability/adequacy of evidence nor interfere with the findings if there is some legal evidence on which the findings are based nor errors of fact be corrected, howsoever grave the same may be etc. On the basis of the aforementioned submissions, Ld. counsel contended that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. 12. I have heard Ld. counsel for the parties and considered the submissions made in the context of the record as also Article 108-B, Article 109 of the Regulations. On the basis of the aforementioned submissions, Ld. counsel contended that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. 12. I have heard Ld. counsel for the parties and considered the submissions made in the context of the record as also Article 108-B, Article 109 of the Regulations. Reference is also made to Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951 in view of Article 108-B of the Regulations and Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951 being pari materia and the Hon'ble Supreme Court having considered Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951 qua the claim as has been made in the instant writ petition. Article 108-B and Article 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations, 1956 as well as Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951 are reproduced hereunder:- Article 108-B of the Jammu & Kashmir Civil Service Regulations 1956:- Reinstatement after suspension: "(i) When a government servant who has been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired before attaining the age of superannuation, or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order:- (a) Regarding the pay and allowance to be paid to such Government servant for the period of his absence from duty; and (b) Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (ii) Where the authority mentioned in sub-rule (i) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified the Government servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired before attaining the age of superannuation or suspended, as the case may be. The period of absence from duty shall be treated as period spent on duty." Article 109 : Committals to prisons : A servant of the State committed to prison either for debt or on a criminal charge, should be considered as under suspension from the date of his arrest and not allowed to draw any pay until the termination of the proceedings against him. When an adjustment of his allowances should be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the officer being acquitted of blame or if the imprisonment was for debt, of its being proved that the officer's liability arose from circumstances beyond his control. Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951. 54. Re-instatement (1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended is reinstated or would have been reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order:- (a) Regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty or for the period of suspension ending with the date of his retirement on superannuation as the case may be; and (b) Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spend on duty. (2) Where such competent authority holds that the Government Servant has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall be given the full pay and dearness allowance to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired as a penalty or suspended, as the case may be. (3) In other cases, the Government servant shall be given such proportion of such pay and dearness allowance as such competent authority may prescribe. (4) In a case falling under clause (2) the period of absence from duty shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. (5) In a case falling under clause (3) the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as a period on duty unless such authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose: Provided that if the Government so desires, such authority may direct that the period of absence from duty shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant. Note:- The order of the competent authority regarding the treatment of the period of absence from duty passed under this proviso is absolute and no higher sanction would be necessary for the grant of extra-ordinary leave in excess of three months in so far as temporary Government servant are concerned. Note:- The order of the competent authority regarding the treatment of the period of absence from duty passed under this proviso is absolute and no higher sanction would be necessary for the grant of extra-ordinary leave in excess of three months in so far as temporary Government servant are concerned. (6) In cases where punishment order does not indicate as to whether the suspension period is to be counted for the purpose of pension or not, the period of suspension shall be counted for the purpose of pension. In all other cases, action shall be taken as per punishment order. (7) Any payment made under this rule to a Government servant on his reinstatement shall be subject to adjustment of the amount, if any, earned by him through an employment, business, profession or vocation during the period between the date of removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of reinstatement. Where the emoluments admissible under this rule are equal to or less than the amounts earned during the employment, business, profession or vocation elsewhere, nothing shall be paid to the Government servant. 13. That perusal of Article 108-B of the J&K Civil Service Regulations, 1956 and Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951 reveals that the two provisions are in essence identical. Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951 came up for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 337 and Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 94 . 14. That the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 337, while considering the order passed by the Rajasthan High Court qua the claim of a Judicial Officer for full pay and allowances in the context of Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951 on account of his acquittal in a murder case as also exoneration in departmental proceedings initiated thereafter was pleased to hold as under: "4. The petitioner was acquitted by the trial court vide judgment dated 1-5-2002. The prosecuting agency had thereupon filed acquittal appeal before the High Court. The acquittal appeal was also dismissed by judgment dated 27-9-2005. The petitioner was acquitted by the trial court vide judgment dated 1-5-2002. The prosecuting agency had thereupon filed acquittal appeal before the High Court. The acquittal appeal was also dismissed by judgment dated 27-9-2005. Thereafter, it was decided to initiate departmental enquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 and it was decided to continue his suspension. In the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was exonerated by an order dated 26-3-2008. Thereupon the petitioner was reinstated in service with immediate effect by an order dated 26-3-2008. 5. The High Court considered the question whether the period of suspension should be treated as period spent on duty and whether he would be entitled to all the benefits under the law. The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur passed an order dated 24-1-2009 which reads as under: "WHEREAS SHRI GURPAL SINGH, RJS presently retired was placed under suspension vide this Office Order No. Estt. (RJS) 199/85, dated 22-12-1985. AND WHEREAS it was decided that regular disciplinary proceedings under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 be initiated against Shri Gurpal Singh, RJS presently retired. AND WHEREAS Hon'ble the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 read with the full court resolution dated 30-10-1971 was pleased to order that on account of initiation of a regular enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 the suspension of Shri Gurpal Singh shall continue. AND WHEREAS departmental enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 was initiated against said Shri Gurpal Singh vide Memorandum No. Estt. B2(iii)/2006/1544, dated 20-4-2006. AND WHEREAS in the above departmental enquiry said Shri Gurpal Singh has been exonerated vide Order No. Estt. (RJS) 25/2008, dated 26-3-2008. AND WHEREAS, Shri Gurpal Singh has been reinstated with immediate effect as Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate in the RJS vide Order No. Estt. (RJS) 26/2008, dated 26-3-2008. AND WHEREAS the matter regarding regularisation of suspension period of Shri Gurpal Singh was considered by the Hon'ble Full Court in its meeting held on 29-11-2008 and it was resolved as under: 'Perused office note and relevant record. (RJS) 26/2008, dated 26-3-2008. AND WHEREAS the matter regarding regularisation of suspension period of Shri Gurpal Singh was considered by the Hon'ble Full Court in its meeting held on 29-11-2008 and it was resolved as under: 'Perused office note and relevant record. RESOLVED that period of his suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty, but without salary except subsistence allowances already paid to him. However, this will not effect his pensionary benefits but he will not be entitled for any promotion.' NOW THEREFORE, the period of his suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty, but without salary except subsistence allowances already paid to him. However, this will not effect his pensionary benefits but he will not be entitled for any promotion." A bare reading of the above quoted order makes it clear that the question whether the suspension of the petitioner from 22-12-1985 till his reinstatement in service on 26-3-2008 was either wholly justified or partly justified or wholly unjustified was not considered at all by the competent authority in terms of Rule 54(2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951. 6. Rule 54(1) and Rule 54(2) are clearly applicable to the petitioner who remained under suspension because of trial on a criminal charge and thereafter because of the decision to initiate departmental enquiry against him. The competent authority was bound to examine the case of the petitioner in terms of Rule 54(1) and Rule 54(2) and in case it came to the conclusion that the suspension of the petitioner was either wholly justified or wholly unjustified or partly justified and that the petitioner was not entitled to any salary and or full salary for the period of suspension then the authority was expected to pass a reasoned order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the employee concerned. In other words, it was open to the competent authority to withhold payment of full salary for the suspension period on justifiable grounds and not otherwise. 7. Having regard to the facts of the case, this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the High Court is given an opportunity to pass appropriate orders under Rule 54 of the Rules. Therefore, the matter is remitted to the High Court on its administrative side to pass appropriate orders under Rule 54. 7. Having regard to the facts of the case, this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the High Court is given an opportunity to pass appropriate orders under Rule 54 of the Rules. Therefore, the matter is remitted to the High Court on its administrative side to pass appropriate orders under Rule 54. The High Court shall issue notice to the petitioner and afford him an opportunity of hearing by calling upon him to file reply to the notice. The High Court shall thereafter consider the reply and pass a reasoned order under Rule 54 of the Rules of 1951. This exercise shall be completed as early as possible and without any avoidable delay but in any case not later than six weeks from today. The High Court to file the order which may be passed by it in the present proceedings. 15. That pursuant to the aforesaid direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a Committee was constituted by the Rajasthan High Court to examine the case of the said Judicial Officer, in terms of Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 for determining "whether his suspension was wholly justified or wholly unjustified or partly justified and to what extent, he was entitled for salary and/or full salary during the period of suspension?" The Committee passed the following order: "Therefore, in the present facts and circumstances (supra), period during which Shri Gurpal Singh remained under suspension cannot be said to be wholly unjustified and sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of RSR in negative form where the authority has to examine as to whether suspension was wholly unjustified. However, after going through complete material on record (supra), the Court is of the view that in the given facts and circumstances (supra), suspension of Shri Gurpal Singh cannot be said to be wholly unjustified and what he was entitled for under law has been paid to him in terms of resolution of Full Court dated 29-11-2008 (supra) conveyed vide order dated 24-1-2009." The Rajasthan High Court after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, reiterated its earlier decision. Thereafter the matter came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 94 . Relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereunder: "29. Thereafter the matter came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 94 . Relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereunder: "29. The only issue that needs to be resolved at this stage is as to whether the petitioner would be entitled only to the subsistence allowance as already paid to him or full salary and allowances, in view of his acquittal in the criminal case and the exoneration in departmental proceedings. Related to the aforesaid issue would be a consequential issue of notional promotion from the date an officer junior to him was promoted in the Rajasthan Judicial Service and the consequential entitlement to the emoluments on the promotional post, which in turn would determine the amount of suspension allowance and the other retiral benefits. xxx 40. The Rajasthan High Court was placed in a very piquant situation till the petitioner's acquittal was reiterated by the Delhi High Court. The High Court, literally, had no option but to place and keep the petitioner under suspension. It was not as if the petitioner had unwittingly breached a traffic regulation, which may not invite, even a frown from the general public. It was also not where he may had a minor altercation with someone which may well be overlooked by a reasonable man, as it would not involve any moral turpitude. He was facing a trial for the offence of murder, a crime of highest moral turpitude. Since time immemorial, Judges have been placed on a very high pedestal in every civilised society. Such high status is accompanied by corresponding responsibility of a Judge maintaining an unusually high standard of dignity, poise and integrity. There can be no two ways about it. Therefore, the decision of the High Court to continue the suspension of the petitioner cannot be said to be wholly unjustified till his acquittal by the Delhi High Court. 41. At this stage, we may just mention observations of this Court in two decisions of this Court in relation to the high standards of behavior expected from a Judge. For instance, in Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 4-5, para 11) "11. ... Judicial officer cannot have two standards, one in the court and another outside the court. They must have only one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. For instance, in Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 4-5, para 11) "11. ... Judicial officer cannot have two standards, one in the court and another outside the court. They must have only one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy." Further, in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, again while elucidating the nature of the position held by a judicial officer, this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 473, para 21) "21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is, therefore, entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences. He is required to keep most exacting standards of propriety injudicial conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge. ... It is, therefore, a basic requirement that a Judge's official and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is higher than that expected of a layman and also higher than that expected of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to high standards of probity and propriety, higher than those deemed acceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter from the fallen standard in the society." 42. The decision of the High Court to keep the petitioner under suspension has to be judged by keeping the aforesaid standards in mind. Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified after he was acquitted of the criminal charges by the trial court. 45. The decision of the High Court to keep the petitioner under suspension has to be judged by keeping the aforesaid standards in mind. Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified after he was acquitted of the criminal charges by the trial court. 45. The acquittal of the petitioner having been affirmed by the High Court of Delhi, in our opinion, it was necessary for the High Court of Rajasthan to take a decision: (a) whether to revoke the order of suspension and permit the petitioner to perform judicial functions; (b) whether to hold a departmental enquiry with regard to the receipt of money allegedly received by him from the deceased; (c) as to how the period of suspension was to be treated; (d) whether the petitioner was entitled to full salary, part salary or no salary at all for the period of suspension. 46. It appears to us that given the findings recorded by the trial court, subsequently reiterated by the High Court of Delhi, the decision to continue the petitioner under suspension, thereafter, was rather harsh. It is true that the suspension of the petitioner was continued as the High Court had decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the petitioner on the charges that he had wrongly extracted certain money from the deceased. But it is a matter of record that both the trial court as well as the High Court had found the entire story with regard to the alleged receipt of money to be false. The enquiry was founded on the same facts and the same evidence which have had been examined by the trial court as well as the High Court. In such circumstances, it was necessary for the High Court to examine the findings of the trial court as well as the High Court in detail before taking a decision to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner, founded on the same set of facts and the evidence. It is apparent from the record that no such examination of the judgment was undertaken by the High Court. Even after taking a decision to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner, it was no longer imperative to continue the petitioner under suspension. It is apparent from the record that no such examination of the judgment was undertaken by the High Court. Even after taking a decision to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner, it was no longer imperative to continue the petitioner under suspension. The petitioner was no longer charged with any criminal offence as both the trial court as well as the High Court had literally concluded that the charges against the petitioner had been concocted. The petitioner had been subjected to continued suspension since 22.12.1985. During the period of departmental proceedings, even if the petitioner was not to be assigned any judicial work, the High Court could have conveniently given him suitable posting on the administrative side. In our opinion, from the time of dismissal of the appeal by the Delhi High Court, the continued suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified. 47. Again it is a matter of record, that even in the departmental enquiry the charges against the petitioner were not proved and he was exonerated of the same. It was only at that stage that the suspension of the petitioner was revoked. The petitioner had already moved the present writ petition immediately after the order of acquittal was upheld by the Delhi High Court. The enquiry proceedings were completed during the pendency of the writ petition. Undoubtedly, the order of suspension was revoked by the High Court on 26-3-2008 but without giving any direction as to how the period of suspension was to be treated. It was only subsequently that the matter with regard to regularisation of his period of suspension was considered by the Full Court in the meeting held on 29-11-2008. Even at that stage though the Full Court passed a resolution that period of suspension shall be treated as period spent on duty, but it was to be without payment of any salary except for the subsistence allowance already paid to him. On. the basis of the aforesaid resolution, the High Court passed the order dated 24.1.2009. So even by order dated 24.1.2009, the petitioner was granted only partial relief. This necessitated the amendment of the writ petition by the petitioner questioning the legality of the aforesaid order. It was only at that stage that this Court by order dated 5-4-2011 directed the High Court to pass appropriate orders under Rule 54 of the Rules. So even by order dated 24.1.2009, the petitioner was granted only partial relief. This necessitated the amendment of the writ petition by the petitioner questioning the legality of the aforesaid order. It was only at that stage that this Court by order dated 5-4-2011 directed the High Court to pass appropriate orders under Rule 54 of the Rules. It appears even at that stage the High Court did not consider it necessary to grant any further relief to the petitioner. 48. We are of the considered opinion, having regard to the sequence of events narrated above, that it would be unjust to deny the salary to the petitioner with effect from the date the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the High Court of Delhi. We see no cogent reason as to why it was necessary to continue the suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings. There was no distinction between the facts or the evidence relied upon in the criminal trial as well as the departmental proceedings. This apart, the petitioner had been acquitted of any involvement in the crime of murder. Whilst exercising its jurisdiction under Rule 54, it was necessary for the High Court to pass a detailed and reasoned order as to whether the period of suspension was wholly unjustified. Undoubtedly, the power under Rule 54 is discretionary but such discretion has to be exercised reasonably and by taking into consideration the material relevant to the decision. Upon acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal charges, it was no longer necessary to keep him under suspension during the pendency of the departmental enquiry. In our opinion, the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly under Rule 54, as directed by this Court in the order dated 5-4-2011. In our opinion, the suspension of the petitioner ought to have been revoked upon acquittal by the High Court even during the pendency of the departmental enquiry. 52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject the submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court. We also reject the submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. 52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject the submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court. We also reject the submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. We, however, hold that the continued suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified. The petitioner is, therefore, held entitled to full pay and allowances from 27-9-2005 i.e. the date of the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We further hold that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to him was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies the requirements as per the Rules) from the date when a person junior to him was considered and promoted to the next higher post. Let such a decision be taken by the High Court within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. 16. That a perusal of the aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court w.r.t. the claim for full pay and allowances by an officer in the context of Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1951 on account of his acquittal in the murder case as also exoneration in departmental proceedings initiated thereafter reveals that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the considered view that in view of the officer having been tried for a murder charge, the Rajasthan High Court had no option but to place and keep the officer under suspension till reiteration of his acquittal by the Delhi High Court in view of a Judicial officer occupying such a position in society accompanied by corresponding responsibility of a Judicial officer for maintaining an unusually high standard of dignity, poise and integrity, therefore, the decision of the High Court to continue the suspension of the Judicial officer could not be said to be wholly unjustified till his acquittal by the Delhi High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the contention that the suspension of the Judicial officer was wholly unjustified after his acquittal of the criminal charges by the trial court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the contention that the suspension of the Judicial officer was wholly unjustified after his acquittal of the criminal charges by the trial court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that decision to keep the petitioner under suspension after acquittal as well as after dismissal of appeal against acquittal was rather harsh, however allowed salary to the petitioner only with effect from the date the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the Delhi High Court by rejecting the submissions that the suspension of the petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court as also that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court despite holding that the continued suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified, held the officer entitled to full pay and allowances only from 27.09.2005 i.e. the date of the judgment rendered in appeal by the Delhi High Court onwards though the Judicial Officer was placed under suspension on 22.12.1985. That in the light of the position as noted above as also the judgments referred to above, it emerges that neither the competent authority nor the appellate authority passed specific orders as per the mandate of Article 108-B read with Regulation 109 of the Regulations which provides for passing of specific orders on reinstatement of a suspended government servant regarding pay and allowance to be paid to such Government servant for the period of his absence from duty and, whether or not the said period is to be treated as a period spent on duty and where the finding is that the suspension, was wholly unjustified, then in that case the Government servant is to be given full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, while the period of absence from duty is to be treated as period spent on duty. In the absence of specific orders having been passed in terms of the Regulations applicable, impugned order Annexure B, dated January 4, 2010, order Annexure C, dated 01.06.2011 passed by Respondent No. 3 upholding order Annexure B, dated January 4, 2010 and Annexure F, i.e. order dated October 3, 2012 passed by Respondent No. 2 are quashed. In the absence of specific orders having been passed in terms of the Regulations applicable, impugned order Annexure B, dated January 4, 2010, order Annexure C, dated 01.06.2011 passed by Respondent No. 3 upholding order Annexure B, dated January 4, 2010 and Annexure F, i.e. order dated October 3, 2012 passed by Respondent No. 2 are quashed. Further, in view of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Supra) the matter is remitted to the competent authority i.e. Senior Superintendent of Police Jammu to consider and pass a speaking order in accordance with the J&K Civil Service Regulations, 1956 after complying with the principles of Natural Justice and in the light of the two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred to above. Needful be done within three months of date of receipt of certified copy of order. Needless to mention, if the petitioner is aggrieved on passing of fresh orders by the Senior Superintendent of Police Jammu, he would be at liberty to challenge the same in accordance with law. Writ petition allowed in aforesaid terms. No order as to costs.