JUDGMENT : S.G. Shah, J. 1. Pursuant to judgment and order dated 30.06.2015, this Court has while allowing Civil Application No. 98 of 2011, as per relief claimed in para 5, directed the petitioner No. 1 to delete the name of petitioner No. 2 from the petition. However, so far as prayer to delete respondent No. 2 i.e. Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara is concerned, considering that, it is altogether a different issue than considering the presence of petitioner No. 2 as a litigant and at the relevant time, because of existence of different judgments on such issue, both by the division bench of this Court and the Honourable Supreme Court and more particularly when one matter is pending before the Honourable Supreme Court on such issue, this Court has thinking it proper to avoid from scrutinizing legality and validity of joining such respondent No. 2 in the main petition, partly allowed the Civil Application with observations that the issue regarding respondent No. 2 can be taken care of while deciding main petition. 2. However, now pursuant to judgment and order dated 06.07.2015 by the Honourable Supreme Court, i.e. just after judgment and order dated 30.06.2015 in this matter as referred herein above, the Honourable Supreme Court has, in Civil Appeal No. 2347 of 2015 between Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinhiji vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in 2015 (9) SCC 1 while considering the maintainability of the Letter Patent Appeal (LPA) dealt with all relevant issues including joining presiding officers of such lower Courts and tribunals in such writ petition and held that in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, such Court whose orders are under challenge or its presiding officer are not required to be impleaded though High Court can call for the record of the case. 2.1 Therefore, considering the above situation, both the parties have argued at length that this review petition, so as to decide that whether prayer which was kept pending in Civil Application 98 of 2011 for deciding it along with Special Civil Application, can be allowed at this stage or not. 3. For the purpose, heard applicant, Party-in-person and learned advocate Mr. Vinayakrao S. Desai, respondent No. 1 in the main petition and learned advocate Mr. 3. For the purpose, heard applicant, Party-in-person and learned advocate Mr. Vinayakrao S. Desai, respondent No. 1 in the main petition and learned advocate Mr. Binay Benagara for Trivedi & Gupta Associates for respondent - Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd., original petitioner in main Special Civil Application challenging the order dated 23.06.2010 by respondent No. 2 - Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara; whereby, tribunal has directed the petitioner to consider the appointment of respondent as per the Rules as Research Assistant and declare that he is entitled to all the benefits as Research Assistant. 4. Respondent No. 1 Mr. Desai who is also an advocate has strenuously explained that why and how such litigations are preferred and thereby, how corporate bodies are trying to take disadvantage of judicial process and thereby, making mockery of law as well as judicial proceedings. His submissions are as under: (1) Respondent No. 2 - Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara is an independent judicial authority; (2) Industrial Tribunal is to be treated as a Civil Court; (3) impugned order is purely judicial order by judicial authority and it is not by quasi-judicial authority or administrative authority; (4) impugned order is relating to dispute between two private parties and, therefore, in any manner it can never be termed as public dispute but it is purely a private dispute; 4.1 In support of his such submission he is relying upon following decisions: (1) State of Maharashtra vs. Labour Law Practitioners' Association & Ors. reported in (1998) 2 SCC 688 , wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has specifically held as under: "There is not much difficulty in holding that the Labour Court performs judicial functions and is a Court. The Labour Court adjudicates upon disputes that, had it not been for the Industrial Disputes Act, the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, it would have been within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to decide, although the ordinary civil courts may not be able to grant all the reliefs that are contemplated by these Acts. The Labour Courts are, therefore, courts and decide disputes that are civil in nature. In the case of The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi ( 1950 SCR 459 ), this Court considered whether an Industrial Tribunal was a court. The Labour Courts are, therefore, courts and decide disputes that are civil in nature. In the case of The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi ( 1950 SCR 459 ), this Court considered whether an Industrial Tribunal was a court. It said that one cannot go by mere nomenclature. One has to examine the functions of a Tribunal and how it proceeds to discharge those functions. It held that an Industrial Tribunal had all the trappings of a court and performed functions which cannot but be regarded as judicial. The Court referred to the Rules by which proceedings before the Tribunal were regulated. The Court dwelt on the fact that the powers vested in it are similar to those exercised by civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit. It had the power of ordering discovery, inspection etc, and forcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling production of documents and so on. It gave its decision on the basis of evidence and in accordance with law. Applying the test laid down in the case of Cooper v. Wilson [(1937) 2 K.B. 309 at p. 340], this Court said that "a true judicial decision presupposes an existence of dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites:- (1) the presentation of their case by the parties; (2) ascertainment of facts by means of evidence adduced by the parties often with the assistance of argument; (3) if the dispute relates to a question of law, submission of legal, arguments by the parties; and (4) by decision which disposes of the whole matter by findings on fact and application of law to facts so found, judged by the same tests, a Labour Court would undoubtedly be a court in the true sense of the term. The question, however, is whether such a court and the presiding officer of such a court can be said to hold a post in the judicial service of the State as defined in Article 236 of the Constitution." (2) Radhe Shyam & Anr. vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors. reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 , wherein practically present respondent No. 1 Mr. vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors. reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 , wherein practically present respondent No. 1 Mr. V.S. Desai has appeared as an advocate in person before the Honourable Supreme Court and the Honourable Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, that may be applicable in such cases, observed and held as under: "18. While the above judgments dealt with the question whether judicial order could violate a fundamental right, it was clearly laid down that challenge to judicial orders could lie by way of appeal or revision or under Article 227 and not by way of a writ under Article 226 and 32. 25. xxxx xxxx xxxx There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above. 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows: "(i) Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; (ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction from jurisdiction under Article 226. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled."" (3) Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinhji vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in (2015) 9 SCC 1 , wherein while dealing with the similar issues, the Honourable Supreme Court has categorically held as under: "41. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled."" (3) Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinhji vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in (2015) 9 SCC 1 , wherein while dealing with the similar issues, the Honourable Supreme Court has categorically held as under: "41. In this context, we may profitably refer to the decision in Savitri Devi (supra) wherein a three-Judge Bench, though in a different context, had observed thus:- "Before parting with this case, it is necessary for us to point out one aspect of the matter which is rather disturbing. In the writ petition filed in the High Court as well as the special leave petition filed in this Court, the District Judge, Gorakhpur and the 4th Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gorakhpur are shown as respondents and in the special leave petition, they are shown as contesting respondents. There was no necessity [pic] for impleading the judicial officers who disposed of the matter in a civil proceeding when the writ petition was filed in the High Court; nor is there any justification for impleading them as parties in the special leave petition and describing them as contesting respondents. We do not approve of the course adopted by the petitioner which would cause unnecessary disturbance to the functions of the judicial officers concerned. They cannot be in any way equated to the officials of the Government. It is high time that the practice of impleading judicial officers disposing of civil proceedings as parties to writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or special leave petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution of India was stopped. We are strongly deprecating such a practice." 43. xxxx xxxx xxxx There are many authorities under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition that can safely be culled out is that the authorities or the tribunals, who in law are entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not maintainable or the court may grant liberty to implead them as parties in exercise of its discretion. There are tribunals which are not at all required to defend their own order, and in that case such tribunals need not be arrayed as parties. There are tribunals which are not at all required to defend their own order, and in that case such tribunals need not be arrayed as parties. To give another example:- in certain enactments, the District Judges function as Election Tribunals from whose orders a revision or a writ may lie depending upon the provisions in the Act. In such a situation, the superior court, that is the High Court, even if required to call for the records, the District Judge need not be a party. Thus, in essence, when a tribunal or authority is required to defend its own order, it is to be made a party failing which the proceeding before the High Court would be regarded as not maintainable." (4) Riju Prasad Sarma & Ors. vs. State of Assam & Ors. reported in (2015) 9 SCC461, wherein again dealing with almost similar issues, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that while acting on the judicial side the Courts are not included in the definition of the "State", though while acting in administrative capacity they are covered under the definition. (5) Savitri Devi vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur & Ors. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 577 , wherein full bench of the Honourable Supreme Court has in para 14 of the judgment categorically held and observed that there was no necessity for impleading the judicial officers, who disposed off the matter in a civil proceedings when writ petition was filed in the High Court, nor is there any justification for impleading them as parties in the special leave petition and describing them as contesting respondents. Judicial officers cannot be in any way equated to the officials of the Government. It cannot be ignored that while holding so the Honourable Supreme Court has also referred the provisions of Order I Rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding necessary party, though it was with reference to the main merits of such cited case. (6) Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Firoze M. Mogal & Anr. reported in 2014 (1) GLH (FB) 1, wherein full bench of this High Court has observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are distinct and separate. (6) Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Firoze M. Mogal & Anr. reported in 2014 (1) GLH (FB) 1, wherein full bench of this High Court has observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are distinct and separate. Thereby, the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is a power that is confined to Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction. On the other hand, the power conferred on High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a power that is confined to Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority in proper case, any government within territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can issue writs to any authority whereas proceedings initiated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are of supporting in nature and, therefore, exercise of supervisory powers and powers of superintendence cannot be equated with original or supervisory jurisdiction and, therefore, Court cannot issue directions to the Civil Court to decide any matter in particular manner, since it does not act as a Court of appeal or that of revision. (7) Smt. Ujjam Bai vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in AIR 1962 SC 1621 and (8) Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1987 SC 1 In both the above cited cases, the full bench of the Honourable Supreme Court has dealt with the meaning of the jurisdiction so as to define the decision of judicial or quasi-judicial authority and powers of the Court in issuance of writ of certiorari against such order wherein also though with different perspective and reasoning held that no writ can lie against judicial authority and their order cannot be challenged except in accordance with law and rule and only if there is absolute illegality. 4.2 In addition to above legal position, the respondent No. 1 has pointed out several factual details, which are very well taken care of in the judgment dated 30.06.2015 and, therefore, it is not necessary to reproduce all those details, because now we have to decide only review petition to confirm that whether issue kept pending at the relevant time can be determined at present or not. So far as review application is concerned, the law is well settled that, if there is any lacuna either in order under reference or if there is any clerical, typographical or arithmetic error, the same can be corrected. It is also settled legal position that if there is a decision by the higher authority on the issue which was kept open at the relevant time then having final decision by higher competent authority, such pending issue can be dealt in accordance with law. Therefore, there is substance in the review application. It is contended that industrial tribunal is a civil Court and it has civil, adjudicatory, plenary jurisdiction and, therefore, it is not quasi judicial authority and therefore, when such issue was kept open while passing judgment and order dated 30.06.2015, it seems that it would be appropriate to reconsider only such part of the judgment dated 30.06.2015 whereby prayer clause 3 of Civil Application No. 98 of 2011 was kept pending. 4.3 Mr. Desai is also relying upon Section 2 and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 contending that even definition and protection extended to Judges confirms that there cannot be a directive writ against them as prayed for by the original petitioner. 5. As against that the learned advocate Mr. Binay Benagra appearing for original petitioner has contended that the Industrial Tribunal is proper and necessary party because it is not a Court in strict and technical sense and, therefore, petitioner is right in joining the Industrial Tribunal as respondent and, hence, the review petition needs to be dismissed. In support of his submission, he is relying upon following decisions: (1) Muljibhai vs. Upendra Vyas reported in 2001 (1) LLJ 409 , wherein the division bench of this Court has in fact while considering the provisions of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1971 opined that the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal are not courts in strict sense so as to consider non-compliance of its order or breach of their order or award to attract provisions of Contempt of Court's Act and to initiate contempt proceedings. However, reading of entire judgment makes it clear that practically, High Court has considered the available and alternative remedy under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and concluded that in view of said alternative remedy, contempt proceedings on ground of failure to implement award or order is not maintainable under the contempt of Court's Act. Therefore, even if the division bench has concluded that the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal are not Courts, in para 13 it is specifically disclosed that is within the meaning of Section 10 of the Contempt of Court's Act and, therefore, proceedings for the breach of order or award passed by such tribunal are not maintainable under the provisions of Contempt of Court's Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that only because of this decision when there are categorical decisions by the Honourable Supreme Court, that the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court are not to be treated as Courts in proper perspective. The decision, is quite obvious in as much as there cannot be contempt proceedings for non implementing the order or award, which can certainly be executed by appropriate proceedings, which is the situation in civil laws that though judgment and order of the Civil Courts are confirmed certain rights in a given case against defendants, in absence of non - compliance, there is provision of execution of such judgment and directions but it cannot be termed as contempt of Court. Therefore, this judgment would not help the petitioner. (2) The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi vs. The Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and the Bharat Bank Employees' Union, Delhi reported in AIR 1950 SC 188 (1), wherein full bench of the Honourable Supreme Court while appreciating certain provisions of Industrial Disputes Act held that although the industrial Tribunal set up under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has all the necessary attributes of the Court of justice, it is not a Court in technical sense of the word though the functions and duties of such tribunal are very much like those of the bodies discharging judicial function. However, it cannot be ignored that the Honourable Supreme Court has to consider its own powers under Article 136 of the Constitution which is extraordinary powers so as to entertain any such litigation against any such authority and the crucial question before the Court that whether an appeal can be taken to such Court against an award of such Industrial Tribunal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution and in fact final determination is practically against original petitioner when it is held in para 68 that where the discretion is committed to any body or a tribunal exercising quasi judicial functions which are not fettered by ordinary rule of law, the tribunal should in the absence of any provisions to the contrary be deemed to have final authority in the exercise of that discretion. Therefore, the Honourable Supreme Court cannot sit over their decision and substantiate their own discretion. Thereafter, ultimately it is concluded that Article 136 of the Constitution does not contemplate any determination given by the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, if we strictly rely upon such judgment practically no writ would lie which is otherwise ground of the respondent No. 1 herein and, therefore, this judgment would not help the original petitioner to succeed in their submission that whatever they have done is proper and correct. 5.1 Learned advocate Mr. Benagra for the original petitioner has in fact tried to interpret the decisions in the cases of Labour Law Practitioners Association (supra), Radhe Shyam (Supra), Jogendrasinhji (supra) in their favour. However, none of such judgment would in any sense support the original petitioner. With reference to Jogendrasinhji (supra) it is submitted relying upon para 31, 39 and 43 that it was not an issue before the Honourable Supreme Court that whether presence of Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal is necessary in writ petition or not and, therefore, such judgment cannot be relied upon. However, as discussed herein above, when different benches of the Honourable Supreme Court has categorically held that the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Courts are Courts and, therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can be issued. 5.2 Mr. However, as discussed herein above, when different benches of the Honourable Supreme Court has categorically held that the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Courts are Courts and, therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can be issued. 5.2 Mr. Benagra appearing for the original petitioner in main petition has further contended that they have followed the practice which is prevailing since decades together in joining the tribunal as such and, therefore, there is nothing wrong in joining such tribunal and hence review petition cannot be entertained. However, they have failed to file their affidavit-in-reply so as to clear their stand that whether main petition is filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, because the decision cited by the respondent No. 1, referred herein above, makes it clear that practically judicial order/s by the judicial authority, which includes Industrial tribunal and Labour Court as Civil Court, cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because they are not sub ordinate administrative authorities of the High Court or Supreme Court and therefore, no writ can be issued against them. Therefore, if at all, any order of such Civil Court or Industrial tribunal or any other equal authority is to be challenged, practically it must be challenged either by an appeal or by revision before the superior judicial authority and if no appeal or revision is provided under concerned statute then as provided under Article 227 of the Constitution of India every High Court has supervisory powers over all Courts and tribunal throughout the territories in relation to which, it exercises jurisdiction. For the purpose High Court can certainly call for R & P and scrutinize legality of any order passed by any judicial authority within the State. However, such superintendence powers cannot be exercised to influence sub ordinate judiciary to pass any order or judgment in particular manner as confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in case of T.G.N. Kumar vs. State of Kerala reported in (2011) 2 SCC 772 and as confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in case of Sushilbhai Laxminarayan Mudliyar vs. Niharchand Waghjibhai Shah reported in 1993 (Supp 1) SCC 11. In view of such clarity when there is no cause or reason or authority for the High Court to pass any order against Industrial Tribunal being respondent No. 2 herein to direct such tribunal by issuing any type of writ as prayed for in main petition, naturally respondent No. 2 Industrial Tribunal cannot be considered as a necessary party. So far as relief to delete such party which is otherwise confirmed as unnecessary party, Court has ample powers and so far as practice and procedure of hearing and pleadings are concerned when Code of Civil Procedure is equally applicable to the writ petitions, the provisions of Order I Rule 10 would certainly be attracted wherein Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 specifically confirms that the Court may at any stage of proceedings strike down or implead a party. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that; "(2) The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added." 5.3 Learned advocate Mr. Benagra has also relied upon the provisions of Sub-Rule (iii) of Rule 180 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, wherein there is provision that where the members of any Tribunal against whose decision or order the application is made are made party respondents to the application as such, and, therefore, they are right in joining industrial tribunal as such. It is important to note that Gujarat High Court Rules are provided for procedural part of supplying additional copies of application and payment of process fee and it does not give any specific right to the litigant to join any such tribunal, only because there is reference in such rule that when members of the tribunal against whose decision or order writ petition is preferred is made party to such writ petition. Otherwise also the right to initiate any proceedings or any other rights of superintendence are generally arising from the statute and Rules are generally made for and provided for procedural aspect only. Therefore, only because of the reference of certain words in Gujarat High Court Rules, it cannot be said that original petitioner has absolute right to join Industrial Tribunal as such. More particularly when there is specific judgment by the Honourable Supreme Court as referred herein above. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission by the original petitioner that respondent No. 2 is necessary party. 5.4 Therefore, now when it is clear and certain that this Court has no authority or jurisdiction to issue any writ prayed for in main petition against respondent No. 2 being tribunal as a Court or at least judicial authority, then respondent No. 2 is not a necessary party at all and, therefore, there is no harm in allowing prayer No. 3 of Civil Application No. 98 of 2011. To that extent, the review petition is allowed as prayed for. Thereby, Civil Application is allowed as prayed for in para 5.