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2016 DIGILAW 913 (ORI)

Secretary, M/s Cuttack Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. , Cuttack v. Nilachal Mohanty

2016-10-05

SANJU PANDA, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2016
JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. Both the writ petitions are being decided by common order since the award passed in Industrial Dispute Case No.24 of 2015 by the Labour Court has been assailed both by the management and the workman. 2. The award dated 4.12.2015 passed in Industrial Dispute Case No.24 of 2015 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar has been in these writ petitions. 3. Brief facts of the case is that the workman who was serving as a Stenographer under the Central Cooperative Bank Limited, Cuttack since 1975 but vide communication dated 12.2.2008 by which he has been asked to explain as to why disciplinary action shall not be initiated against him for his alleged acts of omission or commission. The workman had submitted his explanation denying the charges but without initiating any disciplinary proceeding against him issued notice on 20.11.2008 for compulsory retirement under Rule 41(B) of the Central Cooperative Bank Staff Service Rules, 1984 (hereinafter called as the Rules, 1984) by which he has been noticed to retire from service w.e.f. 20.2.2009, he has made an appeal before the Appellate Authority-cum-Committee of Management as per the provision made under Rule 39A(ii) of the Service Rules, 1984, same was rejected vide Office Order No.10223 dated 20.2.2009, however, finding no other way he had raised dispute before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Odisha under section 68 of the Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1962. While on the other hand case of the management is that the workman was appointed as a Stenographer and while in service he was suspended number of times, did not deposit amount of advance of Rs.10,07,143.29/- and as such disciplinary action was initiated against him vide letter no.11244 dated 12.2.2008, the workman had submitted show cause, the management being not satisfied with it and as such the issue of the workman was discussed by the appointment Sub-committee under Agenda No.3(5) of the proceeding and it was unanimously decided to issue three months prior notice to the workman. The Secretary of the management vide letter no.10191 dated 15.3.2007 as the workman to submit his explanation for his frequent unauthorized absence from duty but he did not submit any explanation which is detrimental to the interest of the Bank and as such the apex body of the management in its meeting dated 18.2.2009 decided for compulsory retirement of the workman from service by exercising its power under Rule 41(B) of the Staff Service Rules, 1984 since his performance is detrimental to the interest of the Bank. 4. In the backdrop of this factual aspect the dispute having been raised by the workman and the appropriate Government after accepting the failure report made reference by referring before the Labour Court for its adjudication, that is: “Whether the termination of service of Sri Nilachal Mohanty, Ex-Stenographer, At-Palanuasahi, P.O. Palahat, Ps/Dist. Khurda by way of compulsory retirement w.e.f. 20.2.2009 by the Secretary, Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., At-Nimchouri, P.O.Chandni chowk, PS-Lalbag, Dist. Cuttack is legal and/or justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?” Labour Court after appreciating rival submissions has passed the award against the management, being aggrieved with the same W.P.(C) No.4893 has been filed by the management. 5. Before appreciating the rival submissions of the parties it is relevant to see the provisions of the Central Cooperative Bank Staff Service Rules, 1984 which have got bearing with this writ petition. The Central Cooperative Bank Staff Service Rules, 1984 has been given its effect under the authority of Section 33(A)(b) of the Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1962, came to effect from 1.10.1984 containing the provision of disciplinary action and misconduct under Rule 33. Rule 33(A) contains major misconduct while Section 33(B) contains Minor misconduct which are being reproduced below: “Section-33(A)-The expression “major misconduct” shall include any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee. (i) Abetting, conveying, attempting or committing theft, fraud or dishonestly in connection with the business, property or affairs of the Bank or its customer. (ii) Willful damage or attempt to cause damage to the properties of the Bank or any of its customers. (iii) Conviction by any court of law or any criminal offence involving moral turpitude. (i) Abetting, conveying, attempting or committing theft, fraud or dishonestly in connection with the business, property or affairs of the Bank or its customer. (ii) Willful damage or attempt to cause damage to the properties of the Bank or any of its customers. (iii) Conviction by any court of law or any criminal offence involving moral turpitude. (iv) Unauthorized disclosure or divulgence or any attempt of disclosure or divulgence of information regarding the affairs of the Bank or any of its constituents or any person connected with the business of the Bank which may come in to the possession of the employees, in the course of his employment, the disclosure of which is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the Bank or its constituents. (v) Giving or taking or attempting to give or take bribe or illegal gratification. (vi) Taking part or canvassing or otherwise interfering or using his influence in any election with Central or State Legislature or Municipality or N.A.C. or any institution constituted under Orissa State Laws or to any office of the Bank or any society affiliated to it except the societies formed exclusively by the employees of the Bank. (vii) Willful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful reasonable order of the management or of a superior. (viii) Drunkenness or riotous or disorderly indecent behavior in the premises of the bank or any such behavior outside the premises of the bank, which is likely to affect the reputation of the bank or any act subversive of discipline. (ix) Willful slowing down in performance of work or inefficient in work abetment or instigation thereof. (x) Unlawfully commencing, going on or joining any strike or stoppage of work individually or as a concerted action or combination with others or abating or instigating or action furtherance of any strike or stoppage of work. (xi) Unlawful resorting to or abetting, instigating or otherwise canvassing for a pen down strike. (xii) Failure to account for or delivery of official paper which come in to his hand, or concealment of misappropriation or conversion of cash, securities, bonds, deeds, or other property of the bank or of its constituents. (xiii) Habitual neglect of work or gross negligence in any work or intentionally not performing any work properly. (xiv) Gambling or betting or attempting to gamble or bet in the premises of the bank. (xiii) Habitual neglect of work or gross negligence in any work or intentionally not performing any work properly. (xiv) Gambling or betting or attempting to gamble or bet in the premises of the bank. (xv) To remain absent from duty without leave application and prior approval of the competent authority whether in continuation of sanctioned leave or otherwise. (xvi) Repeated breach of any law applicable to the bank or of any rules of business of the bank or instructions for the running of any section. (xvii) Holding or attempting to hold or attending any meeting on the premises of the bank without the previous permission of the Chief Executive or in his absence next higher authorities of the Bank. (xviii) Doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank in performance by his duties, negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. (xx) Appearing in any examination or joining any College/School or university without permission of the competent authority of the bank. (xxi) Refusal to accept or charge sheet, order, notice or other communication to be served by the Bank. (xxii) Not residing at the headquarters fixed by the bank. (xxiii) Sleeping during duty hours. (xxiv) Failure to disclose to the bank his wealth or indebtedness once in 3-years or making any false statement about the same. (xxv) Committing any act which amounts to minor misconduct as defined hereafter, three times a year. (xxvi) Abatement or instigation or any of the acts or omission above mentioned. (xxvii) Claiming or performing any false wages or bills or amounts. (xxviii) Failure or completing the training the employee other than probationers. (xxix) Knowingly or wrongfully tempering the records or attendance. (xxx) Unauthorized absence from duty without leave. (xxxi) Speculation in stocks, shares, securities or any commodity whether on his own account or on account of any other person. (xxxii) Overstaying for more 15 days after any sanctioned leave without sufficient cause. Section-33(B)- The expression “ minor misconduct” shall include any of the following acts or omission on the part of any employees- (a) Loitering, idling, or wasting time during working hours of office or remaining within the premises of the bank after authorized hours of work without permission. (b) Late attendance for more than three occasions in a month. (c) Departure without permission before closing hours of office. (b) Late attendance for more than three occasions in a month. (c) Departure without permission before closing hours of office. (d) Disregard of minimum requirements of decency and attending duty uncleanliness of dress and person. (e) Indulging in private or person work within the bank with or without tools or materials belonging to the bank, without permission of the competent authority. (f) Failure to show proper consideration or courtesy or attendance towards superiors, fellow workers, constituents and unseemly or unsatisfactory behavior while on duty. (g) To avail leave without prior approval of competent authority. Rule 34(A) contains list of punishment against an employee found guilty for major punishment, i.e. (i) Withholding of annual increments with or without cumulative effect. (ii) Barring of promotion to the higher grade. (iii) Reversion to lower grade. (iv) Termination of discharge from service. (v) Dismissal or removal from service. Rule 34(B) contains punishment to be inflicted on the workman found guilty of minor misconduct, i.e. (i) Warning or censure and recovery and fine. (ii) Adverse remark in service records. (iii) Stoppage of increment for a period not exceeding one year without affecting future increments. (iv) Suspension. Rule 37 contains the procedure for imposing penalties for major misconduct, i.e. (A) The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to define charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged, together with a statement of allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration while passing order on the case. The person charged shall be required, to submit within 15 days a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. (B) After the enquiry or personal hearing referred to in the sub-clause(A) above has been completed and after competent authority has arrived at a provisional conclusion in regard to the penalties to be imposed, the person charged shall be supplied with copy of the report referred to in that clause and be called upon to show cause, within 15 days time, against the particular penalties proposed to be inflicted. Any representation in his behalf submitted by the person charge shall be taken into consideration before final orders are passed, provided that such representation shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry. Any representation in his behalf submitted by the person charge shall be taken into consideration before final orders are passed, provided that such representation shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry. (C) On receipt of the written statement of defence or if no such statement is received within the time specified the competent authority shall appoint an Enquiry Officer to enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted.” Rule 38 provides for imposing punishment of minor misconduct, i.e. “In every case where it is proposed to impose on an employee any of the minor penalties specified, he shall be given ten days time for making any representation he desires. His representation, if any, shall be taken into consideration before imposing any penalty.” Rule 41 contains provision of retirement/termination of service but relevant provision for the purpose of the issue involved in this case is Rule 41(B), i.e. “An employee of the bank other than the employee borne under Grade-VII service retire from service any time after attaining the age of 50 years by giving a notice in writing to Managing Committee at least three months before the date on which he wishes to retire. It shall open to the Managing Committee to withhold permission to such employee who seeks to retire under this Rule, if he/she is under suspension or if enquiries against him/her are in progress. Managing Committee may also require any such employee of the bank to retire in the interest of the Bank any time he/she attained the age of 50 years, by giving a notice in writing to the employer of the bank at least 3 months before the date on which he/she is require to retire or by giving three months pay and allowance in lieu of such notice. 6. After going through the statutory provisions as referred hereinabove, in case of major punishment procedure for inflicting punishment has been provided under Rule 37 which provides provision to supply definite charge or charges to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration while passing orders on the case. The person charged shall be required to submit within 15 days a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. The person charged shall be required to submit within 15 days a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. After completion of the said procedure and if the competent authority has arrived at a provisional conclusion in regard to the penalties to be imposed, the person charged shall be supplied with a copy of the report referred to in that clause and be called upon to show cause, within 15 days time, against the particular penalties proposed to be inflicted. Any representation this behalf submitted by the person charged shall be taken into consideration before final orders are passed, provided that such representation shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry. In other words, before implicating major punishment there may be compliance of the Public Enquiries Act, 1850. Rule 41(B) contains the provision that an employee of the Bank other than the employee borne under Grade VII service will retire from service any time after attaining the age of 50 years by giving a notice in writing to the Managing Committee at least three months before the date on which he wishes to retire. Thus before referring to this provision three months notice is required to be given. 7. The fact of the case in hand is that the workman was engaged as a Stenographer and while in service he had been served show cause notice dated 12.2.2008(Ext.B) by which decision was taken by the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action and as per the written statement filed by the management wherein it has categorically been stated that the workman has submitted explanation in terms of the show cause but the management being not satisfied with the same has placed this matter before the apex body of the Bank and thereafter unanimously decision was taken to issue three months notice invoking jurisdiction of the provision of Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984. Labour Court after taking into consideration the fact that the disciplinary authority has initiated disciplinary proceeding under Rule 33 of the Rules, 1984 and as such regular procedure for inflicting punishment under the said Rule which has been provided that Rule 37 ought to have been followed but it has not been followed and thereafter the provision of Rule 41(B) since been resorted by issuing three months notice, hence order of compulsory retirement has been held to be illegal being in violation of the provisions of Discipline and Appeal Rule contained in Rules 1984 applicable to the service conditions of the workman concerned. 8. We have examined the provisions of Rules, 1984 as well as the award passed by the Labour Court and we find no interference is warranted in the award for the following reasons. (i) The workman who was holding the post of Stenographer of the permanent establishment of the management the provision of the Rule 1984 is applicable. Rule 1984 contains power to inflict manor and minor punishment and in both the circumstances procedure has been given under Rule 37 and Rule 38 for inflicting major and minor punishment respectively. In case of inflicting major punishment, a regular departmental enquiry has to be initiated i.e. memorandum of charges is to be supplied by statement of allegations and thereafter full-fledged enquiry is to be conducted, the punishment is to be based upon enquiry report in case charge has been found to be proved. From Ext.B. dated 12.2.2008 it is evident that the workman has been asked to show cause as to why disciplinary action as contemplated under Rule 33(A) and Rule 34(A) of the Rules, 1984 will not be initiated to the said acts of commissions and omissions narrated above with a direction to submit report within 15 days from the date of issue of this letter failing which it will be construed that he is not interested in cooperating with official administration and action as deemed proper will be taken against him, it may construed this as a disciplinary action against him. That portion of that letter is being quoted hereinbelow: “You are therefore directed to explain as to why disciplinary action as contemplated under Rule 33(A) and Rule 34(A) of the Rules, 1984 will not be applicable to the said act of commission and omission narrated above. That portion of that letter is being quoted hereinbelow: “You are therefore directed to explain as to why disciplinary action as contemplated under Rule 33(A) and Rule 34(A) of the Rules, 1984 will not be applicable to the said act of commission and omission narrated above. Your explanation should reached the undersigned within 15 days from the date of issue of this letter failing which it will be construed that you are not interested in cooperating with official administration and action as deemed proper will be taken against you. You may construed this as a disciplinary action against you.” From perusal of the Ext.B it appears that the authority have taken decision to take disciplinary action to impose punishment either under section 33(A) and or under section 34(A) of the Rules, 1984. It further transpires that from the said exhibit reference of 53 numbers of explanations have also been made herein. As per the written statement having been annexed with the writ petition as Annexure-2 wherein at para-18 it has specifically been stated that disciplinary action was initiated against the workman vide letter No.11244 dated 12.2.2008 intimating his job performance and history of his service record and in pursuance to the said letter the workman had submitted reply to the show cause, even then the management has not satisfied with the said reply and thereafter it has been placed before the apex body by getting the matter of workman under Agenda No.3(5) of the meeting which was held on 20.7.2008 wherein it was unanimously decided to issue three months prior notice to the workman by invoking power conferred under Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984. Thus, it is evident at the initial stage decision was taken by the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action to impose punishment under Rules 33(A) or 34(A) of the Rules, 1984 but subsequently the order of compulsory retirement has been passed invoking jurisdiction under Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984 which is not permissible for the reason that if a disciplinary action has been initiated which admittedly has been initiated vide letter dated 12.2.2008 it has to be given logical end by following due procedure under the statute but without doing so the authorities have switched over to the provision of Rule 41(B) and passed order of compulsory retirement under the garb of removal. (ii) We have gone through the Ext.2 dated 20.11.2008 from which it is evident that the workman was served with letter dated 12.2.2008 giving him opportunity to explain as to why action as contemplated under Rule 33(A) read with Rule 34(A) of the Rules, 1984 will not be taken for commission and omission committed by him. However it has been written there that he has not submitted explanation nor responded anything in his defence in which, according to us, is contrary to the stand taken by the management in the written statement at para-18 as has been discussed in the preceding paragraph and the management, in absence of reply to show cause, have presumed that the workman has admitted all the offences and thereafter the matter was considered to be taken under Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984 and invoking said jurisdiction the competent authority has taken decision to remove the workman from service by way of compulsory retirement giving him three months notice as contemplated in the said provisions of law. From these aspect of the matter it is evident that the proceeding under the discipline and appeal rule had been initiated to inflict punishment as provided under Rules 33(A) or 34(A) of the Rules, 1984 and thereafter without going to the logical end to the said proceeding order of compulsory retirement has been passed invoking jurisdiction under Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984. There is no dispute about the fact that deadwood cannot be retained in service and the provision of Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984 has been promulgated by the competent authority but simultaneously it is also important that the decision of the authority in this regard is of paramount consideration and if according to the authority the employer become deadwood, a proceeding from its inception has to be initiated under Rule 41(B) of the Rules 1984 but here that is not the fact, rather disciplinary proceeding had been initiated to inflict punishment under Rules 33(A) or 34(A) of the Rules, 1984 which goes to suggest that disciplinary proceeding was initiated vide Ext.B dated 12.2.2008 containing list of allegations along with past antecedents to which the workman has replied and thereafter without resorting to the provision of Rule 37 to impose major punishment as per the list of punishments under the provision of Rule 33(A), order of compulsory retirement has been passed in the garb of removal from service by invoking power conferred under Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984 which cannot be said to be legal. The argument advanced on behalf of the management that it is not a fact that the workman has submitted his reply in pursuance to the show cause dated 12.2.2008 i.e. Ext.B and as such it has been taken by way of misconduct and thereafter the authorities have decided to place the matter before the apex body by way of Agenda No.3(5) wherein it has been taken to invoke jurisdiction under Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984. We, after going through the records, have found that the written statement of the management wherein at paragraph-18 specific assertion has been made that the workman has given reply in pursuance to the show cause Dt.12.2.2008, Ext.B and the authorities being not satisfied with the same has decided to switch over to the provision of Rule 41(B), for ready reference the statement made atpara-18 of the written statement is being quoted below: “That, it is respectfully stated here that due to illegal omission and commission made by the workman, disciplinary action was initiated against the workman vide letter no.11244 dtd.12.2.2008 intimating his job performance and history of his service record. In pursuance to the said letter dtd. 12.2.2008, the workman submitted his show cause and the then management has not satisfied with the said show cause. In pursuance to the said letter dtd. 12.2.2008, the workman submitted his show cause and the then management has not satisfied with the said show cause. The grievance of the workman discussed in agenda No.3(5) of the proceeding of Appointment Sub-Committee held on 22.7.2008 and it was unanimously decided in the said meeting to issue three months prior notice to the workman.” Management witness No.1 has deposed before the Labour Court the same thing which has been stated at para-18 of the written statement but however it is being disputed by learned counsel representing the Management that the workman has not submitted his explanation which led them to take decision under the provision of Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984. However, we are not accepting the oral submission of the management made in this regard since the same is contrary to the record but even accepting this argument even if the employee against whom decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary action if he does not submit his reply then the course would be to initiate a regular proceeding in absence of the employee to give it a logical conclusion but in no circumstance as decision once taken cannot be converted to go for other recourse. (iii) There is no dispute about the fact that it is up to the competent authority to take decision for compulsory retirement in public interest and in that situation the entire record of the concerned employee is to be assessed and thereafter three months notice or whatever provision has been made in the law applicable to the said concerned employee is supposed to be adopted but once the competent authority has made up its mind by taking their decision to initiate a disciplinary action as has been done in this case as would be evident from Ext.B, then shifting from one provision to another provision cannot be said to be in accordance with law as because the provision contemplated under Rules 33(A) or 34(A) of the Rules, 1984 is quite different to that of the provision contained in Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984, but without considering this aspect of the matter the concerned workman has been removed from service byway of compulsory retirement by invoking jurisdiction conferred under Rule 41(B) of the Rules, 1984. 9. 9. We have gone through the award in detail passed by the Labour Court and found that all these points which has been discussed hereinabove have been taken into consideration and thereafter Issue No.1 has been decided in favour of the workman as well as Issue no.2 has also been decided in favour of the workman. Since the workman has attained the age of normal superannuation i.e. on 28.2.2013 and as such no order of reinstatement has been passed, but however amount of Rs.50,000/- as compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages has been passed. 10. W.P.(C) No.2524 of 2016 has been filed by the workman assailing the part of the award by which direction has been sought for to reinstate the petitioner-workman with full back wages and other service benefits. It is undisputed fact that the workman has already attained age of superannuation w.e.f. 28.2.2013 and as such there cannot be order of reinstatement after superannuation of an employee. The very same subject matter fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of G.M. Tank –vs- State of Gujarat and others, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 wherein their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph-32 that after retirement order of reinstatement cannot be passed, which is being quoted herein below: “In the instant case, the appellant joined the respondent in the year 1953. He was suspended from service on 8.2.1979 and got subsistence allowance of Rs.700/- p.m. i.e. 50% of the salary. On 15.10.1982 dismissal order was passed. The appellant has put in 26 years of service with the respondent i.e. from 1953-1979. The appellant would now superannuate in February, 1986. On the basis of the same charges and the evidence, the Department passed an order of dismissal on 21.10.1982 whereas the Criminal Court acquitted him on 30.1.2002. However, as the Criminal Court acquitted the appellant on 30.1.2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w.e.f. 30.1.2002. But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension. This has also been reiterated in the case of Basanti Prasad Vs The Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board and Others reported in (2009) 6 SCC 791 . But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension. This has also been reiterated in the case of Basanti Prasad Vs The Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board and Others reported in (2009) 6 SCC 791 . Hence applying the said principle, according to our considered view, order of reinstatement rightly not been passed by the Tribunal. 11. So far as amount of compensation is concerned, order of reinstatement has been passed which suggest, for the ends of justice, the workman to get all retirement dues and since compulsory retirement has been passed in the year 2009, normal age of superannuation is 28.2.2013, according to us, amount of compensation fixed by the Labour Court warrants no interference. It is also settled that if the award is passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal, this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has got very limited jurisdiction to differ with the finding and it is only in case of finding fact found to be perverse or if there is apparent error on the face of the record or the order is without jurisdiction, then only the interference of the writ petition is warranted, reference given by the Tribunal which is based upon cogent evidence and the materials placed before it subject to exceptions that if there is perversity in finding or there is error apparent on the face of record or order is without jurisdiction, reference may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K. S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good since the same has been considered by Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of M/s.Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 12. Accordingly, on the basis of the settled proposition as has been dealt with in the judgment referred to above and as per the discussions made by us, we find that there is no perversity in the award or any error apparent on the fact of the record, hence we decline to interfere with the same. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are dismissed.