U. P. Jal Nigam Thru Its M. D. 6 Rana Pratap Marg Lucknow v. Surinder Paul Khadwal S/O Shri Late Mathura Das
2016-03-11
RAKESH SRIVASTAVA, SATYENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the opposite party. 2. This petition has been filed challenging the judgment and order dated 29.5.2015 passed by the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow (for short "the Tribunal") primarily on the ground that claim petition was suffering from laches, therefore, the same could not be entertained by the Tribunal. In this regard, counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Dr. Neeraj Kumari Mishra Deo and another, [ 2011 (29) LCD 668 ]. 3. In order to appreciate the argument of the counsel for the petitioner, we have to advert to the facts on record and the facts on record are that the opposite party was awarded selection grade in the year 1980 and an order of recovery from the opposite party was passed in the year 1998. It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner never gave option for award of selection grade after the Second Pay Commission. The selection grade had already accrued to the opposite party in the year 1980 on the basis of the Service Rules as provided under the Rules was that a Junior Engineer, who completed five years of service, would be entitled for award of selection grade. 4. The order issuing recovery against the opposite party was challenged by way of representation, which was moved by the opposite party immediately thereafter in the year 1998. The representation moved by the opposite party came to be decided by means of order dated 16.8.2002. The said order was put to challenge before the State Public Services Tribunal, Dehradun, Uttarakhand as the opposite party at the relevant time was posted in Uttarakhand. The claim petition preferred by the opposite party was allowed vide order dated 17.3.2005 and the aforesaid order was put to challenge before Uttarakhand High Court by way of writ petition, which was allowed vide order dated 22.6.2011 leaving it open to the opposite party to challenge the recovery order as advised under law. Thereafter, the opposite party filed writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy vide order dated 19.7.2012. After that, claim petition was preferred by the opposite party before the Tribunal in August, 2012.
Thereafter, the opposite party filed writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy vide order dated 19.7.2012. After that, claim petition was preferred by the opposite party before the Tribunal in August, 2012. This itself goes to indicate that the claim petition was preferred within a period of one year from the date liberty was granted by the Uttarakhand High Court. If a person has approached wrong forum and liberty has been given by the court to approach the correct forum, then limitation has to be counted from the date a person has been relegated to the court having jurisdiction. In the case in hand, Uttarakhand High Court was of the view that the opposite party was at liberty to approach the proper forum as advised under law. The opposite party approached the Tribunal within a period of one year. Even otherwise, benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be available to the opposite party. In these circumstances, question of limitation as argued by the counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable and the argument is accordingly rejected. 5. so far the question of award of selection grade is concerned, it is to be noted that the same accrued in favour of the opposite party on the basis of the Service Rules then existing in the year 1980. Whether any right, which has accrued in favour of a particular employee, can be taken back by subsequent amendment or on the basis of Second Pay Commission. 6. It is to be noted that the opposite party at no point of time submitted any option as he had already been awarded selection grade and the said right had accrued in his favour in the year 1980. In these circumstances, the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that recovery has wrongly been set aside by the Tribunal does not appeal to reason. The writ petition is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed.