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2016 DIGILAW 917 (HP)

Bhim Sen Dutta v. Himachal Pradesh Gramin Bank

2016-05-25

AJAY MOHAN GOEL

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JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J.: The present writ petition has been filed praying for the following reliefs: “(a) The writ of certiorari may be issued and the impugned orders Annexure P-12 passed by respondent no. 1 and P-22 dated 20.10.2007 passed by respondents no. 2 may be quashed and set aside being illegal and arbitrary in the interest of justice and fair play. (b) Further the writ of mandamus may be issued directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service forthwith alongwith consequential benefits. (c) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and the circumstances of the case may also be granted in favour of the petitioner. (d) Record of the case may also be called for.” 2. The case of the petitioner is that while he was serving as Cashier in Baijnath office of respondent Himachal Gramin Bank, he was served with a charge-sheet dated 03.03.1993 in which 5 articles of charges were levelled against him and by way of said charge-sheet, the petitioner was called upon to submit his defence to the same. 3. In substance, the article of charges alleged against the petitioner were as under:- Article No. 1 The petitioner did not discharge his duty diligently honestly and faithfully and acted against the instructions of the Head Office by personally collecting cash unauthorisedly from different branches on the pretext that he was all alone in the branch and due to heavy withdrawals, immediate requirement of cash had arisen in the Branch Office Baijnath and he thus collected cash when the Branch Office of Baijnath was having huge detention of cash in the branch itself. Article No. 2 That the petitioner was depositing the cash so collected from different branches with his signatures against the column of authorised depositor of the said branch. Article No. 3 The petitioner had been meeting frequent demand of cash from different branches and collecting himself at odd hours on the fake pretext of cash requirement at Branch Office, Baijnath when actually demand of cash in the said branch never existed and similarly in banker account huge unrequired transactions were conducted to overlap that unauthorised cash demands. Article No. 3 The petitioner had been meeting frequent demand of cash from different branches and collecting himself at odd hours on the fake pretext of cash requirement at Branch Office, Baijnath when actually demand of cash in the said branch never existed and similarly in banker account huge unrequired transactions were conducted to overlap that unauthorised cash demands. Article No. 4 The petitioner embezzled a sum of Rs.1.55 lacs from Branch Office, Baijnath, himself/in connivance with R.P. Gupta, Manager and in order to give colour to his act of embezzlement he had been making frequent cuttings in cash balance bank of different dates in denomination of Rs. 50/- notes, the denomination of the said amount had been embezzled from the Branch Office, Baijnath, which was detected on 10.07.1992. Article No. 5 The petitioner had been supplying cash to different branches without any authority of the Manager in utter disregard to the laid down procedure of the bank and he was not supplying the full requirement to different branches and was unauthorisedly supplying less amount without the knowledge of competent authority. 4. On the above mentioned articles of charges, the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner as according to the respondent bank, the petitioner had failed to observe the provisions of conducting Regulations as laid down in (Chapter-IV, Regulations 17 and 19) of Himachal Gramin Bank Staff Service Regulation 1980, which was mis-conduct of Regulation 30 of the said Regulations. 5. It is not clear from the pleadings as to whether the charge-sheet was replied to by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner could neither verify nor deny the fact whether any reply to the said charge-sheet was filed or not. Be that as it may, vide order dated 17.06.1993 one Shri K.S. Manchanda was appointed as Inquiry Officer to look into the charges of imputation against the petitioner. The said Inquiry Officer after conducting the inquiry submitted his inquiry report dated 16.04.1998 (Annexure P-7) to the Disciplinary Authority. In his inquiry report, the Inquiry Officer concluded that all the articles of charges stood proved against the petitioner. A perusal of the said report will demonstrate that the Inquiry Officer has dealt with the article of charges levelled against the petitioner at length and he has taken note of the contentions of the department as well as those of the delinquent officer and thereafter, arrived at his conclusions. 6. A perusal of the said report will demonstrate that the Inquiry Officer has dealt with the article of charges levelled against the petitioner at length and he has taken note of the contentions of the department as well as those of the delinquent officer and thereafter, arrived at his conclusions. 6. This was followed by a notice dated 19.05.1998 from the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner in which he was called upon to show cause as to why penalty of dismissal from bank services in terms of Regulation No. 30(1)(f) of Himachal Gramin Bank, Staff Service Regulation, 1980 (as amended upto 20.01.1983) be not imposed upon him. 7. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said show cause notice dated 20.06.1998 and also appeared in person before the Disciplinary Authority on 20.06.1998. 8. Vide its order Annexure P-12 (dated nil), the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from the bank services forthwith in terms of Regulation No. 30(1)(f) of Himachal Gramin Bank, Staff Service Regulation, 1980 (as amended upto 20.01.1983) upon the petitioner. The said order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was challenged by the petitioner by way of appeal before the Appellate Authority on 24.07.1998. The appeal so filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Chairman of the respondent Bank vide Annexure P-14 dated 08.10.1998. 9. The petitioner preferred CWP No. 155/1999 before this Hon’ble Court, inter alia, on the grounds that his appeal had not been disposed of by the competent authority as the competent authority was the Board of Directors of the Bank and not the Chairman. The said petition was allowed by this Court vide judgment dated 30.08.2003, vide which decision this Court set aside the appellate order and remanded the appeal for disposal in accordance with law to the competent authority, namely, Board of Directors of the Bank. It was further ordered that the Board of Directors shall dispose of the appeal within eight weeks by passing a speaking order and after affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was called upon by the Board of Directors to put-forth his case and his appeal was disposed of on 03.11.2003 vide which order, the order of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority was upheld. 10. Thereafter, the petitioner was called upon by the Board of Directors to put-forth his case and his appeal was disposed of on 03.11.2003 vide which order, the order of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority was upheld. 10. The said order passed by the Board of Directors was challenged by the petitioner by way of CWP No. 1058/2004, inter alia, on the grounds that the issues which had been raised by the petitioner in the appeal had not been adjudicated upon and as such, the order was bad especially in view of the fact that this Court in the earlier order had directed the Disciplinary Authority to pass a speaking order. 11. Vide its judgment dated 14.05.2007, CWP No. 1058/2004 was allowed by this Court and order dated 03.11.2003 was set aside and the respondents were directed to issue notice to the petitioner fixing the date and time of hearing by the Appellate Authority and the respondents were directed to decide the appeal by passing a speaking order within a period of two weeks from the date of hearing. 12. This was followed by the hearing of the appeal by the Appellate Authority which took place on 15.10.2007 in which personal hearing was granted to the petitioner. The Appellate Authority i.e. the Board of Directors thereafter unanimously reviewed the penalty of dismissal given by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 25.06.1998 and decided to impose penalty of removal from service, which shall not be a disqualification for future employment upon the petitioner. This is apparent from Annexure P-22 dated 20.10.2007 alongwith the minutes of meeting dated 15.10.2007 are also appended. 13. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed the present petition praying for quashing Annexure P-22. 14. Reply has been filed to the petitioner by the respondent bank. No rejoinder has been filed to the reply by the petitioner nor it was intended to be filed as is evident from 11.05.2016. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 16. At this stage, it is necessary to underline the fact that this is the third round of litigation pertaining to the initiation of the departmental inquiry against the petitioner ad imposition of penalty upon him by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmation of the same by the Appellate Authority. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 16. At this stage, it is necessary to underline the fact that this is the third round of litigation pertaining to the initiation of the departmental inquiry against the petitioner ad imposition of penalty upon him by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmation of the same by the Appellate Authority. In the first round of litigation i.e. CWP No. 155/1999, the petitioner had assailed the departmental proceedings as well as the penalty imposed upon him. In the said petition, the appellate order was set aside by this Court on the ground that the same was passed by the same authority that had passed the order of imposition of penalty, whereas the appeal was required to be disposed of by the Board of Directors. 17. In the second round of litigation (CWP No. 1058/2004), the order passed by the Board of Directors (Appellate Authority) was set aside by this Court on the ground that the same was not a speaking order. 18. In the present writ petition the relief prayed by the petitioner is for quashing Annexure P-12 i.e. the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Annexure P-22 i.e. the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 20.10.2007. No prayer has been made in the petition for setting aside the inquiry report. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the order passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. the Board of Directors is not sustainable in the eyes of law because the Chairman of the respondent bank who was the Disciplinary Authority who was the author of the initial order of imposition of penalty imposed upon the petitioner had participated as one of the members of the Board while deciding his appeal. He has further argued that even otherwise the departmental proceedings held against him were void ab initio because he was not given proper opportunity to defend himself as he was denied legal assistance. He submits that Representing Officer of the respondent bank was a legally trained person being a law graduate, whereas he was denied the opportunity of being assisted through a legal practitioner. He has further argued that requisite documents were arbitrarily denied to him by the respondent bank which prejudiced his case. He submits that Representing Officer of the respondent bank was a legally trained person being a law graduate, whereas he was denied the opportunity of being assisted through a legal practitioner. He has further argued that requisite documents were arbitrarily denied to him by the respondent bank which prejudiced his case. His contention was that the documents pertaining to the co-accused R.P. Gupta were not supplied to him which adversely affected the petitioner and in the absence of said documents he was not able to properly defend himself. He also argued that the Inquiry Officer was biased against him and he was not given opportunity by the Inquiry Officer to defend his case. As per him, the material witnesses were not produced and the officers who had conducted the preliminary inquiry were also with-held to the prejudice of the petitioner by the department. He further argued that both the Disciplinary authority as well as the Appellate Authority have erred in not appreciating that the charges leveled against the petitioner were vague and were not proved and further the penalty of removal of services which was imposed upon the petitioner without taking into consideration the ground which has been raised by the petitioner in his appeal. Lastly, he argued that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner does not commensurate with the alleged mis-conduct. Accordingly, he prayed for quashing of the impugned orders with all the consequential benefits. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments in support of his case:- 1. S. Sahapathy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1984(3) S.L.R. 161 2. Shri Niranjan Dass Sehgal Vs. The State of Punjab and others, 1968 (2) S.L.R. 183 3. State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1623 4. Hem Parkash Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and another, 2010 (Supp.) Him. L.R. 1957. 20. On the other hand, Mr. Rakakant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has argued that there is no merit in the present petition. Mr. Sharma has further argued that the inquiry proceedings were conducted against the petitioner strictly as per the provisions of Himachal Gramin Bank, Staff Service Regulation, 1980 as amended from time to time. The charges against the petitioner were serious and they stood proved in the inquiry which was held on the charges levelled against the petitioner in which inquiry the petitioner was fully associated. Mr. The charges against the petitioner were serious and they stood proved in the inquiry which was held on the charges levelled against the petitioner in which inquiry the petitioner was fully associated. Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel has further argued that as there is no prayer for quashing of the inquiry report, therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to lay any challenge to the same in the present petition. He further submitted that even otherwise a perusal of the inquiry report reveals that the Inquiry Officer has held the inquiry in a proper manner as per procedure by associating the petitioner in the same. 21. Mr. Sharma further submits that the Chairman of the bank who had passed the order of penalty in his capacity as the Disciplinary Authority had not participated in the proceedings of the Board of Directors in the Agenda Item fixed for the said purpose on 15.10.2007. 22. He has further submitted that as far as the issue being taken up by the petitioner of not having provided him the legal practitioner is concerned, the same was without any merit because the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant the entitlement of the petitioner to be represented by a legal practitioner. The Presenting Officer representing the management case was neither a legal trained officer nor was he a Legal Advisor of the bank or Law Officer of the bank. He was simply in service officer of the bank. Further, the facts of the case and the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner was not all complicated so as to warrant providing assistance of legal practitioner to the petitioner. Mr. Sharma has further submitted that even otherwise the petitioner has not been able to make out a case as to what prejudice was caused to him by not providing him with the services of legal practitioner. 23. He has further submitted that the copies of the documents which petitioner demanded were supplied to him as per the list submitted by him in this Court against receipt during the pendency of the present petition and the petitioner was unnecessarily delaying the inquiry proceedings on one pretext or the other. The documents pertaining to the inquiry being conducted against other officers were not relevant for the purpose of inquiry initiated against the petitioner and, therefore, these documents were not supplied. The documents pertaining to the inquiry being conducted against other officers were not relevant for the purpose of inquiry initiated against the petitioner and, therefore, these documents were not supplied. The petitioner did not challenge the order of non-supplying of these documents, hence now he is estopped from taking this plea. The petitioner further has not been able to establish as to what prejudice has been caused to him by non-supplying the documents to him pertaining to the inquiry of other persons. 24. Mr. Sharma has further argued that a perusal of the record will demonstrate that due opportunity was granted to the petitioner to putforth his case at all levels and it was the petitioner who was time ad again prolonging and delaying the inquiry on one pretext or the other. He further submitted that a perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Authority/Board of Directors will demonstrate that the same was well reasoned order and a detailed order in which all the aspects of the matter which had been raised by the petitioner in his appeal had been dealt with by the Board of Directors. 25. Mr. Sharma has further argued that even the Inquiry Officer has conducted the inquiry in a proper manner and he was not biased against the petitioner as has been alleged. Mr. Sharma submits that the there was no biasness on the part of Inquiry Officer against petitioner and no material has been produced on record to substantiate these allegations. 26. He has thus argued that there is no infirmity in the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer because his report is based on the documentary evidence produced in the inquiry as well as the evidence of the witnesses of the parties recorded in the course of the inquiry. He has further argued that order of penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority confirmed by the Appellate Authority is neither cryptic nor is a non-speaking order. Both the authorities have arrived at their conclusions after due application of mind. 27. I have hard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents available on the writ file. 28. The services of the petitioner are governed by the Himachal Gramin Bank, Staff Service Regulation, 1980 as amended from time to time. The said Regulations has been made available to this Court by the learned counsel for the respondents. 27. I have hard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents available on the writ file. 28. The services of the petitioner are governed by the Himachal Gramin Bank, Staff Service Regulation, 1980 as amended from time to time. The said Regulations has been made available to this Court by the learned counsel for the respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any infirmity in the inquiry proceedings which were undertaken by the Inquiry Officer. It is not his case that he was not associated in the inquiry or that the inquiry was held in a manner which is contrary to the Staff Service Regulation of the respondent bank. Regulation 30 of the Bank Regulation deals with the penalty which can be imposed and how such penalties can be imposed, whereas Regulation 30(1) deals with the right to file appeal. Both these Regulations are reproduced herein below:- “30. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, an officer or employee who commits a breach of these regulations or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence, or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Bank or in conflict with its instructions or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other act of misconduct, shall be liable to the following penalties:- (a) reprimand (b) delay or stoppage of increments or promotion; (c) degradation to a lower post or grade or to a lower stage in his incremental scale; (d) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by the officer or employee; (e) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; (f) dismissal. (2) No officer or employee shall be subjected to the penalties referred to in clause (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of sub-regulation (1) except by an order in writing signed by the Chairman and no such order shall be passed without the charge being formulated in writing and given to the said officer or employee so that he shall have reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or in person, as he prefers and in the latter case his defence shall be taken down in writing and read to him. Provided that the requirements of this sub-regulation may be waived, if the facts on the basis of which action is to be taken have been established in a court of law or court martial, or where the officer or employee has absconded or where it is for any other reason impracticable to communicate with him or where there is difficulty in observing them and the requirements can be waived without injustice to him. In every case where all or any of the requirements of this sub-regulation are waived, the reasons for so doing shall be recorded in writing. (3) The enquiry under this regulation and the procedure with the exception of the final order, may be delegated in case the person against whom proceedings are taken is an officer to any officer who is senior to such officer and in the case of an employee to any officer. For purposes of the enquiry, the officer or employee may not engage a legal practitioner. (4) An officer or employee may be placed under suspension by the officer empowered to pass the final order under this regulation. During such suspension, the officer or employee shall receive subsistence allowance equal to one third of basic pay the officer or employee was receiving on the date prior to the date of suspension plus dearness allowance, and other allowances, excluding conveyance allowance, entertainment allowance and special allowance, calculated on the reduced pay for the first three months of suspension. For the subsequent period after three months he shall be entitled to draw 1/2 of the basic pay plus the dearness allowance and other allowance specified above calculated on the reduced pay. Provided that if no penalty under clause (b), (c), (d) (e) or (f of sub-regulation (1) refunded the difference between the subsistence allowance and the emoluments which he would have received but for such suspension, for the period he was under suspension and that, if a penalty is imposed on him under all or any of the said clauses, no order shall be passed which shall have the effect of compelling him to refund such subsistence allowance. The period during which and officer or employee is under suspension shall, if he is not dismissed from the service, be treated as period spent on duty, leave, or period not spent on duty as the officer who passes the final order may direct. 31. The period during which and officer or employee is under suspension shall, if he is not dismissed from the service, be treated as period spent on duty, leave, or period not spent on duty as the officer who passes the final order may direct. 31. (1) An officer or employee shall have a right of appeal against any order passed by an authority which injuriously affects his interest. (2) The appeal shall be preferred to the appellate authority mentioned in regulation 32 within 30 days of the date of service of the order appealed against. The appellate authority shall consider whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are justified and whether the penalty imposed is adequate and pass suitable order as early as possible.” Perhaps has neither specifically alleged nor proved violation of said Regulation. 29. In compliance to the order passed by this Court on 14.05.2007 in CWP No. 1058 of 2004, the Appellate Authority has passed a detailed and speaking order on the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the Disciplinary Authority. A perusal of the order so passed by the Appellate Authority/Board of Directors will demonstrate that the petitioner appeared before the Board for personal hearing on 15.10.2007 and on the said date, the Board of Directors asked him to present his case and also argue his case. Annexure P-22 will also demonstrate that the Board considered all the points raised by the appellant in his appeal. It has been observed by the Appellate Authority that the delinquent wanted to take the assistance of defence counsel namely Suraj Singh Pathania - then employed with P.S.E.B. and also a Trade Union Leader – Vice President of Shanan Project Employees Association at Joginder Nagar. Despite objection raised by Management representative to permit an outsider as defence counsel, the Inquiry Officer permitted B.S. Dutta to engage the defence Assistant S.S. Pathania as proposed by him. It is also there in the order of the Appellate Authority that after petitioner was allowed to engage S.S. Pathania as defence Assistant, he started raising demand of permitting him to engage a legally trained person and that in fact the intent of the petitioner was to prolong the inquiry and delay it on one pretext or the other. It is also there in the order of the Appellate Authority that after petitioner was allowed to engage S.S. Pathania as defence Assistant, he started raising demand of permitting him to engage a legally trained person and that in fact the intent of the petitioner was to prolong the inquiry and delay it on one pretext or the other. With regard to the issue raised in the appeal by the petitioner that the tenure of the Inquiry Officer was valid only for three months as he was given three months time to complete the proceedings, it was held by the Appellate Authority that this was merely a direction to the Inquiry Officer which was neither statutory nor obligatory and furthermore, the inquiry was unnecessarily delayed by the petitioner. The Appellate Authority has further held that it was the petitioner who was responsible for prolonging the process of inquiry and with regard to the issue of not producing material witnesses, the Appellate Authority has held that it is prerogative of the management to produce only those witnesses which are relevant and which it considers are sufficient to establish the case of the Management and even otherwise the petitioner was at liberty to have had produced the witnesses in his defence. With regard to the issue of non-supply of record of the inquiry of other officer, the Appellate Authority has held that the petitioner was supplied all the documents which he had asked for, as per the directions of this Court and the documents pertaining to the inquiry of R.P. Gupta was rightly not supplied as these acts of the petitioner were nothing but dilatory tactics. Even otherwise there were separate inquiries against the petitioner and R.P. Gupta. As R.P. Gupta co-operated for early completion of the inquiry, he was awarded penalty and reinstated, whereas B.S. Dutta, petitioner, devised various ways and means to prolong the inquiry process. The Appellate Authority has also considered the contention of the petitioner that of biasness on the part of the Inquiry Officer towards the petitioner, which has been negatived by it on the facts and circumstances of the case. 30. The Appellate Authority has also considered the contention of the petitioner that of biasness on the part of the Inquiry Officer towards the petitioner, which has been negatived by it on the facts and circumstances of the case. 30. In fact after the perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Authority, this Court is convinced that the Board of Directors have not only given an opportunity of hearing the petitioner but it has also passed a reasoned and a speaking order vide which it has concurred with the view of the Disciplinary Authority while modifying penalty and the same in fact does not warrant any interference. This is more so because in the case of departmental proceedings, the petitioner first has to establish that there has been a violation of the Regulations which govern the holding of inquiry against an officer and said violation has resulted in grave prejudice to the delinquent official. However, in the present case, the procedure prescribed in the Regulations for imposition of major penalty has been duly followed by the authorities concerned and petitioner has failed to demonstrate anything to the contrary. 31. Even otherwise, this Court while exercising its power of judicial review has to satisfy its conscious as to whether the procedure which has been followed by the authorities while imposing the penalty on the delinquent officer/official, is sustainable in law or not. In my considered view, there is no infirmity in the procedure which has been followed either by the Inquiry Officer or by the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, neither the report of the Inquiry Officer is bad in law nor the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority can be said to be arbitrary, unjust, non-speaking or unreasonable. The Appellate Authority has also passed a reasoned order while rejecting the appeal of the petitioner. While passing the appellate order, the Appellate Authority has applied its mind and has passed a speaking order taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. This Court does not find any infirmity with the order which has been passed by the Appellate Authority. While passing the appellate order, the Appellate Authority has applied its mind and has passed a speaking order taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. This Court does not find any infirmity with the order which has been passed by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, in my considered view, the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted in consonance with the provisions of the concerned regulations of the respondent-Bank and I do not find any infirmity either with the procedure followed by the Inquiry Officer or with the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and appellate authority, respectively. 32. Even the judgments cited at the bar by the by the learned counsel for the petitioner also though pertain to the matter of disciplinary proceedings but they are not material for the purpose of adjudication of the present petition as the factual matrix in those cases was completely different as it exists in the present case. 33. The issue in the case reported in 1984(3) S.L.R. 161 was with regard to allegation of violation of Town Planning Rules and contravening official procedure without indicating the specific rule. The issue involved in 1968 (2) S.L.R. 183 was also with regard to the adherence to the principle of natural justice in all matters of quasi judicial nature. Similarly the matter involved in AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1623 pertained to the violation of principle of natural justice wherein the public servant was denied opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who gave evidence against him and copies of documents to which otherwise he was entitled, were not supplied to him. Similarly, the issue involved in 2010 (Supp.) Him. L.R. 1957 was non-supply of inquiry report to the delinquent official to enable him to make representation against it. 34. In the present case, neither there is any violation of the principle of natural justice nor it can be said that all the relevant documents were not supplied to the petitioner. Similarly, it is also not a case of the petitioner that the inquiry report was not supplied to him to enable him to give response to the same. Therefore, the above judgments do not have any bearing on the facts of the present case. 35. Mr. Digvijay Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has lastly argued that the penalty of compulsory retirement imposed upon the petitioner is otherwise harsh. Therefore, the above judgments do not have any bearing on the facts of the present case. 35. Mr. Digvijay Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has lastly argued that the penalty of compulsory retirement imposed upon the petitioner is otherwise harsh. I am afraid that it is not for this Court to decide that as to what penalty has to be imposed upon an officer/official or the Court ordinarily does not interfere with the punishment which has been imposed until and unless the order of punishment seems to be passed on extraneous reasons. In the present case, no such circumstance exists, which may warrant any interference in the penalty which has been imposed by the authorities concerned. 36. It is settled law that the courts will not act as an appellate Court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. 37. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 584, has held that the test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, malafide or based on extraneous considerations. 38. In the present case, it is amply clear that principles of natural justice were adhered to. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that statutory regulations were violated or that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority is either arbitrary or capricious or is the result of malafide or is based on extraneous considerations. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that statutory regulations were violated or that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority is either arbitrary or capricious or is the result of malafide or is based on extraneous considerations. The conclusions arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are borne out from the material on record and, therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the findings arrived at by the said authorities, by this Court. 39. Therefore, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.