JUDGMENT : Antony Dominic, J. These appeals are filed by the Kerala State Electricity Board and the State of Kerala and others, challenging the judgment in W.P.(C)1648/15. By the judgment under appeal, the learned Single Judge overruled the objection raised by the appellant in W.A.649/16 regarding the maintainability of the writ petition filed by the Kerala High Tension and Extra High Tension Industrial Electricity Consumers Association (hereinafter referred to as 'Association') and directed the appellants to deal with the claims raised by the Association in Exts.P6 and P10 representations and based on individual claims made by its each member with supporting documents. 2. By Ext.P2 order dated 21.5.90, the Government announced incentives to new industries in the matter of power connection. Ext.P2 was adopted by the Electricity Board, vide its order dated 19.6.1990. Subsequently, the Government issued Ext.P3 order dated 6.2.1992, whereby new industrial units which commenced commercial production between 1.1.92 to 31.12.96 and satisfied the other conditions specified, were offered uninterrupted power supply and exemption for five years from payment of enhanced power tariff, which came into effect on 1.1.92. 3. Various industries were set up in the State acting upon the representation contained in the aforesaid order of the Government of Kerala. Despite the aforesaid offer for uninterrupted power supply, power cut at rates varying from 30 to 100 percent was imposed on High Tension (HT) and Extra High Tension (EHT) consumers during the period from 7.1.96 to 15.12.97. According to the Board, during the said period there were restrictions on consumption of energy in excess of 50% for 325 days for Extra High Tension (EHT) consumers and 425 days for High Tension (HT) consumers. It appears that the respondent herein, an association representing the High Tension (HT) and Extra High Tension (EHT) industrial consumers made representations to the Government. In response thereto, the Government issued Ext.P4 order, dated 26.10.1999 granting extension of the period of supply of power at pre-92 tariff to the eligible industrial units which suffered power cut of 50% or more, for such period when power cut was in force. However, this benefit was not extended for the period when the power cut was less than 50%. 4. However, this benefit was not extended for the period when the power cut was less than 50%. 4. Writ petitions were filed by several High Tension (HT) and Extra High Tension (EHT) Consumers claiming that the benefit on par with Ext.P4 should be extended to them for the period when power cut at less than 50% was in force. These writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of this court on 24.2.2005. 5. Some of the petitioners before this court carried the matter in appeal before the Apex Court. By its judgment dated 6.2.2014 in S.V.A.Steel Re-Rolling Mills Limited and others v. State of Kerala and Others [ (2014) 4 SCC 186 ] the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and ordered thus: "37. We, therefore, allow the appeals by quashing and setting aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and direct the respondents to calculate the period during which 100% electricity supply was not given to the appellants and extend the period of incentive accordingly. The calculation shall be made and consequential orders shall be passed within two months from today. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs." 6. Realising that the Apex Court has allowed the appeals filed by some of the High Tension (HT) and Extra High Tension (EHT) Consumers, the respondent association submitted Ext.P6 representation to the Government of Kerala, referring to the judgment in extenso and requesting thus: "In this view of the matter and considering the public interest involved, the Association hereby respectfully requests the Government to forthwith comply with the Order of the Honourable Supreme Court and come out with an appropriate Government Order extending the pre 92 benefit even for days when supply of electricity was more than 50% but not 100% as assured under the Government Order dated 21-5-1990 and 6-2- 1992. In effect therefore irrespective of the extent of Power Cut, an extension will have to be given on all days when Power Cut was imposed. Kindly therefore look into this representation and necessary orders may please be issued as directed and in compliance with the order of the Honourable Supreme Court." 7. This was followed by Ext.P10 representation dated 29.5.2014 requesting to expedite decision on Ext.P6. Complaining that a decision on Exts.P6 and P10 was not taken, the Association filed the writ petition in which the following are the main two prayers: "1. This was followed by Ext.P10 representation dated 29.5.2014 requesting to expedite decision on Ext.P6. Complaining that a decision on Exts.P6 and P10 was not taken, the Association filed the writ petition in which the following are the main two prayers: "1. direct the respondent State to forthwith implement and come out with the requisite orders granting benefits of Ext.P5 judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court to the eligible members of the Petitioner Association. 2. direct the respondent State to forthwith take action on the petitioner's Ext.P6 and P10 representations." 8. When the writ petition came up for admission, maintainability of the writ petition was raised as a preliminary issue. Maintainability of the writ petition was considered by the learned Single Judge, who thereafter disposed of the writ petition ordering thus: "24. In that view of the matter, I hold that the present Writ Petition is maintainable. But it is made clear that, I have not expressed anything on the entitlement of the individual members of the petitioner Association for extension of the benefit of Pre-92 tariff in terms of the law declared by the Apex Court in Ext.P5 judgment, which has to be dealt with by the 1st respondent State and the 2nd respondent Board, based on individual claims made by each member with supporting documents. In the result, this Writ Petition is disposed of directing the 1st respondent to consider Exts.P6 and P10 representations submitted by the petitioner and pass appropriate orders thereon strictly in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, with notice to the petitioner Association and also the 2nd respondent Board. No order as to costs." It is this judgment, which is challenged in these appeals. 9. We heard the senior counsel for the appellant in W.A.649/16, learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellants in W.A.1933/16 and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Association. 10. First issue that was debated before us was regarding the maintainability of the writ petition filed by the association. According to the appellants, the writ petition was not maintainable for the reason that if at all there was any grievance to be agitated before this court, such grievance was an individual grievance of the affected consumers and therefore, only the consumers could have filed the writ petition. According to the appellants, the writ petition was not maintainable for the reason that if at all there was any grievance to be agitated before this court, such grievance was an individual grievance of the affected consumers and therefore, only the consumers could have filed the writ petition. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the association representing the collective body of the consumers was not maintainable. It was also contended that the judgment of the Apex Court being a judgment in personam, the benefit thereof cannot be claimed by the members of the association, who have slept over and waived their rights and acquiesced to the situation. 11. These contentions were resisted by the senior counsel appearing for the association contending that the plea of locus standi now urged by the appellants is a technical plea which should not be allowed to be urged by the State or its instrumentality. According to him, the judgment of the Apex Court is a judgment in rem and once a general declaration of law has been made by the Apex Court, it is the duty of the State to extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons, irrespective of whether they have made individual claims or not. It was contended that such a right available to the consumers should not be allowed to be defeated by taking refuge under technical plea of delay, waiver and acquiescence. 12. We have considered the submissions made. The Association consists of a large number of industrial consumers of electricity, who are High Tension (HT) and Extra High Tension (EHT) consumers. Such members include consumers who have set up industries acting upon the representations made by Government and the Board to supply uninterrupted power at pre 1.1.92 tariff. Several such consumers have suffered power cut during the period from 7.1.96 to 15.12.97, the rates of which varied at different points of time. Many of these consumers have enjoyed the benefit of Ext.P4 whereby the Government have compensated them for the period when the power cut in excess of 50% or more was in force. Surviving grievance is in relation to the period when the power cut was below 50%. Writ petitions filed were dismissed by this court and some of the unsuccessful petitioners filed appeals before the Apex Court which were allowed by judgment dated 6.2.2014. 13. Surviving grievance is in relation to the period when the power cut was below 50%. Writ petitions filed were dismissed by this court and some of the unsuccessful petitioners filed appeals before the Apex Court which were allowed by judgment dated 6.2.2014. 13. There are consumers, who may have waived their rights against the short supply of energy during the period when power cut of less than 50% was in force and acquiesced to the quantity supplied to them. There are also consumers who agitated the matter unsuccessfully before this court and did not pursue the matter further before the Apex Court. After the judgment of the Apex Court was rendered, Ext.P6, an omnibus representation was made by the Association. A reading of Ext.P6 shows that it was made on behalf of all members of the Association and the request made is that the benefit of Ext.P5 judgment rendered on 6.2.2014 shall be extended to all. The first question to be considered is whether the writ petition filed in the aforesaid background, was maintainable. 14. According to us, the grievance, if any, of the affected consumers is an individual grievance. This is also not a grievance, which could have been collectively raised or considered. The effect of denial of benefit of extension of period will vary from consumer to consumer depending upon, the rate of power cut imposed, its duration, the quantity agreed to be supplied, consumption pattern of the consumer and such other relevant factors. Secondly, even when benefit of a judgment rendered by the Apex Court is claimed, issues such as whether the claimant is guilty of delay and laches and whether he has waived his rights and acquiesced to the situation etc. will have to be considered duly adverting to the aforesaid factors. Therefore, such individual grievances, if at all, are to be agitated, only by the consumers concerned and the Association could not collectively maintain a writ petition before this court as a representative action, on behalf of all the consumers. 15. This view that we have taken, finds support in the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev and others [ AIR 1964 SC 685 ] where the Apex Court has held thus: "8. On the merits, the position is absolutely clear. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. On the merits, the position is absolutely clear. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can be issued by the High Court under the said article even for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined to cases of illegal invasion of his fundamental rights alone. But though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of the article clearly indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226. The narrow question which falls for our decision in the present appeals is whether the respondents can be said to have proved any legal right in respect of the properties of which they apprehended they would be dispossessed by the appellant." 16. Subsequently, also the Apex Court has reiterated the same view in its judgment in Vinoy Kumar v State of U.P. and others [ 2001 (4) SCC 734 ] where the Apex Court has held in paragraph 2 thus: "2. Generally speaking, a person shall have no locus standi to file a writ petition if he is not personally affected by the impugned order or his fundamental rights have neither been directly or substantially invaded nor is there any imminent danger of such rights being invaded or his acquired interests have been violated ignoring the applicable rules. The relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is based on the existence of a right in favour of the person invoking the jurisdiction. The exception to the general rule is only in cases where the writ applied for is a writ of habeas corpus or quo warranto or filed in public interest. The relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is based on the existence of a right in favour of the person invoking the jurisdiction. The exception to the general rule is only in cases where the writ applied for is a writ of habeas corpus or quo warranto or filed in public interest. It is a matter of prudence, that the court confines the exercise of writ jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injuries are caused to a particular person or his fundamental rights are violated, and not to entertain cases of individual wrong or injury at the instance of third party where there is an effective legal aid organisation which can take care of such cases. Even in cases filed in public interest, the court can exercise the writ jurisdiction at the instance of a third party only when it is shown that the legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determined class of persons is, by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for relief." 17. These judgments were followed by this court in the judgment in Pournamy Mohan v. State of Kerala ( 2012 (1) KLT 686 ) and Self Financing Arts and Science College Management Welfare Association v. Mahatma Gandhi University [2016 (3) KLT 675]. In the light of the above, we have to necessarily hold that the writ petition filed by the Association, was not maintainable and the learned Single Judge ought to have dismissed the writ petition on that short ground. 18. The second aspect to be examined is whether the benefit of the judgment in S.V.A.Steel Re-Rolling Mills Limited and others v. State of Kerala and Others [ (2014) 4 SCC 186 ] could have been claimed by consumers who are not parties to the judgment. We may in this context, at the risk of repetition say that the power cut in question was in force during the period 7.1.96 to 15.12.97 and the judgment of the Apex Court was rendered on 6.2.2014. In other words, it is almost after 17 years of the power cut which gave rise to the cause of action that the judgment was rendered by the Apex Court and it is thereafter that claim for the benefit is made. In other words, it is almost after 17 years of the power cut which gave rise to the cause of action that the judgment was rendered by the Apex Court and it is thereafter that claim for the benefit is made. Question is whether such a claim is maintainable on the ground of the binding nature of the Apex Court judgment in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. While in this context, we may make reference to the Apex Court judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others [(2015) (1) SCC 347] where the Apex Court has surveyed the earlier precedents and summerised the legal principles thus: "22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." 19. Reading of the above paragraphs of the judgment would show that normally when relief is granted to a particular set of employees, similarly situated employees are also entitled to similar benefit, even if they have not approached the court. However, an exception has been drawn to the aforesaid rule in the form of laches, delays and acquiescence. It is stated that such persons would be treated as fence-sitters and delay and laches and acquiescence would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. Still further, it is clarified that when the judgment relied on is a judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, delay and laches would stand exempted. It is also stated that where the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, the benefit of the judgment will not enure to anyone else. 20. 20. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, let us now again examine the Apex Court judgment in S.V.A.Steel Re-Rolling Mills Limited and others v. State of Kerala and Others [ (2014) 4 SCC 186 ] where in paragraph 32 to 37 it was held thus: "32. In view of the incentives and assurances given to the appellants along with others, who were desirous of setting up new industries, the appellants set up their new units which were much dependent upon continuous supply of electricity. One of the appellants is a Steel Re- rolling Mill. In Steel industry, when the industry is concerned with making of steel or re-rolling of steel, it requires lot of power and energy, and electricity being one of the important sources of power, the appellant was much dependent on continuous supply of electricity, which had been assured to it by the respondent-State. 33. If an assurance was given to the appellants and similarly situated persons that they would be given 100% electricity supply for five years, the respondents cannot wriggle out of their liability by making a policy to the effect that the benefit by way of incentive would be extended only if the electricity supply was reduced to less than 50% on a particular day. A steel industry, for example, which cannot function without electricity or power in any other form, would be put to enormous inconvenience and loss if the power supply is not continuous. So as to reactivate or to restart the machines or to start the process afresh, the industry has to spend something more than what it would have spent if the supply or power namely, electricity was uninterrupted. Stoppage of manufacturing process would mean losses under several heads. The labour employed has to be paid even when the employer does not get work from the labour force. Very often, so as to bring a required temperature for the purpose of carrying on certain processes, more fuel is to be injected so as to attain the condition which was prevailing prior to electricity supply being disconnected. Moreover, there would be several overhead expenses which one has to incur even if there is no production or stoppage of manufacturing process. 34. Moreover, there would be several overhead expenses which one has to incur even if there is no production or stoppage of manufacturing process. 34. The judgments cited by the counsel appearing for the respondents would not help them for the reason that in the cases referred to, the Government had to change the policy in public interest. In the instant case, by compensating the aggrieved appellants, no harm would be caused to the State of Kerala except that it will have to compensate the appellants by supplying assured electricity for some extended period at a specified tariff. 35. For the aforestated reasons, in our opinion, the respondent-State was not wholly fair when it extended benefit to the appellants only for the period during which electricity supply was reduced to less than 50% on certain days. 36. We, therefore, hold that the benefit extended by the respondent State is not sufficient. The respondent- State ought to have extended the period even for the days when supply of electricity was more than 50% but not 100% as assured under G.Os. dated 21.5.1990 and 6.2.1992. We, therefore, direct the respondents to give the said benefit by extending the period of incentive. 37. We, therefore, allow the appeals by quashing and setting aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and direct the respondents to calculate the period during which 100% electricity supply was not given to the appellants and extend the period of incentive accordingly. The calculation shall be made and consequential orders shall be passed within two months from today. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs." 21. These paragraphs of the judgment of the Apex Court would make it pellucid that there is no indication whatsoever in the judgment that the benefits thereof are to enure to anyone other than the parties to the lis, to make it a judgment in rem. On the contrary, all that the Apex Court had directed is that the benefits thereof should be extended to the appellants before it. To demonstrate that where it wanted the benefit of its judgment to be extended to other similarly situated also, the Apex Court has made its intention clear in the judgment itself, we may refer to para 19 of the judgment in K.I.Shephard and Others v. Union of India and Others [ 1987 (4) SCC 431 ]. To demonstrate that where it wanted the benefit of its judgment to be extended to other similarly situated also, the Apex Court has made its intention clear in the judgment itself, we may refer to para 19 of the judgment in K.I.Shephard and Others v. Union of India and Others [ 1987 (4) SCC 431 ]. "The writ petitions and the appeals must succeed. We set aside the impugned judgments of the Single Judge and Division bench of the Kerala High Court and direct that each of the three transferee banks should take over the excluded employees on the same terms and conditions of employment under the respective banking companies prior to amalgamation. The employees would be entitled to the benefit of continuity of service for all purposes including salary and perks throughout the period. We leave it open to the transferee banks to take such action as they consider proper against these employees in accordance with law. Some of the excluded employees have not come to court. There is no justification to penalise them for not having litigated. They too shall be entitled to the same benefits as the petitioners. Ordinarily the successful parties should have been entitled to costs but in view of the fact they are going back to employment, we do not propose to make orders of costs against their employers. We hope and trust that the transferee banks would look at the matter with an open mind and would keep themselves alive to the human problem involved in it." (emphasis supplied) 22. Even if a judgment is a judgment in rem, when benefit thereof is claimed, question such as delay, waiver, acquiescence, etc. would have to be considered and there is nothing obliging the State to extend similar treatment to a claim made at any time, ignoring all these factors. This is particularly because, at this distance of time, having regard to the law of limitation, none of the consumers can approach the civil court for the relief claimed now. All these principles have been explained in the judgment of the Apex Court in U.P.Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, 2006 (11) SCC 464 , where it was held thus: "6. This is particularly because, at this distance of time, having regard to the law of limitation, none of the consumers can approach the civil court for the relief claimed now. All these principles have been explained in the judgment of the Apex Court in U.P.Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, 2006 (11) SCC 464 , where it was held thus: "6. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and laches and delay has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief should be granted to him as was granted to person similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A chart has been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their retirement wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30-6-2005 and 31-7-2005. Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed. They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after their retirement. Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not? 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has invited our attention to various decisions to impress upon that persons who are guilty of such laches and acquiesced with the situation should not be granted any relief because it is going to cost the Nigam a heavy financial burden to the tune of Rs 17,80,43,108. Therefore, relief should be confined to those persons who were continuing in service and filed their writ petitions in time but not to all and sundry who woke up to file the writ petitions much after their retirement. Therefore, relief should be confined to those persons who were continuing in service and filed their writ petitions in time but not to all and sundry who woke up to file the writ petitions much after their retirement. In this connection, our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India wherein their Lordships observed that those people who were sitting on the fence till somebody else took up the matter to the court for refund of duty, cannot be given the benefit. In that context, their Lordships held as follows: (SCC pp. 356-57) "Petitioners are reagitating claims which they had not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared void. There is also an unexplained, inordinate delay in preferring the present writ petition which is brought after almost a year after the first rejection. As observed by the Court in Durga Prashad case, the exchange position of this country and the policy of the Government regarding international trade varies from year to year. In these matters it is essential that persons who are aggrieved by orders of the Government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order with utmost expedition. Therefore, these delays are sufficient to persuade the Court to decline to interfere. If a right of appeal is available, this order rejecting the writ petition shall not prejudice petitioners' case in any such appeal." 8. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya. In that case the respondents woke up to claim the relief which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya. In that case the respondents woke up to claim the relief which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Therefore, the State approached this Court and this Court after considering the matter observed as under: (SCC p. 268) "Although it is not necessary to give an explanation for the delay which occurred within the period mentioned in sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper. In the instant case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay." 9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) "The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage." 10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta, it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9) "9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta, it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9) "9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief." 11. In Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359- 60, para 34) "34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law." 12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows: "In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows: "In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches." 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?" 23. This judgment was followed by the Apex Court in A.P.Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2007) 2 SCC 725 where it was held thus: "40. The benefit of a judgment is not extended to a case automatically. While granting relief in a writ petition, the High Court is entitled to consider the fact situation obtaining in each case including the conduct of the petitioner. In doing so, the Court is entitled to take into consideration the fact as to whether the writ petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and then wake up after the decision of this Court. If it is found that the appellant approached the Court after a long delay, the same may disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief. (See Chairman, U.P.Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh.)" 24. These judgments were followed by a Division Bench of this court in its judgment in State of Kerala v. Thirumeni [ 2007 (4) KLT 938 ] to which one of us (Antony Dominic, J.) was a party. 25. However, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Association placed considerable reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd. [ 2001 (2) SCC 549 ] where one of the contentions raised by the Apex Court was that the respondent therein having failed in the earlier writ petitions challenging the very same cess and having not challenged the order of the High Court further could not make a claim for refund on the basis of the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court. The judgment, the benefit of which was claimed, being a judgment in rem, this contention was negatived by the Apex Court by holding thus: "18. Another reason to defeat the claim for refund put forth is that the respondents have filed writ petitions challenging unsuccessfully the validity of levy in question and those orders have become final inasmuch as no appeal against the same has been filed. The contention is put forth either on the basis of res judicata or estoppel. Another reason to defeat the claim for refund put forth is that the respondents have filed writ petitions challenging unsuccessfully the validity of levy in question and those orders have become final inasmuch as no appeal against the same has been filed. The contention is put forth either on the basis of res judicata or estoppel. It is no doubt true that these principles would be applicable when a decision of a court has become final. But in matters arising under public law when the validity of a particular provision or levy is under challenge, this Court has explained the legal position in Shenoy and Co. v. CTO that when the Supreme Court declares a law and holds either a particular levy as valid or invalid it is idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that judgment would bind only those parties who are before the Court and not others in respect of whom appeal had not been filed. To do so is to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. To contend that the conclusion reached in such a case as to the validity of a levy would apply only to the parties before the Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory. When the main judgment of the High Court has been rendered ineffective, it (sic the judgment of the Supreme Court) would be applicable even in other cases, for exercise to bring those decisions in conformity with the decisions of the Supreme Court will be absolutely necessary. Viewed from that angle, we find this contention to be futile and it deserves to be rejected." 26. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in S.J. Coke Industries (P) Ltd. v. Central Coalfields Ltd. [ 2015 (8) SCC 72 ] where in paragraph 37, reference was made to the Bombay High Court judgment in Firm Kaluram Sitaram v. Dominion of India [ AIR 1954 Bom 50 ] where it was held that the State should not rely on technicalities and if the State is satisfied that the case of the citizen is a just one, irrespective of the legal issues that may be open to it, it must act as an honest person. According to us, having regard to the principles laid down in Aravind Kumar Srivastava's case and U.P.Jal Nigam's Case (supra), the judgments relied on by the counsel for the Association cannot sustain the claim now made on behalf of some of the consumers in respect of a cause of action which arose during 1996- 1997. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment of the learned Single Judge holding that the writ petition is maintainable, is unsustainable and the appeals deserve to be allowed. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the appeals are allowed as above. No costs.