JUDGMENT : P.K. Phukanj, J. The writ appellants are the writ petitioners who are in occupation of Stalls owned by Shillong Municipal Board ('SMB') situated at Jail Road area of Shillong. The SMB issued notices to them to vacate and handover unencumbered possession of the Stalls within 2 weeks from the date of the notices. The ejectment notices were challenged by the appellants through WP(C) Nos. 200, 201 and 202 of 2010. However, the learned Single Judge through impugned judgment dated 1.7.2014 (Annexure 7) found that the petitioners are only licensees and they are not even paying licence fees. Moreover, balancing the interest of the individuals with public interest, the learned Judge declared that the writ petitions are devoid of merit and the same were accordingly dismissed. The writ petitioners were, thus, directed to handover the unencumbered possession of the Stalls within 3 weeks to the SMB. 2. Heard Mr. L.R. Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the Shilling Municipal Board. Also heard Mr. A. Nath, learned Government advocate, Meghalaya. 3. The facts of the case in the 3 writ petitions are similar except that the writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 201/2010, Smt. Jyoti Debnath, the wife of Late Sailendra Debnath with whom the SMB entered into an agreement on 7.1.1991 for allowing to occupy the Stall No. 282 measuring 10' x 9' = 90 sq. ft over the existing Stalls, i.e., 1st Floor within the Municipal Compound at Jail Road, Shillong and also that the writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 200/2010 was allowed to occupy Stall No. 240 at Jail Road, Shillong on transfer after she purchased the right over the said Stall from one Sukanta Chakraborty and entered into agreement dated 5.5.1993 with the SMB. The plot of land, i.e., Stall No. 240 measuring 154 sq. ft in WP(C) No. 200/2010, Stall No. 282 measuring 90 sq. ft in WP(C) No. 201/2010 and Stall No. 280 measuring 150 sq. ft. in WP(C) No. 202/ 2010 all situated at Jail Road, Shillong are the land vested in the SMB. Under section 62 of the Meghalaya Municipal Act, 1973 ('Municipal Act, 1973'), the Municipal property includes property of whatever nature or kind which may become vested in the Board, be under its direction, management and control. 4. ft. in WP(C) No. 202/ 2010 all situated at Jail Road, Shillong are the land vested in the SMB. Under section 62 of the Meghalaya Municipal Act, 1973 ('Municipal Act, 1973'), the Municipal property includes property of whatever nature or kind which may become vested in the Board, be under its direction, management and control. 4. There is no dispute that the land and Stalls standing over the land is owned by SMB. 5. The SMB entered into an agreement with Smt. Swama Das, writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 200/2010 on 5.5.1993, husband of the writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 201/2010 on 7.1.1991 and writ petitioner in WP'(C) No. 202/2010 on 7.1.1991, respectively for allowing them to occupy the Stalls mentioned above with the terms and conditions mentioned in the said agreements. As the present writ appeals are to be decided taking into consideration the terms and conditions of the agreement executed between the parties, before we enter into the merits of the case, it is relevant to refer to the agreements executed between the appellants and the respondents, one of which is reproduced below : "LEASE/AGREEMENT" The Shillong Municipal Board represented by the Chief Executive Officer grants unto you Smt. Swapna Das W/o Shri Bimal Ch. Das, Police Reserve, Shillong a Stall No. 240 at Jail Road, Shillong an area of 7' x 22' =154 sq. ft. (one hundred fifty-four square feet) (1st Floor) for business purpose and to observe/comply with and strictly fulfilling the terms and conditions prescribed by the Shillong Municipal Board as may be from time-to-time be amended by the Board as appearing herein below: 1. That the lessee shall construct the Stall on the above noted plot at her own expenses according to the plan and specifications; 2. That the Lessee shall pay rent @ Rs.308 only per month or Rs.3,696 only per year. The Shillong Municipality reserve every right to reassess the Stall rent from time-to-time; 3. That the Lessee shall use the Stall for her own business in Godown-cum-Office and for no other purpose and it shall not be used for residential purpose; 4. That you are permitted to install electric fittings in the Stall at your own cost provided the Shillong Hydro Electric Co. grants permission and you shall have to obtain separate meter of your own and shall have to pay the monthly consumption of current; 5. That you are permitted to install electric fittings in the Stall at your own cost provided the Shillong Hydro Electric Co. grants permission and you shall have to obtain separate meter of your own and shall have to pay the monthly consumption of current; 5. That the overall control and superintendence of the said plot of land and the Stall thereon shall remain vested in the Board whose duly authorised official(s) shall at all reasonable hours be entitled to inspect the said stall about its bona fide user its stage of repairs and cleanliness. 6. That the Lessee shall not deal with any other business except the purpose for which the stall is allotted and under no circumstances they shall have right to sublet, transfer or sell the stall or any part of it to anybody. 7. That the Lessee shall have no interest in the said plot of land nor she be deemed to have exclusive possession thereof. Lease shall not he hereditary but on production of a succession certificate the Board may consider cases individually; 8. That the Shillong Municipal Board reserve the right to extend the period of Lease; 9. That on expiry of the Lease, the Lessee shall be given the first preference in case of renewal of the Lease the use the plot of land and he stall thereon for further period provided the Lessee had conformed to all the terms and conditions/rules prescribed thereof during her prior occupation of the plot of land and the stall thereon; 10. That on expiry of the period of Lease, if not renewed or on the revocation thereof under the terms and conditions prescribed herein, the Shillong Municipal Board shall take exclusive and absolute possession of the land and deal with it in such manner as it may deem fit; 11. That the Lessee shall keep the Stall neat and clean and carry out annual repairs and painting at her own cost; 12. That you shall have to obtain the requisite license from the Board on payment of prescribed fees in carrying on such business which the Shillong Municipal Board imposed licence fee; 13. That you shall not stock or deal in any dangerous or inflammable articles or any articles prohibited by law; 14. That you shall have to obtain the requisite license from the Board on payment of prescribed fees in carrying on such business which the Shillong Municipal Board imposed licence fee; 13. That you shall not stock or deal in any dangerous or inflammable articles or any articles prohibited by law; 14. That the Lessee shall abide by all reasonable rules and regulations that the Board may come up from time-to-time or adopt for the interest of the Board; 15. That the Lessee shall get the underground water pipe lines if any passing through the site be shifted at her own cost by engaging a registered plumber under the overall supervision of the Water Works Department; 16. That in default of your monthly payment of rent as stipulated at above or infringement of any of the conditions appearing hereinbefore shall entail the revocation of the Licence and the Legal consequences as aforesaid, shall follow; 17. That the Lessee shall abide by the Municipal Rules and Orders issued from time-to-time and in the event of the breach of any of the terms and conditions hereinbefore stipulated in this Lease it shall be void and liable to be cancelled forthwith. In witness whereof I do hereunto sign and set my hand this the 5th day of May, 1993. Sd/- Chief Executive Officer, Shillong Municipal Board. Fully understanding and agreeing the terms and conditions as embodied I subscribe my hand this the 5th day of May 1993. Sd/- (Smt. Swapna Das) Lessee Witnesses: 1. Sd/-Shakhar Chakraborty 2, Sd/-Bimal Das." 6. Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contends in the first place that the definitions of "Landlord" & "Tenant" in section 2, clauses (c) and (f), respectively of the Rent Control Act makes it clear that the person for the time being receiving rent is the Landlord and the person who is paying the rent is the tenant of the premises. The definitions are as follows : "(c) "landlord" means any person who is, for the time being receiving or entitled to receive rent in respect of any house whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person and includes in respect of his sub-tenant, a tenant who has sub-let any house and includes every person not being a tenant who from time-to-time derives title under a landlord; (f) Tenant" means any person by whom or on whose behalf rent is payable for any house and includes every person who from time-to-time derives title under a tenant;" 7. Mr. Das by referring to the observations of the Apex Court in Liaq Ahmed and Others v. Habeed-Ur-Rehman, (2005) 5 SCC 708, contends that the Rent Control Act has been primarily enacted to give protection to the tenants and the statutory right cannot be taken away from them without following the due process of law. The Supreme Court in the above mentioned case observed as follows : "2. Rent control legislations have been acknowledged to be pieces of social legislation which strike a just balance between the rights of the landlord and the requirements of the tenants. Such legislations prevent the landlords from taking the extreme step of evicting the tenants merely upon technicalities or carved grounds. This court in Mangat Rai v. Kidar Nath held that where the Rent Acts afford a real and sanctified protection to the tenant, the same should not be nullified by giving a hyper technical or liberal construction to the language of the statute which instead of advancing the object of the Act may result in its frustration. The Rent Acts have primarily been enacted to give protection to the tenants." 8. The Meghalaya Urban Areas Control Act has also been enacted to provide for the control of rent and eviction of the tenants from the premises covered by the Act. Section 5 of the Act provides protection to the tenants against eviction and eviction against the tenant can be ordered by the court only on the ground specified in various clauses and subsections of the said section. Section 5 of the Rent Act provides as under : "5. Bar against passing and execution of decree and orders for ejectment. Section 5 of the Act provides protection to the tenants against eviction and eviction against the tenant can be ordered by the court only on the ground specified in various clauses and subsections of the said section. Section 5 of the Rent Act provides as under : "5. Bar against passing and execution of decree and orders for ejectment. - (1) No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and perform the conditions of the tenancy: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house - (a) Where the tenant has done anything contrary to the provisions of clause (m), clause (o) or clause (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act 4 of 1882) or to the spirit of the aforesaid clauses in the areas where the said Act does not apply; or (b) Where the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to the occupiers of the adjoining or neighbouring houses; or (c) Where the house is bona fide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the court; or (d) Where the tenant sub-lets the house or any part thereof or otherwise transfer his interest in the house or any part thereof without permission in writing from the landlord; or (e) Where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight of its falling due; or (f) Where the tenant has built, acquired or been allotted a suitable residence. (2) The transfer of the interest of the landlord in the house shall not affect the right of the tenant; provided the tenant pays rent allowable under this Act to the transferee. (2) The transfer of the interest of the landlord in the house shall not affect the right of the tenant; provided the tenant pays rent allowable under this Act to the transferee. (3) Where the landlord recovers possession of a house from a tenant on the ground that the house is bona fide required by him for purpose of repairs or rebuilding or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, and repairs or the rebuilding of the house is not commenced or the house is not occupied by the landlord or such person within thirty days of the date of vacation of the house by such tenant or the house having been so occupied is within six months of the said date re-let to or allowed to be possessed by any other person, the court may, on the application of the evicted tenant made within seven months of his vacating the house, direct the landlord to put the evicted tenant in possession of the house within such period as the court may fix and to pay him such compensation as appears to the court to be reasonable and proper. Such a direction shall be deemed to be a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and to be capable of execution as such under the provisions of that Code under the spirit of the aforesaid Code in areas where the said Code does not apply. (4) Where the landlord refuses to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant may within thirty days of its becoming due, deposit in court the amount of such rent together with process fees for service of notice upon the landlord, and on receiving such deposit, the court shall cause a notice of the receipt of such deposit to be served on the landlord and the amount of the deposit may thereafter be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the court in that behalf. The tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as a defaulter under clause (e) of the provisions to subsection (1) of this section." 9. The tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as a defaulter under clause (e) of the provisions to subsection (1) of this section." 9. From the scheme of the Act, it is evident that if the tenant discloses the grounds and pleads a cause which prima facie is not baseless, unreal and unfounded, the court is obliged to grant him leave to defend his case against the eviction sought by the landlord, if the tenant bring to the notice of the court, such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession, the court shall give him leave to contest. 10. It is settled law that the protection provided by Rent Act to a tenant should not be nullified by giving a hyper-technical or liberal construction to its language. 11. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the appellants made strenuous submissions to convince us that the agreements executed between the appellants and the SMB are essentially Lease Agreements and by virtue of the said agreements, they became tenants under the SMB and they are entitled to be protected under the Meghalaya Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. To fortify his arguments, he also referred to the various clauses of the Lease Agreements and also the pleadings of the SMB in their affidavit-in-opposition filed in the writ petition wherein, the respondent-SMB pleaded that the writ petitions were not maintainable since the dispute raised by the petitioners was purely in the nature of Landlord and tenant for which the petitioners have an equally effective and alternative remedy for redressal of their grievances. 12. Mr. Das further submits that the appellants are not defaulters and on refusal by the SMB to accept the rent, they have deposited rents in the court. Going further, he submits that the move of the respondent-SMB is covered by a veil of secrecy designed to benefit a business house belonging to some influential people. 13. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-SMB on the other hand by referring to the clause Nos. 5, 7 and 12 of the Lease Agreements contends to demonstrate that the agreements are in fact licences and the appellants are permissive occupiers of the Stalls in their occupation and as per the terms and conditions of the agreements, they are liable to vacate the Stalls and handover the unencumbered possession 1 to the SMB. 14. 5, 7 and 12 of the Lease Agreements contends to demonstrate that the agreements are in fact licences and the appellants are permissive occupiers of the Stalls in their occupation and as per the terms and conditions of the agreements, they are liable to vacate the Stalls and handover the unencumbered possession 1 to the SMB. 14. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge, upon collating various clauses of the agreements between the parties and on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Indian Registration Act and Easement Act concluded that there was no letting' and there was no properly executed lease, the deeds being unregistered requiring compulsory registration and the spirit of the Easement Act being followed in Meghalaya and ultimately held that the agreements were in fact 'licences' which required the licensees' to handover possession of the Stalls to the respondent-SMB as per terms and conditions of the said licences. 15. To consider this aspect of the matter, we have revisited the agreements between the parties and the relevant provisions of the law including the Meghalaya Municipal Act. Section 62 of the Meghalaya Municipal Act deals with Municipal property whereas, section 63 empowers the Board to purchase, lease and sell land. For ready reference, section 63(2) is reproduced below : "63. Power to purchase, lease and sell and land -.... (2) No Board shall sell, let, exchange or otherwise dispose of any land vested in it under section 62, except with the sanction of the State Government." 16. A cursory glance of the provisions of section 63 makes it amply clear that the Board has not been empowered to sell, let, exchange or otherwise dispose of any land vested in it under section 62, except with the sanction of the State Government. Neither in the pleadings nor in the agreements, averment 8 was made to the effect that sanction of the State Government was obtained prior to execution of the agreements and it is doubtful whether the Executive Officer of the respondent-SMB had the authority to execute the deeds transferring the land and Stalls to the appellants. However, no dispute has been raised in this regard and we have also no intention at this stage to go in-depth and undertake minute examination of the matter. However, no dispute has been raised in this regard and we have also no intention at this stage to go in-depth and undertake minute examination of the matter. The pertinent question before us is whether the transaction entered into between the parties through the agreements was 'lease' or 'licence'. 17. Mr. Das, learned counsel strenuously contends that the said agreements are leases and, therefore, the revocation of the lease should be in accordance with law and the right under the said lease/agreements is heritable. 18. In controversion, Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent-SMB submits that since the period/terms of the lease is more than one year, if it is a lease, the procedural requirements as to how the lease made as provided under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act are required to be followed lease is defined under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act and the procedure of how the lease is to be made is provided under section 107 of the said Act. Rights and liability of the lessor and lessee are provided under section 108 of the Act. The relevant provisions are reproduced below : "105. Lease defined. - A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined. - The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. 107. Leases how made. - A lease of immovable property from year-to-year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. 107. Leases how made. - A lease of immovable property from year-to-year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered are more instruments instrument, such instrument or, where there than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee: Provided that the State Government may from time-to-time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year-to-year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession. 108. Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee. - In the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, the lessor and the lessee of immovable property, as against one another, respectively, possess the rights and are subject to the liabilities mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property leased: (A) Rights and liabilities of the lessor (a) The lessor is bound to disclose to the lessee any material defect in the property, with reference to its intended use, of which the former is and the latter is not aware, and which the latter could not with ordinary care discover; *** *** *** (o) the lessee may use the property and its products (if any) as a person of ordinary prudence would use them if they were his own; but he must not use, or permit another to use, the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, or fell for sell timber, pull down or damage buildings belonging to the lessor, or work mines or quarries not open when the lease was granted, or commit any other act which is destructive or permanently inurious thereto; (p) he must not, without the lessor's consent, erect on the property any permanent structure, except for agricultural purposes; 'Licence' has been defined under section 52 of the Easement Act as under: "52. 'Licence' defined. 'Licence' defined. - Where one grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence." 19. In Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.M. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262 , the Apex Court observed as under : "27. There is a marked distinction between a lease and a licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised. Under section 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease is, therefore, a transfer of an interest in land. The interest transferred in called the leasehold I interest. The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property during the term of the lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the lessor." Under the aforesaid section, if a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. The legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission, his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate or interest in the property. There is, therefore, clear distinction between the two concepts. The dividing line is clear though sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred (sale, mortgage or lease, etc.). 1 Under section 60 of the Easement Act, a licence is revocable at the will of the grantor which is the essence of a licence. The Easement Act categorically declares that a licence can be revoked by the grantor except in the two contingencies specified under section 60(a) and (b)." 20. 1 Under section 60 of the Easement Act, a licence is revocable at the will of the grantor which is the essence of a licence. The Easement Act categorically declares that a licence can be revoked by the grantor except in the two contingencies specified under section 60(a) and (b)." 20. From the above definitions, it crystallizes that the transaction is a lease, if it grants an interest in the land; it is a licence if it gives personal privilege with no interest in the land. It is well settled by a catena of decision of the Apex Court that the question is not of words but of substance and the label which the parties put upon the transaction, though relevant, is not decisive. The test of exclusive possession is not decisive all though it is a very important indication in favour of the tenants. 21. In the back drop of the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and keeping in mind the definitions of 'lease' and 'licence' and the observations of the Apex Court we have carefully examined the agreements entered into between the parties and we have noticed that the agreements started with the heading lease/'agreements' and in the various clauses, only the word Tease' has been used. So also, the word 'rent'. Monthly rent payable is Rs. 308 and annual rent is Rs. 3,696. The use of the word 'licence' in clause 12 postulates obtaining of licence for carrying on business from the stalls in occupation of the appellants. There is not a single whisper in the agreements that the appellants were licensees under respondent-SMB. Pleadings brought on record through the counter-affidavit filed in the writ petitions are also ambiguous and imprecise to enable the court to hold affirmatively that those agreements are licences. The learned Single Judge appears to have been guided by clauses 5, 7 and 12 of the agreements and also the factum of non-registration of the documents to hold that the agreements are licences. 22. No doubt section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 is dibbling provision. The documents defined in clauses (a) to (e) therein require registration compulsory which also include the agreements executed between the parties in the present case. Section 49 of the Act gives teeth to section 17 by providing effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. 22. No doubt section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 is dibbling provision. The documents defined in clauses (a) to (e) therein require registration compulsory which also include the agreements executed between the parties in the present case. Section 49 of the Act gives teeth to section 17 by providing effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. Section 49 provides that any document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein, nor such document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. Proviso to the section, however, would show that a un-registered document affecting immovable property and required by the Registration Act, 1908 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as evidence of collateral transaction not required to be through registered instrument. 23. In the instant case, no specific period of lease has been mentioned in the agreements. Consequently, the appellants do not have the benefit of a secured term under registered lease deed and as such, the tenancy is to be construed only to be a month-to-month tenancy that could be terminated upon service of notice in terms of the section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the agreements were in standard form of the respondent-SMB and although the appellants insisted for registration that was not done and the same analogy cannot be applied to the appellants. He further contends that as per the agreements the appellants were to construct the Stalls over the land allotted to them at their own expense and as such they are also protected under section 60(b) of the Easement Act. Going further, he submits that although the learned Single Judge has held that the appellants were defaulters but there was no rational behind such a conclusion. The learned Single Judge totally ignored the plea of the appellants that they had deposited rents in court on refusal by the SMB which can only be proved by calling the records from the court. The learned Single Judge totally ignored the plea of the appellants that they had deposited rents in court on refusal by the SMB which can only be proved by calling the records from the court. Moreover, during the pendency of the writ petitions, the private respondents with whom the SMB entered into agreements for leasing out the property raised a wall between the Stalls of the appellants and the building that has been leased out to the private respondent and this aspect of the matter was also not considered by the learned Single Judge although the site plan was enclosed with the petitions. The learned counsel for the appellants also contends that the nature of the legal rights flowing from the agreements needs thorough examination which can only be done by a competent court having jurisdiction. 25. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent-SMB submits that the Board proposed to revoke the licence and assume possession of the land and stalls for the purpose of developing the same and providing better facilities connected with the operation of the Board. The learned Single Judge also by balancing the public interest with that of the individual interest ordered handing over the possession in favour of the respondent-Board. 26. However, while passing the order he appears to be totally oblivious of the pleadings. It is a settled law that disputes arising out of contract cannot be agitated under article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held in the case of the Kerala SEB v. Kurein E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293 , State of U.P v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India Ltd.), (1996) 6 SCC 22 and Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 116 . This is the settled law. The disputes in the instant case flows from the agreements executed between the parties and these are contractual disputes in respect of which the writ court, in our considered opinion is not the proper forum. 27. (India Ltd.), (1996) 6 SCC 22 and Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 116 . This is the settled law. The disputes in the instant case flows from the agreements executed between the parties and these are contractual disputes in respect of which the writ court, in our considered opinion is not the proper forum. 27. Having regard to the entire aspect of the case and the contentions raised in the appeals and keeping in mind the rights of the appellants that are disclosed and taking into account the nature of the development works that are proposed, we are of the considered view that it would a be appropriate for the writ appellants to approach the competent civil court having jurisdiction to raise the dispute, if so advised. In the event of any such dispute raised by the appellants, the learned court is directed to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible keeping in mind the developmental works under taken by the respondent-SMB, uninfluenced by the observations made by us in the Judgment. 28. In the facts and circumstances of the case, to enable the appellants to approach the civil court, it is ordered that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge directing handing over of possession of the stalls to SMB shall not be given effect to until expiry of eight weeks from today. However, our judgment and order shall not stand in the way of coming to an amicable settlement between the parties if the parties so desired. 29. With the above directions, the writ appeals are disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own cost.