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2016 DIGILAW 92 (MAN)

Col. Lalngaihawmi Territorial Commander, d/o (L) Hrangchhunga v. K. Lalbiaksanga, s/o (L) Thamchhuma

2016-06-30

R.R.PRASAD

body2016
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : This application filed under section 482 of the Cr.PC is directed against the order dated 2.8.2013 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Churachandpur in Cril.(C) No.1 of 2013 whereby and whereunder cognizance of the offence punishable u/s 500 of the IPC has been taken against the petitioners. 2. Before adverting to the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, facts which gave rise to this application, need to be taken notice of. The complainant, lodged a complaint case against the petitioners stating therein that in the year 1985 Salvation Army Boys’ Home was established at Churachandpur. Later on its name was changed as “Salvation Army Destitute Children Home”. The said Home being run by an organization namely Salvation Army used to have grants in-aids from the State Social Welfare Department. The State Government, upon finding said Home being not run properly, stopped giving grants-in-aids. Thereupon a resolution was taken by Board fixing responsibility upon “Lamka Corps”(Church) to do whatever is necessary to have special grants from the Government. At that point of time, complainant who was working as Crops Sergeant Major for Lamka Corps was also appointed as Superintendent of the Home for looking after the welfare of the children of the said Home. It is the case of the complainant that on account of his effort when there was marked improvement in the management of the Home, Government of Manipur extended grants in-aids in instalments for the year, 2005-06. Subsequently, Government also granted grants in-aids for the year, 2008-09 to eleven Children Homes including Children Home to which the complainant was the Superintendent. The complainant, through its Managing Committee, utilised the said grants in-aids properly granted either by the Government of India or by Social Welfare Department, Govt. of Manipur. Subsequently, the complainant was removed from the post of Superintendent, and also from the Membership of the Salvation Army, Lamka Corps on the allegation that the complainant by playing mischief received grants in the name of Salvation Army not for the aforesaid destitute Home but in the name of Manipur Boys’ Home and also misused a sum of Rs.40,390 received as grants in-aids. It has been alleged that thereafter the accused person distributed pamphlets written in Mizo language to the District HQs of Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh containing allegation that the petitioner did misuse the fund by appointing himself as Superintendent without informing to the Headquarters, and that the petitioner changed the name of said Children Home as Army Destitute Children Home for creating impression that it is being not run by Salvation Army Authority and to have grants in-aid from the Government. 3. On such complaint, a case was registered. Complainant was examined on solemn affirmation. Thereupon, the Court, after holding that the petitioner being a responsible officer, can be presumed to be the author of the pamphlet took cognizance of the offence punishable u/s 500 of the IPC vide its order dated 2.8.2013 which is under challenge. Mr. H. Kenajit, learned counsel appearing for the complainant, submits that it is the case of the complainant that pamphlet containing allegations defamatory in nature, was circulated in the District HQs of the organization. Only upon it, the Court presumed that since the petitioners are holding responsible posts in the organization, they would be responsible for circulating the pamphlets without taking account of the fact that it was never signed by any of the petitioners nor there has been any allegation that the petitioners were responsible for distribution of pamphlets and that the Letter Head being available in the office, can be utilised by any of the persons. Further, it was submitted that since no material was there before the Court that it was the petitioners who were responsible for circulating said pamphlets, the Court committed illegality in taking cognizance of the offence. In this regard, the learned counsel has referred to a decision rendered in a case of S. Nihal Singh and Ors. Vs. Arjan Das reported in 1983 Cri.L.J. 777. It was further submitted that the material fact has been suppressed by the complainant who has never disclosed that before lodging the complaint case, the complainant had lodged an FIR on the said allegation, which upon its registration, was investigated upon but the police did not find prima facie case being there u/s 500 of the IPC and thereby submitted Final Report exonerating the petitioner from the charges. That was the reason on the part of the complainant to have malice against the petitioner and therefore this complaint was lodged which can easily be taken to have been lodged maliciously with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance. Further submission is that accepting the entire allegations to be true, no offence as defined under section 499 IPC is made out and thereby order taking cognizance warrants to be quashed in view of the decision rendered in a case of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhjan Lal & Ors,. 1992 Suppl. (I) SCC 335 wherein aforesaid two grounds with other grounds have been delineate by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for quashing of the First Information Report. Thus, it was submitted that order taking cognizance is fit to be quashed. 4. As against this, the learned counsel for the complainant-respondent submits that when the Court did find those pamphlets containing allegations against the petitioners which are defamatory in nature, could have been circulated under the authority of the petitioners rightly did take cognizance of the offence particularly when in the said Letter Head/pamphlets containing allegations and were circulated, name of the petitioner No.1 is printed and thereby once the Court has taken cognizance of the offence after having regard of the aforesaid facts, it never warrants to be interfered with. The learned counsel, in support of his submission, has referred to a decision rendered in a case of M.N. Damani vs. S.K. Sinha reported in AIR 2001 SC 2037 . 5. Way back in the year 1992 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhjan Lal & Ors. (supra) was pleased to delineate the circumstances under which the High Court, in exercise of inherent powers u/s 482 of the Cr.PC, can quash the FIR in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Those circumstances delineated by the Supreme Court are as follows: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Those circumstances delineated by the Supreme Court are as follows: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 6. Taking the aid of the aforesaid decision, the learned counsel did assail the order taking cognizance by taking a plea that since the first information report lodged by the complainant did not bring desired result to the expectation of the complainant the complainant lodged the complaint maliciously. Taking the aid of the aforesaid decision, the learned counsel did assail the order taking cognizance by taking a plea that since the first information report lodged by the complainant did not bring desired result to the expectation of the complainant the complainant lodged the complaint maliciously. Under the aforesaid circumstances it one lodges the complaint case, it in strict sense cannot be said to have been lodged maliciously as it happens to be statutory right of the complainant. No doubt it is true that malicious prosecution is not sustainable in law and thereby the court exercises power u/s 482 Cr. PC for quashing of the case. But in such situation, normally the Court takes the allegations not based on document as false but here situation is somewhat different where it is the document which contains allegation allegedly defamatory in nature. Therefore, this is not the case where allegations of defamation is there without there being any documentary proof. Under the circumstances, aforesaid two grounds on which the petitioner has been putting reliance cannot be pressed into service. 7. Coming to the other aspects of the matter, it be stated that the Letter Head of the organization containing allegations, which has been taken to be defamatory by the complainant, has allegedly been circulated and thereby the case of the complainant is that he has been defamed by putting false allegations. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the letter head which has been circulated does not contain the signature of the petitioner No.1, whose name of course is printed in the Letter Head but in absence of signature of the petitioner No.1 being there, petitioner No.1 or any other petitioner in absence of any material showing that it was circulated at the instance of the petitioners, the petitioners cannot be held responsible for circulation of that letter. Admittedly, signature of none of the petitioners is there in the letter head/pamphlet but in the bottom of the letter head name of one of the petitioners, i.e. Petitioner No.1 has been printed along with others who though have not been made accused. Under the circumstances the Court took the view that the strong probability is there that it may have been circulated under the authority of the petitioners. But at the same time, the Court did forget that it is only the petitioner No.1 whose name has been printed. Under the circumstances the Court took the view that the strong probability is there that it may have been circulated under the authority of the petitioners. But at the same time, the Court did forget that it is only the petitioner No.1 whose name has been printed. Others name is not there and at the same time no material is also there against them to show even slightly that they were responsible in getting the letter head circulated. In absence of that the order taking cognizance in view of the decision rendered in the case of S. Nihal Singh and Ors Vs. Arjan Das (supra) being bad is hereby set aside as there appears to be non application of judicial mind on the part of the learned Magistrate and thereby the order taking cognizance is quashed so far as the petitioner No.2, Lt. Col. Lalramhluna and petitioner No.3, Lt. Col. Lalbuilliana and petitioner No.4, Lt. Col. Khaizadinga are concerned. So far as the petitioner No.1 is concerned, order taking cognizance in view of the opinion expressed by the Court below never appears to be bad. 8. Under the circumstances, I do not find any illegality in the order taking cognizance so far as the petitioner No.1 is concerned. Whereas order taking cognizance which relates to other petitioners named above being bad is hereby quashed. Thus, this application is allowed but in part.