Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 921 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Jayantibhai Bhavanbhai Sodha

2016-04-28

A.J.SHASTRI, M.R.SHAH

body2016
JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. As both these appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court, Surendrangar passed in Sessions Case No. 70 of 2009, both these appeals are decided and disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 5.9.2011 passed in Sessions Case No. 70 of 2009, by which, learned trial Court has acquitted original accused for the offence under Sections 304(B), 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code, State of Gujarat has preferred present Criminal Appeal No. 1668 of 2012 under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2.1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court in so far as granting benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 while convicting them for the offences punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2012 under Section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for enhancement of sentence. 3. The prosecution case in nutshell is as under: 3.1. That the complaint was lodged by the deceased herself. As per the case of the prosecution, at the time of incident, victim Dipikaben was at her father's home. She was at her father's home since one month because of miscarriage. The original accused Nos. 1 and 2 father in law and husband of the victim came at about 5.00 p.m. on 2.5.2009 to take her with them. According to the prosecution, father of the victim persuaded original accused No. 1 and 2 to stay over for a night and they may take the victim with them on the next day morning. That the original accused Nos. 1 and 2 stayed over night. Next day morning the original accused Nos. 1 and 2 stated that they do not want to take the victim with them and they are considering of divorce. With such say, they left the house without taking the victim with them. Them left at about 9.30 in the morning. Thereafter, father of the victim had gone to purchase the vegetables and the victim felt very badly as original accused Nos. With such say, they left the house without taking the victim with them. Them left at about 9.30 in the morning. Thereafter, father of the victim had gone to purchase the vegetables and the victim felt very badly as original accused Nos. 1 and 2 had left and had not taken her with them and therefore, she sprinkled kerosene over herself from 5 liter cane and then ignited fire. Upon hearing shouts, brother of the deceased who was playing outside, rushed into the house. He poured the water over her. The brother and cousin brother took the victim to the CJ Hospital in rickshaw and in the hospital the victim herself lodged the complaint while she was under treatment. The Medical Officer sent Yadi to Executive Magistrate and Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased on 3.5.2009 at about 11.55 a.m. which was completed at 12.30 hours. That the Medical Officer of CJ Hospital also sent the Yadi to the Surendranagar City Police Station which was registered as Janavajog Entry No. 23 of 2009 dated 3.5.2009 which was received by the PW No. 14 Mahendrasinh A. Zala, ASI Surendranagar Police Station. PW No. 14 - Mahendrasinh A. Zala rushed to the hospital and recorded the complaint given by the victim herself which was sent to the Surendranagar City Police Station, which was registered as CR-II-3108 of 2009 against the original accused initially for the offence under Section 498 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the concerned witnesses. He prepared the panchnama of the place of the incident. He also recovered the cloths of the victim. He arrested the accused on 19.05.2009. While taking the treatment, the victim Dipikaben succumbed to the burn injuries and died on 31.05.2009. He obtained the inquest panchnama and postmortem report of the deceased. Thereafter, investigation was handed to PSI Shri Mahendrasinh Harisinh Zala on 1.6.2009. Prior thereto, a report was sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to add the offence under Section 304(B), 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. PW No. 15 Mahendrasinh Harisinh Zala conducted the further investigation. Thereafter, investigation was carried out by PW No. 16 Maganbhai M. Damor. He filed the charge sheet against the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of learned JMFC, Surendranagar. 3.2. PW No. 15 Mahendrasinh Harisinh Zala conducted the further investigation. Thereafter, investigation was carried out by PW No. 16 Maganbhai M. Damor. He filed the charge sheet against the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of learned JMFC, Surendranagar. 3.2. As the case was exclusively triable by the learned Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed case to the learned Sessions Court, Surendranagar, which was registered as Sessions Case No. 70 of 2009. That the learned trial Court framed the charge against all the accused for the offence under Sections 498A, 304(B), 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. All the accused pleaded not guilty and therefore, they came to be tried by the learned trial Court for the aforesaid offences. 3.3. To prove the case against the accused, the prosecution examined following witnesses: PW. No. Name of the Witness Exh. No. 1 Dr. Rudrasinh K Zala 17 2 Dr. Sidhdhnesh R Vora 21 3 Dr. Rajendra R Finvaker 25 4 Khodidas M Parmar 29 5 Chandrikaben K Parmar 30 6 Jigneshbhai K Parmar 31 7 Jayeshbhai vaghela 37 8 Jayantibhai Valmiki 39 9 Prakashbhai Valmiki 40 10 Sarojben Gagjibhai 42 11 Prahaladbhai Popatbhai 44 12 Hirabhai Zala 47 13 Raysinghbhai B Dani 51 14 Mahendrasinh A Zala 53 15 Mahendrasinh Harisinh Zala 59 16 Maganbhai M Damor 60 3.4. Through the aforesaid witnesses, the prosecution brought on record material documentary evidences such as complaint given by the victim herself which was recorded by the PW No. 14 at hospital, dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate at Exh. 53 and other medical evidence etc. That after closing pursis submitted by the prosecution, further statement of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. All the accused stated that they have not committed any offence as alleged. The original accused No. 2 - husband of the victim submitted further written statement stated that though the victim was not ready to go to her parent house, his mother in law by force took her to her parental home. It was further stated that because of the miscarriage, the victim was mentally disturbed. The original accused No. 2 - husband of the victim submitted further written statement stated that though the victim was not ready to go to her parent house, his mother in law by force took her to her parental home. It was further stated that because of the miscarriage, the victim was mentally disturbed. It was further stated that in fact they had gone to his in law house to take her back however his father in law Khodidas refused to sent her and therefore, the victim felt bad and committed the suicide. 3.5. At the conclusion of the trial and on appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court by impugned judgment and order has acquitted the original accused for the offence under Sections 304(B), 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and has also acquitted the original accused No. 2 for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, however has convicted the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. However, while convicting the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offences punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the learned trial Court has given benefit of probation to them. Hence, State has preferred the present Appeals. 4. Shri Rakesh Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State has vehemently that in the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record, the learned trial Court has materially erred in acquitting the original accused for the offences punishable under Sections304 B, 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 4.1. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Rakesh Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State that in the present case the victim herself in the complaint, which was subsequently registered as FIR as well as in dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate (Exh. 53) has specifically stated that there was harassment by the original accused. It is submitted that in the present case prosecution has been successful in proving the fact that victim was at her parental house since last one month as she had miscarriage and that when on 02.05.2009 the original accused Nos. 53) has specifically stated that there was harassment by the original accused. It is submitted that in the present case prosecution has been successful in proving the fact that victim was at her parental house since last one month as she had miscarriage and that when on 02.05.2009 the original accused Nos. 1 and 2 came to her parental house, however thereafter on 3.5.2009 they went back without taking the victim with them and they stated that they want divorce and therefore, after they left without taking the victim with them, the victim felt bad and she committed the suicide. It is submitted that therefore, the learned trial Court ought to have convicted the original accused for the offences under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that looking to the short marriage span and because of the harassment, the victim committed the suicide, learned trial Court ought to have convicted the original accused for the offences under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 4.2. It is further submitted by Shri Rakesh Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor that even the learned trial Court has materially erred in acquitting the original accused No. 2 - husband for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 4.3. Shri Rakesh Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State has vehemently submitted that even otherwise the learned trial Court has committed the grave error in granting benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 while convicting them for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 4.4. It is further submitted by Shri Rakesh Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor that once the learned trial Court has convicted the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, offence which is against the woman and against the society at large, the learned trial Court ought not to have granted the benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4. 4.5. It is further submitted by Shri Rakesh Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State that while imposing the sentence and granting benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4, the learned trial Court has shown undue sympathy and as such taken too lenient view and has not exercise discretion judiciously. 4.6. 4.5. It is further submitted by Shri Rakesh Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State that while imposing the sentence and granting benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4, the learned trial Court has shown undue sympathy and as such taken too lenient view and has not exercise discretion judiciously. 4.6. It is further submitted by Shri Rakesh Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State that the learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the gravity of the offence committed by the accused for which, they are convicted. Relying upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumer Singh vs. Surajbhan Singh and others, (2014) 7 SCC 323 , Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 , Raja Bala vs. State of Haryana and others reported in (2016) 1 SCC 463 , Abdul Waheed vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2016) 1 SCC 583 and State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Udaibhan reported in (2016) 4 SCC 116 , it is requested to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court and impose the maximum punishment provided under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 5. Present appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri K.S. Chandrani, learned advocate for the original accused. 5.1. It is vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case and on appreciation of evidence by giving cogent reasons, the learned trial Court has acquitted the original accused for the offence under Sections 304 B, 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and has acquitted the original accused No. 2 even for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the same is not required to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 5.2. It is further submitted by Shri K.S. Chandrani, learned advocate for the original accused that from the evidence on record it cannot be said that the accused abetted the victim in committing suicide. It is submitted that even as per the dying declaration and even according to the prosecution and the victim as the original accused Nos. 1 and 2 did not take her with them, she felt bad and thereafter she sprinkled the kerosene on her and committed the suicide. It is submitted that even as per the dying declaration and even according to the prosecution and the victim as the original accused Nos. 1 and 2 did not take her with them, she felt bad and thereafter she sprinkled the kerosene on her and committed the suicide. It is submitted that therefore, it cannot be said that the accused abetted the victim in committing the suicide. It is submitted that even there is no allegation of whatsoever nature against the original accused Nos. 3 and 4 for the offences under Section 304-B and Sections 306 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that even none of the ingredients for the offence under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code are satisfied against the accused. It is submitted that there are no allegation at all with respect to demand of dowry. It is submitted that therefore, learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the original accused for the offences under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 5.3. It is further submitted by Shri K.S. Chandrani, learned advocate for the original accused that even the learned trial Court has materially erred in convicting the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offences punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that the allegation in the complaint alleged to have been given by the victim and even in the dying declaration are general in nature and therefore, the learned trial Court has materially erred in convicting the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 5.4. It is further submitted by Shri K.S. Chandrani, learned advocate for the original accused that the victim herself cannot be said to be the complainant. Relying upon the deposition of some of the witnesses, it is submitted that the father of the victim is stated to be the complainant. It is submitted that therefore, it is very doubtful that victim herself was the complainant. 5.5. It is further submitted that even otherwise, however in exercise of the discretion vested in it and by giving cogent reasons and the learned trial Court has granted benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. It is submitted that therefore, it is very doubtful that victim herself was the complainant. 5.5. It is further submitted that even otherwise, however in exercise of the discretion vested in it and by giving cogent reasons and the learned trial Court has granted benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 while convicting them for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, it cannot be said that learned trial Court has committed any error, which calls for the interference of this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Making above submissions, it is requested to the dismiss the present Criminal Appeals. 6. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties at length. We have perused the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court. We have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record both oral as well as documentary. 7. At the outset, it is required to be noted that original accused-husband, father in law and mother in law and wife of the elder brother of the husband (sister in law) were charged for the offence under Section 304 B, Section 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. That by impugned judgment and order, the learned trial Court has acquitted the original accused for the offences under Section 304-B, Section 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and has also acquitted the original accused No. 2 - husband for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. However, while convicting the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offences under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the learned trial Court has granted the benefit of probation to them. 8. Now, so far as the acquittal of the original accused for the offences under Section 304 B, 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, on considering the case of the prosecution as it is and even considering and accepting what victim stated in the complaint and in dying declaration, it cannot be said that the learned trial Court has committed any error in acquitting the original accused for the offences under Section 304 B, Sections 306 r/w 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 8.1. 8.1. On re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record and even considering the complaint which was given by the victim herself and the dying declaration, there is no allegation of demand of dowry. It is not alleged that because of the demand of dowry deceased committed the suicide. There is no evidence at all that there was any demand of dowry by the accused and for non fulfillment of the same, victim committed the suicide. Under the circumstances, the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the original accused under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 9. Now, so far as acquittal of the original accused for the offence under Section 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, on re-appreciation of evidence it cannot be said that the prosecution has been successful in proving that the accused abetted the victim in committing the suicide. Even according to the victim, on 3.5.2009 original accused Nos. 1 and 2 returned without taking her with them, she felt bad, therefore, she sprinkled the kerosene. It cannot be disputed that on 2.5.2009 original accused No. 1 and 2 came to the victim parental house and they were requested to stay over night and they stayed. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the learned trial Court has committed any error in acquitting the original accused for the offence under Section 306 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 10. Now, so far as the impugned judgment and order of convicting original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and acquitting original accused No. 2 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, looking to the allegation made in the complaint which was given by the victim herself and the dying declaration in which the deceased had categorically made an allegation of harassment and ill treatment by the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 and no specific allegation of harassment and/or ill-treatment by the original accused No. 2 it cannot be said that the learned trial Court has committed any error in convicting the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and acquitting the original accused No. 2 for the same. 1 and 3 and no specific allegation of harassment and/or ill-treatment by the original accused No. 2 it cannot be said that the learned trial Court has committed any error in convicting the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and acquitting the original accused No. 2 for the same. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned trial Court in convicting the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 11. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the original accused that learned trial Court has committed grave error in convicting the original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, in an appeal preferred by the State under Section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, it is true that accused have not challenged their conviction for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. However, considering the provision of Section377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even in the appeal preferred for enhancement under Section377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused can either plead that they have not committed any offence and even they may plead for reduction of sentence. Therefore, considering the provision of Section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we have heard the learned advocate for the accused and submission that original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 ought not to have been had guilty for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, for which they are convicted. However, for the reasons stated herein above, the original accused No. 1 and 3 are rightly convicted for the offence under Section498-A of the Indian Penal Code. However, looking to the allegation made against the original accused No. 4 - Jethani (sister in law and wife of the elder brother of the husband), we are of the opinion that the learned trial Court has erred in convicting the original accused No. 4 for the offence under Section498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The allegations against her are general in nature and it cannot be said that there are any allegation with respect to harassment and ill-treatment to her. The allegations against her are general in nature and it cannot be said that there are any allegation with respect to harassment and ill-treatment to her. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court convicting the original accused No. 4 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is required to be interfered with. 12. Now, that takes us to impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court granting benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 while convicting them for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 12.1. In the case of Sumer Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the principle of sentencing proportionality and adequacy of sentence. In the aforesaid decision while emphasizing the need for appropriate punishment in paragraph-36 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under:- 36 Having discussed about the discretion, presently we shall advert to the duty of the court in the exercise of power while imposing sentence for an offence. It is the duty of the court to impose adequate sentence, for one of the purposes of imposition of requisite sentence is protection of the society and a legitimate response to the collective conscience. The paramount principle that should be the guiding laser beam is that the punishment should be proportionate. It is the answer of law to the social conscience. In a way, it is an obligation to the society which has reposed faith in the court of law to curtail the evil. While imposing the sentence it is the Court's accountability to remind itself about its role and the reverence for rule of law. It must evince the rationalized judicial discretion and not an individual perception or a moral propensity. But, if in the ultimate eventuate the proper sentence is not awarded, the fundamental grammar of sentencing is guillotined. Law cannot tolerate it; society does not withstand it; and sanctity of conscience abhors it. The old saying "the law can hunt one's past" cannot be allowed to be buried in an indecent manner and the rainbow of mercy, for no fathomable reason, should be allowed to rule. True it is, it has its own room, but, in all circumstances, it cannot be allowed to occupy the whole accommodation. The victim, in this case, still cries for justice. True it is, it has its own room, but, in all circumstances, it cannot be allowed to occupy the whole accommodation. The victim, in this case, still cries for justice. We do not think that increase in fine amount or grant of compensation under the Code would be a justified answer in law. Money cannot be the oasis. It cannot assume the centre stage for all redemption. Interference in manifestly inadequate and unduly lenient sentence is the justifiable warrant, for the Court cannot close its eyes to the agony and anguish of the victim and, eventually, to the cry of the society. Therefore, striking the balance we are disposed to think that the cause of justice would be best sub-served if the respondent is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of two years apart from the fine that has been imposed by the learned trial Judge. 12.2. Again in the case of Narinder Singh and others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the sentencing policy, the purpose/jurisprudential justification of awarding sentence (deterrence, retribution or rehabilitation) vis-a-vis nature of crime. In para 14, 16 and 17 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- 14. The Law prohibits certain acts and/or conduct and treats them as offences. Any person committing those acts is subject to penal consequences which may be of various kind. Mostly, punishment provided for committing offences is either imprisonment or monetary fine or both. Imprisonment can be rigorous or simple in nature. Why those persons who commit offences are subjected to such penal consequences? There are many philosophies behind such sentencing justifying these penal consequences. The philosophical/jurisprudential justification can be retribution, incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, or restoration. Any of the above or a combination thereof can be the goal of sentencing. 16. What follows from the discussion behind the purpose of sentencing is that if a particular crime is to be treated as crime against the society and/or heinous crime, then the deterrence theory as a rationale for punishing the offender becomes more relevant, to be applied in such cases. Therefore, in respect of such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes the duty of the State to punish the offender. Thus, even when there is a settlement between the offender and the victim, their will would not prevail as in such cases the matter is in public domain. Therefore, in respect of such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes the duty of the State to punish the offender. Thus, even when there is a settlement between the offender and the victim, their will would not prevail as in such cases the matter is in public domain. Society demands that the individual offender should be punished in order to deter other effectively as it amounts to greatest good of the greatest number of persons in a society. It is in this context that we have to understand the scheme/philosophy behind Section 307 of the Code. 17. We would like to expand this principle in some more detail. We find, in practice and in reality, after recording the conviction and while awarding the sentence/punishment the Court is generally governed by any or all or combination of the aforesaid factors. Sometimes, it is the deterrence theory which prevails in the minds of the Court, particularly in those cases where the crimes committed are heinous in nature or depicts depravity, or lack morality. At times it is to satisfy the element of "emotion" in law and retribution/vengeance becomes the guiding factor. In any case, it cannot be denied that the purpose of punishment by law is deterrence, constrained by considerations of justice. What, then, is the role of mercy, forgiveness and compassion in law? These are by no means comfortable questions and even the answers may not be comforting. There may be certain cases which are too obvious namely cases involving heinous crime with element of criminality against the society and not parties inter se. In such cases, the deterrence as purpose of punishment becomes paramount and even if the victim or his relatives have shown the virtue and gentility, agreeing to forgive the culprit, compassion of that private party would not move the court in accepting the same as larger and more important public policy of showing the iron hand of law to the wrongdoers, to reduce the commission of such offences, is more important. Cases of murder, rape or other sexual offences etc. would clearly fall in this category. After all, justice requires long term vision. On the other hand, there may be, offences falling in the category where "correctional" objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage in contrast with "deterrence" philosophy. Cases of murder, rape or other sexual offences etc. would clearly fall in this category. After all, justice requires long term vision. On the other hand, there may be, offences falling in the category where "correctional" objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage in contrast with "deterrence" philosophy. Punishment, whatever else may be, must be fair and conducive to good rather than further evil. If in a particular case the Court is of the opinion that the settlement between the parties would lead to more good; better relations between them; would prevent further occurrence of such encounters between the parties, it may hold settlement to be on a better pedestal. It is a delicate balance between the two inflicting interests which is to be achieved by the Court after examining all these parameters and then deciding as to which course of action it should take in a particular case. 12.3. In the case of Abdul Waheed (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while discussing the principles for sentencing has observed that it is the duty of the Court to award proper sentence having regard to the manner in which offence was committed. It is further observed that undue sympathy would do more harm to criminal justice system undermining the public confidence in the efficacy of the system. 12.4. In the case of Raja Bala (supra), it observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the prime objective of criminal law is the imposition of adequate, just and proportionate punishment which is commensurate with the gravity, nature of the crime and manner in which the offence is committed keeping in mind the social interest and the conscience of the society. It is further observed that the Court while imposing the sentence, has a duty to respond to the collective cry of the society. 12.5. In the case of Udaibhan (supra), it is further observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that while imposing the sentence undue leniency in awarding sentence is awarded as it does not have necessary effect of being a deterrent for accused and does not reassure the society that offender was properly dealt with. 13. It cannot be disputed that offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is against woman and therefore, against the society at large. Such an offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code are day by day increasing. 13. It cannot be disputed that offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is against woman and therefore, against the society at large. Such an offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code are day by day increasing. Under the circumstances and considering the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, we are of the opinion that by convicting the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and while granting benefit of probation, the learned trial Court has shown undue sympathy and leniency and has not awarded appropriate adequate punishment commensurate with gravity of the offence. Under the circumstances, impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court granting benefit of probation to the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 while convicting them for the offences under Section498-A of the Indian Penal Code is required to be interfered with by this Court and original accused Nos. 1 and 3 are to be suitably and adequately punished for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, Criminal Appeal No. 1668 of 2012 preferred by the State challenging the impugned judgement and order of passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 70 of 2009 acquitting the original accused for the offence under section 306 read with section 114 of Indian Penal Code is hereby dismissed. 14.1. Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2012 preferred by the State challenging the impugned judgment and order of passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 70 of 2009 convicting the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 herein original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offence under section 498A of Indian Penal Code, however giving them benefits of probation, is hereby partly allowed Qua respondent Nos. 1 and 2 - original accused Nos. 1 and 3 only and the respondent No. 1 original accused No. 1 - Jayantibhai Bhavanbhai Sodha Valmiki and respondent No. 2 original accused No. 3 - Laxmiben W/o. Jayantibhai Sodha Valmiki, are hereby sentenced to undergo SIX MONTHS RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT with fine of Rs. 500/- and in default, to undergo further three months rigorous imprisonment for the offence under section 498A of Indian Penal Code. 500/- and in default, to undergo further three months rigorous imprisonment for the offence under section 498A of Indian Penal Code. However, Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2012 is hereby dismissed qua respondent No. 3 - original accused No. 4 Rekhaben W/o. Mukeshbhai Jayantibhai. 14.2. At the request of the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused, time to surrender to the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 is hereby granted for a period of eight weeks from today.