JUDGMENT : RAJIV SHARMA, J, This Special Appeal is instituted against the judgment and order dated 22.11.2013 rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court in WPMS No.2553 of 2013. 2. Key facts, necessary for adjudication of this Special Appeal, are that the respondent-Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam had invited tenders from the contractors to perform different type of works including construction of basic structure, finishing thereof and also for the supply of the furniture and fixtures, at Tourist Rest House, Auli District Chamoli. Appellants participated in the tender process. Thereafter, various works were allotted to them and agreements were entered into in between the parties before execution of work. Appellants completed their works which were assigned to them. Since the payment was not released in favour of the appellants, a writ petition No.2553 of 2013 was filed by them before learned Single Judge of this Court which was dismissed by learned Single Judge by holding that since the disputed questions of fact were involved in the matter, therefore, the same could not be appreciated in a writ petition. Hence, the present special appeal. 3. It is not disputed that all the appellants had participated in the tender process. Their tenders were accepted and they had been allotted the work as per agreement. They have satisfactorily completed work. 4. In the present matter, an affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent-Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd (GMVN) wherein it is stated in paragraph 4 that there is acute financial crisis with the Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. and in a meeting held with the Commissioner, Infrastructure Development, Uttarakhand on 30.01.2013, it has been decided that Organizing Committee for Winter Games (hereinafter referred to as “OCWG”) will pay a sum of Rs.51.38 lacs to Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. However, the payment has not been made by OGWG. 5. The fact of the matter is that despite the acute financial crises, respondent-Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd has released the payment of Rs.12 lacs and 08 lacs in favour of appellant No.1 and appellant No.2 respectively. However, the payment of appellant No.3-M/s. Sabbir Ahmad and sons has not been released. 6. It is true that where the disputed question of facts are involved, the same cannot be appreciated in the writ petition. However, in the present case, the work allotted to appellants has been satisfactory completed by them. However, the payment of appellant No.3-M/s. Sabbir Ahmad and sons has not been released. 6. It is true that where the disputed question of facts are involved, the same cannot be appreciated in the writ petition. However, in the present case, the work allotted to appellants has been satisfactory completed by them. It is admitted by respondent- Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. that the payment has already been released in favour of two appellants out of three appellants. It is also admitted by Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd-respondent that the payment could not be made in favour of the appellant No.3 as there is litigation between the partners of the firm-appellant No.3 and there is an interim order dated 02.11.2011 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr.Div.), Pithoragarh in Original Suit No.57 of 2011. The amount is required to be released in favour of Firm and not in the name of any partner of the firm-appellant No.3. 7. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 295 , titled as “Barlum Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Company Law Board”; have held that disputed questions are decided on the basis of affidavits and it is within the discretion of the High Court whether to allow a person who has sworn an affidavit before it to cross examined or not. Their Lordships have held as under :- 6. A lengthy argument was addressed before us by Mr Setalvad bearing on the question of mala fides in the course of which he referred us to certain documents. He also wanted us to bear in mind the sequence in which certain events occurred and said that these would indicate that the former Finance Minister must have been instrumental in having an order under Section 237 (b) made by the Chairman of the Board. We were, however, not impressed by this argument. Our learned Brother Shelat has dealt with this aspect of the matter fully in his judgment and as we agree with him it is not necessary to say much on the point. We would, however, like to refer to and deal with one aspect of the argument bearing on the question of mala fides. Mr Setalvad points out that the Company Law Board had decided in December 1964 to take action against Appellant 1 under Section 237(b) and had actually obtained approval of Mr T.T. Krishnamachari to the proposed action. We would, however, like to refer to and deal with one aspect of the argument bearing on the question of mala fides. Mr Setalvad points out that the Company Law Board had decided in December 1964 to take action against Appellant 1 under Section 237(b) and had actually obtained approval of Mr T.T. Krishnamachari to the proposed action. Therefore, according to him the real order is of Mr Krishnamachari even though the order is expressed in the name of the Board. We find no substance in the argument. The decision to take action was already taken by the Chairman and there is nothing to indicate that in arriving at that decision he was influenced by the Finance Minister. If the decision arrived at by the Chairman was an independent one it can not be said to have been rendered mala fide because it was later approved by Mr Krishnamachari whose sons undoubtedly constitute the partnership firm of T.T. Krishnamachari & Sons. It is also suggested by Mr Setalvad that the action approved of in December 1964 was delayed till May 1965 because in the interval some negotiations with Kali Chemie had been started and had they ended fruitfully T.T. Krishnamachari & Sans would have secured the sole monopoly for sale of products of barium chemicals. Now it does seem from certain material brought to our notice that negotiations with Kali Chemie were revived by Appellant 2 because of the difficulties which were being experienced in the working of the collaboration agreement with L.A. Mitchell Ltd. No material, however, is placed before us from which it could be reasonably inferred that had the negotiations with Kali Chemie fructified T.T. Krishnamachari & Sons would have secured the sole monopoly for sale of the products of barium chemicals. One more point was urged in connection with this aspect of the argument and it is that the appellants were not given an opportunity to cross-examine Mr T.T. Krishnamachari and Mr Dutt. One more point was urged in connection with this aspect of the argument and it is that the appellants were not given an opportunity to cross-examine Mr T.T. Krishnamachari and Mr Dutt. In our opinion, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution the normal rule is, as pointed out by this Court in State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog Naik to decide disputed questions on the basis of affidavits and that it is within the discretion of the High Court whether to allow a person who has sworn an affidavit before it — as indeed Mr Krishnamachari and Mr Dutt have — to be cross-examined or not to permit it. In exercise of its discretion the High Court has refused permission to cross-examine them. In such a case it would not be appropriate for this Court while hearing an appeal by special leave to interfere lightly with the exercise of that discretion. 8. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 802 , titled as “Gunwant Kaur Vs. Muncipal Committee Bhatinda and others”; have held that the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right to relief questions of the fact may fall to be determined. The High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 to try issues both of fact and law. Their Lordships have held as under :- 14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit in reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for anologous reasons. 9. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1974) 2 SCC 706 , titled as “Babubhai Muljibhai Patel Vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and others”; have held that where the ordinary remedy was not efficacious and it was not improper to entertain question of fact in writ jurisdiction. Their Lordships have held as under :- “9. On behalf of the appellant his learned counsel, Mr. Amin, has at the outset contended that as the dispute between the parties in this case involved questions of fact, the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 but should have referred the parties to a separate suit. This contention, in our opinion, is not well founded. No plea was admittedly taken in the return filed on behalf of the appellant in reply to the writ petition that respondent No. 1 should be directed to seek his remedy by means of a suit because of disputed questions of fact. In the absence of such a plea, the appellant, in our opinion, cannot be heard to say that the High Court should have relegated respondent No. 1 to the remedy of a suit. Apart from that we find that the term of the appellant as the President of the municipality would have expired in 1975. The trial of a suit in the very nature of things, would have taken considerable time. Apart from that we find that the term of the appellant as the President of the municipality would have expired in 1975. The trial of a suit in the very nature of things, would have taken considerable time. Appeal and second appeal would have also been filed by the unsuccessful party in the case. Had respondent No. 1 been directed to seek his remedy by way of a suit, the relief secured by respondent No. 1 even if he had succeeded in the suit would have been wholly illusory because by the time respondent No. 1 would succeed in the litigation, the term of the office of the President would have either already expired or be about to expire. The appellant in that event would have continued as the President of the municipality even though he had ceased to enjoy the confidence of the requisite number of councillors and they had passed a motion of no confidence against him. The entire concept of a democratic institution would thus have been set at naught. We agree with the observations of the High Court that the purpose underlying the petition would have been completely defeated in case respondent No. 1 had been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit and that such remedy was neither adequate nor efficacious. 10. It is not necessary for this case to express an opinion on the point as whether the various provisions of the CPC apply to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 141 of the Code, to which reference has been made, makes it clear that the provisions of the Code in regard to suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction as far as it can be made applicable. The words "as far as it can be made applicable" make it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a suit, the court must take into account the nature of those proceedings and the relief sought. The object of Article 226 is to provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties. Power has consequently been vested in, the High Courts to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any government, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. Power has consequently been vested in, the High Courts to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any government, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It is plain that if the procedure of a suit had also to be adhered to in the case of writ petitions, the entire purpose of having a quick and inexpensive remedy would be defeated. A writ petition under Article 226, it needs to be emphasised, is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a suit into the proceedings of a petition under Article 226. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right of relief, questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition (see Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality AIR 1970 SC 802 . If, however, on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides, as in the present case, that it should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court in this respect.” 10. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2006) 9 SCC 524 , titled as “New Okhla Industrial Development Authoirty Vs. Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti” have held that the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right, question of fact may fall to be determined. Their Lordships have held as under :- 13. Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti” have held that the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right, question of fact may fall to be determined. Their Lordships have held as under :- 13. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. When the petition raises complex questions of fact which may, for their determination, require oral evidence to be taken and on that account the High Court is of the view that the disputed statement may not be appropriately tried in a writ petition, the High Court should ordinarily decline to try the petition. 14. Thus, a High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right, question of fact may fall to be determined. Ultimately, the question is one of discretion which is to be exercised in conformity with judicial principles. 11. Learned Single Judge in AIR 2001 Patna 16, titled as “Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and others”; has held that writ petition can be entertained, if the question of facts can be resolved on the basis of affidavit evidence alone. The relevant paragraphs are as under :- 7. I must also deal with the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that tangled question of facts is not normally adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. I have purposely dealt with this question at this stage because the facts are now quite clear before the Court. There would hardly be a writ petition which does not need resolution of facts. A writ petition can be entertained if the allegedly tangled question of facts can be resolved on the basis of affidavit evidence, and does not need evidence of a civil suit. This Court has not in the present case felt any difficulty in deciding the question of facts on the basis of affidavits evidence, and I have not felt the necessity of evidence of a civil suit in deciding the question of facts which is needed for disposal of the present writ petition. The contention is, therefore, rejected. I am in this connection reminded of my own judgment dt. The contention is, therefore, rejected. I am in this connection reminded of my own judgment dt. 29-3-2000, in CWJC No. 6911 of 1999 (Anil Kumar Singh v. Union of India 2000 (3) Pat LJR 176) paragraph 7 of which is relevant in the present case and is set out hereinbelow:-- "7. This takes me on the question of relief to be granted to the petitioner. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as well as 2, 5 and 6 have submitted that the complaint has not been examined by the respondent authorities and, therefore, it would be in the fitness of things to remit the matter to examine the complaint, I do not find it possible to accede to the contention for the reason that on account of inaction and abdication of functions attributable to the official respondents, this Court examined materials on record so that the matter is finally concluded. The Supreme Court has held in its judgment reported in AIR 1974 SC 2105 (Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot), that the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right of relief, questions of facts may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court has the jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. When the petitioner raises complex questions of facts, which may for their determination require evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. It is equally open to the High Court on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court may in exercise of its discretion go into a disputed question of fact." "7.1. In the instant case, this Court could decide the issue of fact, namely, residence of respondent No. 7, on the basis of the affidavit evidence and the documents produced before it, without the necessity of oral evidence. Further more in order to do effective justice in writ jurisdiction and for proper application of law, facts have got to be sorted out. Therefore, there is now no justification in the present case to refer the matter back to the authorities to examine the complaint." 12. Accordingly, the Special Appeal is allowed. Further more in order to do effective justice in writ jurisdiction and for proper application of law, facts have got to be sorted out. Therefore, there is now no justification in the present case to refer the matter back to the authorities to examine the complaint." 12. Accordingly, the Special Appeal is allowed. Judgment and order dated 22.11.2013 passed by learned Single Judge is set aside. Respondent-Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. is directed to release the entire payment to the appellant No.3 within a period of twelve weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of the order. However, it is made clear that the payment released in favour of the firm-appellant No.3 shall abide by the outcome of O.S. No.57 of 2011 which is pending in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Pithoragarh.