JUDGMENT : K.M. THAKER, J. 1. Heard Mr. Clerk, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Chauhan, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. The petitioner has challenged the award dated 30.8.2010 passed by learned Labour Court at Anand in Reference (LCA) No. 41 of 2004 whereby learned Labour Court has partly allowed the reference and while denying the relief prayed for by the petitioner i.e. direction to the respondent to reinstate him with consequential benefits, learned Labour Court has instead, awarded lump sum compensation to the tune of Rs.8,000/-. Aggrieved by the said award and direction the petitioner filed present petition and prayed that the respondent should be directed to reinstate him with consequential benefits. 3. So far as factual background is concerned it has emerged from the record and submissions by learned advocates that the petitioner was employed by the respondent during the period between May 1997 to March 2003. The petitioner herein raised industrial dispute on the allegation that his service was illegally terminated and he demanded that he should be reinstated in his service with consequential benefits. Appropriate Government referred the said dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour Court, Anand vide Order of Reference dated 9.2.2004. The said reference culminated into Reference (LCA) No. 41 of 2004. 3.1 During the proceedings of said reference before learned Labour Court the petitioner herein filed statement of claim wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he was engaged by the respondent as “Clerk” w.e.f 22.5.1997 and thereafter he worked continuously with the respondent until 31.3.2003 when his service came to be illegally terminated. He also claimed that during the period of his employment he had worked for more than 240 days in preceding 12 months and at the time when his service came to be terminated he was paid salary @ Rs.85.10 per day. He also alleged that his service was terminated without any fault on his part and without issuing notice or without granting any opportunity of hearing. According to the petitioner his service was terminated in violation of principles of natural justice as well as in violation of statutory provision and without following procedure prescribed by law. In his statement of claim the petitioner also alleged that with a view to frustrating any claim and right of the employee, copy of the appointment letters were not given by the respondent. In his statement of claim the petitioner also alleged that with a view to frustrating any claim and right of the employee, copy of the appointment letters were not given by the respondent. The petitioner claimed before the learned Labour Court by his statement of claim that the respondent should be directed to reinstate him with consequential benefits. 3.2 The reference was opposed by the respondent who filed written statement at exh.5. The respondent denied the statement and allegations by the petitioner. The respondent denied the allegation that the copies of the appointment letters were not supplied to the petitioner and/or that with a view to establishing break in service appointment letters for one year were being executed or that the petitioner was made to sign on blank paper. The respondent also denied in the written statement that the petitioner worked for 240 days in the preceding 12 months. 3.3 During the proceedings before the learned Labour Court the petitioner examined himself and his deposition was recorded at exh.14. The respondent placed on record certain documents which were accepted by the learned Labour Court at Exh.17 to Exh.30 which comprised statement reflecting attendance of the petitioner and copies of the undertakings (Bahedari Patrak) said to have been signed and submitted by the petitioner. The respondent did not examine any witness and did not lead any oral evidence. 3.4 After the stage of evidence was concluded, the learned Labour Court heard the submissions on behalf of the claimant and the employer and after considering the evidence on record and rival submissions of the contesting parties, the learned Labour Court did not accept the petitioner’s claim for relief of reinstatement with consequential benefits. Instead, the learned Labour Court awarded lump sum compensation in the tune of Rs.8,000/-. 4. Mr. Clerk, learned advocate for the petitioner assailed the award dated 30.8.2010 in Reference No.41 of 2004 and submitted that in light of the facts of the case the respondent should be directed to reinstate the petitioner with back-wages at such rate which the Court considers appropriate in the facts of the case. 4. Mr. Clerk, learned advocate for the petitioner assailed the award dated 30.8.2010 in Reference No.41 of 2004 and submitted that in light of the facts of the case the respondent should be directed to reinstate the petitioner with back-wages at such rate which the Court considers appropriate in the facts of the case. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner worked with the respondent during the period between 1997 to March 2003 and during the said period, the petitioner had worked continuously and he had worked for 240 days in each slot of 12 months and also during the slot of 12 months preceding the date on which his service was discontinued (i.e. 31.3.2003). He submitted that despite such fact, the petitioner’s service was terminated without payment of retrenchment compensation and without complying other requirements prescribed under section 25F. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the respondent did not provide copies of the appointment letters issued by the respondent and therefore, the petitioner could not place the copies of the said appointment letters on record before the learned Labour Court. He submitted that though copies of the appointment letters issued by the respondent were in the respondent’s custody and possession, the respondent, for reasons best known to it, chose not to place the said appointment letters or copies thereof on record before the learned Labour Court. He also submitted that the petitioner was made to sign the undertakings. He further submitted that the learned Labour Court erred in holding that the undertaking cannot be termed as, or considered as, ‘contract’ or “appointment letters” and they are merely undertakings submitted by the petitioner. Mr. Clerk, learned advocate further submitted that the respondent’s claim that the petitioner was engaged only for fixed term, is unjustified, incorrect and unsustainable. He submitted that the petitioner was engaged regularly and continuously for almost six years, i.e. from 1997 to 2003 and on 6.3.2003 petitioner’s service was arbitrarily terminated without notice and without opportunity of hearing and without payment of compensation and without following any process. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was performing duties and functions of Clerk and that he was made to sign the said undertakings and he was told that if he did not sign the said undertakings, then he will not get appointment. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was performing duties and functions of Clerk and that he was made to sign the said undertakings and he was told that if he did not sign the said undertakings, then he will not get appointment. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the termination was made in violation of statutory provisions and that therefore reinstatement and back-wages should have been granted as normal and natural consequences. So as to support his submission, Mr. Clerk, learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the decisions in the cases of Tapash Kumar Pal vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. [ (2014) 15 SCC 313 ], Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar vs. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. [ (2014) 6 SCC 434 ], Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. [ AIR 1986 SC 1571 ], M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. [ AIR 1979 SC 75 ]. 5. Mr. Chauhan, learned advocate for the respondent opposed the submissions by Mr. Clerk, learned advocate for the petitioner. Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the petitioner was engaged by fixed term appointment and in view of the terms of the appointment, his engagement would get automatically discontinued on expiry of the term of the appointment. He also submitted that since the petitioner’s appointment would automatically terminate/discontinue Section 25F would not be applicable and the respondent was not obliged to comply with the condition under the said provision. He submitted that the appointment got discontinued automatically and there was no termination by the respondent and therefore also provision under section 25F was not required to be complied. Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the petitioner never worked for 240 days during his tenure. Mr. Chauhan, learned advocate for the respondent relied on the “undertakings” submitted by the respondent (pages 22 to 38) and he emphasized, in particular, clause Nos.1, 2 and 7 of the said undertakings and submitted that by the said undertakings, the petitioner accepted that he would be bound by the terms/clauses contained in the undertakings and therefore, now, the petitioner cannot dispute the said terms/clauses of the undertakings. He submitted that in view of the said undertakings, the petitioner was aware that his appointment was temporary and for fixed period and that, therefore, the petitioner’s claim based on the alleged violation of section 25F is misconceived and unsustainable. Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the respondent did not terminate the service of the petitioner and his appointment with the respondent had automatically come to an end in March 2003 when the period of appointment came to an end. Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the learned Labour Court has taken into account the relevant aspects and has not committed any error in awarding compensation, however, if the Court is of the view that the compensation awarded by the learned Labour Court is inadequate, then the Court may enhance the lump sum compensation to the rate considered appropriate by the Court. He submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, demand for reinstatement does not deserve to be and may not be granted. To support his submission, learned advocate for the respondent relied on the decisions in the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Bhurumal [ (2014) 7 SCC 177 ], Hari Nandan Prasad & Anr. vs. Employer I/r to Management of Food Corporation of India & Anr. [ (2014) 7 SCC 190 ], Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal vs. Santosh Kumar Seal & Ors. [ (2010) 6 SCC 773 ], Manager Gujcomasol Pesticides Deptt. vs. Kiritkumar Babulal Patel & Anr. [ 2011 (1) GLH 550 ]. 6. I have considered the submissions by learned advocates for the contesting parties and also considered the material on record and I have also carefully considered the award impugned in present petition. 7. In present case it is not in dispute that the petitioner was employed by the respondent in May 1997 and his service was terminated w.e.f. 31.3.2003. Thus, he worked with the respondent for about 6 years. 7.1 It is also not in dispute that in the preceding 12 months the petitioner had worked for 240 days with the respondent. 7.2 The total number of days for which the petitioner worked with the respondent are borne out and established from the details/statement placed on record of the learned Labour Court by the respondent employer. 7.1 It is also not in dispute that in the preceding 12 months the petitioner had worked for 240 days with the respondent. 7.2 The total number of days for which the petitioner worked with the respondent are borne out and established from the details/statement placed on record of the learned Labour Court by the respondent employer. Thus, it is the respondent's/employer's document which established before the learned Labour Court that (a) the respondent was engaged/employed by the petitioner; and that (b) he was continuously engaged for about 6 years from May 1997 to March 2003; and (c) in the preceding 12 months the petitioner had worked for 240 days. 7.3 Therefore, 2 primary conditions, which an employee is required to establish to support his claim based on the assertion that the employer acted in violation of Section 25F [viz. (a) before termination of his service he had worked for 12 months (actually the respondent in present case had worked for more than 12 months i.e. for almost 6 years) with the employer; and (b) that during the said period of 12 months preceding the date of termination he had worked for 240 days] are complied by the petitioner in present case. 7.4 Above mentioned facts and details bring out that the termination of the petitioner's service tantamounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) read with Section 25F and that at the time when present petitioner's service was terminated i.e. on 31.3.2003, the petitioner was entitled for retrenchment compensation. 7.5 Despite the said fact, when the petitioner was relieved, his service was discontinued without issuing notice contemplated under Section 25(F) and undisputedly, salary in lieu of the notice was also not paid and the retrenchment compensation was also not paid in accordance with the formula and procedure prescribed under Section 25F of the Act. The respondent has failed to point out any material from the record to establish that the condition and the procedure prescribed by law for retrenchment were complied at the time when the petitioner’s service was discontinued and he was relieved. Actually it is not the case even of the respondent that it had followed the procedure prescribed under Section 25F of the Act while terminating the service of the petitioner. Thus, the termination of petitioner's service was effected in violation of statutory provision and the said defect vitiated the termination – retrenchment. Actually it is not the case even of the respondent that it had followed the procedure prescribed under Section 25F of the Act while terminating the service of the petitioner. Thus, the termination of petitioner's service was effected in violation of statutory provision and the said defect vitiated the termination – retrenchment. Such defective retrenchment would, ordinarily, entail consequences which the law provides. 8. So as to come out from the said position and consequence the respondent has claimed that the petitioner's appointment was for fixed term and therefore termination of the petitioner's service was automatic and consequently Section 25F of the Act was not attracted and the respondent had no obligation to comply the condition prescribed under Section 25F of the Act and the petitioner's claim for reinstatement and consequently benefits are not justified. 8.1 Obviously, the plea is taken with an attempt to take shelter under clause (bb) of section 2(oo). 8.2 Therefore, it is necessary to consider as to whether the petitioner's appointment falls within purview of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and whether the appointment is qualified for the protection or exception provided for by the said clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. 8.3 It is pertinent that the respondent has raised such plea and defence at the time of hearing of this petition however in the written statement (which the respondent filed before the learned Labour Court) any plea on strength of or in light of the provision under sub-clause (bb) or section 2(oo) was not raised. Even any detail with regard to the mode or method or manner in which the petitioner was appointed and continued in service from 1997 to 2003, was also not mentioned or clarified. Any contention either on the basis of facts or in light of any provision under the Act was not raised by the respondent before the learned Labour Court. When the written statement filed by the respondent is examined, it comes out that except bare denial of the facts or allegations by the petitioner in his statement of claim, any other relevant details either factual or any defence on the basis of any provision under the Act is not raised or mentioned by the respondent. When the written statement filed by the respondent is examined, it comes out that except bare denial of the facts or allegations by the petitioner in his statement of claim, any other relevant details either factual or any defence on the basis of any provision under the Act is not raised or mentioned by the respondent. 8.4 The respondent also failed to place on record the contract of employment/ appointment order and/or any evidence to demonstrate that by its very nature the work (for which petitioner was engaged) was of temporary duration and that it was not permanent and/or perennial work. 8.5 Without placing on record such evidence the respondent contended before the learned Court that termination of petitioner's service cannot and could not be faulted on account of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act because the petitioner's appointment was covered under clause(bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. 9. It is pertinent that while raising the said contention the respondent ignores two facts viz. (a) that in present case the petitioner has established that the two conditions required to be established by an employee for attracting Section 25F of the Act exist in present case and that he has complied both the conditions which would attract applicability of Section 25F in his case; and (b) that so as to take shelter under the umbrella of “fixed term appointment”, employer should establish that the work for which such employee was employed was of temporary duration or fixed period and that at the time of appointment specific contract of employment/appointment order with such specific stipulation was executed and issued and the employee was informed by virtue of such specific contract of employer or appointment that his employment is for temporary period and limited duration and for specific work and that the appointment would come to an end upon completion of work, however in present case it (i.e. the respondent) has failed to establish relevant facts. 9.1 It is only on the strength of the “so-called undertakings” - more particularly the clause number 5 and 7 in the said “undertakings” that the respondent has now sought to base its aforesaid plea/defence viz. that the petitioner was engaged for fixed period and that therefore the recourse to Section 25F is not available to him. 9.1 It is only on the strength of the “so-called undertakings” - more particularly the clause number 5 and 7 in the said “undertakings” that the respondent has now sought to base its aforesaid plea/defence viz. that the petitioner was engaged for fixed period and that therefore the recourse to Section 25F is not available to him. In this context, it is pertinent to recall and note that such plea or defence is not mentioned or raised by the respondent in its written statement. 9.2 In this context it is relevant to note that so as to invoke clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and to support its said claim, the respondent must, at-least, establish that a contract of employment with necessary and relevant ingredients – factors and conditions – was executed or appointment orders with such terms was issued. However, in present case the respondent, interestingly, did not place on record before the learned Labour Court any contract or the appointment letters under which it appointed the petitioner (in May 1997 and thereafter continued him in service until March 2003). 9.3 Instead, the respondent placed heavy reliance on said undertaking. 9.4 Now, so far as the said undertakings are concerned, they are placed on record of present petition at pages 21, 25, 28, 31, 34 and 37, whereas the appointment orders/contract were not placed on record before the learned Labour Court and they are not placed on record of the petition as well. 10. On this count the respondent, being conscious about the documents obtaining on the record of the learned Labour Court (viz. the so called undertakings as well as the statements reflecting days for which the petitioner had worked with the respondent) has made an attempt to claim that the petitioner was engaged on the condition that his appointment would be for fixed period and it shall come to an end on expiry of the period mentioned in the said undertakings. 10.1 As mentioned earlier, so as to invoke clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act and to claim protection or exception from the condition prescribed under Section 25F and also to support its claim and defence the respondent must establish that a contract of employment or appointment order with necessary and relevant ingredients/conditions (required for attracting clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act) was executed or issued. However, in present case such contract or appointment order are not placed on record and the respondent has relied on said undertakings, particularly clauses 5 and 7 of the said undertakings so as to contend that the petitioner’s appointment was for fixed period. 10.2 It is also relevant that the respondent's entire defence is rested and based on the terms/clauses in the said undertakings and there is no material – except the undertakings – on record on which the respondent can rely to support its claim/defence. 10.3 Actually, a novel and ingenious method of employing a person for work of permanent and perennial nature and yet circumventing statutory obligations and escaping the employer's obligation to grant various benefits as provided by law e.g. gratuity, P.F., retrenchment compensation, leave/leave encashment etc. is adopted by an university/ limb of university. 10.4 Despite the backdrop is filled with such facts and despite the fact that the factum of petitioner's employment from May 1997 to March 2003 with the respondent is not in dispute, the learned Labour Court has recorded a conclusion that the “undertakings” in question cannot be termed and treated as appointment letters and learned Court has proceeded to decide entire matter on the basis of and in light of said conclusion. 11. It is relevant to note that in view of the fact that (a) any appointment order or contract of employment is not on record and is not shown by the respondent as the document under which the petitioner was appointed (to demonstrate that the said contract contained and specified relevant terms); and (b) in view of the fact that the learned Labour Court has concluded and held that the undertakings cannot be termed and treated as appointment order/contract of employment, there is nothing on record to establish compliance of the conditions required for applicability of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). 11.1 Consequently the protection under clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and/or defence on the strength of said clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) is not available to the respondent because the said provision postulates and prescribes that there must be a “contract” of employment/appointment order with specific terms which should clearly mention (and thereby clearly inform the person to be employed) that the appointment is for specified work and limited period and appointment would come to end on expiry of the work whereas in present case, on account of the conclusion by learned Labour Court (whereby the said undertakings are not treated as contract of employment) there is nothing on record to establish that the petitioner's appointment was made with the said condition and for the object contemplated under the said provision. Thus, there is non-compliance of important condition which must be fulfilled for applicability of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). 11.2 In absence of appointment letter it is not open or even possible for the respondent to claim and contend that the petitioner was engaged for fixed period and for work of temporary nature and duration because if the requisite contract/appointment order/ contract had been executed or issued then the respondent would be in possession of the copies of the contract/appointment letters then it would have placed it on record however the respondent did not place on record such document. In such circumstances and more particularly in light of the conclusion of the learned labour Court (i.e. if the said conclusion is to be retained) the only inference – rather only conclusion would be that any condition about fixed tenure/duration was not attached to the petitioner's appointment. 11.3 Besides this, the said (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act cannot be exploited or abused for repeatedly making consecutive/repetitive appointments – with or without artificial breaks – on fixed/short term basis and that too for work which is of permanent and/or perennial nature and regular and necessary – continuous work for the establishment. 11.4 In present case the petitioner was undisputedly employed for and engaged in work of regular, perennial and permanent nature and not for any casual or temporary work or for intermittent work. This aspect has emerged from the description of petitioner's job/duties which he mentioned and clarified when he was subjected to cross-examination. 11.4 In present case the petitioner was undisputedly employed for and engaged in work of regular, perennial and permanent nature and not for any casual or temporary work or for intermittent work. This aspect has emerged from the description of petitioner's job/duties which he mentioned and clarified when he was subjected to cross-examination. During his cross-examination the petitioner mentioned the nature of duties and functions which he used to perform. The job description given by the petitioner includes work of dispatch, preparation of bills, English and Gujarati typing, computer operation to prepare muster roll of the labourers and to assist senior clerks. 11.5 For the aforesaid reasons coupled with the absence of contract of employment/ appointment order, the protection or exception (from the term/meaning of “retrenchment” and in respect of conditions prescribed by Section 25F of the Act) provided for by clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) is not attracted in present case and it is not available to the respondent. 11.6 In light of the fact of this case the respondent's claim that Section 25F is not applicable in view of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). Consequently the respondent cannot be heard to claim and contend that the termination of petitioner's service is not and cannot be termed “retrenchment”. 11.7 The moment it is accepted and recognized or held that any contract/appointment order with such specific condition and stipulation was not executed/issued by and between the employer and the employee in present case that, exactly, is the meaning and effect of Labour Court's decision then the termination of such employee (provided he was engaged for 12 or more than 12 months and during the period of 12 months before date of termination he had worked for 240 days) would amount to “retrenchment” within the purview of Section 2(oo) read with Section 25F of the Act and resultantly the conditions under Section 25F of the Act would be attracted and applicable in such case and the protection or exception (in respect of the condition under Section 25F of the Act) under sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) would not be available. 11.8 In present case the learned Labour Court Court's decision viz. 11.8 In present case the learned Labour Court Court's decision viz. that the said undertakings cannot be termed and treated as contract of employment tantamounts to absence of contract of employment/appointment order i.e. the learned Court's decision means that any contract/appointment order with requisite condition was not issued/ executed by and between the respondent and the petitioner. 11.9 In this view of the matter and in light of the facts of this case (which are discussed hereinabove at length) and more particularly in light of the conclusion record by the learned Labour Court, it becomes clear that the termination of petitioner's service tantamounts to “retrenchment”. While holding that so called undertakings cannot be termed and treated as appointment letters the learned Labour Court failed to take into account above mentioned aspects and did not examine the matter from the said perspective. 11.10 In that event mandatory obligation to pay retrenchment compensation at the time of termination was applicable and the respondent was under statutory obligation to comply the conditions under Section 25F of the Act while terminating petitioner's service. In present case it is undisputed fact that at the time of terminating petitioner's service the respondent had not paid retrenchment compensation and had not complied the conditions under Section 25F of the Act. The failure to discharge the mandatory obligation rendered the termination ab initio void. Therefore the consequence for violation of Section 25F of the Act should follow. 12. Now the position which would emerge if the so called undertakings are termed and treated as appointment orders, is required to be considered. 13. The learned Court has refused to consider the said undertakings as appointment orders. It is pertinent that the respondent has not challenged said decision. At the same time the respondent has maintained convenient silence on that count and has not placed the appointment orders even on record of the petition. On the other hand it has heavily relied on certain clauses in the said undertakings to support its claim that the petitioner's appointment was for fixed period. 13.1 It is pertinent to note that except the said undertakings there is nothing on record to support the respondent's claim that the petitioner's appointment was for fixed period. 13.2 While examining the matter in light of the said undertakings it is necessary to recall and note that the respondent has not disputed the so called undertakings. 13.1 It is pertinent to note that except the said undertakings there is nothing on record to support the respondent's claim that the petitioner's appointment was for fixed period. 13.2 While examining the matter in light of the said undertakings it is necessary to recall and note that the respondent has not disputed the so called undertakings. Actually it has heavily relied on couple of clauses incorporated in the said undertakings. 13.3 When the undertakings are taken into account, it comes out that the undertakings are cyclostyle predesigned formats which contain terms and conditions of appointment/ employment which are framed in form of stipulation/declaration from the employee. 13.4 It is relevant to note that the undertakings cover entire period of 6 years. 13.5 According to the arrangement introduced and implemented by the respondent on expiry of the period mentioned in one undertaking, another identical undertaking was executed and the petitioner was continued in employment. Thus, a novel and ingenious method and arrangement (for appointing/employing a person by executing/getting executed such “undertakings”) was adopted by the respondent to circumvent or avoid the obligation prescribed by law. 13.6 It is pertinent that so as to claim and contend that the petitioner was appointed for fixed period, the respondent relied on the clause Nos. 5, 7 and 8 of the so called undertakings. 13.7 The fact that on one hand the respondent did not place on record the appointment order/contract of employment and on the other hand the respondent itself placed reliance on the said document and clauses to plead conditions of appointment, establishes that even according to the respondent the said undertakings are the only documents which prescribe the conditions of petitioner's appointment/service. 13.8 A glance at the said undertakings gives out that the undertakings are signed by the competent authority of the respondent and the petitioner and that in effect and in substance the said documents are appointment letters which are merely couched and framed in garb of “undertakings”. 14. In absence of contract of employment/appointment order there is nothing on record to establish and demonstrate the terms and conditions of petitioner's appointment/service i.e. terms and conditions on which the petitioner was appointed and was continued in service for almost 6 years. 14. In absence of contract of employment/appointment order there is nothing on record to establish and demonstrate the terms and conditions of petitioner's appointment/service i.e. terms and conditions on which the petitioner was appointed and was continued in service for almost 6 years. Therefore, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case it is appropriate to examine the case from another/alternative perspective i.e. to examine the matter by treating the clauses in the undertakings as terms and conditions of appointment i.e. by treating said undertakings as “appointment orders”. 15. The consequence which would entail in the event said documents are not termed as appointment orders, is already discussed above. 15.1 Therefore, now the other side or perspective of the said issue viz. the effect and consequences if, in light of the facts of this case, the said documents (undertakings) are termed and treated as appointment orders. 15.2 While on said issue, it is, necessary to keep in focus that it is not, and it has never been, present respondent's case that the undertakings are – and they should be termed and treated as- appointment orders and that while considering the matter from said perspective all “undertakings” (i.e. all undertakings covering total period of 6 years) will have to be considered conjointly, and not separately or individually. 16. On conjoint reading of the said “undertakings” it comes out that (a) right from the first day (when the petitioner was appointed/employed) until the last day (when his employment was discontinued) he was employed and engaged continuously and without break and (b) the work/duty which he performed/for which he was appointed and employed, was work of regular, permanent, recurring and perennial nature and it was not work of casual or ad-hoc nature or of temporary or fixed duration; and (c) that despite such facts and circumstances artificially yearly divisions/phases were created with aid of said undertakings i.e. by executing fresh undertaking on completion – expiry of period of previous undertaking. 17. Such arrangement and method (i.e. engaging a person on strength of the undertakings with said clauses/terms) in respect of the work which, by its very nature, is not of casual or temporary nature or is not work of limited period and fixed duration but is regular work of the establishment and is of perennial nature is not legal and cannot be recognized or permitted or approved by the Court. Actually such arrangement/method of employing persons for regular type of work is (and amounts to) unfair labour practice. 18. Further, in light of the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly ( AIR 1986 SC 1571 ) it follows, that the clauses/provisions in the said undertakings, particularly the clauses on which the respondent has relied (i.e. clause Nos. 5, 7 and 8 thereof) are unreasonable and amount to unconscionable condition. 18.1 On this count it is relevant to note that (a) the petitioner was, actually and in effect, appointed and employed for work which was not temporary or adhoc, or casual but he was appointed and employed for the work which was of permanent, regular, perennial nature; and (b) he was not employed for short period or for limited duration but he was actually and in effect appointed and employed for long duration by artificially shortening or dissecting or bifurcating actual period/duration in smaller phases/pieces i.e. one year (by compelling him to execute the undertakings with the said clauses) and by such method/arrangement he was continuously employed for 6 years with artificial breaks and that was done with aid of unreasonable and unconscionable condition and he was deprived of legally available service benefits e.g. leave, leave encashment, gratuity etc; and (c) entire arrangement also smacks of the intention to frustrate the obligation which would arise in light of Section 25F of the Act. 18.2 Therefore, any action on the strength of or any defence based on the premise of such terms and conditions cannot be sustained and the said clauses in the undertakings do not qualify for and they are not eligible for the protection or exception provided for under, and by way of, clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. 18.2 Therefore, any action on the strength of or any defence based on the premise of such terms and conditions cannot be sustained and the said clauses in the undertakings do not qualify for and they are not eligible for the protection or exception provided for under, and by way of, clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. In this context it is relevant to note that the said clause(bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act postulates (a) that said provision would take in its fold only such appointments which are made in respect of the work which, by its very nature, should be adhoc and temporary and for fixed duration; and (b) the work should not be of regular and perennial nature and it also should not be permanent or recurring work of the establishment or connected with or in aid of permanent work of the establishment; and (c) the terms of the employment should clearly indicate and inform the person that the appointment is for specific work which is of limited duration and the terms of the appointment - employment should be such that it would bring the appointment – employment to an end on completion of the work and not merely on expiry of the period mentioned in the contract, meaning thereby the work and the employment should be co-extensive and co-terminus. The only exception would be the appointment made as a stop-gap arrangement until regular appointment is made i.e. while awaiting regular appointee. 19. In present case the said undertakings do not expressly specify that the engagement of the petitioner is for specific work and that the said work is for temporary and limited/ fixed period and that therefore his appointment will come to an end with completion of the work. The said undertakings do not meet with the requirements or the features explained by Apex Court. The said documents simply mention that the petitioner is engaged on daily wage basis for one year. From the said clause, it cannot be concluded or even inferred that the petitioner was engaged for specific work which, by its very nature, was temporary or casual work of limited or fixed duration. Actually the respondent was repeatedly and continuously engaged for six years, on year to year basis, without any break. From the said clause, it cannot be concluded or even inferred that the petitioner was engaged for specific work which, by its very nature, was temporary or casual work of limited or fixed duration. Actually the respondent was repeatedly and continuously engaged for six years, on year to year basis, without any break. 19.1 When an employee is repeatedly, continuously and consecutively engaged by the same employer, though by separate orders issued from time to time, and when continuous chain of repeated appointments is established, and when it has also emerged that the work for which the person is employed is of regular and permanent nature then such appointment cannot be granted protection of the provisions under clause (bb) of section 2(oo). 19.2 In this context it is relevant to mention that Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar 2003 (4) SCC 27 has held, inter alia, that mere appointment as daily wager does not amount to appointment on contract for specific work. In present case, as mentioned earlier, from the statements at pages 40 to 46 of the petition (which are the documents prepared by the respondent) it has emerged that the petitioner was engaged repeatedly, continuously and consecutively from 16.5.1997 to 21.3.2003. Though the petitioner was purportedly engaged for the tenure mentioned in the undertaking, however, his engagement was, but for the artificial “phases”/divisions created with aid of such separate undertakings, continuous and without break. 19.3 On overall consideration of all aspects this Court is of the view that the engagement of the petitioner by the respondent does not qualify for protection under clause (bb) of section 2(oo). 20. Once this conclusion is reached and when simultaneously it is also established by cogent evidence that the petitioner was employed by the respondent for more than 12 months and he had worked for 240 days or more, during preceding 12 months then the obligation to comply the condition under section 25F would be attracted. In the decision in the case of L. Robert D'Souza vs. Southern Railway 1982 (1) SC 645, Hon’ble Apex Court has observed and held that the provision under section 25F would be applicable in case of daily wagers as well. In the decision in the case of L. Robert D'Souza vs. Southern Railway 1982 (1) SC 645, Hon’ble Apex Court has observed and held that the provision under section 25F would be applicable in case of daily wagers as well. In present case it is also an undisputed fact that when the petitioner was relieved and when his service was discontinued with effect from 31.3.2003, the said condition under section 25F including the condition to pay compensation was not complied. The conditions prescribed under said provision are mandatory and its violation renders the termination of an employee ab initio void. Therefore, this Court is convinced to hold that the petitioner’s appointment was in violation of section 25F of the Act and also in violation of Rule 81 of the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, 1961. 21. It is pertinent that Section 25F of the Act is beneficial provision which is introduced with the object to provide some relief to the workman who is visited with drastic action of retrenchment on account of which the workman and his entire family are thrown into life full of uncertainties, difficulties and dark future. 21.1 In connection with the said beneficial provision an exception is carved out by virtue of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). Certain types of termination of service, which would, ordinarily, tantamount to retrenchment [but for the said clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act], are taken out of Section 25F of the Act. The said clause (bb) provides an exception in respect of the terms and condition prescribed by section 25F. Therefore, the said clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act must be construed strictly. This is necessary so as to curb abuse by unscrupulous employers. Otherwise the said provision can prove to be a handle or weapon in the hands of the employer to resort to policy of “hire and fire” and indiscriminate violation of Section 25F of the Act as well as to circumvent various provision under different Labour Laws and deprive the workmen the benefits which would flow from continuous service. The scheme of the Act and object of the clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) do not permit its misuse or exploitation for such purpose by employing such novel and ingenious methods. 21.2 In this view of the matter the contention or defence of the respondent, in light of clause Nos. The scheme of the Act and object of the clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) do not permit its misuse or exploitation for such purpose by employing such novel and ingenious methods. 21.2 In this view of the matter the contention or defence of the respondent, in light of clause Nos. 5, 7 and 8 of the undertakings, that the petitioner was appointed for fixed period and his service came to an end automatically on expiry of the period mentioned by the said clause (though the work continued) cannot be sustained and deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. 22. This entire controversy, dispute and the matter deserves to be, rather it is required to be, considered from yet another perspective i.e. in light of the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. [ AIR 1986 SC 1571 ]. The relevant observations in the decision in case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. Read thus:- “84. ... "The time may come when this process of 'construing' the contract can be pursued no further. The words are too clear to permit of it. Are the courts then powerless? Are they to permit the party to enforce his unreasonable clause, even when it is so unreasonable, or applied so unreasonably, as to be unconscionable? When it gets to this point, I would say, as I said many years ago : ... "There are cases in our books in which the courts will set aside a contract. Or a transfer of property, when the parties have not met on equal terms, when the one is so strong in bargaining power and the other so weak that, as a matter of common fairness, it is not right that the strong should be allowed to push the weak to the wall. ...One who is in extreme need may knowingly consent to a most improvident bargain, solely to relieve the straits in which he finds himself. Again, I do not mean to suggest that every transaction is saved by independent advice. But the absence of it may be fatal. With these explanations, I hope this principle will be found to reconcile the cases." 22.1 In paragraph No.90 of the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- “90. Again, I do not mean to suggest that every transaction is saved by independent advice. But the absence of it may be fatal. With these explanations, I hope this principle will be found to reconcile the cases." 22.1 In paragraph No.90 of the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- “90. ...This principle is that the courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No court can visualize the different situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. In today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infra-structural organizations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. In today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infra-structural organizations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances.” 22.2 In paragraph No. 94, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- “94. .... The types of contracts to which the principle formulated by us above applies are not contracts which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the court. They are opposed to public policy and require to be adjudged void.” 22.3 Then, Hon'ble Apex Court also observed, inter alia, that:- “95. ....Undoubtedly, the contesting Respondents accepted appointment with the Corporation upon these terms. They had, however, no real choice before them. Had they not accepted the appointments, they would have at the highest received some compensation which would have been probably meagre and would certainly have exposed themselves to the hazard of finding another job. 97. The said Rules as also the earlier rules of 1970 were accepted by the contesting Respondents without demur. Here again they had no real choice before them. They had risen higher in the hierarchy of the Corporation. If they had refused to accept the said Rules, it would have resulted in termination of their service and the consequent anxiety, harassment and uncertainty of finding alternative employment.” 23. When the facts of present case, more particularly the terms and conditions in the “so called undertaking” are examined, it becomes clear that the said terms and conditions are not only unreasonable and unjust, but they are unconscionable and the arrangement placed in effect by the respondent with the petitioner is brought about by virtue of an agreement between lion and lamb. It cannot be ignored that the petitioner worked with the respondent, out of necessity and he continued to serve the respondent for almost 6 years, though the respondent made him sign above mentioned unconscionable undertakings. 24. It cannot be ignored that the petitioner worked with the respondent, out of necessity and he continued to serve the respondent for almost 6 years, though the respondent made him sign above mentioned unconscionable undertakings. 24. In this backdrop and in light of foregoing discussion the question which arise for consideration, is that when termination of service of an employee is found to be in violation of statutory provision and therefore ab initio void what relief can be granted by the Court. 24.1 On this count Mr. Chauhan, learned advocate for the respondent would submit that the respondent did not commit breach of Section 25F however even after holding that the termination of the service of the workman was in violation of Section 25F the Court can modify the relief and award lump sum compensation instead of directing the employer to reinstate the workman with or without consequential benefits. 24.2 So as to support contention that in case of daily wager, even if the termination is found to be illegal, instead of granting reinstatement, the relief ought to be appropriately modified and direction to pay lump sum compensation should be passed. Mr. Chauhan, learned advocate for the respondent relied on the decisions in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal vs. Santosh Kumar Seal & Ors. [ (2010) 6 SCC 773 ], in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Bhuramal [ (2014) 7 SCC 177 ]. It is true that in the said decisions Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held if the termination of an employee is found illegal and unsustainable, the direction for reinstatement may not be passed mechanically and considering the facts of the case, in appropriate cases order to pay compensation in lieu of reinstatement can be passed. 24.3 Per contra, Mr. Clerk, learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the decision in the case of Tapas Kumar Paul vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited [ (2014) 15 SCC 313 ], wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that: “11. 24.3 Per contra, Mr. Clerk, learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the decision in the case of Tapas Kumar Paul vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited [ (2014) 15 SCC 313 ], wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that: “11. Therefore, in the light of the decision of this Court in Deepali Gundu’s case (supra) which has correctly relied upon higher bench decisions of this Court in Surendra Kumar Verma’s case (supra) and Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. (supra), I am of the opinion that the appellant herein is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages since in the absence of full back wages, the employee will be distressed and will suffer punishment for no fault of his own. 12. The Division Bench of the High Court has gravely erred in law that the Tribunal and learned single Judge found that the order of the termination is bad in law for non-compliance with the above statutory provisions of the ID Act and therefore, following the normal Rule of Award of reinstatement is awarded but erroneously denied full back wages in the absence of proof of gainful employment of appellant-workman.” 24.4 Mr. Chauhan, learned advocate also relied on the decision in the case of Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar vs. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited [ (2014) 6 SCC 434 ]. In the said case the learned Labour Court had allowed the reference and directed the employer to pay full salary and other ancillary benefit but High Court had set aside the said award and Hon’ble Apex Court with the below quoted observations in para 21 of the judgment restored the award of the learned Labour Court: “21. The High Court has not applied its mind in setting aside the judgment and award of the labour court in exercise of its power of judicial review and superintendence as it is patently clear that the labour court has not committed any error of jurisdiction or passed a judgment without sufficient evidence. The impugned judgement and order of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the award and judgment of the labour court be restored. 22. The impugned judgement and order of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the award and judgment of the labour court be restored. 22. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and restore the award of the Labour Court, since the services of the appellant were prematurely superannuated taking his date of birth as 27.06.1937 instead of 27.06.1940, and therefore, he is entitled to full back wages and other consequential monetary benefits from the date of termination till the date of his correct superannuation considering his date of birth as 27.06.1940. The back wages shall be calculated on the basis of revised pay scale and the same must be paid by way of demand draft to the appellant within six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order, failing which the respondent shall pay interest @ 12% per annum on the amount due, towards back wages and other consequential monetary benefits, from the date of the Award of the Labour Court till the date of payment.” 24.5 At this stage it is relevant to take into account the observations by Apex Court in the decision in case of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. [ AIR 1979 SC 75 ], wherein Hon’ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: “9. It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to the work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived deprived workman of his earnings. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to the work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived deprived workman of his earnings. It thus, thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigating activity of the employer. If the ‘D’ employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case, viz ., to resist the workman's demand for revision of wages the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed (l with full back wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect. By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavored to secure work to the workmen. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed (l with full back wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect. By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavored to secure work to the workmen. In breach of the statutory obligation the services were terminated and the termination is found to be invalid; the workmen though willing to do the assigned work and earn their livelihood, were kept away therefrom. On top of it the were forced to litigation upto the apex Court and now they are being told that something less than full back wages should be awarded to them. If the services were not terminated the workmen ordinarily would have continued to work and would have earned their wages. When it was held that the termination of services was neither proper nor justified, it would not only show that the workman were always willing to serve but if they rendered service they would legitimately be entitled to the wages for the same. If the workman were always ready to work but they were kept away therefrom on account of invalid act of the employer, there is no justification for not awarding them full back wages which were very legitimately due to them. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram Panchayat v. Safai Kamdar Mandal (1), and a Division Bench of the Allahabad (1) 11- 971] I Labour Law Journal 508 570 High Court in Postal Seals Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court 11, Lucknow & ors.(l), have taken this view and we are of the opinion that the view taken therein is correct.” 24.6 In above mentioned decision Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that ordinarily workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back-wages unless he was gainfully employed. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service should be granted in cases where termination is found to be invalid and that any other view would be a premium in unwarranted litigating activity of the employer. 24.7 In the decision in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) (2013) 10 SCC 324 Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that:- “22. 24.7 In the decision in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) (2013) 10 SCC 324 Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that:- “22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter’s source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments. 38.1 In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. 38.1 In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. 38.2 The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. 38.5 The cases in which the competent Court or Tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman, then the concerned Court or Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior Courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer’s obligation to pay the same. The Courts must always be kept in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages.” 24.8 Thus, what emerges from the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in abovementioned decision is that to support and justify the request that the direction to reinstate the workman with back-wages may not be passed even when the termination of an employee is found to be illegal and in violation of statutory provision, the employer must establish exceptional circumstances. 25. In this context, it has emerged from the record that in 2007, the age of the petitioner workman was 42 years. When the learned Labour Court passed the award in 2010, the petitioner workman would be about 45 years of age and as of now, the petitioner would be 51 years of age. Learned advocate for the respondent has clarified that the age of superannuation for the employees in Class-IV in the respondent university is 60 years. When the learned Labour Court passed the award in 2010, the petitioner workman would be about 45 years of age and as of now, the petitioner would be 51 years of age. Learned advocate for the respondent has clarified that the age of superannuation for the employees in Class-IV in the respondent university is 60 years. Thus, considering present age of the petitioner, he would have tenure of about 9 years, if the relief of reinstatement is not denied to the petitioner. Any evidence with regard to availability of work and vacancy, present status of the petitioner (whether he is employed or not) etc. is not available. On the other hand almost 13 years have passed since the time petitioner's service was terminated and before he was discontinued, the petitioner had worked with the respondent for 6 years. During the interregnum of almost 1 ½ decade petitioner could not be unemployed. 25.1 On overall consideration of facts and circumstances, and the principles and guidelines explained by Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the award impugned in present petition deserves to be set aside and modified by enhancing the amount towards lump sum compensation. Considering the facts of the case that almost 13 years have passed since the petitioner's termination and also considering the fact that the petitioner has crossed 50 years of age, the Court is of the view that the petitioner's claim for reinstatement need not be accepted and learned Labour Court's decision to decline the demand for reinstatement in service may not disturb and the learned Labour Court's decision of awarding lumpsum compensation and instead of reinstatement and other consequential benefits may be accepted, however with modification i.e. by enhancing the quantum of lumpsum compensation. Having regard to the rate of remuneration which the petitioner received at the time of termination and on considering the subsequent revision in minimum wages and other relevant aspects and that total period of petitioner's service is of 6 years, this court is of the view that interest of justice would be served if the respondent is directed to pay Rs.1,90,000/- towards lump sum compensation in lieu of claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits. 25.2 Therefore, following order is passed:- The impugned award is set aside and modified. 25.2 Therefore, following order is passed:- The impugned award is set aside and modified. However, instead of directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner and to pay consequential benefits, the respondent is directed to pay lump sum amount of Rs.1,90,000/-. The respondent will pay the said amount of lump sum compensation as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six weeks from the receipt of certified copy of this order. With aforesaid clarification and direction, the petition is partly allowed and disposed of with aforesaid direction. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Petition partly allowed.