JUDGMENT : 1. These writ petitions have been heard together and shall stand disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. The petitioners, pursuant to an advertisement published on July 14, 2006 (hereafter the said advertisement), offered their candidature for recruitment as Anganwadi workers. They were selected and offered appointment by the Child Development Project Officer, Budge Budge – 1, South 24 Parganas (hereafter the CDPO), sometime in July 2007. 3. Memorandum dated January 25, 2006 issued by the Department of Women & Child Development and Social Welfare, Government of West Bengal (hereafter the relevant department) laid down the guidelines for selection of Anganwadi workers and Anganwadi helpers. Such guidelines were required to be followed to conduct the selection process initiated by the said advertisement. Qualification of Anganwadi workers through direct recruitment was laid down in sub-clause (b) of clause 7, providing for academic qualification. Sub-clause (b) is quoted below: “Minimum Madhyamik/School Final/High Madrasah Examination passed or equivalent examination passed from any recognized Board. Candidates belonging to scheduled castes/schedules (sic scheduled) tribes will be eligible for selection to the post of Anganwadi Workers with a minimum qualification of Class VIII pass. I. All candidates will have to give a declaration regarding her maximum academic qualification. II. Candidates who are graduates will not be eligible for a post of Anganwadi Worker. If a graduate candidate suppresses her academic qualification and if selected to a post of Anganwadi Worker her services will be terminated forthwith without assigning any reason. III. A women candidate may apply for a post of Anganwadi Worker if the result of the final degree examination has not been published before the date of issuing of the notice inviting applications.” 4. A writ petition, being W.P. No. 10192(W) of 2013 [Smt. Kaberi (Dutta) Santra & ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.], was instituted by five candidates. Four of them are private respondents in these three writ petitions. They were unsuccessful in their aspiration of being appointed as Anganwadi workers pursuant to the said advertisement. They complained that the present set of petitioners, who were respondents in such writ petition, had obtained employment as Anganwadi workers by practicing fraud. Despite being graduates, they suppressed such educational qualifications and had declared in their respective applications that they were non-graduates. They were unsuccessful in their aspiration of being appointed as Anganwadi workers pursuant to the said advertisement. They complained that the present set of petitioners, who were respondents in such writ petition, had obtained employment as Anganwadi workers by practicing fraud. Despite being graduates, they suppressed such educational qualifications and had declared in their respective applications that they were non-graduates. The private respondents from time to time had approached the CDPO with a request to cancel the appointments of the petitioners but despite notices having been issued calling upon them to show-cause why their employment should not be terminated, no fruitful action had been taken. It is in such circumstances that orders were prayed for to cancel or rescind the panel published for recruitment of Anganwadi workers, to terminate the services of the appointees who had obtained employment by fraud, to recast the panel with eligible candidates and to appoint the most suitable candidates therefrom. 5. W.P. 10192(W) of 2013 was disposed of on contest by this Bench by judgment and order dated November 21, 2014. The objection raised by the petitioners to the maintainability of the writ petition was overruled and ultimately this Bench proceeded to hold as follows: “46. When an appointment is sought to be made on a non-civil post or a non-statutory post by the State and the incumbents on such posts are to be paid salary/honorarium from the public exchequer, it is for the State to ensure that no candidate steals a march over another candidate by fraud or misrepresentation or the like. Decisions are galore that a fraudulent act cannot be condoned. Here, it was made known to the world at large with the issuance of the advertisement dated July 14, 2006 that appointment on the post of anganwadi workers would be made from amongst lady candidates between 18 and 45 years of age, who are residents of a particular area and are undergraduates. The private respondents despite being ineligible having regard to the laid down qualifications for the post allegedly took a chance of selection, acting unscrupulously. There might have been other ladies, who are graduates, who scrupulously followed the advertisement and did not apply. The private respondents despite being ineligible having regard to the laid down qualifications for the post allegedly took a chance of selection, acting unscrupulously. There might have been other ladies, who are graduates, who scrupulously followed the advertisement and did not apply. If only it were known to such graduates that irrespective of whatever qualification was advertised applications from graduates would be entertained and they would be considered for selection, can the possibility of they not having applied showing respect to the advertisement be ruled out? The answer cannot but be in the negative. It is alleged that on the one hand the private respondents misrepresented to the authorities that they were not graduates and on the other hand created a situation which led to the official respondents to appoint them. If the private respondents have indeed suppressed their actual educational qualifications, does the selection process not suffer from a gross illegality leading to likely commission of a fraud on the public? The answer has to be in the affirmative. There is another way of looking at the problem. The appointments were to be made from amongst undergraduates. The petitioners are all undergraduates, whereas the private respondents are graduates. None can dispute that in the present system, a graduate is considered to be more knowledgeable than a candidate who is ‘Higher Secondary’ passed. It would not be unreasonable to presume that questions might have been set for testing the relative merits of the aspirants keeping in mind that the same are to be answered by ‘Higher Secondary’ passed candidates, and that such questions could be answered better by graduates. At the onset of the process of selection, there was no level playing field inasmuch as the private respondents by misrepresentation of their educational qualifications (if at all) might have been able to secure entry in the selection process to compete with ‘Higher Secondary’ passed candidates and derived undue benefit by not having to compete with fellow graduates. To my mind, this is such a type of conduct that does not deserve kindness, generosity or empathy. 47. Suppression may be resorted to for deceiving a person and a deceit succeeding would amount to fraud. It is settled law that fraud unravels everything, and a fraudulent activity ought not to be validated by stamp of approval from the Court of Writ. 47. Suppression may be resorted to for deceiving a person and a deceit succeeding would amount to fraud. It is settled law that fraud unravels everything, and a fraudulent activity ought not to be validated by stamp of approval from the Court of Writ. Discretion vested in the Court has to be exercised judiciously and not to come to the aid of a party who took a chance of selection despite being over qualified, participated in the process with ‘Higher Secondary’ passed candidates who are intellectually inferior, did not have to compete with equally or more qualified candidates who did not offer their candidature abiding by the terms of the guidelines, and obtained employment through the back door. 48. The Supreme Court in Jainendra Singh (supra) considered, as observed earlier, 13 (thirteen) previous decisions of the Supreme Court. The principles laid down in paragraph 29 of the decision are cardinal without doubt, which ought to be borne in mind by every Court before granting any relief to any candidate who secures appointment by fraud, misrepresentation or the like. Although the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 31 that certain co-ordinate Benches have taken different views, I do not perceive those decisions as laying down law for being treated as a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution. Perusal of the said decisions drives me to hold that the same contain directions issued by the Supreme Court in the exercise of power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution. Viewed in the light of the cardinal principles laid down in paragraph 29 and its several sub-paragraphs, there can be no dispute that selection that is conceived in deceit cannot be saved by equitable considerations. Public interest would suffer if the private respondents, despite the facts that have surfaced, are left unscathed. I, therefore, hold that if any of or all the private respondents has/have secured appointments as anganwadi workers despite being graduates by giving wrong declaration about her/their educational qualifications in the applications made pursuant to the advertisement dated July 14, 2006, and she/they having agreed to have her/their applications cancelled upon subsequent detection of any incorrect/wrong information given therein, it is well within the right of the petitioners to urge the official respondents to proceed against her/them in accordance with law, notwithstanding the lapse of time, for promoting justice and setting things right. 49. 49. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the view that interest of justice would be best served if the writ petition is disposed of with the following directions. The time for the private respondents to respond to the notices dated April 7, 2011 and February 5, 2013 is extended by a month from date. Upon receipt of information that might be provided by the private respondents or if no information is received within the aforesaid period, the CDPO shall proceed to conclude the enquiry in accordance with law. Follow-up orders shall be passed by him as early as possible thereafter but positively by the year end. The petitioners shall be informed of the final result within the aforesaid time frame. 50. Needless to observe, observations made in this judgment are for the purpose of a decision on the writ petition and the private respondents are left free to raise appropriate defence in answer to the show cause notices, whereupon the CDPO or the competent authority shall give decision considering the merits of the defence that is raised.” 6. The judgment and order dated November 21, 2014 not having been challenged in appeal, attained finality. 7. The process of enquiry, though protracted unnecessarily, was carried forward and concluded in terms of the said judgment and order. Finally vide letter dated February 16, 2016, the CDPO cancelled the appointment of the petitioners and discharged them from the posts of Anganwadi workers ‘for giving false declaration about higher qualification with effect from 01.04 2016.’ The orders terminating the petitioners’ services are the subject matter of challenge in these writ petitions. 8. Each of the petitioners has pleaded in her writ petition that by letter dated April 27, 2015, addressed to the Joint Secretary of the relevant department, the CDPO had requested for sympathetic consideration of the petitioners’ cases on the ground of they being subjected to distress, if they were discharged after such a long period of service. It has further been pleaded that the CDPO by his letter dated November 30, 2015 apprised the relevant department, with copy to the petitioners, that no response to his letter dated April 27, 2015 having been received, and bearing in mind the fact that ‘in several cases terminated A.W. Workers and Helpers had been reinstated by the State Govt. It has further been pleaded that the CDPO by his letter dated November 30, 2015 apprised the relevant department, with copy to the petitioners, that no response to his letter dated April 27, 2015 having been received, and bearing in mind the fact that ‘in several cases terminated A.W. Workers and Helpers had been reinstated by the State Govt. as per direction of the Hon’ble High Court’, the petitioners were allowed to continue as Anganwadi workers till any directive is received from the Government in this behalf. The petitioners have also pleaded that the Joint Secretary of the relevant department vide his letter dated February 23, 2016 informed the CDPO of acceptance of his proposal for continuance of the services of the petitioners under Budge Budge – 1, ICDS Project and that the relevant department had no objection if such Anganwadi workers were allowed to continue their services. 9. The petitioners complain that despite the Government having no objection to continuation of their services as Anganwadi workers, the impugned orders of termination have been issued by the CDPO under threat of contempt of Court and the CDPO despite his earlier willingness to continue with the petitioners, has been forced by circumstances beyond his control to oust the petitioners. 10. The writ petitions were moved on March 29, 2016, i.e. prior to the impugned termination orders becoming effective. A coordinate Bench by its order dated March 29, 2016 called upon the said Joint Secretary to explain the circumstances that prompted him to issue the letter dated February 23, 2016 to support candidates who had obtained appointments by fraudulent means to continue in office despite a judgment and order of this Court, by way of an affidavit within March 31, 2016. It was also observed that if ‘a suitable explanation is not forthcoming, an adverse inference may be drawn against the official since, at this stage, it does not appear that other than political considerations or other extraneous considerations, any reasonable official could have issued the instructions contained in the letter dated February 23, 2016’. 11. The concerned Joint Secretary filed an affidavit on March 31, 2016. 11. The concerned Joint Secretary filed an affidavit on March 31, 2016. Paragraph 2(d) of the said affidavit is as follows: “I humbly state and submit that no mandatory order for cancellation of the appointment of Anganwadi Worker was passed by the order dated on 21.11.2014 and therefore on humanitarian ground only the communication dated 23.02.2016 was passed by me. There is no other reason behind it and no other consideration and or malafide intention was. I humbly pray that such action may not be considered by the Hon’ble Court as malicious and or malafide action.” 12. During the pendency of the writ petitions, the said Joint Secretary appears to have issued letter dated April 27, 2016 revoking the earlier letter dated February 23, 2016. It was recorded therein that the earlier letter dated February 23, 2016 was issued inadvertently and accordingly, stands revoked and cancelled. 13. The petitioners in W.P. 10192(W) of 2013 (some of the private respondents herein) had filed an application for contempt dated August 7, 2015 being CPAN 1444 of 2015. It was first listed on January 29, 2016 before this Bench. The order passed on that date reads as follows: “Mr. Ali, learned advocate representing the alleged contemnor/respondent has placed before this Bench an order dated October 30, 2015 passed by the alleged contemnor/respondent, being the present incumbent on the post of Child Development Project Officer, Budge Budge-1, ICDS Project. On perusal of the said order, this Court is prima facie satisfied that the alleged contemnor/respondent is in contempt. Let there be a rule as prayed for returnable on 18th March, 2016. Let the rule be served on the alleged contemnor/respondent within a week from date by special messenger, costs wherefor shall be put in by the petitioner by next Monday. Service of a further copy of the contempt application on the contemnor/respondent is, however, dispensed with. Let the contemnor/respondent respond to the rule by 4th March, 2016; reply thereto, if any, shall be filed by 14th March, 2016. Put up the rule for further consideration on the returnable date at the top of the list.” 14. On the returnable date, the alleged contemnor/respondent remaining personally present in Court filed an affidavit pleading compliance of the order dated November 21, 2014 passed in W.P. 10192(W) of 2013. Put up the rule for further consideration on the returnable date at the top of the list.” 14. On the returnable date, the alleged contemnor/respondent remaining personally present in Court filed an affidavit pleading compliance of the order dated November 21, 2014 passed in W.P. 10192(W) of 2013. The order also recorded the unconditional apology tendered by the contemnor/respondent for having issued letter dated October 30, 2015 based on a misunderstanding of the judgment and order dated November 21, 2014. Considering the pleading in the affidavit that discharge notices had been dispatched to the concerned Anganwadi workers seeking to terminate their services with effect from April 1, 2016, hearing of the contempt rule was adjourned till April 22, 2016. On April 22, 2016, it was recorded that the alleged contemnor/respondent had complied with the judgment and order dated November 21, 2014. However, the Joint Secretary having been found to overreach the Court by issuing letter dated February 23, 2016, a suo motu rule for contempt was proposed to be issued. Learned advocate representing the alleged contemnor/respondent having prayed for time to obtain instructions from the Joint Secretary regarding the circumstances that prompted him to issue such letter, hearing was adjourned till May 13, 2016. Ultimately, the rule having appeared on May 13, 2016, the letter dated April 27, 2016 of the said Joint Secretary was produced in Court and it was directed to be retained with the records. It was recorded that ‘the letter dated April 27, 2016 reveals that the Joint Secretary had inadvertently issued Memo No. 868-SW/2M-81/15 dated February 23, 2016 and that the same is being revoked and cancelled with immediate effect and is to be treated as null and void’. The contempt rule, accordingly, stood disposed of. 15. Soon thereafter, the coordinate Bench recorded an order on May 16, 2016 on these writ petitions to the following effect: “Considerable opportunity has been afforded to the State for its submission to be made in support of an indefensible act of the State. Since a further adjournment is sought on behalf of the State in addition to the several adjournments that have been obtained earlier, the petition and the connected matters are directed to appear on May 17, 2016 when the matters are proposed to be disposed of, irrespective of the State’s convenience.” 16. Since a further adjournment is sought on behalf of the State in addition to the several adjournments that have been obtained earlier, the petition and the connected matters are directed to appear on May 17, 2016 when the matters are proposed to be disposed of, irrespective of the State’s convenience.” 16. In the backdrop of the aforesaid circumstances, the writ petitions were listed before this Bench for consideration (upon change in determination) and heard on several dates commencing from July 25, 2016. 17. A submission had been made on July 25, 2016 before this Bench by Mr. Abhrotosh Majumder, learned Government Pleader that the Government had explored the possibility of appointing the petitioners in W.P. 10192(W) of 2013 while not disturbing the services of the present petitioners. However, it was found that the petitioners in W.P. 10192(W) of 2013 were not eligible to be empanelled on merits and, therefore, cannot be considered for appointment. He, accordingly, wished that the Bench decides the writ petitions on merit. 18. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned advocate representing the petitioners contended that the facts and circumstances would clearly reveal the inclination of the CDPO to retain the services of the petitioners on humanitarian ground, having regard to the fact that they had put in nearly eight years of service. The Joint Secretary of the relevant department had also initially informed the CDPO of the Government’s willingness to abide by such arrangement. It is only because of the contempt rule that was issued by this Bench on CPAN 1444 of 2015 that the CDPO, being the alleged contemnor/respondent, turned around and under the threat of contempt proceeded to discharge the petitioners from service. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1996) 6 SCC 291 [J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar], the Bench had no jurisdiction to issue the rule for contempt since it was not open to the Bench to examine the correctness of the contents of the letter of the CDPO dated October 30, 2015 in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. 19. That the orders of termination were the direct consequence of the rule for contempt was sought to be demonstrated by referring to the impugned letter dated February 16, 2016 wherein it was mentioned as follows: “The undersigned initiated two letters vide Memo. No. …. dated 27.4.15 and Memo. No. …. 19. That the orders of termination were the direct consequence of the rule for contempt was sought to be demonstrated by referring to the impugned letter dated February 16, 2016 wherein it was mentioned as follows: “The undersigned initiated two letters vide Memo. No. …. dated 27.4.15 and Memo. No. …. dated 30.10.15 which was placed before the Hon’ble Court on 29.1.2016. But the Hon’ble Court turned down the appeal of their continuation as A.W. Worker and issued contempt order.” It was urged that the rule could not have been issued at all by this Bench on January 29, 2016. 20. Initiation of the contempt rule being the root cause for ultimate termination of the petitioners’ services, Mr. Bhattacharya prayed for an order as claimed vide prayer clauses ‘a’ and ‘b’ of the writ petitions. 21. It was also contended by Mr. Bhattacharya that the orders of termination having been passed without hearing the petitioners prior to the orders dated February 16, 2016 coming into existence, the same were issued in clear violation of the principles of natural justice and hence ought to be set aside. 22. This Bench has not considered it necessary to call upon the learned advocates representing the State and the private respondents to answer the contentions of Mr. Bhattacharya. However, the orders passed by this Bench in CPAN 1444 of 2015, on which W.P.C.R.C. 37(W) of 2016 was issued, have been perused in view of the contentions raised by Mr. Bhattacharya. 23. By the judgment and order dated November 21, 2014, the CDPO was required to conclude the enquiry in accordance with law and to pass follow-up orders positively by the year end, i.e. end of 2014. He was also under an obligation to inform the final result of the enquiry within the aforesaid time frame to the petitioners in W.P. 10192(W) of 2013. On January 29, 2016, the learned advocate representing the CDPO, the alleged contemnor/respondent, had placed a letter dated October 30, 2015 before the Bench, and not the letter dated April 27, 2015, revealing that the enquiry was yet to be completed. Since the order of this Bench dated November 21, 2014 requiring completion of enquiry by the end of that year prima facie seemed not to have been adhered to, the Bench proceeded to issue the rule. Since the order of this Bench dated November 21, 2014 requiring completion of enquiry by the end of that year prima facie seemed not to have been adhered to, the Bench proceeded to issue the rule. The rules framed by this High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act empower a Judge to issue a rule of contempt on the first date of consideration of a contempt application subject to the Judge being satisfied, prima facie, that contempt has been committed. Mere issuance of a rule does not amount to a decision given in the exercise of contempt jurisdiction that the alleged contemnor/respondent is guilty of deliberate violation of an order passed by the Court and, therefore, liable to be punished. If indeed circumstances had revealed that the alleged contemnor/respondent took all possible steps to complete the enquiry and the Bench was satisfied that the enquiry that was ordered had been completed by the year end, suggesting that there had been no wilful and deliberate violation of the order dated November 21, 2014, the occasion for issuance of the rule may not have arisen. Issuance of a rule, even if the same had played any part in forcing the alleged contemnor/respondent to issue the orders terminating the services of the petitioners, was the byproduct of a judicial process that was initiated to uphold the prestige, majesty and dignity of this Court. If as a consequence thereof the petitioners lost their jobs, such event may be unfortunate but not illegal. The decision in J.S. Parihar (supra) has no application on facts and in the circumstances and is clearly distinguishable. 24. Be that as it may, the attending facts and circumstances do suggest over zealousness on the part of the CDPO to protect the petitioners despite they having obtained public employment by practicing fraud. It could either be out of fear for deliberately acting in violation of the Court’s order, or wisdom having dawned on him late realizing that the petitioners had admitted suppression of their actual educational qualifications and the fraud needs to be undone, that he has now issued the termination orders. Any action taken to undo a fraud by a person in a position to do so should always be welcomed. This Bench therefore finds no reason to accept the first contention raised by Mr. Bhattacharya. 25. Insofar as the second contention of Mr. Any action taken to undo a fraud by a person in a position to do so should always be welcomed. This Bench therefore finds no reason to accept the first contention raised by Mr. Bhattacharya. 25. Insofar as the second contention of Mr. Bhattacharya is concerned, it appears from the letter dated April 27, 2015 of the CDPO that the petitioners themselves admitted their guilt of suppression of actual educational qualifications. Admission made by a party without being under any duress or coercion can be acted upon. Rules of natural justice are required to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without there being any possibility of a change in decision on merits, is settled law [see: (2004) 4 SCC 281 : Escort Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division]. The petitioners were called upon by the CDPO in terms of the order dated November 21, 2014 to place their version. Such version was considered. Thus, on facts, a hearing would not have made any difference in the ultimate result or materially altered the situation. That a candidate having obtained appointment by practicing fraud (suppression of educational qualification) is not entitled to equitable considerations has been held in subsequent decisions of this Court, post the judgment and order dated November 21, 2014, reported in 2015 (5) CHN (CAL) 138 (State of West Bengal v. Chaitali Das), 2015 (2) CHN (CAL) 303 (Kakon Dutta v. State of West Bengal). 26. The petitioners are, therefore, not entitled to any relief either in law or in equity. The impugned orders of termination are upheld. 27. The writ petitions stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 28. Photocopy of this judgment and order duly counter-signed by the Assistant Court Officer shall be retained with the records of W.P. 5553(W) of 2016 and W.P. 5551(W) of 2016. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.