ORDER : Vivek Rusia, J. Petitioner has filed the present petition being aggrieved by the order dated 08.01.2016 by which the application under sections 65 & 66 of the Indian Evidence Act was rejected. 2. Petitioner/plaintiff being the real sister of respondent No.1 filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of plot bearing survey No.213/2, Gram Panchayat, Jetpura, district Dhar. The suit was filed on the ground that the suit property was allotted by the Gram Panchayat, Jetpura to petitioner's mother Smt. Ramkunvarbai and she has constructed a house thereon and later on the same was bequeathed to the petitioner by way of Will. 3. Respondents/defendants filed written statement and stated that the plot in question was in fact allotted to him by the Gram Panchayat, therefore, mother had no right to execute the Will in favour of the plaintiff. 4. During the course of evidence plaintiff filed an application under section 65 & 66 of the Indian Evidence Act seeking permission of the trial Court to lead secondary evidence in respect of lease deed in favour of her mother on the ground that the original record in respect of lease is not traceable in the office of the Gram Panchayat. The said application was opposed by the defendants. Learned trial Judge vide order dated 08.01.2016 has rejected the application, hence the present petition. Learned Civil Judge has rejected the application on the ground that neither it was certified copy of the original nor prepared mechanically from the original. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. That the petitioner/plaintiff has not filed the application for taking the document on record but specifically filed an application under section 65 of the Evidence Act that the photocopy be admitted in evidence as secondary evidence, therefore, learned trial Court has considered the said application under the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. This Court in the case of Rashid Khan s/o Yasin Khan Musalman and another reported in 2011(3) MPLJ 575 has specifically considered in detail whether the photocopy can be accepted as secondary evidence. In another case of Smt. Aneeta Rajpoot v. Smt. Saraswati Gupta passed in W.P.No.11990/2012 decided on 16.08.2012 High Court has considered the scope of section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act in detail and held that the photocopy is not admissible as secondary evidence. In another case of Smt. Aneeta Rajpoot v. Smt. Saraswati Gupta passed in W.P.No.11990/2012 decided on 16.08.2012 High Court has considered the scope of section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act in detail and held that the photocopy is not admissible as secondary evidence. Para - 11, 12, 13 7 14 of the said judgment is reproduced below: 11. Learned counsel for petitioner/defendant rightly submitted that secondary evidence would include categories mentioned in Clauses (1) to (5) to Section 63. Learned counsel further rightly submitted that if conditions embodied in Section 65(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act exist, secondary evidence relating to document can be given. In support of (6) W.P. No.11990/2012 his forceful submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on two decisions of Supreme Court Nawab Singh (supra) and Smt. J. Yashoda (supra) and also of learned Single Bench of Rajasthan High Court Smt. Ratan Sharma (supra). But, to me, even then in the facts and circumstances of the present case the photocopy of the document of receipt cannot be admitted in secondary evidence. On bare perusal of the application under Section 65 of the Evidence Act which has been rejected by the impugned order it is found that although it has been mentioned that under the false pretext the plaintiff and her husband obtained the original receipt from petitioner/defendant, but, nowhere it has been so stated in the application that the photocopy was made from the original and it was compared with original. The name of the person, who had obtained the photocopy by mechanical process has also not been mentioned in the application and further who compared the same with original his name is also not mentioned nor any affidavit in that regard has been filed. 12. So far as the applicability of Clause (2) of Section 63 Evidence Act placed reliance by the learned counsel for petitioner is concerned, according to me, it can be said that by some mechanical process a photocopy of original receipt was obtained, but, there cannot be any surety of its correctness and accuracy in absence of supporting material on record. Again in this regard there is no averment in the application that the photocopy which has been obtained by mechanical (7) W.P. No.11990/2012 process was never tempered and it ensures its accuracy. Again in this regard there is no averment in the application that the photocopy which has been obtained by mechanical (7) W.P. No.11990/2012 process was never tempered and it ensures its accuracy. Even if accurate photocopy is obtained by a mechanical process, it is a matter of common parlance that after inserting some words on a document which is already a photocopy and by interpolating the same, another photocopy of the said interpolated photocopy may be obtained and thus the accuracy of photocopy is always surrounded by dark clouds of doubt. In the present case since there is no averment in the application under Section 65 that photocopy was compared with the original and it is an accurate photocopy of the original and further by not filing any affidavit of person who obtained the said photocopy is on record, it is difficult to hold the hallmark and authenticity and accuracy of the photocopy. 13. The decision of Nawab Singh (supra) placed reliance by the learned counsel for petitioner is not subject to context since it does not relate to admissibility of a photocopy of the document to be admitted in secondary evidence. Similarly another decision of Smt. J. Yashoda (supra) is also not applicable because the photocopy was not compared with the original and therefore photocopy was not admitted as secondary evidence in that case (see para 7 of the said decision). According to me, not only the satisfaction of Clause (a) to Section 65 is required, but simultaneously it is also required that the photocopy was compared with the original in terms of section 63(3) of the Evidence Act. 14. The Supreme Court in United India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Anbari and other (8) W.P. No.11990/2012, 2000(10) SCC 523 while dealing with the photocopy of licence of a driver expressed the view as under :- 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the point regarding validity of the driver's licence was raised by the appellant before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the Tribunal in accepting photocopy of a document purporting to be the driver's licence and recording a finding that the driver had a valid licence, has committed a grave error of law. He also submitted that the High Court has not dealt with the said contentions of the appellant and without giving any reason has dismissed the appeal. He also submitted that the High Court has not dealt with the said contentions of the appellant and without giving any reason has dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal and also the High Court have failed to appreciate that production of a photocopy was not sufficient to prove that the driver had a valid licence when the fact was challenged by the appellant and genuineness of the photocopy was not admitted by it. Thus, the Apex Court has held that photocopy was not sufficient to prove that driver had a valid licence. By following the aforesaid decision of Supreme Court, Shri Justice Dipak Misra, J. (as His Lordship then was) in Haji Mohd. Islam and another v. Asgar Ali and Another AIR 2007 MP 157 has held that when a photocopy without any reasonable source has been filed, it is not permissible as secondary evidence. Yet there is another decision of this Court in W.P. No.8224/2010 (Sunil Kumar Sahu v. Smt. Awadharani) decided on 31.08.2010 wherein it has been held that photocopy of a document is not admissible as secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. 7. In the case of Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti and others reported in AIR 1990 SC 396 the Apex Court has held that ordinary copy of the sale deed cannot be considered as secondary evidence. Para-25 of the said judgment is reproduced below: 25. The High Court said, and in our opinion very rightly that Ex.3 could not be regarded as secondary evidence. Section 63 of the Evidence Act mentions five kinds of secondary evidence. Clauses (1),(2) and (3) refer to copies of documents, clause (4) refers to counter parts of documents and clause (5) refers to oral accounts of the contents of documents. Correctness of certified copies referred to in clause (1) is presumed under Section 79, but that of other copies must be proved by proper evidence. A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. But in the present case Ex.3 is not a certified copy. It is just an ordinary copy. There is also no evidence regarding contents of the original sale deed. Ex.3 cannot, therefore, be considered as secondary evidence. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence. 8. But in the present case Ex.3 is not a certified copy. It is just an ordinary copy. There is also no evidence regarding contents of the original sale deed. Ex.3 cannot, therefore, be considered as secondary evidence. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence. 8. In the case of Smt. J. Yashoda v. Smt. K. Shobha Rani reported in AIR 2007 SC 1721 the Apex Court has held in para-7, 8 & 9 as under: 7. Secondary evidence, as a general rule is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence. If the original itself is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party, who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents. 8. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which may be given in the absence of that better evidence which law requires to be given first, when a proper explanation of its absence is given. The definition in Section 63 is exhaustive as the Section declares that secondary evidence "means and includes" and then follow the five kinds of secondary evidence. 9. The rule which is the most universal, namely that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be produced, decides this objection that rule only means that, so long as the higher or superior evidence is within your possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no inferior proof in relation to it. Section 65 deals with the proof of the contents of the documents tendered in evidence. In order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. Under Section 64, documents are to be provided by primary evidence. Section 65, however permits secondary evidence to be given of the existence, condition or contents of documents under the circumstances mentioned. The conditions laid down in the said Section must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the Section. The conditions laid down in the said Section must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the Section. In Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal Dube and Another [ 1975(4) SCC 664 ], it was inter alia held as follows: "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court in this respect calls for no interference. According to clause (a) of Section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in Section 66 such person does not produce it. Clauses (b) to (g) of Section 65 specify some other contingencies wherein secondary evidence relating to a document may be given, but we are not concerned with those clauses as it is the common case of the parties that the present case is not covered by those clauses. In order to bring his case within the purview of clause (a) of Section 65, the appellant filed applications on July 4, 1973, before respondent No. 1 was examined as a witness, praying that the said respondent be ordered to produce the original manuscript of which, according to the appellant, he had filed Photostat copy. Prayer was also made by the appellant that in case respondent no. 1 denied that the said manuscript had been written by him, the photostat copy might be got examined from a handwriting expert. The appellant also filed affidavit in support of his applications. It was however, nowhere stated in the affidavit that the original document of which the Photostat copy had been filed by the appellant was in the possession of Respondent No. 1. There was also no other material on the record to indicate the original document was in the possession of respondent no.1. It was however, nowhere stated in the affidavit that the original document of which the Photostat copy had been filed by the appellant was in the possession of Respondent No. 1. There was also no other material on the record to indicate the original document was in the possession of respondent no.1. The appellant further failed to explain as to what were the circumstances under which the Photostat copy was prepared and who was in possession of the original document at the time its photograph was taken. Respondent No. 1 in his affidavit denied being in possession appeared to the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances, the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that no foundation had been laid by the appellant for leading secondary evidence in the shape of the Photostat copy. We find no infirmity in the above order of the High Court as might justify interference by this Court." 9. In the case of Ratanlal v. Kishanlal reported in 2012 (III) MPJR 24 this Court has held as under: 12. According to me the photocopy is neither a primary nor secondary evidence and in this regard decision of this Court Ramesh Verma and others etc. v. Smt.Lajesh Saxena and others etc. AIR 1998 M.P 46 may be seen. Apart from this even if it is stretched to the extent to bring the photocopy of will Ex.P/1 within the sphere of secondary evidence, the plaintiff was required to satisfy the ingredients to Section 65 of the Evidence Act which speaks about the secondary evidence. The plaintiff was further required to examine the person who took out the photocopy of the original. This is very much essential because it is a matter of common knowledge that by putting another writing written on a separate paper if that paper is kept upon the original document and photocopy is taken out, the said photo copy cannot be said to be a true photocopy of the original document. 10. This is very much essential because it is a matter of common knowledge that by putting another writing written on a separate paper if that paper is kept upon the original document and photocopy is taken out, the said photo copy cannot be said to be a true photocopy of the original document. 10. Learned Civil Judge has come to the conclusion that photocopy is neither a primary evidence nor secondary because the party is required to prove when and where the photocopy was taken and it is the same and exact copy of the original, therefore, in view of the above law trial Court has not committed any error while rejecting the application under section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. 11. Even otherwise, the scope of Article 227 of Constitution of India in exercising jurisdiction is very limited in respect of interfering with the order of subordinate Court. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 , wherein it has held that: "The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. If order is shown to be passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, it suffers from manifest procedural impropriety or perversity, interference can be made. Interference is made to ensure that Courts below act within the bounds of their authority. Another view is possible, is not a ground for interference. Interference can be made sparingly for the said purpose and not for correcting error of facts and law in a routine manner." 12. In view of the aforesaid observations, I do not find any illegality or error committed by the trial Court. Accordingly, present writ petition is dismissed.