JUDGMENT : SANDEEP MEHTA, J. By way of the instant criminal writ petition, the petitioner complainants have approached this Court assailing failure of the respondent Anti Corruption Bureau in registering an FIR on the basis of a complaint submitted by the petitioners to the Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. 2. Facts in brief are that the petitioners herein, being the legal heirs of one Bage Khan, filed a complaint with the Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau against a Judicial Officer who was, at the relevant time, posted as the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pokaran. It was alleged in the complaint that Shri. Bage Khan owned khatedari land measuring 94 bighas 6 biswas in the Patwar Halka Badhewa, Tehsil Pokaran. A revenue dispute arose between the complainant party and accused persons, namely Kadar Khan and Ilamddin owing to the alleged fraudulent mutation of the said agricultural land which was entered in the names of the two persons named above. The complainant party filed a mutation appeal in the Court of District Collector, Jaisalmer against the alleged illegal mutation entries. The appeal was accepted by order dated 11.06.2002 and the two mutation entries made in the names of Kadar Khan and Ilamddin were cancelled and the Tehsildar, Pokaran was directed to make an inquiry and to rectify the error and enter the mutation of the disputed lands in the names of legal heirs of Bage Khan. 3. Kadar Khan and others challenged the order dated 11.06.2002 by filing two separate appeals in the Court of Additional Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur. Both the appeals were rejected and the order dated 11.06.2002 passed by the SDM was upheld. The two orders referred to above, were not challenged any further and became final. 4. An FIR No. 12/2001 was registered by Smt. Lakhmo W/o Baghe Khan (mother of the petitioners) against Kadar Khan and others in relation to the fraudulent mutation at Police Station Falsund for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC. Prolonged investigation was conducted and ultimately, on 26.05.2009, a charge-sheet was filed in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pokaran for the above offences against four accused namely Kadar Khan, Gafoor Khan, Makne Khan and Hadaram. The Judicial Officer concerned (against whom the present complaint was filed) was posted as ACJM, Pokaran at that time. Prolonged investigation was conducted and ultimately, on 26.05.2009, a charge-sheet was filed in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pokaran for the above offences against four accused namely Kadar Khan, Gafoor Khan, Makne Khan and Hadaram. The Judicial Officer concerned (against whom the present complaint was filed) was posted as ACJM, Pokaran at that time. The complainants, attributing oblique motives to the Judicial Officer, alleged that despite knowing that the parties were having a bitter dispute amongst themselves, the Judicial Officer, acted in hot haste and completed the trial within a short period of four months without summoning the material witnesses. The accused were acquitted by judgment dated 22.09.2009. The case had been registered as a State case and by the time, charge-sheet came to be filed, Smt. Lakhmo, the original complainant passed away. Thus, the petitioners were not aware of the judgment of acquittal and could not challenge it. It was further alleged that within a matter of two months from the date of recording of acquittal of the accused, the arraigned Judicial Officer, himself purchased the property despite the knowledge that the fraudulent mutation entries of the disputed land made in the name of Kadar Khan and others had been cancelled long back. In order to avoid exposing himself in the fraudulent scheme, the Judicial Officer dishonestly got the registered sale-deeds of the property executed in the names of his sisters-in-law Smt. Kalawati wife of Lalit Kumar and Smt. Sarla Devi wife of Loonkaran Singhal, residents of Gunga, Tehsil Shiv, District Barmer, who are having no independent sources of income. The complainant party thus alleged that the land was as a matter of fact, purchased and acquired by the Judicial Officer for himself in a Benami fashion by keeping the two ladies in front. It was further alleged in the complaint that the Judicial Officer, totally bypassed the principles of fairness and judicious approach while acquitting the accused. The acquittal was recorded by striking a barter deal that the accused, would be acquitted and in lieu thereof, the property would be transferred to the relatives of the Judicial Officer. For the purpose of hiding the fraudulent transaction, no attempt was made to get the property mutated in the name of the purchasers despite the registration having been carried out way back in the year 2009. For the purpose of hiding the fraudulent transaction, no attempt was made to get the property mutated in the name of the purchasers despite the registration having been carried out way back in the year 2009. The complainants further alleged that they came to know of the entire fraudulent transaction in the year 2015 when the matter was under consideration before the Revenue Appellate Authority. It was further alleged that before filing the complaint, a notice for demand of justice was also forwarded to the High Court. It was also alleged that the Judicial Officer, whilst being posted at various places in Rajasthan, acquired massive properties disproportionate to his known sources of income. Even before being inducted in service, the conduct of the Judicial Officer was shady inasmuch as, a criminal case for the offences under Sections 8/21 and 8/22 of the NDPS Act had been registered against him for which a charge-sheet was also filed. Another criminal case involving the offences under Section 147, 323, and 451 of the IPC was pending against the Judicial Officer at the time of his induction in Judicial services. The arraigned officer got inducted in Judicial Services by making concealment of these facts. The complainants further alleged that despite information in form of the notice for demand of justice being given to the Registrar General, Rajasthan High Court against the corrupt and tainted Judicial Officer, no action was forthcoming and the High Court Administration was also trying to protect him. The Anti Corruption Bureau officials also did not take lawful action upon the complaint submitted by the petitioners. Upon this, the petitioners complainants have approached this Court by way of the instant criminal writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. The matter came up for consideration on 10.03.2016 on which date, the learned Public Prosecutor was directed to inquire from the concerned officer of the Anti Corruption Bureau as to the action, if any, taken upon the complaint filed by the petitioners herein. In response to the query made by the Court, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted on record, a letter dated 10.03.2016 of the Additional Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur as per which, the complaint received from the complainants was forwarded to the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur by letter dated 29.10.2015. In response to the query made by the Court, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted on record, a letter dated 10.03.2016 of the Additional Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur as per which, the complaint received from the complainants was forwarded to the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur by letter dated 29.10.2015. Upon this, the Registry was directed to apprise the Court regarding further steps if any, taken pursuant to the complaint of the petitioners forwarded by the ACB to the Registrar General, Rajasthan High Court. The requisite information was supplied to this Court in an envelope marked as “Confidential”. The envelope was opened and the letter contained therein was perused. On going through the letter, it is evident that complaint of the petitioners as forwarded by the Anti Corruption Bureau to the Registrar General was considered by Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice and a decision taken thereupon that the same be filed. Thus, it has to be assumed that Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice, after examining the complaint of the complainants, has decided that no action is warranted thereupon against the Judicial Officer, on the administrative side. 6. Shri. Moti Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners complainants, vehemently contended that ex-facie the allegations levelled in the complaint disclose the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences. The complainants have set up a case involving grave and serious allegations of misconduct and corruption against the Judicial Officer and as such, it was the bounden duty of the Anti Corruption Bureau officials to have registered the FIR and investigated the matter fairly. He urged that the provisions of Judicial Officers Protection Act and the Judges Protection Act do not have any application to the situation at hand because once, there is an allegation of corruption against a Judicial Officer, the provisions of these statutes cannot be applied to rescue and shield such corrupt officer. He has filed detailed written submissions in support of his oral contentions wherein, basically the allegations levelled in the complaint are reiterated. It is stated in the written submissions that the sale-deeds of the disputed lands were executed in favour of Kalwati Devi and Sarla Devi without actual consideration being paid and were actually meant to procure illegal gratification in lieu of the acquittal of the accused in the criminal trial. It is stated in the written submissions that the sale-deeds of the disputed lands were executed in favour of Kalwati Devi and Sarla Devi without actual consideration being paid and were actually meant to procure illegal gratification in lieu of the acquittal of the accused in the criminal trial. Abuse of power, taint and misconduct are attributed to the Judicial Officer in passing the judgment of acquittal. It is also alleged that the Judicial Officer acted in hot haste and decided the case in an extremely short period of four months from the filing of charge-sheet by overriding the principles of fair trial. It is further alleged that the Judicial Officer committed grave misconduct while exercising the powers of public office and obtained valuable property for himself without consideration from the accused who were facing trial in his own court. It has been mentioned at para No. 5 of the written submissions that the Registrar General has informed the Court that the complaint of the petitioners was received by Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice who has ordered the institution of a departmental inquiry through the Registrar (Vigilance). Various provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act are quoted in the written submissions. It has further been asserted that the Registrar General was obliged by law to return the complaint to the officials of Anti Corruption Bureau and not to withhold the same because he is not an investigating agency. It is further mentioned that Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides for a prior sanction before cognizance can be taken against public servants for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, but the said provision does not place any restriction upon the registration of an FIR and investigation against the public servant. It is vehemently asserted that the Anti Corruption Bureau was bound to register the FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. Reliance in support of the submissions is placed on the Constitutional Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 and Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary Reported in AIR 2014 SCW 329 . Reliance is also placed on the Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ravi Shankar Srivastava reported in RLW 2005 (3) Raj. Reliance is also placed on the Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ravi Shankar Srivastava reported in RLW 2005 (3) Raj. 1736 in support of the contention that the scope of The Judges Protection Act is not intended to prevent the initiation of a criminal inquiry against any person who is or was a Judge. It is further asserted in the written submissions that the provisions of The Judges Protection Act are not applicable in the case at hand because the acts of the “alleged Judicial Officer” are beyond the scope and ambit of Sections 2 and 3 of the Act. Reliance is also placed on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 2015 SCW 391 in support of the contention that the findings of the inquiry should be brought in the public domain so as to show fairness and transparency essential in the judicial system. 7. I have heard the arguments advanced by Shri. Moti Singh, learned counsel representing the petitioners and have gone through the complaint filed by the petitioners, the written submissions as well as the judgments cited at bar. 8. Upon a pertinent query being put during the course of the arguments, Shri. Moti Singh candidly conceded that the much criticized judgment of acquittal dated 22.9.2009 passed by the arraigned Judicial Officer, has attained finality as the same was not challenged before any forum. On going through the allegations leveled in the complaint, it is evident that the basic thrust of the complainants' is that the judgment of acquittal was bartered through a deal for transfer of the disputed land to the Judicial Officer. As noted above, the much berated judgment of acquittal was never challenged and thus has attained finality and therefore, no comments can be allowed to be made there against and that too at this belated stage. Much leverage is sought to be drawn from the circumstance that the judgment was delivered in hot haste. Suffice it to say that expediency in disposal of the criminal cases is call of the hour from all quarters in this country, where the judicial system is beleaguered with huge numbers of pending cases. Much leverage is sought to be drawn from the circumstance that the judgment was delivered in hot haste. Suffice it to say that expediency in disposal of the criminal cases is call of the hour from all quarters in this country, where the judicial system is beleaguered with huge numbers of pending cases. Thus, merely because the arraigned Judicial Officer, acted with expediency in the criminal case, that by itself cannot be a circumstance to attack his judgment. As a matter of fact, the endeavour of the complainants as well as their counsel to criticize the judgment on the ground that the Judicial Officer acted expediently is depreciable particularly considering the fact that the judgment was never challenged and has attained finality. 9. Nonetheless, I have minutely scrutinized the judgment of acquittal dated 22.02.2009 rendered by the Judicial Officer in Criminal Case No. 260/2009 (State v. Kadar Khan). The criminal case was founded on the allegation that the accused managed to get the mutation of the disputed property in their favour by adopting fraudulent means. Suffice it to say that the law is well settled that a mutation entry does not confer any proprietary rights whatsoever. A mutation is merely an entry made for collecting revenue and nothing beyond that. It was noticed in the judgment of acquittal that the complainant Lakhmo passed away before the trial commenced and thus could not be examined in evidence. Mst. Nimo & Sayro, being the daughters of Smt. Lakhmo and Baghe Khan, were examined at the trial as PW-9 and PW-10 respectively. Both turned hostile and did not support the prosecution story. The trial Judge took note of the document. (Ex.D/2) executed by Lakhmo wherein it was recorded that Baghe Khan had kept the accused Kadar Khan with him. A will (Ex.D/5) was also exhibited wherein, Kadar Khan was portrayed to be the adopted son of Bage Khan. The disputed mutation entries were made on the basis of the above will executed by Bage Khan. The Panchayat acted on the adoption deed and passed the mutation in favour of Kadar Khan. The mutation was entered way back in the year 1978. The document (Ex.D/2) bears the thumb impression of Lakhmo, the mother of the present petitioners. The said document was subjected to FSL examination and was found to be genuine. The Panchayat acted on the adoption deed and passed the mutation in favour of Kadar Khan. The mutation was entered way back in the year 1978. The document (Ex.D/2) bears the thumb impression of Lakhmo, the mother of the present petitioners. The said document was subjected to FSL examination and was found to be genuine. In the document, Smt. Lakhmo acknowledged that her husband had no male issue and thus, he had kept Kadar Khan with himself and that she was executing a will in favour of Kadar Khan to the effect that her husband's property be transferred in Kadar Khan's favour after the death of Bage Khan. Thus, evidently, the trial court, was thoroughly justified in drawing its conclusions on the basis of oral as well as documentary evidence which reflected that Baghe Khan had adopted Kadar Khan. In this background, this Court is of the firm opinion that the judgment of acquittal dated 22.09.2009 recorded by the arraigned Judicial Officer is absolutely unquestionable on facts as well as law. 10. The complainants have further alleged that the judgment of acquittal was bartered and thereafter, the Judicial Officer procured the disputed property for himself. The property was sold to Ilamddin and Nizamuddin much before commencement of the criminal trial. It is the admitted case as per the complaint and the other documents available on record that the registered owners of the property namely Ilamddin and Nizamdeen, sold the property to Smt. Kalawati Devi and Smt. Sarla Devi respectively through registered sale deeds dated 17.11.2009. Neither Ilamddin nor Nizamdeen were arraigned as accused in the criminal case decided by the Judicial Officer. Thus, there is no foundation for the allegation that the acquittal was bartered in lieu of procuring the property fraudulently. There can be no quarrel with the prepositions of law as laid down in the judgments relied upon by the petitioners' counsel. In the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the principles required to be followed in the matter of registering an FIR where the information given to the officer-in-charge of a police station discloses the necessary ingredients of cognizable of-fences. In the case of Lalita Kumari (supra), the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the principles required to be followed in the matter of registering an FIR where the information given to the officer-in-charge of a police station discloses the necessary ingredients of cognizable of-fences. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in no unequivocal terms, laid down at para No. 6 of the judgment that “an overall reading of all the codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine-qua-non for recording a first information report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.” Thus, before proceeding with the matter, the officials of the Anti Corruption Bureau had to be satisfied that the complaint of the petitioners disclosed the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences and that it was permissible in law to register the FIR. As has been discussed above, ex-facie, the allegations leveled by the complainant in the complaint do not reveal the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences. The complaint is entirely aimed at establishing that the Judicial Officer, passed the judgment of acquittal for oblique motives and acquitted the accused so that, in exchange, he could lay hands on the disputed property for himself. Admittedly, the only controversy involved before the Judicial Officer in the criminal case was as to whether the mutation entries made in relation to the disputed property were fraudulent or not. It is undisputed that the lands had been transferred by Kadar Khan to Nizamdeen and Ilamddin long before the case was instituted in the court of Judicial Officer. Though the FIR was filed by Lakhmo against the said Nizamdeen and Ilamddin as well, the police did not file a charge-sheet against these persons. The sale deeds which are derided in the FIR were executed by the registered owners in favour of Kalawati Devi and Sarla Devi for valid consideration as narrated in the registered documents. In view of the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, the allegation that the property was acquired by the Judicial Officer in a Benami fashion for himself by keeping the ladies of the family as a front is per se unacceptable. It has to be presumed as per the provisions of the Act of 1988 that the ladies in whose favour the registered sale deeds were executed, purchased the property from their own sources and for themselves. It has to be presumed as per the provisions of the Act of 1988 that the ladies in whose favour the registered sale deeds were executed, purchased the property from their own sources and for themselves. The allegation leveled in the complaint that the ladies were not having any source of income is baseless and ex-facie appears to be obliquely motivated. The petitioners counsel gave strong challenge to the action of the Anti Corruption Bureau officials in not registering the FIR and forwarding it to the Registrar General, Rajasthan High Court and so also the inaction of the High Court pursuant to receiving the complaint from the Anti Corruption Bureau. The said argument is based on the ratio of the judgment rendered by a Single Bench of this Court in the case of Ravi Shankar Srivastava (supra). The officer sought to be prosecuted in Ravi Shankar Shrivastava's case was working as a Member of the Board of Revenue. A preliminary inquiry was made against the officer in relation to a source information and it was revealed that the officer had accepted gratification prior to deciding the case in favour of the complainant therein. The Single Bench of this Court went on to hold that sanction of the Government was not required for prosecution of the public servant concerned if the complaint is not in connection with the discharge of official duties. It was pertinently held that the prosecution of the public servant concerned was not proposed in relation to acts done by him in the discharge of his official duties. The situation in the case at hand is entirely different, inasmuch as, admittedly the berated judgment of acquittal was passed by the Judicial Officer while discharging his judicial functions. Thus, the judgment of Ravi Shankar Srivastava (supra) which was heavily relied upon by the petitioners' counsel is totally distinguishable and has no application to the case at hand because the factual scenario involved in the case at hand is entirely different. The judgment in the case of Ravi Shankar Srivastava (supra) was later on considered and distinguished by another Single Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Verma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2014 (2) RLW 1207. The judgment in the case of Ravi Shankar Srivastava (supra) was later on considered and distinguished by another Single Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Verma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2014 (2) RLW 1207. In the case of Ajay Kumar Pandey v. Unknown reported in AIR 1998 SC 3299 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court went to the extent of laying down that any threat of filing a complaint against the Judge in respect of judicial proceedings conducted by him in his Court amounts to an attempt to interfere in the due course of administration of justice. The contemnor in that case was the lawyer representing the party and was convicted and sentenced under the Contempt of Courts Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as below:- “16. At the outset, we wish to emphasise that this Court being the Supreme Court of the country, has not only the right to protect itself from being scandalized or denigrated but it also has the right, jurisdiction and the obligation to protect the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts in the country from being insulted, abused or in any other way denigrated. Any action on the part of a litigant-be he a lawyer appearing in person-which has the tendency to interfere with or obstruct the due course of justice has to be dealt with sternly and firmly to uphold the majesty of law. No one can be permitted to intimidate or terrorise judges by making scandalous unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the discharge of their judicial functions so as to secure orders which the ‘litigant ‘wants’. 17. The subordinate judiciary forms the very backbone of administration of justice. This Court would come down with a heavy hand for preventing the judges of the subordinate judiciary of the High Court from being subjected to scurrilous and indecent attacks, which scandalise or have the tendency to scandalise, or lower or have the tendency to lower the authority of any Court as also all such actions which interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the courts to enable them to discharge their judicial functions without fear. 18. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law and if the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the Courts has to be respected and protected at all costs. It is for this reason that the Courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those for contempt of Court who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine the authority of the courts and bring them in disrepute and disrespect thereby obstructing them from discharging their judicial duties without fear or favour. This power is exercised by the Courts not to vindicate the dignity and honour of any individual Judge who is personally attacked or scandalised but with a view to uphold the majesty of law and the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can be permitted which may shake the very foundation itself. 19. ‘Criminal Contempt’ is defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and reads: “2(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which- (i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.” The definition is self explanatory. Scandalising the Judges or the Courts tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrepute and is an affront to the majesty and dignity of law. Such acts constitute criminal contempt of Court. No one can be permitted to foul the fountain of justice. Scandalising the Judges or the Courts tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrepute and is an affront to the majesty and dignity of law. Such acts constitute criminal contempt of Court. No one can be permitted to foul the fountain of justice. If the authority of the Court is undermined or impeded by acts or publications, the fountain of justice would get sullied creating distrust and disbelief in the minds of the litigant public and the right thinking public at large. Indeed everybody is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness or legality of a judgment or sentence or an order of a Court. Objective criticism is permissible provided it is made with detachment in a dignified language and respectful tone. The liberty of expression cannot be treated as a licence to scan-dalise the Court and instead of criticising the judgment to criticise the judge who delivered it. 20. In Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406 : (1991) AIR SCW 2419), this Court opined: “The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the authority of Court. The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury, but, to protect that to vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. That the “publication” contemplated by Section 2(c) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (supra) includes pleadings affidavits etc. which are filed in the Court, is no longer in doubt. 21. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of UP., (1984) 3 SCC 405 AIR 1984 SC 1374 an advocate whose client had been convicted by the learned Judge of the Special Court at Dehradun, was required to appear before the learned Judge to make his submissions on the question of ‘sentence’ to be imposed on the accused upon his being found guilty of an offence Under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the Court. The learned advocate appeared in a shirt-and-trouser-outfit in disregard of the rule requiring him to appear only in Court attire when appearing in his professional capacity. The learned Judge asked him to appear in the prescribed formal attire for being heard in his professional capacity. The advocate apparently took exception and left the Court. Some other advocate appeared on behalf of the accused. The learned Judge of the Special Court imposed a sentence of 4 years' RI on the accused. So far as the Court of the learned Special Judge was concerned, as the judgment had been pronounced, nothing more remained to be done by that Court. The appellant, a senior advocate of long standing, however, made a written application before the learned Judge of the Special Court couched in scurrilous language making imputation mat the Judge was a “corrupt Judge” and adding that he was “contaminating the seat of justice”. A threat was held out that a complaint was being lodged to higher authorities that he was corrupt and did not deserve to be retained in service. The offending portion of the application inter alia read: “I am making a complaint against you to the highest authorities in the country, that you are corrupt and do not deserve to be retained in service. The earlier people like your are bundled out the better for us all. As for quantum of sentence, I will never bow down before you. You may award the maximum sentence. Anyway, you should feel ashamed of yourself that you are contaminating the seat of justice.” 22. On Rule being issued in suo motu contempt proceedings, the contemner was punished and sentenced under the Contempt of Courts Act. Before this Court, questioning his conviction and sentence, the contemner advocate filed an appeal and at the same time tendered his apology. Rejecting the apology, this Court observed: “We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a ‘licence’ to scandalize courts and commit contempt of Court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to persuade members of the Bar, who care for their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they are expected to pay such a price for it. And no sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter as per the dictates of his conscience on account of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted by an advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his wishes. If this situation were to be countenanced, advocates who can cow down the Judges, and make them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of character assassination and persecution, will be preferred by the litigants to the advocates who are mindful of professional ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum of courts” and such course cannot be permitted. (Emphasis ours) Again, in Re: Shri. Sanjiv Dutta, (1995) 3 JT (SC) 538; (1995 AIR SCW 2203), a three Judge Bench of this Court, while dealing with an affidavit filed by a public functionary causing aspersions on the Court, which (affidavit) had the tendency to malign the Court, while assailing the correctness of an order made in a writ petition filed in this Court, held the contemner guilty of criminal contempt of Court and observed (at p. 2208) of AIR SCW): “Abuses, attribution of motives, vituperative terrorism and defiance are no methods to correct the errors of the Courts. In the discharge of their functions the Courts have to be allowed to operate freely and fearlessly but for which impartial adjudication will be an impossibility. Ours is a Constitutional government based on the rule of law. The Constitution entrusts the task of interpreting and administering the law to the judiciary whose view on the subject is made legally final and binding on all till it is changed by a higher court or by a permissible legislative measure. Ours is a Constitutional government based on the rule of law. The Constitution entrusts the task of interpreting and administering the law to the judiciary whose view on the subject is made legally final and binding on all till it is changed by a higher court or by a permissible legislative measure. Those living and functioning under the Constitution have to accept and submit to this obligation of respecting the constitutional authority of the Courts. Under a Constitutional government, such final authority has to vest in some institution. Otherwise, there will be a chaos. The Court's verdict has to be respected not necessarily by the authority of its reason but always be reason of its authority. Any conduct designed to or suggestive of challenging this crucial balance of power devised by the Constitution is an attempt to subvert the rule of law and an invitation to anarchy. The contemner, for reasons which can only be attributed to his misconception of his role and over-zealousness to assert himself and his side of the matter intentionally overstepped his limits and conveniently ignored die above legal position, and abrogated to himself, in substance, the role of a Judge in his own cause. He has thus in effect not only challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to discharge its functions but also its authority to do so.” (emphasis supplied) 23. In Re: R.L Ahuja: 1993 Supp 4 SCC 446, the respondent-contender cast unfounded and unwarranted aspersions and made scurrilous and indecent attacks against some of the Judges of this Court who had earlier dealt with his case in wild, intemperate and even abusive language in the memorandum of writ petition and in a representation sent to the President of India. This Court while convicting and sentencing the contemner for committing criminal contempt of court observed: “The passages in the memorandum of the writ petition and the letter addressed to the President of India attack the integrity and fairness of the Judges. This Court while convicting and sentencing the contemner for committing criminal contempt of court observed: “The passages in the memorandum of the writ petition and the letter addressed to the President of India attack the integrity and fairness of the Judges. The remarks made by the contemner are disparaging in character and derogatory to the dignity of the Court and besides scandalizing the Court in relation to judicial matters have the tendency to shake the confidence of the public in the apex court.” The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they desire is on the increase and it is high time that serious note is taken of the same. No latitude can be given to a litigant to browbeat the Court. Merely because a party chooses to appear in person, it does ‘not give him a licence to indulge in making such aspersions as have the tendency to scandalise the Court in relation to judicial matters. (Emphasis ours) The contemner in the present case let alone showing any remorse or regret has adopted an arrogant and contemptuous attitude …………………………………………. …….. Of course, the dignity of the Court is not so brittle as to be shattered by a stone thrown by a mad man, but when the Court finds that the contemner has been reckless, persistent and guilty of undermining the dignity of the Court and his action is, motivated, deliberate and designed, the law of contempt of Court must be activised.” (Emphasis supplied) 24. Thus, it is now settled that abuses, attribution of motives, vituperative terrorism and scurrilous and indecent attacks on the impartiality of the Judges in the pleadings, applications or other documents filed in the Court or otherwise published which have the tendency to scandalise and undermine the dignity of the Court and the majesty of law amounts to criminal contempt of Court. 25. While a litigant as also his lawyer have the freedom of expression and liberty to project their case forcefully, it must be remembered that they must while exercising that liberty maintain dignity, decorum and order in the Court proceeding. Liberty of free expression cannot be permitted to be treated as a licence to make reckless imputations against the impartiality of the Judges deciding the case. Liberty of free expression cannot be permitted to be treated as a licence to make reckless imputations against the impartiality of the Judges deciding the case. Even criticism of the judgment has to be in a dignified and temperate language and without any malice. 26. In D.C. Saxena v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216 : (1996 AIR SCW 3082) this Court observed:- “Advocacy touches and asserts the primary value of freedom of expression. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom of speech. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity, equality and justice. It plays its part in helping to secure the protection or other fundamental human rights. Freedom of expression, therefore, is one of the basic conditions for the progress of advocacy and for the development of every man including legal fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom of expression, therefore, is vital to the maintenance of free society. It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. But they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the Court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary.”… In other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper motives to a Judge is scandalisation of the Court and would be contempt of the Court. Even imputation of lack of impartiality or fairness to a Judge in the discharge of his official duties amounts to contempt. The gravamen of the of-fence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an affront to the majesty of justice. When the contemner challenges the authority of the court, he interferes with the performance of duties of Judge's office or judicial process or administration of justice or generation or production of tendency bringing the Judge of judiciary into contempt.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. Does the law give a lawyer, unsatisfied with the result of a case, any licence to permit himself the liberty of scandalising a court by casting unwarranted imputations against the judge in discharge of his judicial functions? Does the law give a lawyer, unsatisfied with the result of a case, any licence to permit himself the liberty of scandalising a court by casting unwarranted imputations against the judge in discharge of his judicial functions? Does the lawyer enjoy any special immunity under the Contempt of Courts Act, where he is found to have committed a gross contempt of Court? The answer has to be an emphatic NO: 28. In Lalit Mohan Das v. Advocate General, Orissa, [1957] SCR 167: ( AIR 1957 SC 250 ), this court observed (at p. 254 of AIR): “A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client. He may even submit that a particular order is not correct and may ask for a review of that order. At the same time, a member of the Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court in which he is appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly overstepped the limits of propriety when he made imputations of partiality and unfairness against the Munsif in open Court. In suggesting that the Munsif followed no principle in his orders, the appellant was adding insult to injury, because the Munsif had merely upheld an order of his predecessor on the preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees, which order had been upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalizing the Court in such manner is really polluting the very fount of justice; such conduct as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the Judicial service; it brought into disrepute the whole administration of justice. From that point of view, the conduct of the appellant was highly reprehensible.” 29. In M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1991) 3 SCC 600 : (1991 AIR SCW 2011), this Court took notice of the growing tendency amongst some of the Advocates of adopting a defiant attitude and casting aspersions having failed to persuade the Court to grant an order in the terms they expect. In M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1991) 3 SCC 600 : (1991 AIR SCW 2011), this Court took notice of the growing tendency amongst some of the Advocates of adopting a defiant attitude and casting aspersions having failed to persuade the Court to grant an order in the terms they expect. Holding the Advocate guilty of contempt, Ahmadi, J. observed (at p. 2012 of AIR SCW): “The tendency of maligning the reputation of Judicial Officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud. And, when a member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned Judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behavior, use of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a Judge into submission to secure a desired order. Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned Judge but the entire institution. The foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the Presiding Judicial Officers with impunity. It is high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system.” (Emphasis supplied) Again, in Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) 2 SCC 584 : (1995 AIR SCW 3488), this Court observed (at Pp.3509 & 3510 of AIR SCW): “To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to him, to question his authority to ask the questions, to shout at him, to threaten him with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting language and abuse him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to create scene in the Court, to address him by losing temper are all acts calculated to interfere with and obstruct the course of justice. Such acts tend to overawe the Court and to prevent it from performing its duty to administer justice. Such conduct brings the authority of the Court and the administration of justice into disrespect and disrepute and undermines and erodes the very foundation of the judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people in the ability of the Court to deliver free and fair justice. The stance taken by the contemner is that he was performing his duty as an outspoken and fearless member of the Bar. He seems to be labouring under a grave misunderstanding. Brazenness is not outspokenness and arrogance is not fearlessness. Use of intemperate language is not assertion of right nor is a threat an argument. Humility is not servility and courtesy and politeness are not lack of dignity. Self-restraint and respectful attitude towards the Court, presentation of correct facts and law with a balanced mind and without overstatement, suppression, distortion or embellishment are requisites of good advocacy. A lawyer has to be a gentleman first. His most valuable asset is the respect and goodwill he enjoys among his colleagues and in the Court.” 30. In the instant case, from a perusal of the memorandum of various petitions filed by the contemner in this Court and the language used therein, it is apparent that he has cast aspersions on each and every learned Judge who in the discharge of his judicial functions decided the matter not liked to by the alleged contemner at one stage or the other. The aspersions cast by him undoubtedly have the tendency to scandalise the Court. The alleged contemner has been attempting to brow beat the learned subordinate Judges as well as the learned Judge of the High Court and cause interference in the administration of justice. Even in this Court, after the Rule was issued to him, he tried to brow beat the Court. He filed an application stating that since he had filed a contempt petition against the Judges constituting the Division Bench which had issued Rule against him, this Bench should transfer the case. It was an obviously motivated action on his part to intimidate the Bench. He did file the contempt petitions against it both the Judges constituting the Bench. Those petitions were dismissed by a Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.S. Verma (as the Hon'ble Chief Justice then was) and Hon'ble Mr. It was an obviously motivated action on his part to intimidate the Bench. He did file the contempt petitions against it both the Judges constituting the Bench. Those petitions were dismissed by a Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.S. Verma (as the Hon'ble Chief Justice then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal by the following order:- “We regret to find that the petitioner who is a practising lawyer of some standing has chosen to resort to such a proceeding which, in our view, is misconceived. We find no merit in the same, but before dictating this order, we have tried to explain this position to the petitioner with the hope that he will appreciate that as a member of the Bar, he is expected to utilise his time in a better manner to assist in the administration of justice. The contempt petition is dismissed.” The alleged contemner in this case has been making continuous attempts to subvert the course of justice in whichever Court his case was. He has been acting not only as if he is above the law but as if he is law unto himself. Notwithstanding his own assessment of his ‘merit and ‘competence’ as stated by him in the memo of petitions, the alleged contemner appears to be blissfully ignorant of the role of a lawyer and the law relating to grafting of pleadings-which must be precise and not scandalous or abusive. It is sad that by filing the applications, and the petition, as a party in person, couched in very objectionable language, he has permitted himself the liberty of indulging in an action, which does little credit to the noble profession to which he belongs. An advocate has no wider protection than a layman when he commits an act which amounts to contempt of Court. It is most unbefitting for an advocate to make imputations against the Judge only because he does not get the expected result, which according to him is the fair and reasonable result available to him. Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only because a lawyer appears as a party in person, he does not get a licence to commit contempt of the Court by intimidating the Judges or scandalising the Courts. Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only because a lawyer appears as a party in person, he does not get a licence to commit contempt of the Court by intimidating the Judges or scandalising the Courts. He cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during arguments, which is either intemperate or unparliamentary and which has the tendency to interfere in the administration of justice and undermine the dignity of the Court and the majesty of law. These safeguards are not for the protection of any Judge individually but are essential for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the Courts and for upholding the majesty of law. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments, even if, out-spoken, but made without any malice and without attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in proper language do not attract any punishment for contempt of Court. However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute the Courts must bitter themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. The alleged contemner, has undoubtedly committed contempt of the Court by the use of the objectionable and intemperate language. No system of justice can tolerate such unbridled licence on the part of a person, be he a lawyer, to permit himself the liberty of scandalising the Court by casting unwarranted, uncalled for and unjustified aspersions on the integrity, ability, impartiality or fairness of a Judge in the discharge of his judicial functions, as it undoubtedly amounts to an interference with the due course of administration of justice. No litigant, even a lawyer appearing in person in his own cause, can be permitted to overstep the limits of fair, bona fide and reasonable criticism of the judgment and bring the Courts generally into disrepute or attribute motives to the Judges rendering the judgment. Perversity, calculated to undermine the judicial system and the prestige of the Court, cannot be permitted for otherwise the very foundation of the judicial system is bound to be undermined and weakened. Perversity, calculated to undermine the judicial system and the prestige of the Court, cannot be permitted for otherwise the very foundation of the judicial system is bound to be undermined and weakened. Liberty of free expression is not to be confused with a licence to make unfounded, unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the Judges or the Courts in relation to judicial matters. In the established facts of this case, we hold that the alleged contemner has committed gross contempt of court and convict him accordingly.” 11. The fact that the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Judicial Officer was not challenged and has attained finality is far too significant a circumstance to be overlooked. If, parties having oblique motives and their Advocates are allowed to make wild allegations against judicial dictums which have attained finality, the very independence of the judiciary will be severely threatened and no Judge shall be able to work fearlessly and independently. It is clearly reflected from the record that the counsel representing the complainants has been taking undue interest in the entire matter and appears to have made it his own goal to somehow or the other and at any cost to target and get the Judicial Officer entangled in a criminal case. Allegations have been leveled in the complaint on the workings of the officer at different stations, the knowledge whereof cannot be imputed to the complainants who are illiterate persons. Thus evidently, it is the petitioners' Advocate who appears to be operating behind the scenes in the matter. A totally false assertion has been made at para No. 5 of the written submissions, which are signed by the counsel, that the Registrar General has informed this Court that the petitioners' complaint has been forwarded by Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice to the Registrar (Vigilance) for making inquiry. The fact is totally otherwise inasmuch as, Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice has directed that the complaint be filed. 12. Now coming to the issue whether the Anti Corruption Bureau officials were justified in sending the petitioners' complaint to the Registrar General or not. Sections 2 and 3 of the Judges Protection Act, 1985 have a material bearing on this issue and are reproduced herein for the sake of convenience:- “2. 12. Now coming to the issue whether the Anti Corruption Bureau officials were justified in sending the petitioners' complaint to the Registrar General or not. Sections 2 and 3 of the Judges Protection Act, 1985 have a material bearing on this issue and are reproduced herein for the sake of convenience:- “2. Definition.—In this Act, “Judge” means not only every person who is officially designated as Judge, but also every person— (a) who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or (b) who is one of a body of persons which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment as is referred to in Clause (a). 3. Additional Protection to Judges.— (1) Notwithstanding Anything Contained in any Other Law for the Time Being in Force and Subject to the Provisions of Sub-Section (2), No Court Shall Entertain Or Continue any Civil Or Criminal Proceeding Against any Person who is or was a judge for any Act, Thing Or Word Committed, Done or Spoken by him when, Or in the course of, Acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in Sub-Section (1) Shall Debar or affect in any manner the power of the central government or the state government or the supreme court of india or any high court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a judge. 13. As per the foregoing provisions, it cannot be denied that the arraigned Judicial Officer, who was discharging his judicial duties while passing the judgment of acquittal, is covered by the definition of Judge set out in Section 2 of the Act. As per Section 3 of the Judges Protection Act, all courts have been prohibited from entertaining any criminal or civil proceedings against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, provides an exception and saves the powers of the competent authority which can be, the Central Government, the State Government, the Supreme Court of India or the High Court or any other authority empowered under law to take such action against any person who is or was a Judge. The clear intent of the provision is that in case, the High Court feels that action; civil and criminal is warranted against any subordinate Judicial Officer, it can so direct without prejudice to the restrictions contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. That precisely appears to be the reason that the complaint was for-warded by the officers of the Anti Corruption Bureau to the High Court. Only Hon'ble the Chief Justice, upon being persuaded that action is warranted, could have allowed registration of a criminal case against the officer overriding the restrictions contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Judges Protection Act. As noticed above, Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice has already decided that no action is warranted upon the complaint received from the complainants against the arraigned Judicial Officer and has been filed. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion; (a) that the complaint submitted by the petitioners' was per se malicious and motivated. (b) that the same does not disclose the necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence whatsoever. (c) that the motives of the petitioners' counsel in filing the complaint and prosecuting the matter is oblique and malafide and was aimed at interfering in the administration of justice and tarnishing the image of the Judiciary and therefore, deserves to be deprecated. 14. As an upshot of the above discussion, the writ petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed with a cost of Rs. 10,000/-.