JUDGMENT : A.S. Supehia, J. 1. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 30.08.2002, whereby the service of the petitioner was terminated by respondent No. 1. Perusal of the said order clarifies that the petitioner has been terminated with immediate effect from 31.08.2002 after Office Hours. The said communication/order states that since there are directions from the State Government to close down the Aanganwadis (Bal Mandirs) such employees like the petitioner are to be terminated from service. 2. This Court vide order dated 10.10.2003 has recorded the statement made by learned advocate appearing for respondent No. 1 that the municipality has decided to reopen the Bal Mandir and the petitioner will be allowed to resume her duty w.e.f. 13.10.2003. Accordingly, the petitioner was reinstated on 13.10.2003 subject to result of the petition. 3. Today, when the matter is taken up for hearing Mr. Trivedi, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently submitted that the petitioner was illegally terminated from her service without issuing any notice. He has further stated that the petitioner was a regular employee selected pursuant to an advertisement. He has also contended that for the interregnum period i.e. 31.08.2002 (the date of termination) till 13.10.2003, the petitioner is entitled for back wages and continuation of service. He has relied on the communication dated 31.12.2002 written by the Regional Director of Municipalities instructing the District Collector, Amreli to restore the original status as decision to close down the Bal Mandirs is kept in abeyance by the Director of Municipality, Gandhinagar. He has also further stated that it was incumbent upon the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in view of the aforesaid communication dated 31.12.2002 but the same was not done. In absence of compliance of the same, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court challenging the termination order. 4. Learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent No. 3 has specifically drawn attention of this Court at Paragraph No. 5 wherein it is stated that the respondent-Municipality has given appointment to the petitioner, which is not regular and the same is contrary to the Resolution dated 28.10.1991 and 09.09.1998, whereby it was provided that before making any appointment the prior approval of the Government was required to be obtained, and in absence of any approval the appointment of the petitioner is said to be illegal. Hence, the termination of the petitioner was legal and valid. 5. Ms. Hence, the termination of the petitioner was legal and valid. 5. Ms. Khyati P. Hathi, learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, has stated that no permanent appointment could have been made by the Nagarpalika without prior appointment of the State Government as per the aforesaid circular. She further stated that the petitioner was appointed for a period of six months on probation and was made permanent with retrospective effect from 15.12.1999. She also stated that as per policy of the State Government decision was taken by the Municipality to discontinue the petitioner. 6. Mr. Trivedi, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, has also relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.A. Abdul Majeed vs. State of Kerala & Others, (2001) 6 SCC 292 wherein in Paragraph Nos. 8-9 it has been observed as under: "7. Mr. Sukumaran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private Respondents 4 to 6 has urged that the appointment of the appellant was through the back door whereas the private respondents were appointed through the Public Service Commission and, therefore, the appellant cannot get seniority over the private respondents. 8. It is an admitted position that the post was advertised by the GCDA and the appellant possessed all the qualifications as shown in the advertisement. He was duly selected and appointed. He successfully completed his period of probation. He was given one promotion to the next higher grade and his probation was declared in promoted post of Upper Division Typist. In view of these admitted facts we find force in the submission of Mr. Dave that after long lapse of time the question of initial appointment cannot be re-opened at the instance of private respondents and that too for altering his seniority. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Iyer, learned senior counsel, has to be rejected. 9. As the appellant was appointed after the post was advertised and he was duly selected before appointment it cannot be said that the appointment of the appellant was through back door and therefore we reject the contention of Mr. Sukumaran, learned senior counsel." 7. Learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has also relied upon judgment in the case of Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust vs. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel & Another, (2012) 9 SCC 310 . He has stated that the respondent authorities cannot take benefit of their own mistake. 8. Sukumaran, learned senior counsel." 7. Learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has also relied upon judgment in the case of Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust vs. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel & Another, (2012) 9 SCC 310 . He has stated that the respondent authorities cannot take benefit of their own mistake. 8. After carefully analysis of the facts of the case, I am of the view that, the impugned Order of termination of the petitioner requires interference. She is also entitled to the back wages and continuity of service, as well. It deserves to be noted that though the Director of Municipalities vide communication 31.12.2002, has specifically informed the District Collector, Amreli to continue the Bal Mandirs and restore the original position, the petitioner was not reinstated in service at her original post. Vide Letter dated 10.10.2002, the Director of Municipality had requested the Regional Director to do the needful on the application made by the Teachers of Bal Mandir requesting for reinstatement. No action was taken by the Respondent Nagarpalika and the Regional Director. This was in complete defiance of the Order/Letter of the Director of Municipalities. 9. The contention of the authorities on illegal appointment of the petitioner is liable to be rejected since it is not denied that the petitioner was appointed pursuant to the advertisement dated 13.05.1999. She was also made permanent on 15.12.1999, and thereafter placed in regular pay-scale. The petitioner cannot be penalized for the inertness on the part of respondent authorities in obtaining the approval from the State Government. Even otherwise, it is evident from the impugned order that the cause of her termination was not the "non approval" of the appointment of the petitioner but is about closing of Bal Mandirs, pursuant to the decision taken by the State Government. In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & Another, (2002) 1 SCC 520 the Apex Court has stated that an affidavit cannot be relied on to improve or supplement an order equally an order which is otherwise valid cannot be invalidated by reason of any statement to justify the order. In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & Another, (2002) 1 SCC 520 the Apex Court has stated that an affidavit cannot be relied on to improve or supplement an order equally an order which is otherwise valid cannot be invalidated by reason of any statement to justify the order. In the case of East Coast Railway & Another vs. Mahadev Appa Rao & Others, AIR 2010 SC 2794 , the Apex Court has observed that an order passed by a public authority exercising administrative/ executive or statutory powers must be judged by the reasons stated in the order or any record or file contemporaneously maintained. It follows that the infirmity arising out of the absence of reasons cannot be cured by the authority passing the order stating such reasons in an affidavit filed before the Court where the validity of any such order is under challenge. Thus, a new cause or reason, independent of the reason stated in the impugned order, is sought to be canvassed by the respondent authorities. The same is liable to be rejected by this Court. 10. I may further observe that the Respondents cannot take benefit of their own wrong. In the case of Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust (supra) the Apex Court, in a similar case whether a teacher was terminated by the Trust on the ground that initial appointment was illegal as he did not possess the prescribed qualification for the said post and proper procedure was not followed for making appointment. The Apex Court, after examining the case, in Paragraph No. 28, has observed as under:- "28. A person alleging his own infamy cannot be heard at any forum, what to talk of a Writ Court, as explained by the legal maxim "allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus." If a party has committed a wrong, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own wrong. (Vide : G.S. Lamba & Others vs. Union of India & Others, AIR 1985 SC 1019 ; Narender Chadha & Others vs. Union of India & Others, AIR 1986 SC 638 ; Molly Joseph @ Nish vs. George Sebastian @ Joy, AIR 1997 SC 109 ; Jose vs. Alice & Another, (1996) 6 SCC 342 and T. Srinivasan vs. T. Varalakshmi AIR 1999 SC 595 . This concept is also explained by the legal maxims "Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet" and "nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria." (See also : Eureka Forbes Ltd. vs. Allahabad Bank & Others, (2010) 6 SCC 193 and Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab & Another, (2011) 12 SCC 588 ). Thus, the respondent authorities cannot take benefit of their own wrong, that too by canvassing absolutely a new ground or case for justifying termination of the petitioner. 11. Now, I may deal with the entitlement of the petitioner qua back wages and continuity of service for the interregnum period between 31.08.2002 to 13.10.2003, i.e. from the date of termination to reinstatement. In the facts and such circumstances narrated above, it can be said that the petitioner was kept out of job during the period between 31.08.2002 to 13.10.2003 without any fault on her part and she was constrained to live without wages for the aforesaid period only because of the fault on the part of the authorities concerned. In such circumstances, in view of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case Ramesh Kumar vs. Union of India & Others, AIR 2015 SC 2904 the principle of no work no pay will not apply to the present case. The respondent-authorities were unable to show that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the aforesaid period. In the case of Raj Kumar vs. Director of Education & Others, JT 2016 (4) SC 48, has observed that in absence of any evidence of gainful appointment for the period in question, an employee is entitled to back wages. It was further observed that the back wages shall be computed on the basis of periodical revision of wages/salary. 12. Petition is allowed accordingly. The impugned Order of termination is set aside. Petitioner has been regularly working since 2003. For the interregnum period i.e. from the date of termination of the petitioner till her reinstatement she will be entitled for salary/wages and allowance which shall be computed on the basis of periodical revision of wages/salary. It further clarified that the same shall also be treated as continuous. The authorities concerned shall pass necessary orders to that effect within a period of four weeks from the receipt of this order. Rule is made absolute accordingly.