JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Gogia, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. In this petition the petitioner has challenged award dated 2.11.2010 passed by learned Labour Court, at Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No. 163 of 1999 whereby learned Labour Court partly allowed the reference and while rejecting the workman's claim for reinstatement in service, the learned Labour Court directed the petitioner to pay 4 months wages as compensation, 1 month wage towards notice pay, Rs. 2000/- towards cost i.e. total Rs. 13,000/- by way of lump sum compensation. 3. The claimant has challenged the award on the ground that it is unjustified and the learned Labour Court ought to have directed the respondent to reinstate him and should also have awarded appropriate backwages. 4. So far as factual background is concerned it has emerged from the material on record and from the submissions by learned advocates for the petitioner and respondent that the petitioner herein had raised industrial dispute on the allegation that his service was illegally terminated by the respondent - Rajkot Urban Development Authority ("RUDA" for short). 4.1 In the statement of claim filed by the petitioner - claimant he alleged that he joined service of the respondent RUDA in February 1991 as a "Peon" and his salary was fixed at Rs. 2200/-. It was alleged that after being engaged in 1991 his service was illegally terminated in January 1999 without following any procedure prescribed by law. He also alleged that he was discontinued from service in violation of Section 25F, Section 25G and Section 25H of Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). On such allegation the petitioner claimed reinstatement in service with consequential benefits. 5. The respondent RUDA opposed the reference by filing written statement. It was also claimed that his appointment was by way of "ministerial staff" on fixed term basis i.e. until the term of the Chairman. It was asserted in the written statement that actually the claimant was appointed by the respondent by Chairman as his personal ministerial staff and that therefore the engagement of the petitioner claimant was only for the period/tenure until the term of the Chairman continued. Differently put the employment of the petitioner claimant was coterminous with completion of Chairman's tenure. It was asserted in the written statement that actually the claimant was appointed by the respondent by Chairman as his personal ministerial staff and that therefore the engagement of the petitioner claimant was only for the period/tenure until the term of the Chairman continued. Differently put the employment of the petitioner claimant was coterminous with completion of Chairman's tenure. It was claimed that the petitioner was informed about said fact and he was aware about the said fact i.e. about nature of his appointment and its effect, from the initial stage of his appointment. It was also claimed that in the appointment letter dated 25.1.1991 the terms of the petitioner's appointment were clearly mentioned. It was also claimed that the petitioner was discontinued when the next incumbent in the office of the Chairman was not inclined to continue the petitioner as his personal staff. The service of the petitioner was therefore discontinued on and from 6.1.1999. It was also claimed that since the petitioner claimant was appointed as ministerial staff with specific condition that his appointment would terminate with the tenure of the chairman, the appointment was covered under Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act and therefore provision under Sections 25G and Section 25H would not be applicable and the respondent had not committed breach of said provision. 5.1 During the proceedings before learned Labour Court, oral and documentary evidence was recorded after stage of pleadings was completed. Thereafter learned Labour Court heard the submissions by learned Counsel for the claimant and the respondent RUDA. 5.2 Learned Labour Court then considered the material available on record and passed impugned award with abovementioned directions. 6. Mr. Gogia, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that when the learned Labour Court found that the petitioner was continued in service for about 8 1/2 years, the learned Labour Court ought to have held that the petitioner's service after such long period was in violation of Section 25F of the Act and on such basis the respondent should have been directed to reinstate the petitioner. Mr. Gogia, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the learned Labour Court ought to have also granted backwages and while denying relief of reinstatement and backwages learned Labour Court has committed error and therefore award deserves to be set aside. 7. Per contra, Mr. Mr. Gogia, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the learned Labour Court ought to have also granted backwages and while denying relief of reinstatement and backwages learned Labour Court has committed error and therefore award deserves to be set aside. 7. Per contra, Mr. Mushaw, learned advocate for the respondent RUDA reiterated the details related to petitioner's appointment and emphasized the fact that the petitioner was appointed as part of Ministerial Staff. He also submitted that the very fact that the petitioner's appointment was for fixed period was mentioned in the appointment letter. He also submitted that the petitioner was aware about the nature of his employment and also about the condition that his appointment was for fixed tenure. According to the learned advocate for the respondent the petitioner's claim is not maintainable and the same deserves to be rejected. 8. Mr. Gogia, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was continued after completion of tenure of the Chairman at whose instance and on whose behalf the petitioner was appointed as part of the ministerial staff and therefore defence of the respondent RUDA is not sustainable. 9. In this context, Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent RUDA submitted that the incumbent in the office of the Chairman of respondent RUDA who succeeded outgoing Chairman (at whose instance the petitioner was appointed) had also desired to appoint/continue the petitioner as part of his ministerial staff and therefore the petitioner was continued as personal/ministerial staff of the succeeding Chairman and that therefore the petitioner's claim is unjustified. 10. The said factual aspect is not in dispute. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the material on record and the award. 12. It is not in dispute that the appointment of the petitioner was made by way of personal - ministerial staff of the Chairman. 12.1 Even before learned Labour Court the said fact was established and learned Labour Court has also recorded finding of fact that the petitioner's appointment was by way of ministerial staff of the Chairman and that he was appointed under and in light of the provisions of Gujarat Ministerial Personal Staff (Recruitment and Conditions Service) Rules, 1991. 12.1 Even before learned Labour Court the said fact was established and learned Labour Court has also recorded finding of fact that the petitioner's appointment was by way of ministerial staff of the Chairman and that he was appointed under and in light of the provisions of Gujarat Ministerial Personal Staff (Recruitment and Conditions Service) Rules, 1991. Learned Labour Court also recorded findings of fact that in light of the provision under Rule 5(b), the said rules are applicable to RUDA and the appointment of the petitioner was covered under the said rules. The appointment of the personal staff or ministerial or Chairman would be coterminous with the completion of the tenure of the Chairman. Learned Labour Court also recorded that in view of such fact position the petitioner's appointment would stand covered under clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act and that therefore it cannot be accepted that the petitioner's service was terminated in violation of Section 25F of the Act. In light of such facts the learned Labour Court rejected the petitioner's claim for reinstatement. 12.2 The findings of fact recorded by learned Labour Court viz. that the petitioner was engaged as part of Ministerial Staff of the Chairman and that his appointment was governed by the provisions under the Gujarat Ministerial Personal Staff (Recruitment and Conditions Service) Rules, 1991 and that the petitioner was appointed at the request of the Chairman as personal/ministerial staff, without following other formalities and procedure for regular selection and recruitment and that specific stipulation that his appointment is for fixed tenure, are not in dispute. Even learned advocate for the petitioner could not and has not disputed the said findings of fact. 12.3 It is undisputed fact that the petitioner's appointment was coterminous with the Chairman's tenure. 12.4 It is pertinent to note that the said aspect of petitioner's appointment was actually heart of the terms and conditions of the appointment letter which was known to the petitioner at the time of appointment. 12.5 Merely because the petitioner was continued for almost 8 ½ years until he came to be relieved when newly appointed Chairman declared that he did not require services of the petitioner it cannot be said that the petitioner's termination from service is in violation of Section 25F of the Act. 13. 12.5 Merely because the petitioner was continued for almost 8 ½ years until he came to be relieved when newly appointed Chairman declared that he did not require services of the petitioner it cannot be said that the petitioner's termination from service is in violation of Section 25F of the Act. 13. In this context it would also be referred to the decision in case of State of Gujarat vs. P.J. Kampavat, 1993 (1) GLR 848. In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court examined rival contentions in light of the provisions under Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959. Reference to the said decision is not out of place in light of the facts of present case inasmuch as in the said case of Mr. P.J. Kampavat the respondent before Hon'ble Apex Court was appointed as ministerial staff in the office of Chief Minister. His appointment, like appointment of present petitioner, was made with specific stipulation that the appointment is purely temporary and liable to be terminated forthwith and it would automatically come to an end with the term of Chief Minister (in present case the term of the Chairman). 13.1 In the cited decision the appointment of the respondent before Hon'ble Apex Court was also coterminous with the term of the Chief Minister (in present case term of the Chairman). The facts of the case are summarized by Hon'ble Court in the said decision in paragraph Nos. 3 and 4 whereas the rival contentions are summarized by Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No. 5 of the decision. In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- "6. In the light of the rival contentions, the Gujarat High Court framed three questions for their consideration, viz., (1) Whether the respondents (State) had discriminated against the petitioners by not absorbing them in the State service and instead terminating their services by impugned orders and whether the said action was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (2) Whether the impugned termination orders were contrary to BCS Rule 33 and hence, they were null and void and inoperative of law. (3) What reliefs were the petition r.5 entitled. On the first question, the High Court held against the writ petitioners. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (2) Whether the impugned termination orders were contrary to BCS Rule 33 and hence, they were null and void and inoperative of law. (3) What reliefs were the petition r.5 entitled. On the first question, the High Court held against the writ petitioners. It was of the opinion that the writ petitioners cannot be directed to be absorbed in regular service inasmuch as their initial entry itself was otherwise than in accordance with the Rules and also because their appointment was made exclusively on the recommendation of the concerned Minister who selected persons of his choice to serve in his establishment. Such absorption, the High Court pointed out, may amount to circumventing the Rules relating to recruitment and would be unjust to other employees. Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution do not come to the rescue of the writ petitioners. Further, it was held, the Gujarat Non-Secretariat Clerks and Clerk Typist (Training and Examination) Rules, 1970 do not apply to the writ petitioners. On the second question, however, the High Court was of the opinion that the writ petitioners are entitled to the protection of R. 33(1)(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules; Since the termination has been effected without satisfying the requirements of the said Rule, they were declared to be null and void. On the question of relief, the High Court was of the opinion that granting of relief of reinstatement would be of no help to the writ petitioners inasmuch as even after such reinstatement their services can be terminated by paying one month's salary as contemplated by the proviso to R. 33(1)(b) of the BCS Rules. Taking "a practical view of the matter" to use the language of the High Court they directed that in lieu of orders of reinstatement, the writ petitioners shall be paid the salary from the date of their termination up to the date of judgment and for a further period of two months thereafter - that is for a period of approximately two years. The correctness of the said judgment, in so far as it goes against the State is canvassed in these appeals. 7. It is evident from a reading of the order of appointment of the writ petitioners that it was purely a contractual appointment conterminous with the tenure of the Minister's establishment, at whose choice and instance they were appointed. The correctness of the said judgment, in so far as it goes against the State is canvassed in these appeals. 7. It is evident from a reading of the order of appointment of the writ petitioners that it was purely a contractual appointment conterminous with the tenure of the Minister's establishment, at whose choice and instance they were appointed. The order expressly stated that they shall not get any right to appointment in regular cadre. Their services were, it was expressly stated, liable to be terminated at any time without giving any notice and or without assigning any reasons. Indeed, they were asked to furnish undertakings in the above terms which they did. The order no doubt employs the words "appointed as direct recruits on purely temporary basis and these are the words which constitute the sheet-anchor of the writ petitioners contention. We are, however, of the opinion that the order must be read as a whole and so read, it is clear that the, appointment of the respondents/writ petitioners was made otherwise than in accordance with the rules, at the choice and on the recommendation of the concerned Minister who wanted them to serve in his establishment. That the State has the power to make such contractual appointment is recognised by Cl. (2) of Art. 310. Cls. (1) and (2) of Art. 310 reads as follows: "310. Tenure of office of persons serving the Union or a State:- (1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union or of an All-India service or holds an post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State. (2) Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the Union or a State holds office during the pleasure of the President or, as the case may be, of the Governor of the State, any contract under which a person, not being a member of a defence service or of an All-India service or of a civil service of the Union or a State, is appointed under this Constitution to hold such a post may, if the President or the Governor, as the case may be deems it necessary in order to secure the services of a person having special qualifications, provided for the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate the post." 8. While Cl. (1) corresponds to sub-sec. (1) of S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, Cl. (2) is practically a reproduction of sub-sec. (4). Cl. (1) declares that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, every person holding a post in defence service or civil service or any post connected with them holds office during the pleasure of the President and similarly every person holding a civil post under the State holds the same during the pleasure of the Governor of the State. Cl. (2) recognises the power of the President/Governor to appoint a person to a civil post (under the Union or the State) on contract. However, the person to be so appointed should not be a member of a defence service or of an All-India service or a civil service of the Union or the State. The clause enables the President/Governor to provide, if he thinks it necessary to secure the services of a person having specific qualifications for payment to him compensation in case the post is abolished before the expiry of the agreed period or where he is asked to vacate the post before the expiry of such period for reasons not connected with any misconduct on his part. In the case before us, of course, there is no such provision for compensation apart from the fact that this is not a case of termination before the expiry of the period of contract. (For the purposes of this cage, it is unnecessary to examine the reasons for which sub-sec. In the case before us, of course, there is no such provision for compensation apart from the fact that this is not a case of termination before the expiry of the period of contract. (For the purposes of this cage, it is unnecessary to examine the reasons for which sub-sec. (4) was enacted in S.240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and why was it repeated in Art. 310. 9. In the light of this clause it is idle to contend on the part of the respondents/writ petitioners that their appointment is under the rules or that their appointment is a temporary appointment within the meaning of Bombay Civil Service Rules. Rule 2 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules which is quoted in the judgment of the High Court reads thus "except where it is otherwise expressed or implied, these rules apply to all members of services and holders of posts whose conditions of services the Government of Bombay are competent to prescribe: Provided that they shall also apply to:- "(a) any person for whose appointment and conditions of employment special provision is made by or under any law for the time being in force, and (b) any person in respect of whose service, pay and allowances and pension or any of them special provisions has been made by an agreement made with him in respect of any matter not covered by the provisions of such law or agreement." 10. The High Court has relied upon the said rule to hold that the writ petitioners are covered by Cl. (b) to the proviso. It has further held that the respondent must be deemed to be holders of temporary posts within the meaning of Rule 9(56) which defines the expression temporary post to mean a post carrying a definite rate of pay sanctioned for a limited time. On the above basis, the High Court has applied Rule 33 which provides the mode of terminating the service of a temporary Government servant. In short, the rule provides for a prior notice, the duration of which depends upon the length of service put in by the temporary Government servant. On the above basis, the High Court has applied Rule 33 which provides the mode of terminating the service of a temporary Government servant. In short, the rule provides for a prior notice, the duration of which depends upon the length of service put in by the temporary Government servant. We are, however, of the opinion that the said rules have no application to the respondents herein and that they cannot be deemed to be temporary Government servants within the meaning of the said rules inasmuch as the terms of their appointment clearly amount to an otherwise provision within the meaning of the non obstinate clause ("except where it is otherwise expressed or implied") with which R. 2 begins. The order appointing the respondents expressly states not only that their services shall be terminated at any time without giving any notice and without assigning any reason but also that their appointment is for a limited period conterminous with the concerned minister's tenure. They were also asked to execute an undertaking in the above terms which they did. It is evident that the terms of their appointment and the undertaking are clearly inconsistent with the said rules and in particular with R. 33. Rule 33(1)(b) and the term making their tenure conterminous with their minister cannot go together. Sub-rule (1) of R. 33 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules may be set out at this stage, for the reason that the High Court has rested its case on Cl. (b) of the said sub-rule. "33. (1)(a) The service of a temporary Government servant shall be liable to termination at any time, by a notice in writing given to him by the appointing authority. (b) Where a temporary Government servant has put in service for a period exceeding one year the period of such notice shall be one month and where such Government servant has put in service for one year or any period less than one year the period of such notice shall be one week. (b) Where a temporary Government servant has put in service for a period exceeding one year the period of such notice shall be one month and where such Government servant has put in service for one year or any period less than one year the period of such notice shall be one week. Provided that the services of any such Government servant may he terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowance for the period of the notice due the same rates at which he was drawing pay and allowances immediately before the termination of his service or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of the notice period." 11. For the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that the appointment of the respondents was a pure and simple contractual appointment and that such appointment does not attract and is outside the purview of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959. Since the tenure of the ministers at whose instance and on whose recommendation they were appointed has come to an end with 10-12-1989 their service also came to an end simultaneously. No order of termination as such was necessary for putting an end to their service, much less a prior notice. They ought to go out in the manner they have come in." 14. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that by way of settlement of entire claim of the petitioner the amount awarded by the learned Labour Court by way of lump sum compensation may be enhanced and that if the amount of lump sum compensation is enhanced then the petitioner would accept such additional/enhanced amount by way of full and final settlement and withdraw the petition and claim for reinstatement and/or backwages. 15. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner was continued in service for about 9 years which, in ordinary circumstances and but for abovementioned rules, qualified him for gratuity, it was offered that the amount of lump sum compensation may be enhanced to Rs. 37,500/-. 16. Learned advocate for the petitioner after taking telephonic instructions from the petitioner, agreed to accept such enhanced amount i.e. Rs. 37,500/-. 16. Learned advocate for the petitioner after taking telephonic instructions from the petitioner, agreed to accept such enhanced amount i.e. Rs. 37,500/- as lump sum compensation for all claims and demands and by way of full and final settlement and submitted that in view of such payment the petitioner withdraws the petition and all claims/disputes. 17. In this view of the matter, following order is passed with consent of learned advocates:- The impugned award dated 2.11.2010 passed by learned Labour Court, at Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No. 163 of 1999 is modified and the lump sum compensation awarded by the learned Labour Court is revised/enhanced to Rs. 37,500/-. Except said modification rest of the award and conclusion as well as direction by learned Labour Court are confirmed. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has agreed to accept the said amount in full and final settlement of all claims and has also agreed to not press the claim for reinstatement and/or backwages. In view of said submission and stipulation by learned advocate for the petitioner, the petition is disposed of as withdrawn and not pressed, however, with aforesaid modification of the award dated 2.11.2010 passed by learned Labour Court, at Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No. 163 of 1999. Accordingly the petition is disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Orders accordingly.