JUDGMENT : This appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition of Act, 1894 (hereinafter for short called as ‘the L.A. Act’) has been directed against the judgment passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sundargarh being the referral court in the matter of a reference under section 30 of the L.A. Act made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, UMPP, Sundargarh at the behest of the appellant who was the petitioner therein as also before the referral court. The reference in respect of the claim of the appellant over the awarded amount towards her share in so far as the acquired land is concerned and for apportionment thereof, has been answered by the referral court against her holding that she is not entitled to the claim as advanced in respect of such apportionment of the awarded amount. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has come to be filed. 2. Facts center round the matter of acquisition of the land measuring Ac. 26.280 decimals in Mouza Kopsingha for establishment of Ultra Mega Power Project at Bhedabahal in the district of Sundargarh. Land acquisition compensation has been determined at Rs.5,97,35,754/-. The Land Acquisition officer having said that the compensation is payable to Kadamba Negi, Janhabi Negi, Basudev Negi, Lalita Negi, Kumari Dhrua and Kumudini Majhi, this appellant raised her claim over the same. The claim is confined to 1/5th share from out of the total amount awarded on account of the compensation for such land acquisition. 3. Admittedly, the property acquired stood recorded in the name of one Satyananda Negi. Satyananda had two sons namely, Chakradhar and Gajadhar. Chintamani, Parakhita, Basudev and Kulamani are the four sons of Chakradhar. The present appellant-petitioner is the daughter of said Chakradhar. Kumari and Kumudini are the two daughters of Gajadhar. It is alleged that the land records have been corrected to the exclusion of the appellant by perpetration of fraud. So the appellant’s claim is that she has equal share over the amount of compensation as determined with her four brothers. 4. The parties are members of Scheduled Tribe and as such the provisions of Hindu Succession Act have no application to them. In so far as the succession is concerned, they still remain governed under the old Hindu Law notwithstanding the commencement of Hindu Succession Act. 4. The parties are members of Scheduled Tribe and as such the provisions of Hindu Succession Act have no application to them. In so far as the succession is concerned, they still remain governed under the old Hindu Law notwithstanding the commencement of Hindu Succession Act. On the admitted fact situtaton, upon the death of Satyananda, the property came to be devolved upon his two sons namely, Chakradhar and Gajadhar with the right of survivorship being available. However, it is not stated as to who died first. If we say that Chakradhar predeceased Gajadhar then it would be said that the property developed upon Gajadhara with half share and rest half resting with the four sons of Chakradhara. If wife of Chakradhar would be living then she would have taken equal interest with sons i.e. four sons of Chakradhara and widow, each having one tenth share (1/2/5). But the widow of Chakradhara would only be having limited interest till her death. If we take for a moment that Gajadhar predeceased Chakradhar then it being not the case of the parties that Chakradhar and Gajadhar had partitioned the property which came to be succeeded by them from Satyananda by metes and bounds completely severing the joint status thereby giving a good-bye to the rule of survivorship in no more coming into play, the property is to be survived by Chakradhar alone as Gajadhar has no sons but only daughters. If his wife would be there then she would have had the half interest that too limited only for her lifetime. Ultimately, upon death of Chakradhar the propriety in that event is to be succeeded only by his four sons and not the daughter, the present appellant. As according to article 43 the traditional Old Hindu Law, the entry for sons comes much ahead of the entry and as per the same in the absence of anyone heir in the prior entry only the heir or heirs of the latter entry come to succeed. Therefore, in any event on the facts as stand at present admitted by the parties, the claim of appellant has no legs to stand. In view of above, the final answer recorded by the referral court stands confirmed. Therefore, in any event on the facts as stand at present admitted by the parties, the claim of appellant has no legs to stand. In view of above, the final answer recorded by the referral court stands confirmed. However, this Court at this stage feels it necessary to observe that in the case in hand the referral court without any difficulty could have easily answered the reference viewing the admitted case of the parties and the factual position as it stand applying the laws governing the field instead of taking up the strenuous exercise to record the evidence at length and then going for examination of the same at length which appear to be purposeless. Such an exercise by the referral court appears to be a futile one at the expense of the time and energy of all concerned which could have been easily avoided being mindful of all the aforesaid. 5. In the wake of aforesaid, the appeal fails. No order as to cost.