ORDER : I.A. No. 1534 of 2016 1. This interlocutory application has been preferred for condonation of delay of 2280 days in preferring Arbitration Appeal No. 01 of 2015 preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2. Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the arbitration proceedings were conducted by the Government officers. Arbitration award was passed on 11th January, 2007 by the learned Arbitrator, who is Hon'ble Mr. Justice (Retired) Sri A.K. Prasad, Judge of this Hon'ble Court. Against this award, application along with delay condonation application was preferred under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 30th June, 2008 with delay of 413 days. This application was preferred before the Sub-Judge-I, Ranchi and that delay application was dismissed because no steps were taken by the State for service of notice nor anybody was present on behalf of the State. This order was passed on 24th November, 2008 in Miscellaneous Case No. 25 of 2008. Against this order, the present Arbitration Appeal No. 01 of 2015 has been preferred with delay of 2280 days. 3. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the reasons stated in this interlocutory application especially paragraph 6 onwards, there are no reasonable reasons for condonation of delay of 2280 days in preferring Arbitration Appeal No. 01 of 2015. In paragraph 6, it has been mentioned that the Executive Engineer has probably did not understood the procedural aspects of the law. In paragraph 7, the reasons mentioned is loss of track of the matter which is not a reasonable ground for condonation of such a huge delay. In paragraph 9 also, ignorance of the officers has been pointed out, which is also not a valid ground for condonation of delay. In paragraph 10, it has been mentioned that the delay is not deliberate, which is also not a valid ground for condonation of delay. Similar are the grounds in subsequent paragraphs also. It has also been mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 13 that the Government officers themselves conducted the arbitration proceedings. This also cannot be a reason for condonation of delay. The Government was never restrained in engaging any lawyer. In paragraph 13, it has been mentioned that the officers themselves were conducting the matter before Sub-Judge-I, Ranchi and lawyer could not remain present before Sub-Judge-I, Ranchi. This also cannot be a reason for condonation of delay. The Government was never restrained in engaging any lawyer. In paragraph 13, it has been mentioned that the officers themselves were conducting the matter before Sub-Judge-I, Ranchi and lawyer could not remain present before Sub-Judge-I, Ranchi. The Government should have engaged an efficient Advocate. Thus, there is no justifiable reason for condonation of delay of 2280 days in preferring Arbitration Appeal No. 01 of 2015. Moreover, this interlocutory application has been preferred after one year and one month from the date of filing of this Arbitration Appeal No. 01 of 2015. Thus, there is continuous lethargic approach on the part of the State. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent has also raised an issue that under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an application could have been preferred, challenging the award passed by the learned Arbitrator, within a period of three months and maximum condoneable delay is 30 days. The application preferred under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 by the State of Jharkhand is also with a delay of 413 days from 11th April, 2007 i.e. after expiry of three months' period. Thus, the said application under Section 34 before Sub-Judge-I, Ranchi was also beyond the period of condoneable delay. 5. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General Vs. Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 in paragraphs 25 to 30, which read as under:- “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.” (emphasis supplied) 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157 in paragraphs 24 and 25, which read as under:- “24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 25. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision-making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.” (emphasis supplied) 7. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there are no reasonable reasons for condonation of delay in preferring Arbitration Appeal No. 01 of 2015. Hence, this interlocutory application is, hereby, dismissed. Arbitration Appeal No. 01 of 2015 8. In view of the order passed in the aforesaid interlocutory application and as the delay is not condoned, this appeal fails. I.A. No. 1536 of 2016 9. This interlocutory application also stands dismissed, as Arbitration Appeal No. 01 of 2015 fails. I.A. No. 1149 of 2016 10. Presence of the Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi is now not required. 11. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1149 of 2016 stands disposed of.