General Manager (Region), Food Corporation of India v. Ramadayal Meena
2016-10-19
SANJAY YADAV
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Sanjay Yadav, J. With consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally. Present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, at the instance of employer, is directed against the order dated 22.3.2016 passed by Appellant Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 1972 Act'), Jabalpur, affirming the order-dated 6.10.2015 passed by Controlling Authority under 1972 Act, Bhopal. 2. Respondent No.1 employed as Manager (Contract) at District Office, Bhopal, retired on attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f. 30.4.2014. A day before his retirement, the respondent No.1 was served with a charge-sheet on 29.4.2014, alleging misconduct of causing financial loss to the Corporation to the tune of Rs.1,10,27,259.17/-. The departmental enquiry initiated on the said charge-sheet is reportedly pending till date. Respondent No.1 on 12.8.2014 was informed that since gross misconduct has been committed by him, he is not entitled for disbursement of gratuity amount under the provisions of Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971 (for short 'Regulations, 1971'). 3. Sub-clause (iii) of Regulation 60-A of Regulations, 1971 which provides for that "during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the disciplinary authority may withhold payment of gratuity for ordering the recovery from gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation, if the employee is found in a disciplinary proceedings or judicial proceedings to have been guilty of offence or misconduct as mentioned in the relevant Section of the Payment of the Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972) or to have caused pecuniary loss to the Corporation by misconduct or negligence during his service, including service rendered on deputation or on re-employment after retirement, provided that the provisions of relevant Section of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 shall be kept in view in the event of delayed payment, in case, the employee is fully exonerated." 4. Aggrieved, Respondent No.1 filed an application under Section 7(4) of 1972 Act before the Controlling Authority, claiming gratuity amount of Rs.10 Lakhs on the ground that he retired on 30.4.2014 on attaining the age of superannuation and completed 38 years, 1 month and 18 days of service; thus, entitling him to receive gratuity amount.
Aggrieved, Respondent No.1 filed an application under Section 7(4) of 1972 Act before the Controlling Authority, claiming gratuity amount of Rs.10 Lakhs on the ground that he retired on 30.4.2014 on attaining the age of superannuation and completed 38 years, 1 month and 18 days of service; thus, entitling him to receive gratuity amount. The Controlling Authority overruling the objection raised on behalf of petitioner-employer and taking into consideration that respondent No.1 does not inhibit the disqualification as is provided under sub-section (6) of Section 4 of 1972 Act, proceeded to allow the application preferred by respondent No.1 by order-dated 6.10.2016 and directed the petitioner-employer to pay the gratuity amount of Rs.10 Lakhs along with 10% simple interest per annum w.e.f. 1.5.2014. 5. Aggrieved, petitioner-employer filed an application under Section 7(7) of 1972 Act before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority vide order-dated 22.3.2016, dismissed the appeal holding : "The Management of FCI, has negligently delayed the disciplinary proceedings, and kept mum till date of retirement of the employee and issued charge sheet on after noon of 30-4-2014. The employee was not terminated from service for any moral turpitude, or for any charges of causing loss to the management. He was given normal retirement on 30-4-2014 upon attaining age of superannuation. Hence, the management cannot forfeit the gratuity under Section 4(6) of the PG Act 1972. The regulation of the FCI, Reg. 60-A also says that the recovery of loss has to be made in accordance with provisions of Gratuity Act 1972. In case of loss, partial amount only can be forfeited, and total forfeiture only in case of termination. But, in this case, there is no termination of service, and the employee was superannuated /retired from service. In this case total amount was withheld and since the payment of gratuity was withheld without any statutory power, contrary to the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, that too without any valid reason acceptable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (since there is no provision to withhold gratuity under the PG Act 1972 during pendency of disciplinary proceedings), not only the employer has to pay interest, but also, the FCI is liable for penalties under Section 9(2) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 punishable with a term of not less than 6 months imprisonment or with fine which would meet the ends of justice.
In view of the above reasons, I hereby direct that the ex-employee/opposite party, is entitled to the total amount deposited by the employer/FCI i.e. Rs. 11,58,333/- with the Controlling Authority. I hereby confirm the order of the Controlling Authority dated 6-10-2015. I hereby direct that the Controlling Authority to disburse the amount of Rs.11,58,333/- to the Opp. Party within 15 days." 6. By way of present petition, petitioner-employer challenges the orders passed by the Controlling Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority on the ground that pending departmental enquiry, respondent No.1 is not entitled for payment of gratuity amount. 7. The solitary issue which arises for consideration is as to whether it is permissible under law for the petitioner-employer to withhold the amount of gratuity to the respondent No.1 even after superannuation from service because of pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him. An answer to the issue lies in the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 663 wherein while dwelling upon the Rule 34.3 of the Coal India Executives' Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 which is in the similar terms as sub-clause (iii) of Regulation 60-A of Regulations, 1971, their Lordships were pleased to observe : "10. The provisions of the Act, therefore, must prevail over the Rules. Rule 27 of the Rules provides for recovery from gratuity only to the extent of loss caused to the company by negligence or breach of orders or trust. Penalties, however, must be imposed so long an employee remains in service. Even if a disciplinary proceeding was initiated prior to the attaining of the age of superannuation, in the event, the employee retires from service, the question of imposing a major penalty by removal or dismissal from service would not arise. Rule 34.2 no doubt provides for continuation of a disciplinary proceeding despite retirement of employee if the same was initiated before his retirement but the same would not mean that although he was permitted to retire and his services had not been extended for the said purpose, a major penalty in terms of Rule 27 can be imposed. 11. Power to withhold penalty contained in Rule 34.3 of the Rules must be subject to the provisions of the Act. Gratuity becomes payable as soon as the employee retires.
11. Power to withhold penalty contained in Rule 34.3 of the Rules must be subject to the provisions of the Act. Gratuity becomes payable as soon as the employee retires. The only condition therefor is rendition of five years continuous service. 12. A statutory right accrued, thus, cannot be impaired by reason of a rule which does not have the force of a statute. It will bear repetition to state that the Rules framed by Respondent No. 1 or its holding company are not statutory in nature. The Rules in any event do not provide for withholding of retrial benefits or gratuity. 13. The Act provides for a closely neat scheme providing for payment of gratuity. It is a complete code containing detailed provisions covering the essential provisions of a scheme for a gratuity. It not only creates a right to payment of gratuity but also lays down the principles for quantification thereof as also the conditions on which he may be denied therefrom. As noticed hereinbefore, sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act contains a non-obstante clause vis-a-vis sub-section (1) thereof. As by reason thereof, an accrued or vested right is sought to be taken away, the conditions laid down thereunder must be fulfilled. The provisions contained therein must, therefore, be scrupulously observed. Clause (a) of Sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act speaks of termination of service of an employee for any act, will full omission or negligence causing any damage. However, the amount liable to be forfeited would be only to the extent of damage or loss caused. The disciplinary authority has not quantified the loss or damage. It was not found that the damages or loss caused to Respondent No. 1 was more than the amount of gratuity payable to the appellant. Clause (b) of Sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act also provides for forfeiture of the whole amount of gratuity or part in the event his services had been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part or if he has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude. Conditions laid down therein are also not satisfied." 8. A cavil is, however, raised on behalf of petitioner-employer on the basis of recent decision rendered in Ch. cum Man.
Conditions laid down therein are also not satisfied." 8. A cavil is, however, raised on behalf of petitioner-employer on the basis of recent decision rendered in Ch. cum Man. Director Mahanadi Coalfield Ltd. v. Rabindranath Choubey : Civil Appeal No.9693/2013 arising from SLP(Civil) No.31583/2013 decided on 29.10.2013 : JT 2013 (14) SC 332, wherein it is observed : "23. The issue which confronts us in the instant appeal is as to whether gratuity can be withheld in the wake of Rule 34 of CDA Rules when examined in juxtaposition with the provisions of the Gratuity Act. To put it otherwise, whether in the scheme of Gratuity Act, gratuity has to be necessarily released to the concerned employee on his retirement even if departmental proceedings are pending against him. We find that Jaswant Singh Gill's case directly answers this question, that too in the context of these very CDA Rules. However, it is because of the reason that the said judgment proceeds on the basis that after the retirement of an employee, penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed upon the retired employee. If this view is not correct and the imposition of penalty of dismissal is still permissible, employer will get the right to forfeit the gratuity of such an employee in the eventualities provided under Sections 4(1) & 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act which reads.... Section 4 - Payment of gratuity. - (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years, - (a) on his superannuation, or (b) on his retirement or resignation, or (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease: Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement: Provided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity payable to hi m shall be paid to his nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor, shall be deposited with the controlling authority who shall invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority. Explanation.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement. x x x x x (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer' shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused; (b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited - (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, or (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by hi m in the course of his employment. 25. It is the case of the appellant that in the charge sheet served upon the respondent herein, there are very serious allegations of misconduct alleging dishonestly causing coal stock shortage amounting to Rs. 31.65 crores, and thereby causing substantial loss to the employer. If such a charge is proved and punishment of dismissal is given thereupon, the provisions of Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity would naturally get attracted and it would be within the discretion of the appellant to forfeit the gratuity payable to the respondent. As a corollary one can safely say that the employer has right to withhold the gratuity pending departmental inquiry. However, as explained above, this course of action is available only if disciplinary authority has necessary powers to impose the penalty of dismissal upon the respondent even after his retirement. Having regard to our discussion above of Jaswant Singh Gill (supra) and Ram Lal Bhaskar (supra), this issue needs to be considered authoritatively by a larger Bench. We, therefore, are of the opinion that present appeal be decided by a Bench of three Judges." 9. Evident it is from the said decision that the matter has been referred to a larger Bench on the basis of the judgment in State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar 2011 (10) SCC 249 .
We, therefore, are of the opinion that present appeal be decided by a Bench of three Judges." 9. Evident it is from the said decision that the matter has been referred to a larger Bench on the basis of the judgment in State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar 2011 (10) SCC 249 . However, in the instant case, no Rules or Regulations have been commended at as would empower the petitioner-employer to dismiss the service of a retired employee from the retrospective date. The law that the service cannot be terminated from retrospective date is well settled in view of the decision in R. Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 951 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held : "4. The order dated October 17, 1950 directed that the appellant be dismissed from service with effect from the date of his suspension, that is to say, from May 20, 1949. In substance, this order directed that (1) the appellant be dismissed, and (2) the dismissal do operate retrospectively as from May 20, 1949. The two parts, of this composite order are separable. The first part of the order, perates as a dismissal of the appellant as from October 17, 1950. The invalidity of the second part of the order, assuming this part to be invalid, does not affect the first part of the order. The order of dismissal as from October 17, 1950 is valid and effective. The appellant has been lawfully dismissed, and he is not entitled to claim that he is still in service. 5. Our attention is drawn to similar observations in Sudhir Ranjan Haldar v. State of West Bengal AIR 1961 Cal 626 . With respect, we are unable to agree with this line of reasoning. An order of dismissal with retrospective effect is, in substance, an order of dismissal as from the date of the order with the super added direction that the order should operate retrospectively as from an anterior date. The two parts of the order are clearly severable. Assuming that the second part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the. first part of the order should not be given the fullest effect The Court cannot pass a new order of dismissal, but surely it can give effect to the valid and severable part of the order." 10.
Assuming that the second part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the. first part of the order should not be given the fullest effect The Court cannot pass a new order of dismissal, but surely it can give effect to the valid and severable part of the order." 10. The impugned orders, when tested on the anvil of principle of law laid down in Jaswant Singh Gill and R. Jeevaratnam (supra), cannot be faulted with as would warrant any indulgence. 11. Consequently, petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.