JUDGMENT : Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. Introduction: An order of the Appellate Tribunal under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘the Act’) is challenged in this Appeal. Procedurally, an appeal to this Court lies in sixty days under Section 42 of the Act; the period is extendable by sixty more days-120 days in total. The Act casts a burden on the Appellate Tribunal to communicate the order either to the appellant or her authorized agent depending on the method of service. 2. Here the order was served on the appellant's counsel. There arose some delay in the appellant's coming to know of it. She filed this appeal taking alternative pleas: 1. There is no delay from the date of her knowledge about the order; 2. If there is delay, it needs to be condoned as there are justifiable reasons. This appeal raises these issues: Has the Tribunal properly served the order on the party? Is there any delay? Does the procedure prescribed in the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Appeal) Rules, 2005 (‘the Rules') in conflict with that provided in the principal enactment? Dispute: 3. The appellant is the defendant in the Original Complaint No.308 of 2014 before the adjudicating authority under the Act. Shorn of extraneous particulars, we may observe that initially the adjudicating authority passed an order provisionally attaching the appellant's property-residential house. Subsequently the order of provisional attachment was confirmed through a final order dated 28.8.2014. Aggrieved, the appellant, invoking Section 26 of the Act, filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in FPAPMLA639/Cochin/2014. On 5.8.2015, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Later, the appellant filed this appeal along with an application to condone the delay if any. 4. The appellant's primary contention is that the appeal was filed within time under Section 42 of the Act for she obtained the certified copies from her counsel recently, i.e. on 11.1.2016. Nevertheless, the appellant has filed this interlocutory application as a matter of abundant caution: The delay, if any, to a tune of 102 days, may be condoned because there are justifiable grounds. The respondent has joined the issue by filing a counter affidavit. 5. Before proceeding further, we may have to ascertain whether there is any delay to be condoned. Nevertheless, the appellant has filed this interlocutory application as a matter of abundant caution: The delay, if any, to a tune of 102 days, may be condoned because there are justifiable grounds. The respondent has joined the issue by filing a counter affidavit. 5. Before proceeding further, we may have to ascertain whether there is any delay to be condoned. As seen from Section 42 of the Act, any person aggrieved by any decision of the Appellate Tribunal may appeal to this Court within sixty days from the date the Appellate Tribunal's decision is communicated. The proviso adds that the period for appealing can be extended by sixty more days. The total period for filing an appeal, therefore, is 120 days from the date of communication, 6. If we were to conclude that there was a delay, it would exceed 120 days as has been contended by the respondent. Then, the appeal would be hopelessly barred by time because the court has not been vested with any power of discretion to condone the delay beyond the maximum permissible period: 120 days. So, the moot question is whether the Appellate Tribunal has served its order on the appellant on time. It is an admitted fact on either side that a copy of the order was served through speed post on the appellant's counsel appearing before the Appellate Tribunal, then, The record reveals that a copy of the order was enclosed to a covering letter dated 7.8.2015 (Annexure R1(a)). 7. If we assume that it was dispatched on the same day, it could have, probably, reached the appellant's counsel in fifteen days. For, according to the respondent, it was not returned undelivered. So the respondent legitimately tries to draw a presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act that the copy of the order was duly served on the counsel within time. The question, then, is whether service of notice or order on the counsel amounts to its proper service on the party to the proceedings. Submissions: Appellant's : 8. Sri. Ramesh Chander, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has strenuously contended that neither the substantive provisions of the statute nor the rules made thereunder have contemplated service of notice on the agent, much less on the counsel. Submissions: Appellant's : 8. Sri. Ramesh Chander, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has strenuously contended that neither the substantive provisions of the statute nor the rules made thereunder have contemplated service of notice on the agent, much less on the counsel. In elaboration, he has submitted that under section 39 of the Act, the party to the proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal has a right to take the assistance of an authorised representative. According to him, an authorised representative need not be a lawyer alone; It can be any person who is competent to represent or assist the party to the proceedings. 9. The learned Senior Counsel has also submitted that sub-section (5) of Section 26 of the Act specifically mandates that the Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of its order to the parties to the appeal. In this context, drawing our attention to section 73 of the Act, which confers on the Central Government the rule making power, the learned Senior Counsel has laid emphasis on Rule 5(b) of the Rules. 10. On a perusal it is evident that Rule 5(b) of the Rules allows the Tribunal to serve notice on an authorised agent. Nevertheless, the teamed Senior Counsel contends that Rule 5(b) runs counter to Section 26(5) of the Act; so, it renders itself ultra vires. He has drawn our attention to the amended relief the appellant has sought; Rule 5 is ultra vires of the parent statute. 11. Eventually placing reliance on Benarsi Krishna Committee and others Vs. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited (2012) 9 SCC 496 , the learned Senior Counsel, in the alternative, has contended that an authorised agent to receive a notice cannot be a counsel who represents the party only before a particular forum, a judicial forum at that. He or she ought to have been specifically authorised to receive the postal communication. Respondent's: 12. Per contra, the learned Central Government Standing Counsel has, with equal vehemence, submitted that in the first place Rule 5 does not fall foul of either Section 26 or any other provision of the principal statute. According to her, Rule 5 only makes explicit what has already been implicit in Section 26(5) of the Act. She has further contended that in terms of Rule 5(b) of the Rules, the Tribunal has duly served a copy of the order on the appellant's counsel. According to her, Rule 5 only makes explicit what has already been implicit in Section 26(5) of the Act. She has further contended that in terms of Rule 5(b) of the Rules, the Tribunal has duly served a copy of the order on the appellant's counsel. And it remains undenied. In the end, she has urged us to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the period prescribed under section 42 of the Act, 13. Heard Sri. M. Ramesh Chander, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, and Smt. C.G. Preetha, the learned Central Government Standing Counsel. Issues: I. Does the service of, say, an order, on the counsel amount to its proper service on the party to the proceedings? II. Is Rule 5 ultra vires of the Parent Statute? Discussion: Issue No.I. 14. To begin with, to the credit of learned counsel on either side, we may acknowledge that they have referred to various analogous and, in some cases, in para materia provisions governing the service of notices either on the parties or on their authorised agents. A case m point is Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The expression employed is 'delivered'. On the other hand, Section 26(5) of the Act here employs '"send". In section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the expression is "by giving a notice in writing". In Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, Section 14 deals with service of notice. That provision employs the expression "served". 15. We may, in this context, refer to Section 39 of the Act here. It permits a party to the proceedings either to appear in person or to take the assistance of any authorised representative of his choice to present his case before the Appellate Tribunal. An explanation is appended to the provision: "Authorised representative" shall have the same meaning as assigned to it under sub-section (2) of Section 288 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 16. As seen from the Income Tax Act, sub-section (2) of Section 288 defines "authorised representative" to mean a person authorised by the assessee in writing to appear on his or her behalf. It includes any legal practitioner, an accountant, or any person who has passed an accountancy examination recognised by the Board. It mentions certain other categories, which need no enumeration. 17. It includes any legal practitioner, an accountant, or any person who has passed an accountancy examination recognised by the Board. It mentions certain other categories, which need no enumeration. 17. The fulcrum of the appellant's submissions is Rule 5 of the Rules. At the outset, we may consider Rule 4, too. It defines 'order' as the one passed by an Appellate Tribunal, Rule 5 delineates the meaning of 'service’. There is no cavil concerning the proposition that an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal falls within the definition of ‘order' under Rule 4; it needs to be served in the manner indicated either in the statute or in the rules made thereunder-so long as the procedures prescribed in the statute and the rules coexist. 18. It is trite to observe that if there is to be any repugnancy or conflict between the principal legislation and the subordinate legislation, the subordinate legislation always yields. Equally trite is the proposition that, before any adjudicatory forum concludes that there is an irreconcilable incongruity between the principal and the subordinate legislation, it should strive to harmoniously construe both. In so far as rule 5 is concerned, it reads as follows: “5. Equally trite is the proposition that, before any adjudicatory forum concludes that there is an irreconcilable incongruity between the principal and the subordinate legislation, it should strive to harmoniously construe both. In so far as rule 5 is concerned, it reads as follows: “5. Service of notice, requisitions, or orders.- A notice, requisition, or an order issued under these rules shall be served on any person in the following manner:- (a) by delivering or tendering the notice of requisition or order to that person or the person duly authorized by him; or (b) by sending the notice or requisition or order to him by registered post with acknowledgement due to the address of his place of residence or his last known place of residence or the place where he carried on, or last carried on, business or personally works or last worked for gain; or (c) by affixing it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the premises in which the person resides or is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally works or has worked for gain and that written report thereof should be witnessed by two persons; or (d) if the notice or requisition or order cannot be served under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c), then by publishing in a leading newspaper (both in vernacular and in English) having wide circulation in the area or jurisdiction in which the person resides or is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally works or last worked for gain.” 19. A notice or an order needs to be served in the manner provided. Here the procedure is in the alternative. First, under sub- rule (a) a notice or an order can be delivered or tendered on the person or the person duly authorised by the party to the proceedings. Under sub-rule (b), the notice or the order can be sent by registered post with acknowledgment due; it must be addressed to the party to the proceedings at her place of residence or her last known place of residence or the place where she carries on business. 20. If either of the above eventualities fails, the service can be by way of affixture and, thereafter, if necessary, by publication. 20. If either of the above eventualities fails, the service can be by way of affixture and, thereafter, if necessary, by publication. In both those instances, the affixture and the publication must be addressed to the party to the proceedings-not the authorized agent. 21. Succinctly put, as per sub-rule (a), if the service is by way of delivery, it can be either on the person or his authroised agent. If it is by registered post, it must be only on the person-the authorized agent stands excluded. 22. Here it is an admitted fact that the Appellate Tribunal has chosen sub-rule (b) for communicating its order-through registered post with acknowledgement due. Once we accept that fact, it goes without saying that sub-rule (a) stands excluded. Indeed, the appellant has contended that under sub-rule (a), a duly authorised agent must be the person authorised by the party only to receive the notice. This authorization, as has been contemplated under sub-rule (a), she asserts, has nothing to do with what has been mentioned under section 39. 23. To make matters simple, we wish to observe that the appellant's submissions on interpreting any expression employed in sub-rule (a) need not be considered. Indisputably, the Appellate Tribunal has invoked sub-rule (b) to serve a copy of the order. On whom it has been served and whether that service amounts to proper service are altogether different matters, though. 24. Now, we will focus on sub-rule (b) of Rule 5, The Appellate Authority did send a copy of the order to the appellant's counsel, who represented her before the appellate forum. It was sent through speed post, a variant of registered post. 25. From days of Taylor v. Taylor (1876 (1) Ch.D. 426), the aphoristic judicial assertion is that statutory conformity brooks no deviation. Once a statute mandates a particular procedure, it ought to be followed in the manner prescribed or not at all. On this proposition, one can with profit refer to Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor ( AIR 1936 PC 253 ), State of UP v. Singhara Singh ( AIR 1964 SC 358 ), Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya (1987) 4 SCC 525 , Ram Phal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma ( AIR 2004 SC 1657 ), and M. P. Wakf Board v. Subhan Shah (2006) 10 SCC 696 ). 26. 26. Here we may consider what the learned Central Government Standing Counsel has insisted on: Serving order even through post still amounts to delivering or tendering in terms of sub- rule (a) of rule 5, We are afraid, the whole sub-rule (b) becomes otiose if that interpretation is favoured. 27. It is elementary that we need to give effect to every word and phrase employed in a statute or rule, for cardinal is the cannon of construction that there can be no presumption about legislative surplusage. If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect. None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence (United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 28. A mere perusal of Rule 5 compels us to conclude that sub- rule (a) and (b) operate in the alternative. Once the appellate forum has chosen the procedure under sub-rule (b), it cannot be heard saying that it is only an expansion of the procedure under sub-rule (a). Therefore, we are inclined to hold that sub-rule (b) is mandatory in its scope and ambit; necessarily, the communication should be addressed to the party and the party alone. Any alternative service through post on the so-called authorised agent does not amount to proper service. 29. There is yet another reason for us to come to this conclusion: Once an infraction of a provision-even-procedural-leads to adverse or penal consequences, the procedure needs strict compliance; it brooks no dilution. Further, even if there were to be any ambiguity in a provision, the infraction of which is alleged, the interpretative inclination must be towards the person affected by that infraction. Here, undeniably once a person is non-suited on the ground of limitation, the consequences are penal. Therefore, our conclusion that sub-rule (b) of rule 5 has been violated further gets fortified on this ground of strict interpretation. 30. Though the learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on Benarsi Krishna Committee (supra), given the conclusion we have arrived at, it needs no reference. Further, the decision relied on interprets the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act; it concerns the service of notice. The procedure prescribed there substantially differs from what is prescribed in the Money Laundering Act or the Appellate Rules. Issue No.II: Is Rule 5 ultra vires of the Parent Statute? 31. Further, the decision relied on interprets the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act; it concerns the service of notice. The procedure prescribed there substantially differs from what is prescribed in the Money Laundering Act or the Appellate Rules. Issue No.II: Is Rule 5 ultra vires of the Parent Statute? 31. Justice Felix Frankfurter held in Spector Motor Service, The. v. McLaughlin (323 U.S. 101, 103, (1944) that if there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not pass on questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable. The assertion is the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. A Constitutional Court, unless inevitable, should avoid adjudicating constitutional issues and resolve the case on, say, statutory grounds. 32. Because the answer to Issue No.1 resolves the legal tangle on delayed approach to the court, we need not address this issue. Conclusion: 33. As seen from the record, the appellant applied for the certified copy of the order on 5.1.2016 and obtained it on 11.1.2016; she filed the appeal on 15.1,2016. There is a delay of 55 days, In fact, the appellant filed the appeal within four days after her getting the certified copy. 34. Viewed from another perspective, the appellant came to know about the order on 22.9.2015, when the respondents filed the counter affidavit in the appellants previous writ petition: W.P.(C) No.28032 of 2015. The respondent asserted that the Tribunal had already served the order copy on the appellant's counsel. Reckoned from 22.9.2015, there is a delay of 55 days in filing the appeal. Given the reason of iii health cited by the appellant in the affidavit filed to support the application and the attendant circumstances, we feel that it is a fit case for exercising our discretion to condone the delay-which is within the permissible limit of sixty days. We accordingly condone the delay. The registry is directed to process the appeal further. No order on costs.