JUDGMENT : Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. W.A. No.1042 of 2015 1. The issue arising for decision in the writ appeal at the instance of the State Government is as to whether the learned single Judge had acted, in accordance with law, in the matter of interpreting the term 'public purpose' as defined in Section 2(xiv) of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008, the 'KCPLW Act', for short. 2. We have heard the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner. We have also heard the learned counsel for the petitioners in the captioned writ petitions. 3. In terms of Section 10 of KCPLW Act, it is the power of the Government to grant exemption to convert or reclaim paddy land on the basis of the report submitted by the State Level Committee. The State Level Committee has to draw its conclusions on the basis of materials, including the Local Level Monitoring Committee's report. The requirement on the basis of which such exemptions can be granted, among other things, is 'public purpose' as defined in Section 2(xiv) of the KCPLW Act. It reads as follows:- "2(xiv) 'Public purpose' means purposes for the schemes undertaken or financed by the Centre-State Governments, Government-Quasi- Government Institutions, Local Self Government Institutions, Statutory Bodies and other schemes as may be specified by the Government from time to time." 4. The above definition clause is issue specific and it is clear that the term 'public purpose' means what is said in that definition clause; nothing beyond. This means that purposes for the schemes undertaken or financed by the Central-State Governments, Government-Quasi-Government Institutions, Local Self Government Institutions, Statutory Bodies or other schemes as may be specified by the Government from time to time alone would fall under the definition of 'public purpose' for the purpose of the KCPLW Act. 5. However, the learned single Judge in the judgment impugned in the writ appeal has taken the view that education itself is a public purpose and providing land in connection with an educational institution is also a public purpose, having regard to the category of children in standards I to V, who may be eligible for certain benefits in terms of the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. We are clear in our mind that the approach adopted by the learned single Judge cannot be sustained in view of the clear provision of the definition clause of the term 'public purpose' for the purpose of the KCPLW Act. Under such circumstances, the impugned judgment is only to be vacated. 6. However, we think that having regard to the number of students who are shown to be studying in the school concerned; in particular, Ext.P5 report of the Village Officer, it would be appropriate if the Government takes a dispassionate look on the whole issue and considers whether the case of the school concerned can be considered on any ground referable to the executive power of the State Government or under any other statutory provisions. We take this approach, more particularly, because the existing transit available for the young ones to the school appears to be dangerous, going by the report of the Village Officer. 7. In the result, the impugned judgment is vacated and the respondent/writ petitioner is left with liberty to move the Government for any order which it may pass, in the light of what we have stated herein above. The writ appeal is ordered accordingly. WP(C) Nos.13690 & 14015 of 2015 These writ petitions are listed along with W.A.No.1042 of 2015 as they are referred to the Division Bench by the learned single Judge as per reference orders dated 29.05.2015 and 15.06.2015 respectively. They are filed for a direction to the State Government authorities to consider and pass orders on the respective applications filed by the writ petitioners therein in the light of the dictum laid down by this Court in judgment dated 28.11.2014 in WPC No.30463 of 2013, which is challenged in W.A.No.1042 of 2015. That writ appeal has been disposed of vacating the judgment impugned therein leaving the writ petitioner therein with liberty to move the Government for reliefs, if any, as may be possible and available within the realm of governance within the executive domain and also within other statutory provisions. Hence, leaving open such right of the writ petitioners, the directions sought for herein are refused. These writ petitions are ordered accordingly.