JUDGMENT : Asha Arora, J. 1. The instant revisional application is against an order dated 7th May, 2016 passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Sealdah in Title Suit No. 109 of 2000 renumbered as Title Suit No. 57 of 2014. 2. By the impugned order the Trial Court rejected an application filed by the defendant no. 3 for deciding the point of maintainability of the suit pursuant to the Order dated 8th February, 2016 passed by this Court in C.O. No. 4218 of 2015. By the aforesaid order the Trial Court was directed to decide the issue of maintainability on two points namely, whether the suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the CPC) and whether it is ex facie barred by limitation. The Trial Court decided both the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and rejected the application filed by the defendant no. 3. 3. Aggrieved, the petitioner /defendant no. 3 has approached this Court. 4. Leading this Court through paragraph 12 of the previous suit being Title Suit No. 18 of 1999 and paragraph 6 of the present suit being Title Suit No. 109 of 2000 (renumbered as Title suit No. 57 of 2014), Mr Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/defendant no. 3 argued that the cause of action as regards the petitioner/defendant no. 3 in both the suits is the same. The deed of conveyance dated 9th November, 1992 executed in favour of the defendant no. 3 has been assailed by the plaintiffs in the present suit as well as in the earlier suit. Mr. Mitra contended that on the basis of the cause of action in the earlier suit plaintiffs could have sought for further relief in the said suit in the nature of cancellation of the deed of conveyance dated 9th November, 1992 and recovery of possession. Instead of claiming the entire relief in the earlier suit plaintiffs filed the present suit seeking cancellation of the impugned deed of conveyance and recovery of possession without obtaining the leave of the Court as contemplated by Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC. In the absence of obtaining such leave in the earlier suit, plaintiffs are precluded from bringing a subsequent suit claiming the reliefs which were omitted in the earlier suit. In the absence of obtaining such leave in the earlier suit, plaintiffs are precluded from bringing a subsequent suit claiming the reliefs which were omitted in the earlier suit. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that though the plaintiffs had knowledge of the deed of conveyance at the time of filing of the earlier suit, no relief was sought for cancellation of the deed. Therefore the present suit claiming the reliefs which ought to have been sought in the earlier suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC. To buttress his submissions Mr. Mitra relied upon the decision reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 595 (State Bank of India Versus Gracure Pharmaceuticals Limited). Reference has also been made to the decisions reported in (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 625 in the case of Virgo Industries (ENG.) Private Limited Versus Venture Tech Solutions Private Limited and the case of N.V. Srinivasa Murthy and Others versus Mariyamma (dead) by proposed LRS. & Others reported in (2005)5 Supreme Court Cases 548. On the point of limitation, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present suit is for cancellation of the deed of conveyance which was registered on 9th November, 1992. Since no specific date has been mentioned in the plaint with regard to the plaintiff’s knowledge of the deed of conveyance, the date of registration of the deed becomes the date of deemed knowledge. Therefore the claim for cancellation of the deed of conveyance is barred by Article 59 of the Limitation Act. In support of such submission reference has been made to the decision reported in (2000)7 Supreme Court Cases 702 in the case of Dilboo (smt) (dead) by LRS. And Others versus Dhanraji (Smt)(dead) and Others. It has also been contended that the claim of the plaintiffs for recovery of possession being consequential to the cancellation of the deed of conveyance, cannot be granted. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs in the present suit clearly brings the case within the purview of Article 59 of the Limitation Act. So the suit is barred by limitation. To fortify his submission reliance has been placed upon the decision reported in AIR 1981 Patna 219 in the case of Bilat Das and Others Versus Babuji Das. 5. At the outset, Mr. So the suit is barred by limitation. To fortify his submission reliance has been placed upon the decision reported in AIR 1981 Patna 219 in the case of Bilat Das and Others Versus Babuji Das. 5. At the outset, Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the opposite parties/plaintiffs invited this Court’s attention to the fact that the revisional application has been filed by a company named Edward Food Research & Analysis Centre Limited whereas in the cause title of the plaint of Title Suit No. 109 of 2000 M/S Edward Keventors Private Limited is the defendant no. 3. The preamble of the revisional application clearly mentions the name of the petitioner as “Edward Food Research & Analysis Centre Limited (formerely known as Edward Keventer Private Limited).” It appears that the name of the defendant no. 3 (company) has been changed and it is now known as Edward Food Research and Analysis Centre Limited. This fact is evident from the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC which was filed on behalf of the petitioner under the name “Edward Food Research & Analysis Centre Limited”. The affidavit in support of the revisional application as well as the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC have been affirmed by the same person namely, Kailash Chandra Joshi as the Constituted Attorney of the defendant no. 3 Company. There is therefore no substance in the submission on behalf of the opposite parties on this score. 6. On merits learned counsel for the opposite parties/plaintiffs argued that in view of the order dated 8th February, 2016 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in C.O No. 4218 of 2015 there is no further scope for revision against the impugned order of the Trial Court. Referring to paragraph 4 of the order in C.O No. 4218 of 2015 learned counsel for the opposite parties sought to impress that in terms of the observation made therein the Trial Court found that though on a bare perusal of the plaint it cannot be said that the present suit is ex facie barred by limitation, the issue is required to be decided by evidence. It has further been contended on behalf of the opposite parties that the Trial Court was justified in holding that the present suit is not barred by Order 2 Rule 2 since the cause of action in the two suits is not the same. 7. In C.O No. 4218 of 2015 a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while allowing the revisional application in part directed the Trial Court to reconsider the application filed by the petitioner only on two points namely, bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC and limitation. In the aforesaid order the following observation has been made on the issue of limitation: “There cannot be any doubt that the law of limitation is essentially a mixed question of law and fact. The power to reject an application being barred by limitation can be exercised at any stage of hearing. However, if on a bare perusal of the plaint it appears that the suit is ex facie barred by limitation, the Court can pronounce a judgement rejecting the said application”. In accordance with the direction of this Court in C.O No. 4218 of 2015 the Trial Court reconsidered the matter on the above mentioned two points. The relevant portion of the Trial Court’s finding on the issue of limitation is quoted hereunder: “Plaintiffs of the instant suit in the plaint contended that very recently the plaintiffs came to understand that the acts of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 were based on the deed of conveyance and thereafter, making search in the Registry Office they found about the deed of conveyance registered in the office of the Registrar of Assurance, Calcutta. These words “very recently” are required to be adjudged on the basis of the evidence and on bare reading of the plaint, it does not appear ex facie that the suit is barred by law of limitation. Article 59 of the Limitation Act prescribes period of limitation when time runs from plaintiffs’ knowledge and there is no express requirement of diligence on his part. Time runs when the facts first become known to the plaintiffs. It is a pure question of fact (and not law). When the plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts entitled him to have the instrument cancelled or set aside, it is required to be considered on the basis of evidence placed by both the sides. Time runs when the facts first become known to the plaintiffs. It is a pure question of fact (and not law). When the plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts entitled him to have the instrument cancelled or set aside, it is required to be considered on the basis of evidence placed by both the sides. Therefore, only on perusal of the plaint, it cannot be adjudged that the instant suit is barred by the law of limitation. On the basis of above discussion, this court is of the view that this suit is not barred by law of limitation ex facie.” 8. It is evident that the issue of limitation has been dealt with in terms of the order of this Court in C.O No. 4218 of 2015. The finding of the Trial Court that the point of limitation (as quoted hereinabove) is required to be considered by evidence warrants no interference. Coming to the next issue, to decide whether the claim of the plaintiffs in the present suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 the reliefs sought for in the two suits need to be looked into. Plaintiffs filed the previous suit being Title Suit No. 18 of 1999 against Edward Keventer Private Limited (now known as Edward Research and Analysis Centre Limited, the present petitioner) and other defendants praying inter alia for the following reliefs: “ (a) A decree in preliminary form for partition of the suit properties by metes and bounds declaring the 50% share of the plaintiffs in respect of schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ properties and also 40% share of consideration money for Rs. 8,500/- out of schedule ‘C’ property mentioned in the schedules of the plaint. (b) A final Decree for partition of the entire suit properties by metes and bounds in terms of the preliminary decree with delivery of possession therein by the help of partition commissioner to be appointed by the Ld. Court. (C) A decree for partition and declaration that the plaintiffs are the owners of undivided 50% share of the premises no. 20, Gopal Chandra Mukherjee Road, (Schedule A (iv)) of the plaint and the deed of conveyance between the defendants no. 1 and 2 with the defendant no. 6 is not binding upon the plaintiffs. (d) Receiver; (e) Inventory and accounts, decree be passed. (f) Temporary Injunction, (g) Permanent Injunction. 20, Gopal Chandra Mukherjee Road, (Schedule A (iv)) of the plaint and the deed of conveyance between the defendants no. 1 and 2 with the defendant no. 6 is not binding upon the plaintiffs. (d) Receiver; (e) Inventory and accounts, decree be passed. (f) Temporary Injunction, (g) Permanent Injunction. (h) Order and/or decree be passed under Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P. Code. (i) Cost of the suit. (j) Any other relief or reliefs the plaintiffs are entitled in law and in equity.” 9. The subsequent suit being Title Suit No. 109 of 2000 (renumbered as Title Suit No. 57 of 2014) which is the present suit was instituted by the plaintiffs against Edward Keventer Private Limited (now known as Edward Food Research and Analysis Centre Limited, the present petitioner) and two other defendants praying inter alia for the following reliefs: “(a) declaration that the plaintiffs are the 50% owners of the suit property; (b) declaration that the plaintiffs are not bound in terms of the deed of conveyance between the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 with the defendant No. 3 vide Deed No. 20384 in Book No. I, executed before the Registrar of Assurance at Calcutta dated 9.11.1992; (C) declaration that the said deed of conveyance dated 9.11.1992 is invalid, illegal and void as the same has been executed fraudulently; (d) declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to get monthly rent of the suit property from the defendant no. 3 since 10.12.78 till today towards their 50% share; (e) Cost of the suit; (f) Any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiffs are found to be entitled in law and in equity. 10. At the instance of the plaintiffs the plaint of the present suit was amended by an order dated 11th June, 2003 inserting thereby the following prayers: “(e) a decree of cancellation of Deed of conveyance dated 9.11.1992 registered before the Sub-Registrar of Assurance Calcutta vide Book no. I Deed no. 595 pages 328 to 341 being No. 20384 for the year 1992 executed by the defendants no. 1 & 2 in favour of the defendant no. 3 and to have noted the same to the said Registry Office. (f) Decree of recovery of possession evicting the defendant no. 3 from the suit property. (g) Cost of the suit. 595 pages 328 to 341 being No. 20384 for the year 1992 executed by the defendants no. 1 & 2 in favour of the defendant no. 3 and to have noted the same to the said Registry Office. (f) Decree of recovery of possession evicting the defendant no. 3 from the suit property. (g) Cost of the suit. (h) any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiffs are found to be entitled to in law and equity. 11. In the previous suit (Title Suit No.18 of 1999) the petitioner has been impleaded as the defendant no. 6 and in the present suit he is the defendant no. 3. By way of prayer (C) of the plaint of the previous suit plaintiffs have claimed a declaration that the deed of conveyance executed in favour of the defendant no.6 is not binding upon them. The cause of action for filing the previous suit against the petitioner has clearly been spelt out in paragraph 12 of the plaint of the said suit the relevant portion of which is extracted herein below: “12. That the defendants no. 1 and 2 similarly and illegally sold, transferred and parted with possession on 9.11.1992 the joint properties of plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 and 2 more or less 17 cottahs and eight chittaks of land with structures standing thereon situated at premises no. 20, Gopal Mukherjee Road, P.S. Cossipore, District : North 24 Parganas, Calcutta 700 002 to and unto M/S Edward Keventor Private Limited of 11/3, Lindsay Street, Calcutta- 700 016 at a consideration of Rs. 1,40,000/- describing themselves as 16 annas owners of the property only to deprive the plaintiffs of their due shares. The plaintiffs state that the said deed of conveyance is a fictitious deed and executed under valued and the defendant nos. 1 and 2 illegally sold the entire 100% share of the said premises fraudulently to the defendant no. 6 with the intention to deprive due share of 50% of the plaintiffs.” In paragraph 20 of the plaint of the previous suit it is stated that the defendant no. 6 (Edward Keventer Private Limited) is a necessary party. On the basis of the cause of action as averred in paragraph 12 referred to hereinabove the relief in terms of prayer (C) mentioned above has been claimed. The cause of action for filing the present suit as against the petitioner/defendant no. 6 (Edward Keventer Private Limited) is a necessary party. On the basis of the cause of action as averred in paragraph 12 referred to hereinabove the relief in terms of prayer (C) mentioned above has been claimed. The cause of action for filing the present suit as against the petitioner/defendant no. 3 finds place in paragraph 6 of the plaint of the instant suit which reads thus: “6. That very recently these plaintiffs came to understand that the defendants nos. 1 and 2 by suppressing everything conveyed the entire suit property in favour of the defendant no. 3 against valuable consideration without any consent, permission and knowledge of the plaintiffs as well as doing fraudulent acts and as such the said Deed of conveyance between the defendant no. 1 and 2 with the defendant no. 3 is illegal, invalid and void ab initio. The said deed of conveyance was registered before the Registrar of Assurance at Calcutta on 9.11.1992 in Book No. I, Deed No. 20384”. 12. It is clear from the above quoted paragraphs of the plaint of the two suits that the cause of action for instituting the previous suit and the present suit against Edward Keventer Private Limited is in substance the same. The claim of the plaintiffs as against this defendant in both the suits emanates from the impugned deed of conveyance dated 9th November, 1992. Simply put, it is clear from a plain reading of the plaints of the two suits that the cause of action on which the present claim is based had already arisen when the plaintiffs sought enforcement of their claim in the previous suit. In other words, the facts on the basis of which the present suit was filed, existed on the date of filing of the earlier suit. No fresh of action arose in between the first and the second suit. In the present suit plaintiffs prayed for cancellation of the deed of conveyance dated 9th November, 1992 and sought for a declaration that the deed is invalid, illegal, void as the same has been executed fraudulently. The said deed of conveyance has been assailed in the previous suit on the same ground (in paragraph 12 of the plaint) with a claim that it is not binding upon the plaintiffs. In the present suit plaintiffs also prayed for recovery of possession of premises no. The said deed of conveyance has been assailed in the previous suit on the same ground (in paragraph 12 of the plaint) with a claim that it is not binding upon the plaintiffs. In the present suit plaintiffs also prayed for recovery of possession of premises no. 20, Gopal Mukherjee Road which is the subject of the deed of conveyance dated 9th November, 1992. There is also a claim of rent in respect of the said suit property from the petitioner/defendant no. 3. It is clear that the reliefs prayed for in the present suit could have been sought in the previous suit. Order 2 Rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires every suit to include the whole of the claim to which the plaintiff is entitled in respect of a particular cause of action. The provision is against the splitting up of claims and the splitting up of remedies by filing separate suits. The object of the provision is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings on the same cause of action so that a person is not vexed twice for the same cause. In this context it is expedient to refer to the provision of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC which provides as follows: “R.2. Suit to include the whole claim.-(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. Relinquishment of part of claim.- (2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.-(3) A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Explanation.-For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action.” 13. Explanation.-For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action.” 13. The provision of Order 2 Rule 2(2) does not contemplate omission or relinquishment of any portion of the plaintiff’s claim so as to entitle him to come back later to seek what has been omitted or relinquished by filing a subsequent suit. Order 2 Rule 2(3) contemplates a situation where a plaintiff being entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action, omits to sue for all such reliefs, he is precluded from bringing a subsequent suit to claim the reliefs earlier omitted except in a situation where leave of the Court had been obtained. Undisputedly the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs without obtaining the leave of the Court in the earlier suit. The present suit seeking the reliefs omitted in the earlier suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC since no leave was obtained in the previous suit. 14. On the point of applicability of the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 in a situation where the second suit has been filed during the pendency of the first suit, the Supreme Court held in the judgment reported in (2013)1 Supreme Court Cases 625 in the case of Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited Versus Venturetech Solutions Private Limited that Order 2 Rule 2 would be applicable even when the subsequent suit has been filed during the pendency of the earlier suit. Disposal of the previous suit is not a requirement therefore. The relevant paragraph 17 of the judgement of the Apex Court is as follows: “17. The learned Single Judge of the High Court had considered, and very rightly, to be bound to follow an earlier Division Bench order in R. Vimalchand v. Ramalingam holding that the provisions of Order 2Rule 2 CPC would be applicable only when the first suit is disposed of. As in the present case the second set of suits were filed during the pendency of the earlier suits, it was held, on the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, that the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2(3) will not be attracted. As in the present case the second set of suits were filed during the pendency of the earlier suits, it was held, on the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, that the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2(3) will not be attracted. Judicial discipline required the learned Single Judge of the High Court to come to the aforesaid conclusion. However, we are unable to agree with the same in view of the object behind the enactment of the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as already discussed by us, namely, that Order 2 Rule 2 CPC seeks to avoid multiplicity of litigations on the same cause of action. If that is the true object of the law, on which we do not entertain any doubt, the same would not stand fully sub served by holding that the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC will apply only if the first suit is disposed of and not in a situation where the second suit has been filed during the pendency of the first suit. Rather, Order 2 Rule 2 CPC will apply to both the aforesaid situations.” 15. In view of the foregoing discussion the present suit being Title Suit No. 57 of 2014 pending before the learned Judge Small Causes Court Sealdah being barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC stands dismissed. 16. The revisional application is accordingly allowed. 17. A copy of this judgement shall be sent forthwith to the Trial Court.