JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This case has a long chequered history. Respondent No.1 in the year 1980 started his career as a driver with the petitioners. It was alleged that in the year 1991 respondent No.1 had misappropriated the funds of the Federation amounting to Rs. 20,725/- and remained absent from duty with effect from 09.03.1992 to 23.04.1992. Respondent No.1 was charge-sheeted for misbehaviour with the staff and for disobedience of the orders of the superiors. Major penalty of remuneration was imposed upon him vide order dated 13.07.1994. This order was assailed by filing appeal before respondent No.2 (Registrar Co-operative Societies). However, it was alleged that respondent No.1 did not pursue the appeal and the same was dismissed in default on 17.12.1994. Respondent No.1 thereafter filed an application for restoration of the appeal, but the same was also dismissed in default on 21.03.1995. Respondent No.1 filed CWP No.1844 of 1995 before this Court which came to be allowed on 30.03.1998 and respondent No.2 was directed to supply copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner and to proceed further from that stage in accordance with law. 2. The petitioners filed review petition No.9 of 1998 which was allowed vide order dated 12.10.1998 and the order earlier passed by this Court on 30.03.1998 was held to be without jurisdiction and consequently the writ petition was ordered to be dismissed. The order in review was assailed by respondent No.1 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP. The Hon’ble Supreme Court remanded the case back to this Court for taking afresh decision, but when the writ petition came up for hearing, the same was withdrawn by respondent No.1 with liberty to pursue the remedy in accordance with law. 3. Respondent No.1 thereafter filed an appeal before the State Government which came to be accepted vide order dated 09.04.2012 and the case was remanded to respondent No.2 for deciding the same on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing to respondent No.1. Respondent No.2 vide order dated 13.03.2014 granted liberty to respondent No.1 to file an appeal before petitioner No.2, who was further directed to give an opportunity of being heard to respondent No.1. Petitioner No.2 was also directed to pass a speaking order and take into consideration the entire contentions of respondent No.1 raised in the appeal. 4. On 18.11.2014, petitioner No.2 rejected the appeal filed by respondent No.1. Petitioner No.2 was also directed to pass a speaking order and take into consideration the entire contentions of respondent No.1 raised in the appeal. 4. On 18.11.2014, petitioner No.2 rejected the appeal filed by respondent No.1. This order was assailed by respondent No.1 by filing revision petition before respondent No.2 under Rule 3.15(a) (b) of HIMFED Service Rules. Respondent No.2 vide order dated 20.11.2015 allowed the revision. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 13.07.1994 and thereafter the order passed by the Appellate Authority on 18.11.2014 were quashed and set aside. However, after taking into consideration the gravity of proved charges, respondent No.1 was imposed penalty of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect. The period of absence of 76 days was ordered to be regularized by sanctioning the leave of kind due in favour of respondent No.1 and lastly respondent No.1 was held entitled to all consequential benefits of service and the amount of recovery against fertilizer affected from the salary of respondent No.1 was ordered to be refunded after reconciliation of the accounts alongwith 6% interest. 5. The findings recorded by respondent No.2 have been assailed in this petition as being totally perverse and contrary to law. 6. Respondent No.1 has filed reply wherein preliminary submissions have been raised to the effect that the instant petition is a gross abuse of the powers of this Court and has been filed with the sole aim of prolonging the agony of the replying respondent, who has been harassed by the writ petitioners ever-since 1994 and is still being continued to be harassed even today. Respondent No.1 has thereafter narrated the sequences of events as set out in para-3 of the preliminary submissions. 7. Insofar as the merits of the order passed by respondent No.2 are concerned, respondent No.1 has supported the same as per detailed submissions made in para-5 of the preliminary submissions. Respondent No.2 has not chosen to file any reply. 8. The petitioners in their rejoinder have chronologically set out the list of events ever since 1992 and the same reads thus:- Date/Year Particulars of event 7-10-92 Charge sheeted vide memorandum 5537 dated 7-10-1992 Charges framed:- 1. Misappropriation of fund of federation. 2. Willful absence from duty. 3. Misconduct and indiscipline. 4. Disobedience of orders of the superiors. 5-11-92 Vide Himfed Office order No.5713-16 dated 5-11-92 inquiry officer M.C Jublani. Deputy Controller (F&A) was appointed. Misappropriation of fund of federation. 2. Willful absence from duty. 3. Misconduct and indiscipline. 4. Disobedience of orders of the superiors. 5-11-92 Vide Himfed Office order No.5713-16 dated 5-11-92 inquiry officer M.C Jublani. Deputy Controller (F&A) was appointed. 31-3-1994 Enquiry was completed, total 10 witnesses were examined on behalf of Federation and 2 witnesses were examined by Sh. Gurcharan Singh. Out of four charges, 2 charges are proved and one is partly proved, and one charge was not proved against Delinquent employee. 1. Misappropriation of fund of Federation proved. 2. Willful absence from duty partly proved out of 85 days 76 days absent. 3. Misconduct and indiscipline …Not proved. 4. Disobedience of order of the superiors proved. 6-6-1994 Matter was placed before administrative committee, committee has decided to remove Gurcharan Singh from service and matter was sent to Managing Director. 13-7-1994 Managing Director has removed the delinquent Gurcharan Singh from service. Copy of removal order alongwith enquiry report was given to present petitioner Sh. Gurcharan Singh. August, 1994 Appeal is filed before Registrar Co-operative Societies. December, 1994 Appeal was dismissed for default. March, 1995 Application for restoration filed. March, 1995 Application for restoration was also dismissed for default. July, 1995 CWP 1844/1995 was filed before the Hon’ble High Court. March, 1998 CWP was allowed. April, 1998 Review Petition No.9/1998 filed by HIMFED. October, 1998 Review Petition 9/1998 was allowed and liberty was given to appellant Gurcharan Singh to approach appropriate forum. November/December, 1998 Gurcharan Singh filed original application No.2276/98 before Administrative Tribunal of Himachal Pradesh. 1999 SLP for recall of order dated 3-11-2000 was filed after withdrawal of original application. 15-9-2005 SLP was decided and matter was remanded to Hon’ble High Court for fresh decision. 26-8-2009 Gurcharan Singh has withdrawn the writ petition with liberty to approach the appropriate authority. June, 2011 Review Petition filed before Secretary Cooperation to the Govt. of H.P. for setting aside the dismiss to default order dated 17-12-1994 and 20-3-1995 which was allowed and review petition was restored to its original place. 13 March, 2014 Matter was decided with liberty to petitioner to approach the BOD. 25-3-2014 Appeal was filed before Board of Director. 29-9-2014 Appeal was heard by BOD. BOD affirmed the previous decision taken by management of Himfed and against the respondent. December, 2014 Revision petition was filed before Ld. RCS. 20-11-2015 Revision petition was allowed vide order dated 20-11-2015. 9. 25-3-2014 Appeal was filed before Board of Director. 29-9-2014 Appeal was heard by BOD. BOD affirmed the previous decision taken by management of Himfed and against the respondent. December, 2014 Revision petition was filed before Ld. RCS. 20-11-2015 Revision petition was allowed vide order dated 20-11-2015. 9. On the strength of these events, it is claimed that respondent No.1 was never harassed by the petitioners, rather it is respondent No.1, who had dragged the petitioners into unwanted and unwarranted litigation. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material placed on record. 10. It is not in dispute that respondent No.1 pursuant to the orders passed by respondent No.2 has been taken back in service. The only grievance of the petitioners as submitted by Ms.Ranjana Parmar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms.Komal Kumari, Advocate, is with respect to grant of entire backwages and imposition of 6% interest on the amount to be worked out after reconciliation of accounts. It is vehemently argued that the back-wages could not have been ordered to be paid to respondent No.1 as the principal of “no work, no pay” was fully applicable to the facts of the case. 11. In support of her contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance in U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. and another versus Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC 479 , wherein it has been held as under:- “17. Before Adverting to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties, we may observe that although direction to pay full back wages on a declaration that the order of termination was invalid used to be the usual result but now with the passage of time, a pragmatic view of the matter is being taken by the court realizing that an industry may not be compelled to pay to the workman for the period during which he apparently contributed little or nothing at all to it and/or for a period that was spent unproductively as a result whereof the employer would be compelled to go back to a situation which prevailed many years ago, namely, when the workman was retrenched.” 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in order to counter the arguments and justify the non-applicability of rule of “no work no pay” has placed reliance on the following judgments:- AIR 1991 SC 2010 : (1991) 4 SCC 109 (2014) 14 SCC 375 (2013) 7 SCC 595 13. In Union of India and others versus K.V. Jankiraman and others (1991) 4 SCC 109 , it had been urged by Union of India that the normal rule is “no work, no pay” and, therefore, a person cannot be allowed to draw the benefits of post, the duty of which he has not discharged. While rejecting the contention, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “24. It was further contended on their behalf that the normal rule is “no work no pay”. Hence a person cannot be allowed to draw the benefits of a post the duties of which he has not discharged. To allow him to do so is against the elementary rule that a person is to be paid only for the work he has done and not for the work he has not done. As against this, it was pointed out on behalf of the concerned employees, that on many occasions even frivolous proceedings are instituted at the instance of interested persons, sometimes with a specific object of denying the promotion due, and the employee concerned is made to suffer both mental agony and privations which are multiplied when he is also placed under suspension. When, therefore, at the end of such sufferings, he comes out with a clean bill, he has to be restored to all the benefits from which he was kept away unjustly. 25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.” 14. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.” 14. In State of Bihar and others versus Kripa Nand Singh and another (2014) 14 SCC 375 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “no work, no pay” is the rule and “no work, yet pay” is the exception and it is apt to reproduce paras 1 and 8 which read thus:- “1. Leave granted. “No work, no pay”, is the rule and “no work, yet pay”, is the exception. Compulsory waiting period is one such exception. But to qualify for the exception, an employee has to establish that he had made earnest endeavours and yet that he was not able to join duty for no fault on his part. He must also show his earnestness to join duty. Voluntary waiting period is not covered by the exception. 8. In the judgment dated 31-1-2002, the first round of litigation in Kripa Nand Singh v. State of Bihar CWJC No. 16087 of 2001 decided on 31-1-2002 (Pat), the High Court had made it clear that his entitlement for salary for the period between 24-2-1986 to 16-7-1991 would depend on whether he was at fault or not in joining any post during the period in question. His conduct speaks volumes to show that he was at fault. He waited for five years to get another posting. He had not made any representation during the said period for joining duty in any other place. His writ petition itself is after ten years of his joining duty at a place apparently of his choice. Though the order is dated 5-2-1986, he had joined duty only on 17-7-1991. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the period between 24-2-1986 to 16-7-1991 is to be treated as a compulsory waiting period. It is in fact a voluntary waiting period.” 15. In State of Uttar Pradesh versus Dayanand Chakrawarty and others (2013) 7 SCC 595 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if any employee is prevented by the employer from performing his duties, the employee cannot be blamed for having not worked, and the principle of “no pay no work” shall not be applicable to such employee, as would be evident from the following observations:- “48. In view of the orders passed by this Court in Harwindra Kumar versus Chief Engineer, Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300 , U.P. Jal Nigam versus Radhey Shyam Gautam (2007) 11 SCC 507 and U.P. Jal Nigam versus Jaswant Singh (2006) 11 SCC 464 , it was not open to the High Court to rely on some other decision of this Court, ratio of which is not applicable in the present case for determining back wages of the respondents restricting it to be 20% of the basic salary. We observe that the principle of “no pay no work” is not applicable to the employees who were guided by specific rules like Leave Rules, etc. relating to absence from duty. Such principle can be applied to only those employees who were not guided by any specific rule relating to absence from duty. If any employee is prevented by the employer from performing his duties, the employee cannot be blamed for having not worked, and the principle of “no pay no work” shall not be applicable to such employee.” 16. From the conspectus of the aforesaid judgments as relied upon by the respective parties, the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent No.1 was not entitled to the grant of back-wages on the principle of “no work, no pay” is apparently misconceived and based upon wrong notions of law. If an employee is not being offered work, he cannot be deprived of the wages. Deprivation to work against the post to which an employee is entitled to is always at the risk and responsibility of the employer and, therefore, cannot be made the basis for depriving such an employee of the emoluments to which he is subsequently held entitled to. 17. Similar issue came up before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.N. Srivastava versus Union of India and another (1998) 9 SCC 559 wherein it was held as under:- “3…..It was submitted by learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-authorities that no back salary should be allowed to the appellant as the appellant did not work and therefore, on the principle of “no work, no pay”, this amount should not be given to the appellant. This submission of learned Senior Counsel does not bear scrutiny as the appellant was always ready and willing to work but the respondents did not allow him to work after 31-1-1990……” 18. This submission of learned Senior Counsel does not bear scrutiny as the appellant was always ready and willing to work but the respondents did not allow him to work after 31-1-1990……” 18. The Courts cannot be oblivious and feign ignorance of the magnitude of the sufferings and pains to which an employee is subjected on account of deprivation of the monetary benefits, particularly, in this age of high cost of living, inflation etc. The Court cannot shut its eyes and forget the holocaust of economic deprivation of respondent No.1 and his family for all these long years. 19. Even otherwise, the principle of “no work and no pay” can be invoked by the employer to deny wages or pay to the employee in those cases in which he abstains from discharging the duties assigned to him. However, it cannot be applied in the cases in which the employee is kept away from duty or is prevented or rendered ineligible to discharge duties of a particular post due to an act and omission of the employer. 20. Thus, in such circumstances, where a person is wrongly denied his due, full benefits of entire back-wages can be given to him or else the same would be totally inequitable. After-all, the principle of “no work, no pay” cannot be treated as an inflexible principle to which there are no exceptions. The principle of “no work, no pay” will have no applicability to the instant case. Therefore, I find no illegality, irregularity or perversity insofar as this part of the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 is concerned. 21. Now adverting to the question regarding award of interest. I really find no reason accorded by respondent No.2 for the grant of the same. Admittedly, this is not a case where the charges against respondent No.1 have not at all been proved. Rather, respondent No.1 has been imposed penalty of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect for the charges which have been duly proved. Indisputably, these findings of respondent No.2 have attained finality as these findings have not been assailed by respondent No.1. Therefore, in this scenario, I really see no reason why interest at the rate of 6% ought to have been awarded by respondent No.2, more particularly, when even reasons for awarding the same are not forthcoming. 22. Indisputably, these findings of respondent No.2 have attained finality as these findings have not been assailed by respondent No.1. Therefore, in this scenario, I really see no reason why interest at the rate of 6% ought to have been awarded by respondent No.2, more particularly, when even reasons for awarding the same are not forthcoming. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this petition is partly allowed and the impugned order awarding interest of 6% to respondent No.1 on the consequential benefits of service is set aside while rest of the impugned order is upheld, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Interim order stands vacated. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.