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2016 DIGILAW 942 (MP)

Ashan Khan v. Pankaj

2016-10-20

NANDITA DUBEY

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JUDGMENT : Nandita Dubey, J. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, heard finally. 2. Appellant has filed this appeal being aggrieved by the award dated 29.02.2010 by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Multai, district Betul in MCC No. 46/2008, whereby the claim of the appellant for grant of compensation under the provisions of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (in short "the Act") relating to no fault liability, has been rejected on the ground that admittedly the income of the injured was Rs.4 lacs per annum. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that in such cases, even if, it was an admitted fact that the income of the injured was Rs.4 lacs per annum, the Tribunal should have restricted the income of the injured to Rs.40,000/- per annum and should have allowed the application under Section 163-A of the Act, as the said provision is a social welfare legislation. 4. Shri Pramod Thakre, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Manju and others 2008 ACJ 359 , wherein the Court has observed in para 9 as under :- Accordingly, we are of the view that while dealing with the claim under Section 163-A, the award can be made only for such an amount as is payable in accordance with Second Schedule. A look at Second Schedule shows that it gives a structured formula of the amount award-able as compensation in case of death and according to Second Schedule, for the death of the deceased, the maximum amount awarded as compensation comes to Rs.6,40,000/-. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent/Insurance Company on the other hand submits that the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the claim of the appellant. The counsel has relied on the judgment in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and others 2004 ACJ 934 : (2004) 5 SCC 385 , wherein the Supreme Court has held in para 51 and 67 as under :- "51. The scheme as envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. The scheme as envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens namely, persons whose income per annum is, Rs.40,000/- or less is covered thereunder, whereas sections 140 and 166 cater to all Sections of society. 67. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala (supra) has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala (supra) that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs. 40,000/- per annual shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is upto Rs. 40,000/- can take the benefit thereof. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act." In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the limit of Rs.40,000/- given under Section 163-A of the Act cannot treated as a cap for persons having income more than Rs. 40,000/-. The Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim of the appellant in view of the admitted fact that the injured was earning Rs.4,00,000/- per annum from contractor-ship. In view of the legal position discussed above and the admitted income of Rs.4 lakhs, the application under Section 163-A of the Act was rightly rejected. 6. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned award. The appeal being merit-less is accordingly dismissed.