JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. During his availing casual leave, the petitioner was arrested by the police for his committing an offence punishable under Section 302, 382 read with Section 34 IPC. However, on 20.12.1999, the petitioner was afforded the facility of bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Kangra at Dharamshala. The learned Additional Sessions Judge rendered findings of conviction against the petitioner for his committing an offence under Section 304-II read with Section 34 IPC besides imposed upon him sentence of imprisonment of three years. 2. The petitioner standing aggrieved by the rendition of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala preferred an appeal therefrom before the High Court, appeal whereof of the petitioner assailing the rendition of the learned Additional Sessions Judge stood accepted by this Court. Also obviously, the petitioner stood acquitted of the charge for which he faced trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. On 31.01.2009 the petitioner was reinstated by the respondents. The respondents on being beset with the representations of the petitioner rendered an order comprised in Annexure P-3 whereby they ordered for regularization of the period of absence from the duty of the petitioner by granting to him leave of kind due. 3. Tritely, the petitioner stands aggrieved by the incorporation in Annexure P-3 of his period of absence being ordered to be regularized by his standing granted leave of kind due. The short submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner in assailing the afore-stated portion occurring in Annexure P-3 flows from the employer/respondent imputing a fallible interpretation to Rules 26.1 and 26.2 of the NHPC Conduct Discipline & Appeal Rules (hereinafter for short referred to as 'NHPC Rules’) which flawed interpretation rendered qua them by the employer upsurges from a mis-reckoning by the employer of the factum of given his reinstatement in service on his standing acquitted by this Court of the charges whereupon findings of conviction stood rendered against him under Section 304-II IPC by the learned trial Court, he stood entitled to the statutorily accrued full pay and allowances even for the period he remained under suspension. Since the petitioner remained off work since 13.5.1998 till 20.12.1999 given his standing subjected to judicial custody thereat, the learned counsel for the petitioner makes an espousal of the said period when he remained in judicial custody being amenable to a construction synonymous to his facing suspension or the period aforesaid ipso facto bearing a parlance akin to his standing beset with an order of suspension effect whereof when stood effaced by his standing acquitted by this Court for the offence for which he stood charged and convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala entitled him to the benefit of the apposite Rules. 4. The synonymity which the learned counsel for the petitioner attracts vis-à-vis the period he stood subjected to judicial custody with an order of the employer/respondent suspending him from service also the synonymity which the petitioner attracts vis-à-vis the order of acquittal by this Court of the offences for which he stood convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge with hence his standing exonerated, warrants its being discountenanced. The learned counsel for the petitioner while drawing the afore-stated synonymities vis-à-vis the period he suffered judicial custody with his standing beset with an order of his employer suspending him from service besides the synonymity vis-à-vis he draws inter se the order by this High Court acquitting him for the charges for which he stood convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala with his hence standing exonerated, appears to stand erected with his remaining un-awakened to the prime factum of Rule 29.1 of the Rules which stands extracted hereinafter contemplating of none of the major penalties specified in the apt Rules being imposable upon the delinquent unless preceding thereof the delinquent stands subjected to a valid inquiry conducted in conformity with the apposite Rules: “29.1. No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in Clause 27.5, 27.6 and 27.7 of Rule 27 shall be made except after an inquiry is held in accordance with these rules.” The effect of the occurrence of the afore-stated Rule in 'NHPC Rules’ cannot stand undermined nor can they be omitted to be read into Rules 26.1 and 26.2 of the NHPC Rules which stand extracted herein-after as given the chronology of their occurring prior to Rule 29.1 warrants of both the preceding rules besides the apposite rule succeeding them being read conjunctively besides in harmony. Any dis-conjunctive reading of Rules 26.1 and 26.2 of Rule 29.1 would render each unworkable eroding the very salutary purpose of their incorporation in the apposite Rules: “26.1. When the employee under suspension is reinstated, the competent authority may grant him the following pay and allowances for the period of suspension:- (a) If the employee is exonerated and not awarded any penalties mentioned in the Rule 27, the full pay and allowances which he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended, less the subsistence allowance already paid to him; (b) If otherwise, such proportion of pay and allowances as the competent authority may prescribe. 26.2. - In a case falling under sub clause (a) the period of absence from duty will be treated as a period spent on duty, in case failing under sub clause (b) it will not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the competent authority so directs.” 5. As an apt sequitur, the suspension which beset an employee arising from his delinquency in service enjoins holding of a departmental inquiry by the disciplinary authority whereupon in case he stands exonerated he would stand entitled to avail the benefits encapsulated in Clause (a) of Rule 26.1 of the NHPC Rules. Since Rule 29.1 of the Rules omits to with specificity make a reference of the period when an employee stands subjected to judicial incarceration his period spent thereat being amenable to a construction of his being hence beset with an order of suspension also when hence the apposite Rules with specificity exclude the period spent by an employee in judicial custody to fall outside the realm of its being construable to be a period reckonable of his standing beset with an order of suspension, the effect of an omission with specificity in the apposite Rules of the period when an employee stands subjected to judicial custody constituting his standing beset with an order of suspension, obviously the period when the petitioner underwent judicial incarceration cannot hold any synonymity with his being hence come to be suspended. The concomitant sequel thereof is of when he stood acquitted by this Court for the offences for which he was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge cannot render his acquittal by this Court to hold any synonymity with his standing exonerated within the ambit of Clause (a) of Rule 26.1 of the apposite NHPC Rules, significantly when a circumspect harmonious reading of the apposite rules specifically the ones succeeding Rule 26.1 of the NHPC Rules, the relevant portion whereof stands extracted herein-above manifest of the disciplinary authority holding jurisdiction to impose major penalties only when the delinquent employee has faced a valid departmental inquiry on conclusion whereof he is held guilty, imperatively when he stands exonerated therein he would stand entitled to the benefit of Clause (a) of Rule 26.1 of the NHPC Rules hence obviously when for the operation of Rule (a) of 26.1 of the NHPC Rules the sine qua non is of the petitioner facing a departmental inquiry on conclusion whereof he stands exonerated begets the obvious sequel of acquittal of the accused by this Court for the offence for which he stood convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge not rendering the offence committed under the penal laws by the petitioner to be a delinquency within the ambit of the apposite rules nor also the order of acquittal of the petitioner by this Court for the charge he stood convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge holding any synonymity or analogity with the apposite order of exoneration by an Inquiry officer on conclusion of the departmental inquiry held by him for his committing a delinquency within the ambit of the apposite Rules. Moreover, the period for which the petitioner suffered judicial incarceration not holding synonymity with his standing suspended by the disciplinary authority for his committing a delinquency within the ambit of the rules besides his on standing exonerated by the Inquiry Officer on the latter holding a valid inquiry qua the misconduct committed by him within the ambit of rules he comes to be reinstated whereupon he stands entitled to the benefit contemplated in Rule 26.1 of the apposite Rules also not holding synonymity with his standing acquitted by a Court of law for a penal charge on acquittal whereof he stands reinstated in service, concomitantly the reinstatement in service of the petitioner on his standing acquitted by a Court of law of a penal charge would not secure any entitlement to him to avail the benefit of Rule 26.1 of the apposite Rules, benefit whereof for reasons afore-stated is available only to an employee standing reinstated on his standing exonerated by a valid inquiry conducted in accordance with rules by the Inquiry Officer whereas its benefit would not be available to the petitioner on his standing reinstated in service on his standing acquitted by a Court of law for a penal charge. 6. Be that as it may, with their being no semblance of synonymity vis-à-vis the period the petitioner stood subjected to judicial incarceration with an order of his standing suspended from service by the disciplinary authority, suspension whereof would occur only on his committing a delinquency in service than by his committing an offence under the penal laws nor also their occurring any synonymity inter se his standing exonerated for a charge of misconduct within the ambit of the apposite Rules with an order of acquittal for his committing a penal offence, cannot give any capitalization to the learned counsel for the petitioner to contend of their being any fallacious interpretation rendered by the employer qua the apposite Rules nor also he can contend of the impugned apposite part of Annexure P-3 suffering from any gross infirmity. 7. The result of the above discussion is that the instant writ petition stands dismissed, so also the pending application (s), if any.