Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 945 (MP)

Atar Singh v. State Of M. P.

2016-10-20

ANAND PATHAK

body2016
ORDER : Shri Devendra Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners. Shri Prakhar Dhengula, learned Panel Lawyer for respondent No. 1/State. Shri Pramod Pachori, learned counsel for respondent No. 2/complainant. Heard finally with the consent of parties. 2. The present petition under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code has been preferred by the petitioners for quashment of FIR registered at Crime No. 421/2015 at Police Station Dabra, District-Gwalior for the offence punishable under sections 498-A, 323 of Indian Penal Code and section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. Oft repeated quote of Shakespeare (in Othello) “Chaos has come again”, can be borrowed here to depict the present factual context in hand. The growing social trend and menace of dowry demand continues and reflected in the present case also wherein the petitioners are accused on the basis of complaint filed by respondent No. 2/complainant (wife of petitioner No. 3). 4. Facts of the case in brief are that petitioners are family members of respondent No. 2/complainant (family members of husband of respondent No. 2). On the basis of complaint filed by respondent No. 2/complainant, an FIR has been registered at Case No. 421/2015 for the offence punishable under sections 498-A, 323 of Indian Penal Code and section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 5. Reason for being crestfallen for the petitioners is the registration of FIR, as according to them, they have been falsely implicated in the case. Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently raised the point of territorial jurisdiction on the basis of provision as contained in sections 177 and 178 of Criminal Procedure Code, with further reliance over the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Y. Abraham Ajith and others vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another, (2004) 8 SCC 100 . His argument is that the complainant was allegedly harassed at her matrimonial home at Dholpur in the hands of her husband and in-laws (petitioners in the present case). Her parental home is at Dabra, District-Gwalior. At Dabra, no incidence of dowry demand, mental harassment and physical abuse have taken place, therefore, no cause of action is made out at the Court of competent jurisdiction at Dabra. Her parental home is at Dabra, District-Gwalior. At Dabra, no incidence of dowry demand, mental harassment and physical abuse have taken place, therefore, no cause of action is made out at the Court of competent jurisdiction at Dabra. Only the Court which can take cognizance in the present matter is at Dholpur and not at Dabra, therefore, the trial Court at Dabra has caused illegality and jurisdictional error in taking cognizance of the charge-sheet filed by the police authority against the present petitioners. 6. His another ground for quashment of FIR is Omnibus Allegations. According to him, the complaint did not disclose any cause of action because the complainant-Pooja has made only omnibus allegations against the present petitioners and while relying upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667 , and Geeta Mehrotra and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2012) 10 SCC 741 , he vehemently argued that on the basis of omnibus allegations, petitioners cannot be fasten with the liability of dowry demand as contained under section 498-A of Indian Penal Code and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 7. Besides raising these arguments, petitioners are trying to sail through on the basis of different judicial pronouncements with special reference to judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Bhura Ram and others vs. State of Rajasthan and another, 2008 (4) M.P.H.T 15 (SC), wherein the Apex Court has held that section 498-A of Indian Penal Code is not a continuing offence, therefore, the complainant should have specifically mentioned the date, time and place of incident for reaching home the allegations. 8. Another limb of arguments of counsel for the petitioners is in respect of jurisdiction under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code wherein he tried to contend that even if revisional jurisdiction is available to the petitioners, even then petitioners can avail all the remedy under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. He relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the matter of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2009) 1 SCC (Cr.) 806. On the basis of these arguments, petitioners are seeking exoneration. 9. He relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the matter of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2009) 1 SCC (Cr.) 806. On the basis of these arguments, petitioners are seeking exoneration. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State submits that ingredients of the FIR as well as the statements made by the complainant and her family members under section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code are sufficient enough to implicate the petitioners and fasten the liability of demand of dowry over them. He further submits on the basis of record that before the trial Court, charges of section 498-A of Indian Penal Code as well as section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act have been rightly framed. Therefore, he prayed for dismissal of the petition. 10. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2/complainant who at present is the bete noire of the petitioners, with all force resisted the contentions of the petitioners. He craved the indulgence of this Court over the provisions of section 178 of Criminal Procedure Code and tried to negate the claim of the petitioners in respect of territorial jurisdiction. 11. His rebuttal in respect of omnibus allegations is sufficient on the basis of statements of the complainant and her family members. 12. According to counsel for respondent No. 2/complainant, charges have been framed against the petitioners under section 498-A of Indian Penal Code as well as section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, and therefore, appropriate remedy to the petitioners would have been to prefer revision against framing of charges because after framing of charges, remedy under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code is not available. Charges were framed vide order dated 8-2-2016 whereas the petition has been preferred on 5-4-2016 i.e., at much belated stage, after framing of charges. Even, trial has commenced, therefore, while relying upon a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohit @ Sonu and another vs. State of U.P. and another, (2013) 7 SCC 789 , he contends that if specific remedy is available in the present case then remedy under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code is not a proper remedy. Even, trial has commenced, therefore, while relying upon a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohit @ Sonu and another vs. State of U.P. and another, (2013) 7 SCC 789 , he contends that if specific remedy is available in the present case then remedy under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code is not a proper remedy. He further relied upon the pleadings of the petitioners and submitted that the present petitioners have only challenged the FIR registered at the behest of respondent No. 2/complainant and has not challenged the subsequent proceedings including trial and the order of framing of charges therefore, relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court as rendered in Satish Mehra vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 13 SCC 614, he prayed for dismissal of the case. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 14. The contents of the FIR as well as the statements made by the complainant and her mother, father and brother under section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code reflect that specific allegations have been levelled against the present petitioners. The allegations further reflect that the petitioners came to Dabra and demanded dowry from the family members of the complainant. Once the FIR as well as statements made by the complainant and her other family members indicate the name of the petitioners then they cannot be given the benefit of doubt in any manner at this stage. 15. In respect of question of jurisdiction of the case is concerned, the same is within the jurisdiction of the Court at Dabra. Section 178 of Criminal Procedure Code is relevant in this regard. Section 178 of Criminal Procedure Code reads as under :— “178. Place of inquiry or trial. — (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) Where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 16. Perusal of the said section as well as statements of the complainant and other family members indicate that the dowry demand has been made at Dabra also i.e. her maternal home, therefore, the complainant had the jurisdiction at Dabra also and no jurisdictional error has been committed by the respondent/prosecution to register the FIR and to investigate the matter and to file the charge-sheet as well as by the trial Court to initiate trial against the petitioners. 17. Section 178 of Criminal Procedure Code provides certain exigencies which are applicable in the present case in its full dimensions. The contents of the FIR, wherein the complainant has made a statement about insulting behaviour, insinuation and lust of the petitioners for dowry at Dabra, and the statements made by the complainant-Pooja, her brother-Kamal, Father-Mukundi Kadeda and mother-Bitti Bai under section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code are sufficiently elaborate and lucent in respect of demand of dowry by the petitioners. The judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the matter of Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30 squarely applies here. 18. The judgment as relied upon by the petitioners in the matter of Preeti Gupta (supra) and Geeta Mehrotra (supra) are not applicable in the present case because facts of the said cases are different vis-a-vis the present case. Here, allegations are specific, therefore, there are sufficient material for the prosecution to proceed with the investigation as well as with the trial. 19. Here in the present case, the un-controverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offences and allegations are not absurd and inherently improbable. Continuous prosecution is a rule whereas quashing of charges or proceedings is an exception. Here, allegations broadly satisfied for the prosecution to proceed, therefore, at this stage inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code cannot be invoked because no miscarriage of justice apparently seems to be carried out. 20. From Submissions of learned counsel for the parties as well as the documents placed with the record, it appears that the charges have been framed on 8-2-2016 whereas this petition has been preferred in April, 2016 and the challenge has been made only to the FIR registered for the aforementioned offences and challenge has not been made to the subsequent proceedings. The objection of the respondents is that once charges have been framed against the petitioners thereafter, the petition under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code is not maintainable and appropriate remedy to the petitioners would have been to prefer a criminal revision against framing of charges. 21. The said objection of the respondents is not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Satish Mehra vs. State of (NCT of Delhi), 2012 (13) SCC 614 wherein the Apex Court has held that powers to quash proceedings after charges were framed is wider as evidence adduced while submitting the charge-sheet can be looked into for determining disclosure of offence against the accused. It further mandates that where allegations do not discloses prima facie case and prosecution of accused would result in abuse of process then proceedings can be quashed at earlier stage or at a later stage. At the same time, the Apex Court has further cautioned that the extraordinary power available to the High Court needs to be exercised carefully and sparingly. It cannot be used for quashing the legitimate prosecution. 22. Despite the fact that petition is maintainable under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code even after framing of charges but here the factual matrix of the case does not warrant interference of this Court under the extraordinary jurisdiction of section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. 23. Similarly, contentions as raised by the respondents in respect of maintainability of the petition under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code on the basis of alternative remedy of section 397, Criminal Procedure Code, the said aspect has been dealt with by the recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Prabhu Chawla vs. State of Rajasthan and anr. decided on 5-9-2016 in Cr.A. No. 844/2016 wherein the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the matter of Mohit @ Sonu (supra) has been clarified and the power under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code has been reiterated. 24. In view of the abovesaid, plea of maintainability of the petition as raised by the respondents has no legal sanctity, and the same is rejected on the ground of pronouncement of the Apex Court in the matter of Prabhu Chawla (supra). Relevant extract of judgment reads as under :— “10. 24. In view of the abovesaid, plea of maintainability of the petition as raised by the respondents has no legal sanctity, and the same is rejected on the ground of pronouncement of the Apex Court in the matter of Prabhu Chawla (supra). Relevant extract of judgment reads as under :— “10. The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under section 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under section 397 overlaps. The opening words of section 482 contradicts this contention because nothing of the Code, not even section 397, can process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the Court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self restraint, nothing more, “We venture to add a further reason in support. Since section 397, Criminal Procedure Code is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code only to petty interlocutory orders ! A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable.” 25. Therefore, the instant petition under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code is maintainable but this Court declines to interfere on other grounds as mentioned in the order. 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Taramani Parakh vs. State of M.P. and ors., 2015 Cr.L.J. (SC) 2031 has held as under :— “27.1. Though there are no limits of the power of this Court under section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of the rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. …… 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. …… 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.” 27. Thus, in the totality of circumstances, legal position and the fact situation of the case, no case is made out by the petitioners for interference under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. Resultantly, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.