Virender Singh, J. It is a tale of two women, mother and wife of late Jai Prakash Kumar Besera, fighting for the death-cum-retiral dues of the deceased employee. The appellant writ petitioner (hereinafter to be referred as “petitioner”) approached this Court in W.P. (S) No. 3145 of 2008 seeking a direction upon the respondent M/s Eastern Coalfields Limited to make payment of death-cum-retiral dues to her, which was declined by the Writ Court holding that the petitioner has no legal right to claim the death-cum-retiral benefits of late Jai Prakash Kumar Besera. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The undisputed facts emerging from the records of the case are that, late Jai Prakash Kumar Besera was employed as a fitter with the respondent M/s Eastern Coalfields Limited and he died on 31.05.2006. On an application and subsequent representations made by the petitioner for payment of gratuity and life cover, the Regional Commissioner, Coal Mines Provident Fund (CMPF), Deoghar issued a cheque bearing No. 931565 dated 06.07.2007 however, the said cheque was not handed over to the petitioner. Constrained, the petitioner approached the permanent Lok Adalat in PLA Case No. 133 of 2007, which was permitted to be withdrawn and thereafter, the petitioner approached the Writ Court. 3. In the writ proceeding, the petitioner was directed to implead the mother of her deceased husband namely, Most. Talamai Marandi as respondent no. 6. The respondent no. 6 after service of notice upon her appeared through counsel however, she did not file counter affidavit opposing the writ petition. 4. Before the Writ Court, the respondent M/s Eastern Coalfields Limited took a stand that the deceased employee had divorced the petitioner and he had filed an application before the authority for deletion of the name of the petitioner from the service records as his nominee and in place of the petitioner his mother may be substituted as his nominee. Consequently, the respondent M/s Eastern Coalfields Limited declined to release death-cum-retiral dues to the petitioner. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both the sides and perused the document on records. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that an employee during his lifetime cannot nominate a person for “family pension” and it is the wife and the minor children alone who are entitled to receive family pension on the death of the employee. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both the sides and perused the document on records. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that an employee during his lifetime cannot nominate a person for “family pension” and it is the wife and the minor children alone who are entitled to receive family pension on the death of the employee. Challenging the jurisdiction of the respondent M/s Eastern Coalfields Limited to treat the petitioner as the divorced wife of the deceased employee, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the application submitted by the deceased employee for substituting the name of his mother in place of the petitioner as nominee would not make any difference and the claim of the petitioner over the death-cum-retiral benefits cannot be denied on an apparently frivolous dispute raised by her mother-in-law. 7. Mr. Rajesh Lala, the learned counsel for the respondent M/s Eastern Coalfields Limited reiterates the stand taken before the Writ Court. 8. Mr. Kailash Prasad Deo, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 submits that the petitioner who left the company of her husband long back and who was divorced by her husband according to customary law, cannot come back and claim the death-cum-retiral benefits accruing on account of death of the deceased employee. The learned counsel further submits that unless, a competent court of law declares the petitioner successor of the deceased employee, she cannot claim the death-cum-retiral benefits. 9. The law on the “issue of nomination” is by now, well settled. The law laid down in “Aimai Vs. Awabai Dhanjishaw Jamsetii and Ors.” reported in AIR 1924 Sind 57 and “Hardial Devi Ditta Vs. Janki Das and Anr.” reported in AIR 1928 Lahore 773, still holds good. A nominee does not get any right or title over the property or the estate of the deceased by virtue of nomination alone. It has been held that the nominee would only get the right to receive the amount and he holds the amount for the benefit of the heirs. In “D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar and Anr. Vs. Indian Insurance & Banking Corporation Ltd. Salem and Anr.” reported in AIR 1957 Mad 115 , it has been held thus; “So far as nomination is concerned we do not see any appreciable difference between the English and American Laws on the one hand, and what obtains in our country. In “D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar and Anr. Vs. Indian Insurance & Banking Corporation Ltd. Salem and Anr.” reported in AIR 1957 Mad 115 , it has been held thus; “So far as nomination is concerned we do not see any appreciable difference between the English and American Laws on the one hand, and what obtains in our country. According to the English Law the payee or the nominee is nothing more than an agent to receive the money, which money remains as the property of the assured and at his disposal during his life time and on his death forms part of the estate. The result is that the payee or the nominee takes no beneficial interest in it.” 10. The aforesaid declaration of law has been approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Now, when the implication of the application filed by the deceased employee, seeking substitution of his mother in place of the petitioner as his nominee in the service records, is examined in the context of law governing the issue of nomination, it becomes apparent that it had no legal consequence and even after the substitution of the respondent no. 6 in the service records, the petitioner could have legally laid claim over the death-cum-retiral benefits. 11. In so far as, the claim of the mother of the deceased employee over the family pension which forms part of the death-cum-retiral benefits is concerned, the law does not permit the same. Grant of family pension is governed by the extant rules and it is an admitted position that the mother of the deceased employee is not entitled to receive family pension. In fact, the deceased employee could not have nominated his mother as a nominee during his life time to receive family pension. An employee cannot have a claim over the family pension for the simple reason that it accrues only after the death of the employee and therefore, it cannot even be bequeathed to a person through a testamentary disposition. In fact, the deceased employee could not have nominated his mother as a nominee during his life time to receive family pension. An employee cannot have a claim over the family pension for the simple reason that it accrues only after the death of the employee and therefore, it cannot even be bequeathed to a person through a testamentary disposition. In “Jodh Singh v. Union of India” reported in (1980) 4 SCC 306 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus; “Where a certain benefit is admissible on account of status and a status that is acquired on the happening of certain event, namely, on becoming a widow on the death of the husband, such pension by no stretch of imagination could ever form part of the estate of the deceased. If it did not form part of the estate of the deceased it could never be the subject matter of testamentary disposition.” 12. In “Smt. Violet Issaac and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.” reported in (1991) 1 SCC 725 , when the widow made an application for grant of family pension though, due to strained relationship her husband had nominated his brother to receive the retiral benefits and he had also executed a Will in favour of his brother bequeathing all his properties to him, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the deceased employee had no title to the same and therefore, he should not have disposed of the same by nominating his brother by testamentary disposition. 13. The marriage of the petitioner with the deceased employee namely, Jai Prakash Kumar Besera stands admitted in view of her nomination by the deceased employee himself. Further, the plea taken by the respondents that the deceased employee himself had filed an application for change of nomination in the service records with intimation to his employer that he has divorced the petitioner, shows that the petitioner was legally wedded wife of the deceased employee. The question whether the deceased employee had divorced the petitioner or not is not an issue which should have been adjudicated by the respondent M/s Eastern Coalfields Limited. On the other hand, records reveal that the petitioner instituted a proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. vide, T.R. No. 30 of 2006 in which an order was passed on 17.03.2006 directing her husband to make payment of Rs. 800/per month for her maintenance. On the other hand, records reveal that the petitioner instituted a proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. vide, T.R. No. 30 of 2006 in which an order was passed on 17.03.2006 directing her husband to make payment of Rs. 800/per month for her maintenance. The order passed in T.R. No. 30 of 2006 discloses that the learned Magistrate has recorded a prima-facie finding that the petitioner is the legally wedded wife of the deceased employee. The said order was not challenged by the husband of the petitioner. The respondent no. 6 though appeared in the writ proceeding, she had chosen not to produce any evidence which would conclusively displace the prima-facie finding recorded in T.R. No. 30 of 2006. 14. Apparently, the learned Writ Court erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioner, considering the alleged document of divorce and the affidavit produced by the deceased employee as conclusive proof of divorce. The petitioner has categorically denied her divorce. Moreover, no document or text has been produced by the respondent no. 6 to substantiate her claim that her son divorced the petitioner in accordance with the customary law. 15. What follows the discussions made hereinabove is the conclusion that the impugned order dated 02.09.2015 requires interference. Resultantly, the instant Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. The respondent no. 3 is directed to ensure payment of death-cum-retiral benefits to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks.