ORDER : Sanjay Yadav, J. 1. Learned counsel for the parties are heard on admission. 2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to order dated 26.8.2016; whereby, in an election petition, the Tribunal (Sixth Additional District Judge, Sagar), has dismissed the applications under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, one is dated 11.8.2016 and the other is dated 22.8.2016. 3. Whereas, vide application dated 11.8.2016, the petitioner who is a returned candidate and is a Sitting Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Sagar, raised an objection as to the security amount of Rs. 250/- deposited vide challan receipt No. 15, which as per petitioner was an amount deposited by one Gajendra Patel under the head 0070 in relation to some administrative work. That, the petitioner has utilized the amount deposited by some other person as security amount in the election petition. It was also contended that as there are three election petitioners, Rs. 250/- each ought to have deposited the security amount, instead only Rs. 250/- was deposited and that of some one else's deposit has been used. The Tribunal rejected the contention on the findings that the original challan receipt has been filed witnessing the deposit of Rs. 250/- the copy whereof is on record as Annexure P/9. The receipt as evident therefrom bears an entry that the amount is deposited on account of "Election Petition for Nagar Nigam, Sagar Mayor Post." The amount thus is not for any administrative services, which might have been deposited for by the said Gajendra Patel in whose favour a certificate has been issued by the District Treasury Officer on 10.8.2016. Thus, the amount deposited towards security by the Election Petitioner is under the head of Election Petition and the amount said to be deposited by the Gajendra Singh is under a differed head, i.e., in respect of some administrative work. Since, the petitioner fails to establish that the amount deposited as a security for an election petition is also a deposit under "other administrative service, the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the Security amount is duly deposited by the respondent Election Petitioner cannot be faulted with. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be said to suffer a non deposit of Security amount. No interference on that account is caused. 4. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be said to suffer a non deposit of Security amount. No interference on that account is caused. 4. Another contention by the petitioner raised vide said application dated 11.8.2016 is that in sub-section (2) read with clause (iii) of Section 441 of M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, the expression "Petition" being used in a singular term, only an individual voter could have filed the petitioner rather than a joint petitioner by three petitioners. In case if three petitioners have joined there ought to have been three set of security amount. The contention deserve to be negatived on the anvil of clause (b) of Section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957 which mandates that unless a different intention appears "(b) words in the singular shall include the plural and words in the plural shall include the singular." In view whereof the expression "petition" in sub-section (2) of Section 441 of 1956 Act would include plural. In this context reference can be had of the decision in Yeshwant Sitaram Dessai and Others vs. Jaisingrao A. Rane and Others, AIR 1974 Goa 4 ; wherein it is held: "3. The first issue is whether the petition is bad for non-compliance of Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called "the Act") sub-section (1) of which reads as follows: Section 117 (1):- At the time of presenting an election petition, the petitioner shall deposit in the High Court in accordance with the rules of the High Court a sum of two thousand rupees as security for the costs of the petition. It is contended by Dr. Lobo that Section 117 requires that the deposit should be made by the petitioner and not by each petitioner. The deposit is for the security of costs of the petition and since there is one petition only the deposit should be only of Rs. 2000/-. This, Dr. Lobo argues, is evident from the fact that joint petitions are allowed to be filed by candidates together. I agree with Shri Lobo. It has been held in Marutrao Bhaurao vs. Gulabrao Dadasaheb, (1963) 5 Ele. LR 303 (Ele. Tri. Poona) that a joint election petition by more than one petitioner is maintainable and that Sections 110 and 112 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, clearly envisages such joint petitions and that therefore a security deposit of Rs. It has been held in Marutrao Bhaurao vs. Gulabrao Dadasaheb, (1963) 5 Ele. LR 303 (Ele. Tri. Poona) that a joint election petition by more than one petitioner is maintainable and that Sections 110 and 112 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, clearly envisages such joint petitions and that therefore a security deposit of Rs. 1000/- (in our case Rs. 2000/-) is sufficient for a joint petition. A similar finding was given by the Election Tribunal of Allahabad in Deochand vs. Vashist Narain, (1953) 6 Ele. LR 138 (eLE. TRI. ALL). My answer to the first issue is therefore in the negative. 5. In Krishnarao Anandrao Dhayagude and Others vs. Khandala Taluka Shetkari Sahakari Kharedi Vikri Sangh Ltd. Lonand and Others, AIR 1982 Bombay 410 it is held: 23. Therefore, we are of opinion that in spite of the fact that the other petitioners have not deposited separately security deposit of Rs. 500/- at the time of presentation of the election petition, the petition would be maintainable and was not liable to be summarily dismissed as has been held by the learned Additional commissioner. In our opinion, the learned Additional Commissioner's view that such a petition in absence of security deposit by the other three petitioners wholly wrong and not sustainable in the even of law. We are fortified in the view we have taken inasmuch as this Court has taken a similar view in Namdeo Chimnaji vs. Govindda, (1963) 65 Bom. LR 843 : AIR 1964 Bom. 137 at p. 146, where it is held as follows: "Though there may be more than one petitioner to an election petition, so long as one deposit is made for the election petition. The election petitioners would comply with the requirements of Sec 117 of the Representation of the People Act." 6. Similar view has been taken by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in ILR (1964) 1 Punjab 418 and High Court of Karnataka in ILR (1978) 2 Kant 1479. 7. In view whereof a Single Petition, at the instance of three petitioners accompanied by a Government Treasury receipt showing deposit of two hundred and fifty rupees cannot be faulted with. 8. That, vide application dated 22.8.2016, petitioner raised an objection on the anvil of the stipulation contained under clause (c) of sub-section (5) of Section 441 of 1956 Act. 7. In view whereof a Single Petition, at the instance of three petitioners accompanied by a Government Treasury receipt showing deposit of two hundred and fifty rupees cannot be faulted with. 8. That, vide application dated 22.8.2016, petitioner raised an objection on the anvil of the stipulation contained under clause (c) of sub-section (5) of Section 441 of 1956 Act. The provision mandates that, the election petition be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings. It is contended that since there are three petitioners, all the three ought to have verified the plaint. Rule 15 Order 6 C.P.C which makes a provision regarding verification of pleadings envisages: "15. Verification of pleadings.- (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. (4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings." 9. Under sub-rule (1) a pleading can be verified by the party, where there is only one party, by one of the parties where there are several parties and by a third party who is proved to be the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Thus verification by one of the parties in the case at hand cannot be faulted with. Furthermore, as per sub-rule (2) the person verifying shall specify by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleadings, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. Thus verification by one of the parties in the case at hand cannot be faulted with. Furthermore, as per sub-rule (2) the person verifying shall specify by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleadings, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. The verification in the case at hand which is in following terms and is signed by all the three petitioners: ^^ge ;kfpdkdkjx.k 1 fxj/kj iVsy 2 larks"k lsyV ,oa 3 lhrkjke ikBd rhuksa fuoklh lkxj vkt LFkku lkxj esa mDr fuokZpu ;kfpdk ij] mls i<+≤>dj vius gLrk{kj dj lR;kfir djrs gSa fd mDr fuokZpu ;kfpdk ds ^rF;* laca/kh laiw.kZ dFku gekjs Lor% ds Kku ls rFkk ^vk/kkj* laca/kh iSjk 1] 2] 3] 4] 5] 6] 7 ,oa 8 ds leLr dFku vkaf'kd :i ls Lor% ds Kku ls rFkk vkaf'kd :i ls vU; ls iwNdj] ;dhu dj lp o lgh gSA** When tested on the anvil of the stipulations contained under Order 6, Rule 15 (2) CPC cannot be faulted with, the rejection of objection on that count is not interfered with. 10. Next contention that the election petition under Section 441 (2) of 1956 is to be entertained and tried by Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, which as per sub-section (1) of Section 7 Civil Courts Act, 1958 is a District Judge; whereas, the election petition is tried by the Additional District Judge which being beyond the jurisdiction deserves to be quashed. The contention are taken note of and rejected on the anvil of the stipulations contained under sub-section (2) of Section 7, substituted by M.P. Act 7 of 1980 and M.P. Act 14 of 1996 providing for that: "(2) An Additional District Judge shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge, including the functions of Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction which the District Judge may, by general or special order, assign to him and in discharge of such functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge." 11. In this context reference can be had of the decision in M/s. Badrilal Jodhraj and Sons Indore vs. Girdharilal and Another, AIR 1988 MP 24 wherein it is held: "11. In this context reference can be had of the decision in M/s. Badrilal Jodhraj and Sons Indore vs. Girdharilal and Another, AIR 1988 MP 24 wherein it is held: "11. The position of an Additional District Judge, as it emerges, in view of the foregoing discussion pertaining to various provisions of the M.P. Civil Courts Act, 1958, is not that of a Judge or Court subordinate to the District Court. On the other hand he enjoys an equal concurrent jurisdiction. An Additional District Judge, not being a Court subordinate to the District Judge, the District Judge cannot revise an order passed by any Additional District Judge in any case in exercise of his power as a District Judge, under Section 115, CPC, as amended by the M.P. Amendment Act of 1984." 12. Similarly in N.K. Saxena and Another vs. State of M.P. and Another, 2008 (2) MPHT 365 , it is held: 14. A reading of the provisions of the Civil Courts Act, as amended by the Act No. 17 of 1982 extracted above would show that although the Court of District Judge and the Court of Additional District Judge have been classified as two separate classes of Court under Sub-section (1) of Section 3, they belong to one and the same cadre, namely, the cadre of Higher Judicial Service, and that the Additional District Judge and the District Judge exercise almost the same judicial powers. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Civil Courts Act, the Court of District Judge and the Court of Additional District Judge have jurisdiction to hear and determine any suit or original proceeding without restriction as regards value. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 7, the Additional District Judge shall discharge any of the functions, of a District Judge including the functions of Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which the District Judge may by general or special order assign to him and in the discharge of such functions, he can exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act, appeals from decrees or orders of Court of Civil Judge Class I or Civil Judge Class II lie to the Court of District Judge. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act, appeals from decrees or orders of Court of Civil Judge Class I or Civil Judge Class II lie to the Court of District Judge. But the explanation under Sub-section (1) of Section 13 makes it clear that the Court of District Judge shall include an Additional Judge to that Court and Subsection (2) of Section 3 makes it clear that the Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge shall be from the cadre of Higher Judicial Service. Hence, an Additional District Judge and District Judge have the same appellate jurisdiction." 13. In the case at hand as is evident from the order sheets brought on record that by a Special Order dated 19.2.2015 passed by the District Judge, the election petition was made over to Sixth Additional District Judge, Sagar for disposal according to law. 14. In view whereof the contention that the Sixth Additional District Jude is not a Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction and the proceedings deserves to be quashed is negatived. 15. Another contention which is taken note of and rejected at the outset is as to presentation of election petition. Though it is contended that the presentation of petition is not in consonance with the stipulations contained under Section 441 of 1956 Act which requires presentation of the petition by the petitioner. The said issue as is evident from order dated 15.9.2015 by the Tribunal having been dwelt upon and negatived and the order having been allowed to attain finality does not deserve reconsideration, hence contention negatived. 16. Petitioner has relied on the decision in G.V. Sreerama Reddy and another v. Returning Officer and others, 11.8.2009 and Smt. Latha G. Krishna vs. The Returning Officer, 11.7.2003. These decisions are gone through but since they turn on the respective facts and relevant statutory provisions prevalent and applicable in the given facts of these cases, are of no assistance to the petitioner in the case at hand. 17. Taking over all view of the matter, the impugned order being not against law, is not interfered with. 18. In the result petition stands dismissed. The Tribunal, i.e., the Sixth Additional District Judge is expected to conclude the proceedings and decide the petition expeditiously. The petitioner is directed to co-operate for an early disposal of election petition. No costs.