JUDGMENT : J.K. Maheshwari, J. 1. These petitions under Article 226/227 have been filed challenging the award dated 22.7.2015 passed by the Labour Court No.1, Bhopal directing the petitioners to make payment to the respondents as claimed in applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. By filing reply, it is contended by the petitioners before the labour court that because the respondents were discharging the duties of Supervisors, however did not come within the definition of 'workman'. It is said the provisions of Section 33C(2) are not applicable, because the employees fall within the definition of workman is yet to be decided. It is also contended that the objection of the petitioners ought to be decided by the Labour Court on filing the statements of claim by the respondents in separate proceedings raising the dispute. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Krishnan and another v. Special Officer, Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mill and another-(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 210. The Apex Court has observed as under:- 13. We are of the opinion that the reference to Municipal Corporation's case (supra) is completely misplaced as in that matter, the fact that different categories of workers were doing identical kind of work was virtually admitted but different scales of pay were nevertheless being paid to them. It is also relevant that oral evidence had been adduced by the workmen to supplement the documentary evidence and it was in that situation that the Court felt that an application under section 33 C(2) was maintainable. 14. We find that the claim by the appellants herein has been disputed from the beginning and that the documents filed by the appellants themselves suggest that they were unsure of their own status. We have also perused the representations which have been filed as additional documents. A perusal of the letter dated 10th February 1996 from S. Karuthiah Pandian, Special Officer shows that the appellant D. Krishnan was being posted as a Canteen Manager. We have also perused the representations which have been filed as additional documents. A perusal of the letter dated 10th February 1996 from S. Karuthiah Pandian, Special Officer shows that the appellant D. Krishnan was being posted as a Canteen Manager. The subsequent letters dated 20th May 1996, 20th January 1997, 20th February 1997, 15th April 1998 and 6th August 1998 were all written by the appellant D. Krishnan identifying his post as that of Manager of the canteen and in the body of the last letter, a specific plea has been made that amongst the several duties entrusted to him, he had to instruct 4 workers to come in the morning, to prepare breakfast and a complaint that on one particular day, one C. Uttharakumar, a Clerk working under him had refused to follow his orders. We also find similar letters written by the second appellant, K. Shanmugam and they too are on the record as additional documents. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the light of the categorical statements time and again in the very documents relied upon by the appellants in support of their case, that they were, prima- facie, Managers and it would, therefore, be beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to determine their status in proceedings under Section 33 C(2) of the Act. 15. In this view of the matter, we find that the judgment reported in Municipal Corporation's case (supra) was clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In this case, it was observed that: "13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent workmen who were all daily- rated/causal workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. The workmen's claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" being disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33-C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. Respondents' claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made under Section 33-C(2) of the Act by these respondents." 16. In Brijpal Singh's case (supra), this is what the Court had to say: "It is well settled that the workman can proceed under Section 33-C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. This Court in the case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand held that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. Proceeding further, this Court held that the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman, and his employer." 17. Mr. Mr. Gonsalves, has, however urged that a preexisting right could also emanate from a statute, in this case from Section 59 of the Factories Act, which provided for the payment of overtime wages and in this view of the matter, all that the Labour Court was called upon to do was to make a calculation of the amounts due to the appellants. The facts of the case are, however, not as clear cut and dried, as has been contended. The Division Bench has observed that though section 59 of the Factories Act undoubtedly provided for extra payment as overtime wages, but according to Rule 78B of the Tamil Nadu Factories Rule, 1950, only an employee authorised to work overtime by an overtime slip would be entitled to claim an overtime allowance. The specific case of the respondent-Management, which has not been contested by the appellants even during the course of the arguments before us, is that no such slips had ever been issued. Additionally, we are of the opinion that in the absence of any supporting oral evidence by the workmen which would also result in their cross-examination, a mere reliance on the documents filed by them is insufficient for determining the factual basis of the issues involved, in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. In this view of the matter, Mr. Gonsalves's argument based on Rameshwar's case (supra) or the scope and ambit of Section 33 C(1) vis-a-vis Section 33 C (2), is also unacceptable." 3. In view of the aforesaid judgment it is apparent that if adjudication of the issue raised by either of the party is required, which is coming to the root of the case to ascertain the claim the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act cannot be maintained, because it is for the purpose of execution after passing the award by the Labour Court. 4. Considering the aforesaid, it can safely be observed that the status of the employees being Workman is required to be adjudicated in a dispute raised by the employees before the Labour Court. After deciding the said issue, the issue regarding payment of the ascertained amount can be settled. Therefore, filing a dispute under Section 33C(2) of the Act is not maintainable without determination of the status of the employees as Workman. After deciding the said issue, the issue regarding payment of the ascertained amount can be settled. Therefore, filing a dispute under Section 33C(2) of the Act is not maintainable without determination of the status of the employees as Workman. In such circumstances, the judgment of D. Krishnan (supra) is fully applicable in the facts of the present cases. Accordingly, the impugned award passed by the Labour Court stands set aside. However, employees are at liberty to approach the Labour Court within a month from today raising the dispute in accordance with law, which shall be considered and decided within a period of one year from the date of its filing. 5. With the aforesaid observation, all the aforesaid petitions are allowed and disposed of.