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2016 DIGILAW 957 (UTT)

Ranveer Singh v. State of Uttarakhand

2016-12-09

V.K.BIST

body2016
JUDGMENT : V.K. Bist, J. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders dated 19.11.2016, 21.11.2016 and 28.11.2016. 2. Key facts, necessary for adjudication of the case are, that election of the Committee of Management of a Cooperative Society, namely, Dugdh Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd., Haridwar, District Haridwar was held on 07.11.2013. The term of the elected Management Committee was five years. There were six members in the Management Committee. On 18.05.2016, two members of the Management Committee, namely, Smt. Rekha Devi and Smt. Bala Devi submitted their resignations before the Registrar (respondent no.2 herein). Respondent no.2, vide order dated 19.05.2016, accepted the resignations of the above two members and simultaneously disqualified one member, namely, Subhash Kumar, on the ground that his Society has supplied less quantity of milk as provided under the byelaws. In the same order, the respondent no.2 further observed that the Management Committee has come into minority, and thus, superseded the elected Management Committee of respondent no.3. The very next day, i.e., on 20.05.2016, the Management Committee was replaced by an Administrative Committee of five members; one out of them was the person, who had tendered resignation and one another was the son of one of the members, who resigned. These two orders dated 19.05.2016 and 20.05.2016 were challenged in Writ Petition (M/S) No.1519 of 2016. Vide judgment and order dated 16.09.2016, the learned Single Judge quashed the orders dated 19.05.2016 and 20.05.2016; but, issued certain directions in the following manner:- “17. It is, however, made clear that in order to meet a quorum, the remaining members i.e., other than the two who had resigned on 18.05.2016 shall meet immediately within a period of three weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order after calling for a general body meeting and co-opt member in accordance with law for smooth functioning of the Committee.” 3. The judgment and order passed by the coordinate Bench dated 16.09.2016 was assailed by one Kehar Singh before the Division Bench of this Court. Vide judgment and order dated 26.10.2016, the Division Bench upheld the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and only set aside paragraph-17 of the said judgment. While deciding the special appeal, the Division Bench, in paragraph 13 of the judgment, observed as follows:- “13. Vide judgment and order dated 26.10.2016, the Division Bench upheld the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and only set aside paragraph-17 of the said judgment. While deciding the special appeal, the Division Bench, in paragraph 13 of the judgment, observed as follows:- “13. …Taking into account the views of the general body meeting of the Co-operative Society is a legislative effort in consonance with the democratic principles, as a co-operative society is also a democratic institution and it is meant to be governed as a democratic institution. 4. The Division Bench further observed as follows:- “18..….Whether there is a quorum with the Board are all matters, which need not be gone into by this Court as we are affirming the quashing of the order passed under Section 35 of the Act read with the constitutional provisions enabling supersession on the basis, which we have indicated. We need not go into the question as to whether there is a quorum for the Committee and whether there is power to co-opt and this question is left open. We are also not pronouncing on the question relating to the power available to the Authorities to proceed afresh in the matter….” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order dated 19.11.2016 is bad in the eyes of law as before passing such order no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the Committee of Management, as provided u/s 35 of Uttarkhand Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 (for short, the Act). Further, the basis of the impugned order, is perverse, inasmuch as in paragraph-14 it is not said that the Committee of Management is in minority. He further submits that it is absolutely illegal on the part of the Registrar, on its own, to say that since the Management Committee is in minority, therefore, there is no need to provide opportunity of hearing. He also refers the judgment passed by the Division Bench and submits that there is nothing in the judgment which says that the Management Committee has come into minority. 6. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has raised preliminary objection and has stated that the petitioner has not impleaded the Committee of Management in the array of parties. Besides this, he submits that the orders dated 19.05.2016 and 20.05.2016 were set-side only on the ground that no opinion of general body meeting was taken before passing of these orders. 6. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has raised preliminary objection and has stated that the petitioner has not impleaded the Committee of Management in the array of parties. Besides this, he submits that the orders dated 19.05.2016 and 20.05.2016 were set-side only on the ground that no opinion of general body meeting was taken before passing of these orders. He further submits that a cooperative society vests in a general body of its members in general meeting as provided u/s 28 of the Act. He also submits that this is undisputed that no opinion of general body was taken. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench, general body meeting has been summoned. He also submits that there is no need to give opportunity of hearing as Management Committee is constituted from the general body and where it is in existence, but, in the case at hand, it is not in existence, so there is no need for giving opportunity of hearing. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material available on record. 8. I have gone through the judgment and order dated 26.10.2016 passed by the Division Bench of this Court. From the perusal of the same, I find that the Division Bench was of the view that before passing of the orders dated 19.05.2016 and 20.05.2016 the respondent no.2 had not sought opinion of the general body, and for this reason alone, the said order was in violation of Section 35 of the Act. As far as other submissions which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, I am of the view that the Division Bench has not given any finding in respect of these issues, like whether the Management Committee is in minority and whether there is quorum or not and whether there was any resignation. In my view, the Division Bench has not given any finding about the resignations of the two members and has not set aside the orders dated 19.05.2016 and 20.05.2016 on this ground; these orders were set aside only on the ground that no opinion of the general body was taken; therefore, it cannot be considered that the acceptance of resignations has been set aside. It is always open for the persons, whose resignation has been accepted, to challenge the said order on its merit. It is always open for the persons, whose resignation has been accepted, to challenge the said order on its merit. As far as the impugned orders are concerned, by which general body meeting has been convened, I am of the view that this Court should not interfere in the matter at this stage. In fact, general body meeting has been called by the Registrar, keeping in mind the observations made by the Division Bench in its judgment dated 26.10.2016. However, I grant liberty to the petitioner to challenge the subsequent orders which will be passed in pursuance of the opinion given by the general body, if the same affects the right of the petitioners in any manner. It will further be open for the petitioner to challenge any such order on the grounds, which have been taken in the present petition, including the ground of opportunity of hearing not being afforded to the Management Committee. 9. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is disposed of. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is the apprehension of the petitioner that, at the behest of the Minister, respondent no.2 may call the members individually in his room, and if the same is done, the purpose of the general body meeting will be frustrated. On this, learned C.S.C. submits that this is a totally misconceived argument and the meeting will be held strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes. It is also made clear that the general body meeting will be held in the presence of all the members. 10. Let certified copy of this order be issued today itself.