JUDGMENT : Servesh Kumar Gupta, J. Having heard the learned senior counsels in delay condonation application no. 186 of 2016 and the objections presented there against, it would be in the fitness of things to record the historical facts of the controversy between the parties. The Original Suit No. 15 of 1992 was instituted by the plaintiffs M/s Grand Hotel, the Mall, Nainital and others against the defendants Smt. Usha Joshi and others, seeking the decree of possession on the property in question because it was pleaded that defendants had encroached upon such property. 2. The defendants submitted their written statement resisting the pleadings and made the averments of counter claim seeking the relief of injunction against the plaintiffs restraining them not to disturb their possession. The Suit was proceeded in the Court of District Judge and by the judgment dated 19.6.2004 it was decreed while the counter claim was rejected. Feeling aggrieved the defendants presented the First Appeal No. 49 of 2004 within the time limitation challenging the granting of decree in favour of the plaintiffs. No any other appeal was preferred against the refusal of decree pertaining to the counter claim of the defendant. 3. When such appeal could come up for hearing on this Court on 18.12.2015, the learned senior counsel for the respondents had raised the preliminary objections that such First Appeal was not maintainable for the reason that no separate appeal was preferred against the refusal of counter claim of the defendants. He relied upon the two judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court:- 1. Premier Tyres Limited vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1202 2. Ram Prakash vs. Smt. Charan Kaur and another, reported in 1997 AIR SCW 1828. 4. Since these precedents were relied at the spur of the moment, hence the learned senior counsel for the appellant sought two weeks time to look into this aspect in the present controversy. 5. In order to avoid any controversy as indicated above another First Appeal No. 03 of 2016 preferred with a delay of 4127 days seeking condonation of such period by moving an application as shown in the title. The learned senior counsel of the appellant has placed reliance of two judgments, one is of the constitutional bench of the Apex Court namely Narhari and others vs. Shanker and others, [1953] 0 Supreme(SC) 32. The learned senior counsel of the appellant has placed reliance of two judgments, one is of the constitutional bench of the Apex Court namely Narhari and others vs. Shanker and others, [1953] 0 Supreme(SC) 32. and another is Director, Income Tax (International Taxation) vs. Transocean Offshore International Ventures Ltd. & others, [2011] 0 Supreme (UK) 701. 6. I have heard the pros and cons in the matter, pertaining to the only delay condonation excluding the merits which is to be dealt with after hearing both the appeals on merits. In my view the precedents as relied by the learned senior counsel of the respondents are not attracted in the present controversy because the filing of a single appeal or two appeals varies from case to case, nature of the facts and the differences of the reliefs, as sought by the parties. In the matter in hand, the relief sought by the plaintiff and that of the defendants was so interdependent and interlinked to each other, that granting of the relief to one party by itself could not have been a ground to deny the relief to the other party. 7. In this regard, the Hon’ble constitutional bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narhari (Supra) has held “it is now well settled that where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there need not be two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up. When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such, there is no question, of the application of the principle of res judicata. The same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one.” 8. In the present controversy, there was only one judgment, one decree was drawn. The same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one.” 8. In the present controversy, there was only one judgment, one decree was drawn. Similarly, the Divisional Bench of this Court in case of Director, Income Tax (Supra) has held that “Considering the judgments, referred to above, we are of the view that if, by conduct, appeals are consolidated at the appellate stage and the appellate authority is invited to render one judgment to dispose of all the appeals by a common judgment, may be several decrees/orders are required to be passed to dispose of those appeals, but since each of them would be supported by the common judgment, in the event, the common judgment is interfered with, those orders would loose their soul and would collapse forthwith like a body without soul. Accordingly, one appeal, according to us, is maintainable against a common judgment, but, however, appellant would be required to pay court fees as is payable in accordance with the provisions of the applicable Court Fees Act in respect of each appeal, which stands consolidated by the common judgment against which an appeal has been preferred.” 9. The Constitutional Bench judgment, as relied by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents, Premiere Tyres (Supra) is not applicable in the present controversy for the reason that there were two different suits filed by the parties against each other, one was for the recovery of the excess amount paid by it to the other party while the pleadings of the other party was claiming the entitlement of the invoice price because as per his averments, the Corporation was not liable to pay in excess of D.G.S.&D. contract rates. 10. Both the suits were connected and tried together as the nature of the dispute in both the suits were same. Issues framed were also common. The Trial Court found that the Corporation was liable to pay for the goods supplied to it by the appellant only at D.G.S.&D. contract rates. Even on this finding, the claim of the appellant was found substantiated for a part and consequently the suit was decreed to that extent. In Ram Prakash case (Supra), both the petitioner and the respondents filed two different suits, claiming the damages against each other. Even on this finding, the claim of the appellant was found substantiated for a part and consequently the suit was decreed to that extent. In Ram Prakash case (Supra), both the petitioner and the respondents filed two different suits, claiming the damages against each other. The petitioner’s suit was dismissed and the respondents’ suit was also dismissed by the Trial Court. The respondents filed only one appeal against the dismissal of his own suit, while no appeal was filed against the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit. So, in that eventuality, the Hon’ble Apex Court held up that two different appeals would have been presented and mere filing of the one appeal can not cover the relief sought by one party against the other. 11. Since the appeal No. 03 of 2016 has been presented after the arguments raised by the learned counsel of the respondents on 18.12.2015, hence to avoid the technical error (if any), this second appeal has been presented. 12. Virtually, in the matter in hand, even if Mr. Joshi would not have filed this appeal No. 03 of 2016 then also I think there was no hitch for this Court to hear the Appeal No. 49 of 2004 on merits and adjudicate the controversy between the parties. 13. In view of what has been set forth above, I allow the delay condonation application and admit this Appeal No. 03 of 2016 for hearing, which shall remain clubbed along with FA No. 49 of 2004 and list both these appeals clubbed together for arguments after winter vacations in the week commencing 20.02.2017.