JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. In this group of petitions, except Special Civil Application No. 3588 of 2011, the petitioner company has challenged separate but similar awards dated 22.10.2010 whereby the learned Labour Court directed the petitioner to reinstate the concerned workmen with continuity of service and backwages and other consequential benefits to be calculated from 18.1.2007. In Special Civil Application Nos. 3591/2011, 4112/2011, 4113/2011, 1899/2011, 3592/2011, 3590/2011, 3593/2011 and 3587/2011, the petitioner has challenged awards passed in Reference (LCN) Nos. 23/2005, 16/2005, 19/2005, 21/2005, 20/2005, 24/2005, 22/2005 and 18/2005 respectively. Whereas in Special Civil Application No. 3588/2011, the petitioner has challenged order/award passed in Complaint No. 22/2004. 2. So as to consider the grievance and contention of the petitioner company against the impugned awards, it is necessary to take into account relevant facts involved in the cases. 2.1 In January 2007, the petitioner company purchased a unit/division of respondent No. 2 company as a 'going concern' vide agreement dated 18.1.2007. 2.2 Before the said agreement dated 18.1.2007 was entered into and executed by and between the petitioner company (hereinafter referred to as 'the purchaser company') and the respondent No. 2 company (hereinafter referred to as 'respondent No. 2' or 'vendor company'), the said vendor company had, somewhere in 2004, dismissed the service of the workman (i.e. respondent No. 1 in SCA No. 3587/2011). 2.3 It appears that at the relevant time when the service of respondent No. 1 workmen came to be terminated, a dispute against the said vendor company was pending before the learned Tribunal, by way of Reference (ITN) No. 159 of 2001. 2.4 Since the service of respondent No. 1 workmen was terminated by the said vendor company during pendency of the said dispute/Reference No. 159 of 2001, the said vendor company had filed approval application under section 33(2)(B) and prayed for approval of its action viz. dismissing respondent No. 1 workmen from the service. The said approval application came to be registered as Approval Application (ITN) No. 20 of 2004 in Reference (ITN) No. 159 of 2001. dismissing respondent No. 1 workmen from the service. The said approval application came to be registered as Approval Application (ITN) No. 20 of 2004 in Reference (ITN) No. 159 of 2001. 2.5 At this stage, it is necessary to clarify that at the time when the service of the respondent in Special Civil Application No. 3587 of 2011 came to be terminated, several other workmen were also terminated and that, therefore, the said vendor company had filed other approval applications along with above mentioned Approval Application No. 20 of 2004. 2.6 While the approval applications filed by the vendor company were pending, respondent No. 2 company (i.e. vendor company) entered into an agreement with present petitioner, i.e. purchaser company on 18.1.2007 whereby the petitioner company purchased and acquired, as a going concern, industrial undertaking/establishment of the vendor company. 2.7 Sometime after the said agreement dated 18.1.2007 was executed, the learned Tribunal decided the approval applications and vide orders passed on 14.5.2009, the approval applications came to be rejected. 2.8 At this stage, it is relevant to mention that Mr. Thakkar, learned advocate for the petitioner (i.e. purchaser company) informed the Court that at the relevant time, the purchaser company had challenged the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed by the learned Tribunal in the approval applications by filing writ petitions being Special Civil Application No. 3603 of 2011 and connected matters. He also submitted that the said petitions were disposed of by the Court vide order dated 18.3.2011 on the ground that the petitioner (purchaser company) was not party to the approval applications and therefore, the petitions at its behest need not be entertained. He also submitted that however, the Court reserved purchaser company's right to challenge the order of the approval applications if the workmen raised any demand against purchaser company. A copy of the order dated 18.3.2011 is tendered by learned advocate for the petitioner. The relevant part of the order reads thus: "1. ... ... ... ... ... 2. ... ... ... ... ... 3. Learned advocate Mr. Thakker submitted that this Unit has been taken over by business transfer agreement on 18.1.2007. Prior to that, it was not a responsibility of petitioner to comply with order passed by Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad while rejecting approval application filed by respondent No. 2. ... ... ... ... ... 2. ... ... ... ... ... 3. Learned advocate Mr. Thakker submitted that this Unit has been taken over by business transfer agreement on 18.1.2007. Prior to that, it was not a responsibility of petitioner to comply with order passed by Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad while rejecting approval application filed by respondent No. 2. He also submitted that at the time when business transfer agreement was entered between petitioner and respondent on 18.1.2007, condition was incorporated which is at Article VI. ... ... ... ... ... 4. ... ... ... ... ... 5. In light of aforesaid background and considering the fact that petitioner was not a party to the aforesaid proceedings, therefore, present petition is not entertained by this Court only on that ground and is accordingly disposed of at this stage without expressing any opinion on merits. 6. However, it is made clear that in case if any proceedings is initiated by respondent No. 1 - employee against present petitioner for implementation of order passed by Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad in Approval Application which is under challenge in present petition, at that occasion, it is open for petitioner to challenge very same order passed by Industrial Tribunal in Approval Application." 2.9 In reply to the query by the Court, Mr. Thakkar, learned advocate for the purchaser company and the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3603 of 2011 and connected matters, clarified that the purchaser company has accepted the said order dated 18.3.2011 and has hitherto not filed (and until now it has not filed) any appeal, or any other proceedings, against the said order. 2.10 It appears that the respondent No. 1 herein and other workmen had raised dispute claiming reinstatement in service, backwages and other benefits. 2.11 The said dispute came to be adjudicated before the learned Tribunal by the approval Government vide separate orders of reference. The said orders of reference came to be registered as Reference (LCN) No. 21 of 2005 and other cognate reference cases, wherein the learned Labour Court passed awards which are impugned in present petitions. 2.12 It appears that in the said reference cases, the workmen had impleaded present petitioner, along with the vendor company, as opponent. The said orders of reference came to be registered as Reference (LCN) No. 21 of 2005 and other cognate reference cases, wherein the learned Labour Court passed awards which are impugned in present petitions. 2.12 It appears that in the said reference cases, the workmen had impleaded present petitioner, along with the vendor company, as opponent. 2.13 During the pendency of the said reference cases, the workmen filed miscellaneous applications and prayed that in view of the rejection of the approval applications, the direction to reinstate the workmen with backwages and other benefits may be passed. It appears that the workmen also placed on record a copy of the order dated 14.5.2009 whereby the approval applications were rejected. 2.14 It appears that the purchaser company (i.e. present petitioner) had opposed the said interlocutory application which the workmen had filed on or around 13.4.2010. The petitioner herein had opposed said interlocutory application on the ground that it was not party in the approval applications filed by the workmen and that, therefore, any direction cannot be passed against it. 2.15 After the parties completed the stage of evidence in the reference cases, the learned Labour Court, after considering the material on record and the submissions by learned advocates, passed separate but similar awards dated 22.10.2010 and allowed the reference cases and directed the petitioner to reinstate the workmen with continuity of service and backwages to be calculated from 18.1.2007. The learned Labour Court also directed the vendor company to pay wages from the date of termination upto 17.1.2007. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said awards and directions in the reference cases. Hence present petitions. 3. Mr. Thakkar, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that while dismissing the petition against the order passed in approval application, the High Court had clarified that it would be open to present petitioner to file proceeding if any demand is raised against the purchaser company. He further submitted that the purchaser company purchased the undertaking from respondent No. 2/vendor company, as a going concern, and that as per the agreement it was agreed between the vendor company and the purchaser company (i.e. present respondent No. 2 and present petitioner) that those workmen who were on the rolls of the vendor company on 18.1.2007 and whose names are included in the list supplied by the vendor company, will be absorbed by the purchaser company. He submitted that in pursuance of the said provision under the agreement, the vendor company had provided list of names of the employees to be transferred along with the undertaking and the purchaser company had absorbed those workmen. He further submitted that the workmen concerned in this group of petitions were terminated by the vendor company before 18.1.2007 and the vendor company had not mentioned the names of the workmen concerned in present proceeding in the list provided to the purchaser company and that, therefore, the petitioner i.e. purchaser company cannot be held responsible for reinstatement of the concerned workmen. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that in view of the agreement between the purchaser company and the vendor company, the liability and responsibility of the vendor company is restricted in respect of the workmen who were on the rolls of the company on 18.1.2007 and whose names were mentioned by the vendor company and the list supplied to the purchaser company. So as to support the said submission, learned advocate for the purchaser company claimed that (a) 'writing' was executed by and between the purchaser company and the vendor company on 18.1.2007 whereby the terms related to the employees were finalised between the parties and that in view of the said writing between the vendor and the purchaser, the award and directions against the petitioner are not sustainable. According to the petitioner, the learned Labour Court has committed error in fastening the said liability on the petitioner company and in the process the learned Labour Court has misconstrued the agreement dated 18.1.2007 executed between the vendor company and the purchaser company. So as to support his submission, learned advocate for the purchaser company relied on the decision in the case of Anakapalle Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workmen and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1489 and the decision in the case of Workmen of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company & Ors., 1966 (1) LLJ 730. 4. Ms. Pahwa, learned advocate for the workmen, while opposing the petition, submitted that the said agreement dated 18.1.2007 does not contain any provision which would enable the company to decline to discharge it obligation to reinstate the workmen. v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company & Ors., 1966 (1) LLJ 730. 4. Ms. Pahwa, learned advocate for the workmen, while opposing the petition, submitted that the said agreement dated 18.1.2007 does not contain any provision which would enable the company to decline to discharge it obligation to reinstate the workmen. She also submitted that the awards and the directions are passed in light of the fact that the approval applications have been rejected by the learned Tribunal and that, therefore, the contentions by the purchaser company are unjustified and deserve to be rejected. She also submitted that the order in approval applications was passed after the purchaser company acquired undertaking and that, therefore, it cannot escape the obligation to comply the direction by the learned Labour Court. 5. I have considered the award dated 22.10.2010 as well as the order dated 14.5.2009 passed in approval applications and other material on record. I have also considered rival contentions and the decision on which the learned advocate for the petitioner relied as well as the agreement dated 18.1.2007 executed between the parties. 6. Before proceeding further, it is relevant and appropriate to recall certain dates and events. They are: "(a) order terminating the service of the concerned claimants - 16.12.2004; (b) the time when the vendor company filed approval applications - 2004; (c) during the pendency of the said approval applications, appropriate Government passed order of reference and referred the dispute related to termination of the employees for adjudication to the learned Labour Court - 27.1.2005; (d) it is not in dispute that present petitioner was impleaded as party opponent in the reference proceedings; (e) the date of the agreement between the purchaser company and the vendor company and the date of acquisition of the unit/undertaking - 18.1.2007; (f) the date when the learned Tribunal decided the approval applications - 14.5.2009; (g) the date of the award in the reference cases - 22.10.2010 (i.e. after the acquisition of the undertaking)." 7. The above mentioned details bring out the fact that the order rejecting the approval applications came to be passed about 28 months after the petitioner company purchased and acquired the unit/undertaking from respondent No. 2 and the order in reference cases came to be passed after about 32 months. The above mentioned details bring out the fact that the order rejecting the approval applications came to be passed about 28 months after the petitioner company purchased and acquired the unit/undertaking from respondent No. 2 and the order in reference cases came to be passed after about 32 months. Thus, it is difficult to digest that for such long period the purchaser had no idea about pendency of the approval applications. 8. It is pertinent that the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed by the learned Tribunal whereby the approval applications came to be rejected, were challenged by present petitioner in 2011 by filing writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 3603 of 2011 and other matters and that the said petitions came to be rejected by the Court vide order dated 18.3.2011. It is not in dispute that any proceeding/appeal against the said order dated 18.3.2011 are not filed either by the vendor or the purchaser company. Thus, the said order dated 18.3.2011 has attained finality. 8.1 It is equally pertinent to note that the order dated 14.5.2009 (whereby the approval application came to be rejected) were not challenged by present respondent No. 2 company. Thus, the said orders dated 14.5.2009 have attained finality and it binds present petitioner. 8.2 At this stage, it would be appropriate to take into account the relief prayed for in present petition. The petitioner/purchaser company has prayed, inter alia, that: "14(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the award and order dated 22.10.2010 passed by the learned Labour Court, Nadiad in Reference (LCN) No. 21/05 at Annexure A, directing the petitioner to reinstate respondent No. 1 with continuity of service and backwages along with consequential benefits from 18.01.2007. 8.3 In light of the facts of the case and more particularly in light of the relief prayed for in the petitions it emerges and becomes clear that- "(a) What the petitioner claims is that the award dated 22.10.2010 may be set aside; (b) Any relief against order dated 14.5.2009 is not prayed for." 8.4 It is necessary to keep in focus that the awards dated 22.10.2010 substantially rests on the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed in approval applications and the said orders dated 14.5.2009 is/are not challenged in these petitions and they have, rather, attained finality. 9. In this view of the matter and if the award dated 22.10.2010 which is challenged in these petitions, is not set aside, then the question which would arise is about the obligation to comply and implement the said award i.e. who is legally obliged to comply and implement the award once it has become enforceable as per section 17 of the Act. 9.1 In view of the fact that the said award dated 22.10.2010 is passed in light of and is based on proved and established breach of section 33 of the Act and it also rests on the order - award dated 14.5.2009 and on conjoint reading of section 33 and section 18 of the Act, and also according to the agreement dated 18.1.2007, it becomes clear that the obligation to comply and implement the award dated 22.10.2010 (as well as the order - award dated 14.5.2009) is, as can be seen from following discussion, on the petitioner. Actually conjoint reading of sections 33, 18 and 17 make it clear that after the order - award dated 14.5.2009 the workmen are deemed to be in service. 10. However, since the award dated 22.10.2010 is challenged by the petitioner, it is necessary to first find out whether the award deserves to be set aside. So far as the issue related to the obligation to comply the award is concerned, it has to be considered and examined in light of section 33 and section 18 of the Act. 10. However, since the award dated 22.10.2010 is challenged by the petitioner, it is necessary to first find out whether the award deserves to be set aside. So far as the issue related to the obligation to comply the award is concerned, it has to be considered and examined in light of section 33 and section 18 of the Act. 10.1 It is pertinent that the award dated 22.10.2010 and the learned Labour Court's conclusion in respect of the legality or otherwise of the termination of service of the concerned workman are based on the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed by the learned Tribunal in approval application (whereby the learned Tribunal rejected approval applications) which have, now, attained finality inasmuch as the petitions against the orders dated 14.5.2009 have been rejected vide orders dated 18.3.2011 and the said orders dated 18.3.2011 have not/have never been challenged either by present petitioner and/or by present respondent No. 2 and now in present petition also said orders dated 14.5.2009 are not challenged. 10.2 On the orders dated 14.5.2009 having attained finality the workmen, in light of section 33 of the Act, are deemed to be in service. 10.3 When the award dated 22.10.2010 is examined in light of these facts, it becomes clear that the conclusions recorded by the learned Labour Court in award dated 22.10.2010 holding that the termination of service of the concerned claimant was illegal and since approval applications are rejected, the concerned claimants are entitled for reinstatement and back-wages, cannot be faulted. 10.4 Besides this, even otherwise, in the award dated 22.10.2010 its conclusion that the termination of the service of the concerned claimants is vitiated and illegal and that therefore the concerned claimants are entitled for consequential benefits and relief i.e. reinstatement with back wages. There is no reason and no material to disturb the said conclusion in findings recorded by the learned Labour Court. The petitioner has failed to make out any ground against the said findings of conclusions recorded by the learned Labour Court and to establish and convince this Court to hold that the award dated 22.10.2010 is erroneous. The petitioners has failed to establish that the award deserves to be set aside and to convince the Court to quash the award. 11. The petitioners has failed to establish that the award deserves to be set aside and to convince the Court to quash the award. 11. Now, what is important at this stage is the fact that though liberty to challenge orders dated 14.5.2009 was reserved and granted vide order dated 18.3.2011 passed by the Court in Special Civil Application No. 3603 of 2011 in favour of present petitioner company even in present petition, the petitioner company has not challenged the order dated 14.5.2009 passed in approval applications on any ground. 12. Consequently, the decision, the reasons and the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal and the final directions passed by the learned Tribunal vide orders dated 14.5.2009 passed in the approval applications have attained finality. Therefore the orders dated 14.5.2009 are enforceable by the workmen and they are deemed to be in service. Thus when the award dated 22.10.2010 is based on order - award dated 14.5.2009 and when the award dated 22.10.2010 accepts the reasoning and conclusions by the Tribunal in the order dated 22.10.2010, then unless any exceptional and strong reason and ground is made out, there would be no justification to set aside award dated 22.10.2010. 12.1 In this view of the matter and more particularly when the petitioner has not challenged the orders dated 14.5.2009, now it is neither open nor permissible for the petitioner company to raise any objection or to make any grievance against any part of the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed by the learned Tribunal in the said approval applications and the said order dated 14.5.2009 and/or against the consequences flowing from the order dated 14.5.2009 and/or against demand based on the said order. 13. Despite such facts and position, the petitioner company wants to avoid the consequences and/or the obligation imposed by virtue of the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed in approval applications and the award dated 22.10.2010 passed in reference cases. 13. Despite such facts and position, the petitioner company wants to avoid the consequences and/or the obligation imposed by virtue of the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed in approval applications and the award dated 22.10.2010 passed in reference cases. 13.1 The acquisition was made on 18.1.2007 and the orders in approval applications were passed on 14.5.2009 i.e. after about 28 months and despite the fact that the undertaking/unit of respondent No. 2 was sold during pendency of the proceeding and the orders in approval applications came to be passed after the unit/undertaking was taken over by the purchaser company as a going concern and that about 28 months was available, therefore, it was the obligation at least of the respondent No. 2 company to bring the said fact on the record of the approval applications before the Court, however, neither the petitioner nor the respondent No. 2 placed the said fact on record and did not inform learned Tribunal about the fact and/or took steps to implead/transfer the purchaser company. Even the petitioner company could have placed the said fact on record and informed the learned Tribunal the fact about the agreement and brought it to the knowledge of the Tribunal. 13.2 Now, neither the petitioner nor the respondent No. 2 company can take disadvantage of said lapse - which could be intentional or otherwise. 13.3 In this background, the petitioner is not justified in claiming that it had no idea about, and it did not have knowledge about the proceedings (i.e. approval applications) pending before the learned Tribunal. 13.4 The purchaser company cannot escape its liability, more so when it is statutory obligation on the pretext or on the ground that it was not impleaded as party to the proceeding of approval applications, more so when neither the purchaser nor the vendor company took any steps to inform the learned Tribunal, and did not bring the fact, to the knowledge of the learned Tribunal (viz. that the unit/establishment is sold by respondent No. 2). Such excuse or ground does not hold any substance or merits in vie of the fact that rejection of approval application on merits amounts to and means that the concerned workmen are deemed to be in service and when the workmen are deemed to be in service since 14.5.2009 i.e. after the rejection of approval application. Such excuse or ground does not hold any substance or merits in vie of the fact that rejection of approval application on merits amounts to and means that the concerned workmen are deemed to be in service and when the workmen are deemed to be in service since 14.5.2009 i.e. after the rejection of approval application. 13.5 On this count it is pertinent that by virtue of clause 6.06 of the agreement dated 18.1.2007 it was obligation of the respondent No. 2 to disclose the fact and details of pending litigation. 13.6 Besides this, the petitioner company cannot escape its liability and obligation to comply the directions vide order dated 14.5.2009 and/or by the award dated 22.10.2010 in view of the fact that despite the liberty granted by the Court vide order dated 18.3.2011, the petitioner company never challenged the order dated 14.5.2009 in the approval applications. It is pertinent that even in present petition, the said order is not challenged. 14. At this stage, it would be relevant to take into account certain clauses and provisions in the agreement dated 18.1.2007 executed by and between the petitioner/purchaser company and the vendor company, i.e. respondent No. 2 herein. The relevant clauses from the said agreement are: "The BUSINESS TRANSFER AGREEMENT, dated as of January 18, 2007, ... ... ... ... ... PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS A. ... ... ... ... ... to C. ... ... ... ... ... D. The Seller wishes to sell to the Acquiror, and the Acquiror wishes to purchase from the Seller as a going concern, the Seller's Lighting Undertaking in the Territory with the assets and liabilities of the Seller pertaining to the Lighting Undertaking (the referred Assets" and "assumed Liabilities") and the Transferred Employees upon the terms subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement. NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties to agreement agrees as follows: ARTICLE II Section 2.01 ... ... ... ... ... Section 2.02 ... ... ... ... ... (a) ... ... ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... ... ... (c) Assumed Liabilities. NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties to agreement agrees as follows: ARTICLE II Section 2.01 ... ... ... ... ... Section 2.02 ... ... ... ... ... (a) ... ... ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... ... ... (c) Assumed Liabilities. On the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement, the Acquiror hereby agrees, effective at the time of the Closing, to assume and agree to pay, discharge and perform (i) all liabilities and obligations for Taxes, benefits, compensation and employment related matters for which the Acquiror bears the ultimate responsibility pursuant to an obligation to assume, indemnify or reimburse under this Agreement; (ii) all liabilities and obligations of the Lighting Undertaking reflected in Section 2.02(c) of the Disclosure Schedule; ... ... ... ... ... ARTICLE III Section 3.1 ... ... ... ... ... to 3.10 ... ... ... ... ... Section 3.11 Employment and Employee Matters. Agreements relating to Employee of Seller are as set forth in Article VI below. ARTICLE VI EMPLOYEE MATTERS Section 6.01 Employees and Employee Plans. Section 6.01(a) of the Disclosure Schedule sets forth a list of the names of employees (both who are covered by the definition of "workmen" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well as the those not so covered") related to the Lighting Undertaking whose services are agreed to be transferred to the Acquiror with the Lighting Undertaking (collectively "Employees of Seller"). The compensation and benefits paid to each Employee of Seller ("Employee Plan") is in writing and the Seller has previously made available to the Acquiror, a true and complete copy of each Employee Plan. Section 6.02 Offer of Transfer of Services of the Employees of the Seller. (a) Pursuant to the transfer of the ownership the Lighting Undertaking from the Seller to the Acquiror as on the Closing Date of this Agreement, it is agreed that the services of all Employees of Seller and as set out in Section 6.01 (a) of the Disclosure Schedule, be transferred to the Acquiror with effect from Closing Date on the following terms and conditions. (i) ... ... ... ... ... (ii) ... ... ... ... ... (iii) ... ... ... ... ... (b) The Seller agrees to furnish to each of the Employees of Seller a letter proposing the transfer of their services to the Acquiror with effect from Closing Date (the "Transfer Letter"). (i) ... ... ... ... ... (ii) ... ... ... ... ... (iii) ... ... ... ... ... (b) The Seller agrees to furnish to each of the Employees of Seller a letter proposing the transfer of their services to the Acquiror with effect from Closing Date (the "Transfer Letter"). A proforma of the Transfer Letter to be issued to each of the concerned employees (both in the case of employees who are "workmen" and those who are not covered as "workmen") of the Seller is hereto annexed and marked Exhibits 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. The Acquiror has agreed to sign the Transfer Letters in token of its acceptance of the terms and conditions of the transfer of services of the Employees of Seller. Section 6.03 Refusal to Accept. If any Employee, who is covered by the definition of "workmen" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 refuses to transfer to the Acquirior for any reason whatsoever, the Acquiror shall reimburse Seller the cost of any compensation that the Seller is required to pay to such Employee. The Parties shall work together to avoid any extended employment disruption. Section 6.04 & 6.05 ... ... ... ... ... Section 6.06 Employee Litigation. Except as set forth in Section 6.06 of the Disclosure Schedule, there are no material claims and/or litigation pending or, to the Knowledge of Seller, threatened between the Seller and its Employees. The Seller shall be liable to for Liability relating to or arising in respect of the period prior to the Closing Date and Acquiror shall be responsible for Liability relating to or arising in respect of the period after the Closing Date. Provided however that the Acquiror shall be responsible, at hits own cost, for defending any litigation to which the Acquiror is made a party and Seller and Acquiror shall comply with the order of the Governmental Authority, as applicable." 15. From the above quoted provisions contained in the agreement dated 18.1.2007 executed between the petitioner (i.e. the purchaser) and respondent No. 2 (i.e. the vendor), it emerges that the petitioner purchased the undertaking as a 'going concern' along with the assets and liabilities of the vendor, including the liabilities and obligations for taxes, benefits, compensation and employment related matters. Thus, the petitioner/purchaser had assumed the liabilities towards employment related matters. Thus, the petitioner/purchaser had assumed the liabilities towards employment related matters. The said Article VI also prescribed, by virtue of section 6.06 that details relating to the claims/litigations pending in respect of the employees shall be part of the agreement by way of disclosure schedule and it would provide the details relating to pending claims and/or litigations. Therefore, it was vendor's obligation to disclose (and to provide details of) the approval applications which were filed in 2004 and were pending as on 18.1.2007 as well as about the reference case (order of reference was made in January 2005) which was also pending on the date of agreement dated 18.1.2007. 15.1 It is pertinent to note that though the petitioner has conveniently claimed that it was not joined as party to the approval applications but it has neither alleged/claimed that the respondent had not informed it about pending approval application and/or about pending reference case. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not claim that the respondent had not informed that as on date of agreement approval application and the reference case are pending. 15.2 When the terms and conditions of the said agreement dated 18.1.2007 and more particularly clause (d) of the preliminary statement sub-clause (c) of section 2.02 and the definition of the term 'liabilities' under said Exhibit A and various clauses contained under Article VI are read together, it comes out that services of all employees which would include the employees who would fall within purview of the definition of the term 'workmen' as well as the persons/employees who would not come within the purview of the said term, were to be transferred to the purchaser and the discretion (viz. whether to accept such transfer of employment/service to the petitioner, or not) was left to the employees and the agreement provided that those employees/workmen who wanted to refuse such transfer were free to do so and they shall be paid compensation and he shall be reimbursed by the purchaser. whether to accept such transfer of employment/service to the petitioner, or not) was left to the employees and the agreement provided that those employees/workmen who wanted to refuse such transfer were free to do so and they shall be paid compensation and he shall be reimbursed by the purchaser. The said provisions also give out that the discretion to accept or to not accept any employee was not granted to the purchaser and all employees i.e. who come within the purview of the definition 'workmen' as well as those who do not fall within the purview of the said term, were to be transferred (and they would stand transferred to the purchaser) except those persons who refused to accept the transfer. 15.3 In this context, it is pertinent that the definition of the term 'workmen' is contained under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the said term includes, inter alia, the person/employee who is dismissed or discharged or retrenched from the service and the dispute related to such termination is pending. Therefore, the dismissed or discharged or retrenched employees whose litigation against such dismissal or retrenchment or discharge was pending (except those who voluntarily refused to accept the transfer) were also transferred and their liabilities were also transferred to, and assumed by, the purchaser, i.e. the petitioner. 15.4 When above quoted provisions from the agreement dated 18.1.2007 are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that there is no provision under the agreement which would enable the purchaser company to claim that it has no liability in respect of the workmen whose services were terminated before the date of the agreement and their services came to be restored by Court's order passed after the date of the agreement. 16. Actually, the stand and defence of the company overlook, and are contrary to not only the provisions under the agreement dated 18.1.2007 but are also contrary to and in disregard to, the provisions under the Industrial Disputes Act viz. section 18 read with section 2(s) of the Act. 16. Actually, the stand and defence of the company overlook, and are contrary to not only the provisions under the agreement dated 18.1.2007 but are also contrary to and in disregard to, the provisions under the Industrial Disputes Act viz. section 18 read with section 2(s) of the Act. 16.1 In this context, it would also be relevant and appropriate to take into account the definition of the term 'workman' as contained under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act: "2(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) to (iv) ... ... ... ... ..." 16.2 It comes out from the said definition that the term 'workman' includes even the person who has been dismissed or discharged or retrenched and whose dismissal or discharge or retrenchment has led to dispute. Undisputedly the services of present respondents - claimants were terminated and against such terminations disputes were raised and reference cases were filed. Therefore present respondents would come within the purview of the 'workman'. 16.3 Along with the said provision, it is also relevant to also take into account section 18 of the Act which reads thus: "18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), an arbitration award] which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (2) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), an arbitration award] which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under Sub-section (3A) of section 10A] or a n award o f a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has become enforceable] shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as par ties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator,] Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part;" (Emphasis supplied) 16.4 The said provision specifies the parties to whom an order or award passed by the Labour Court and/or the Tribunal would be binding. The said section provides that an order or award passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal would be binding, inter alia, to all parties to the dispute as well as to the 'heirs' and 'assigns' and 'successors' of the party who is an employer. Thus, not only the 'successors' or 'heirs' but even the 'assigns' of the employer (who was party to the dispute/proceeding before the learned Labour Court) would be bound by the award passed in such dispute. Thus, not only the 'successors' or 'heirs' but even the 'assigns' of the employer (who was party to the dispute/proceeding before the learned Labour Court) would be bound by the award passed in such dispute. 16.5 Actually, having neglected or ignored or failed to place (despite clause 6.06 of the agreement dated 18.1.2007 in light of which the petitioner is supposed to have knowledge and information about pendency of approval application and reference case) on record the details of the sale of undertaking and/or the agreement dated 18.1.2007 and to join the approval application (or to request the Tribunal to join the petitioner as party to the approval application) the petitioner cannot escape the applicability of clause (a) of section 18(3) and/or its consequences. However, even if it is assumed that section 18(3)(a) would not be applicable to present petitioner then also the petitioner stands found, by virtue of section 18(3)(c) of the Act, to the obligation to comply and implement the award dated 22.10.2010 and order - award dated 14.5.2009. 16.6 On reading section 18(3)(c) it emerges that by virtue of clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 18 when an award/order is passed and it becomes enforceable, (if the said award and directions are not set aside) would be binding to the employer or the employer's heirs or his 'successor' or 'the assign' of the employer and the employer or his/its heirs or successors or assigns would be obliged to honour and comply the award. It would be statutory obligation of either of said parties (i.e. employer or the successors or the heir/s or the assigns of the employer) to implement the directions passed by virtue of the order dated 14.5.2009 and the award dated 22.10.2010. 16.7 In present case, the obligation to comply and implement the award dated 22.10.2010 falls on the shoulders of the petitioner by virtue of section 18(3)(c) which is statutory obligation and inasmuch as the said section obliges the 'assigns' (or the heirs or the successors) of an employer to comply the orders/awards passed by the learned Labour Court or the learned Industrial Tribunal. 17. 17. During the hearing of present petition, learned advocate for the petitioner tried to wriggle out of the said position by taking advantage of and/or to take shelter under a so-called 'writing' allegedly executed between the parties which allegedly provide that the existing employees on the rolls of the company as on 18.1.2007 have been transferred to the purchaser. Learned advocate for the petitioner would, while taking shelter under the so-called writing, submit that the petitioner's obligation was only in respect of the employees who were on the rolls as on 18.1.2007 and since the respondent was not on the rolls (since he was terminated before 18.1.2007), the petitioner has no obligation in respect of the respondent. 17.1 The said submission is not sustainable for more than one reason; First, the said writing is not part of the agreement dated 18.1.2007. Second, according to the respondent, the so-called writing was not placed on record of the learned Labour Court and it was not referred to in the written statement and any contention/defence on the ground of the said 'writing' was not raised before the learned Labour Court. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to refer to or rely on the so-called writing. Third, in any case, the so-called 'writing' i.e. entire document, and in any case its contents, are not duly proved in accordance with law before the learned Labour Court. Therefore, the so-called 'writing' and its contents do not have any evidentiary or probative value. Fourth, on reading the so-called 'writing', it emerges that the parties have not mentioned, anywhere, in the so-called 'writing', the date on which the so-called 'writing' was allegedly entered into and executed/signed. It appears that the so-called 'writing' was executed after the learned Tribunal passed the orders in the approval applications and only with the purpose to frustrate said orders. Fifth, the so-called writing runs counter to or is contrary to plain and ordinary meaning of the provisions under the agreement dated 18.1.2007 and the terms and conditions incorporated therein and/or it is contrary to or it militates against the apparent and literal, plain and obvious meaning as well as the intention of the parties which flow from the terms of the said agreement and that, therefore, it cannot be accepted or cannot be given effect to over the agreement dated 18.1.2007. Sixth, apparently, the so-called writing appears to be an afterthought and in all probability seems to have been prepared subsequently and for the purpose of the reference proceedings which were pending when orders in approval applications were passed and/or with a view to frustrating the implementation of the order passed in approval application and/or the award which may be passed in reference case. Seventh, when sufficient and express provisions with regard to the issues related to the employees - including the subject of transfer of employees to the petitioner and matters connected with said aspect are exhaustively provided for and contained in the agreement dated 18.1.2007, there was neither need nor justification to allegedly execute the so-called writing which contained clauses (a) to (d) which, on face of it, appear to have been conceived and prepared subsequently and run contrary to main, original and substantive provisions in the agreement dated 18.1.2007 and the main object of the subsequent so-called writing is reflected from paragraph No. 2 of the so-called writing viz. the said clauses (a) to (d) appear to have been incorporated with a view to providing platform to claim and contend that the writing was executed to provide clarifications. Eight and more important aspect is the fact that the petitioner itself was party opponent in the reference cases (wherein the impugned award dated 22.10.2010 is/are passed) and that, therefore, by virtue of section 18(3)(c) also the petitioner is under statutory obligation (if the impugned award dated 22.10.2010 passed in reference cases) is/are not set aside. 17.2 For the said reasons, the so-called writing cannot be taken into consideration and the contention or submission by learned advocate for the petitioner on the basis of the so-called 'writing' cannot be taken into account. 17.3 Besides this, section 18(3)(c) provides that the award or order passed by the learned Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal shall be binding to the 'assigns' (and the heirs as well as the successors) of the employer and said section statutorily obliges the 'assigns' or the 'successor' or the heirs of an employer to comply the award or orders passed by the learned Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal and that, therefore, the said agreement dated 18.1.2007 and/or the so-called 'writing' cannot override or negate or dilute or frustrate, in any manner, the statutory obligation cast by virtue of section 18(3)(c). 17.4 It is pertinent that the respondent No. 2 was party to the proceeding in respect of approval applications as well as the reference cases. The petitioner was party to the proceedings in respect of the reference cases. Further, the petitioner purchased the undertaking (where the claimants was - were employed prior to termination) as a going concern during the pendency of the approval application as well as reference cases and the order in approval applications came to be passed after the petitioner/purchaser acquired the said unit/undertaking. Therefore, the petitioner would, at least, be the 'assign' (if not successor) of the vendor - respondent No. 2 company. 17.5 When above referred provisions are taken into account then it emerges that even if it is assumed, only for sake of examining petitioner's claim that it is not obliged to implement the award dated 22.10.2010 and the order/award dated 14.5.2009 in light of the agreement dated 18.1.2007 then also in light of section 18(3)(c) of the Act, the petitioner herein is under legal obligation to comply the awards dated 22.10.2010. 18. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that the petitioner has challenged the award dated 22.10.2010 on the ground that according to the terms of the agreement its liability or obligation commences after 18.1.2007 and that, therefore, it is not under obligation to reinstate the workmen whose services were terminated before 18.1.2007 and were not on the rolls of the company on 18.1.2007 and that, therefore, the learned Labour Court ought not have directed the petitioner/purchaser company to reinstate the workmen. 18.1 On this count it is pertinent that the petitioner has not challenged the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed in approval applications and/or the reasons and conclusions (viz. that the termination of service of the concerned workmen was in violation of section 33 and therefore illegal and unjustified recorded by the learned Labour Court in support of its findings of fact and conclusions in said orders dated 14.5.2009 and the said orders dated 14.5.2009 and the findings and the conclusions recorded therein, have attained finality. Consequently, by virtue of section 33 and its effect (and as consequence of the decision in the order dated 14.5.2009) the workmen are deemed to be in service. Therefore also the said contention is not sustainable. Consequently, by virtue of section 33 and its effect (and as consequence of the decision in the order dated 14.5.2009) the workmen are deemed to be in service. Therefore also the said contention is not sustainable. 18.2 In this context profitable reference can be had to the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma & Others, (2002) 2 SCC 244 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: "14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b), Proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33A would be meaningless and futile. The said Section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted. 15. The view that when no application is made or the one made is withdrawn, there is no order of refusal of such application on merit and as such the order of dismissal or discharge does not become void or inoperative unless such an order is set aside under Section 33A, cannot be accepted. In our view, not making an application under Section 33(2)(b) seeking approval or withdrawing an application once made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). An employer who does not make an application under Section 33(2)(b) or withdraws the one made, cannot be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory obligation created on him to make such an application. An employer who does not make an application under Section 33(2)(b) or withdraws the one made, cannot be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory obligation created on him to make such an application. If it is so done, he will be happier or more comfortable than an employer who obeys the command of law and makes an application inviting scrutiny of the authority in the matter of granting approval of the action taken by him. Adherence to and obedience of law should be obvious and necessary in a system governed by rule of law. An employer by design can avoid to make an application after dismissing or discharging an employee or file it and withdraw before any order is passed on it, on its merits, to take a position that such order is not inoperative or void till it is set aside under Section 33A notwithstanding the contravention of Section 33(2)(b) proviso, driving the employee to have recourse to one or more proceeding by making a complaint under Section 33A or to raise another industrial dispute or to make a complaint under Section 31(1). Such an approach destroys the protection specifically and expressly given to an employee under the said proviso as against possible victimization, unfair labour practice or harassment because of pendency of industrial dispute so that an employee can be saved from hardship of unemployment." 19. What is actually challenged by the petitioner is the order directing the petitioner it to bear the burden for the period prior to 18.1.2007 and to reinstate the workmen on the ground that the term of the agreement absolves it or protects it from such direction and/or obligation. What is actually challenged by the petitioner is the order directing the petitioner it to bear the burden for the period prior to 18.1.2007 and to reinstate the workmen on the ground that the term of the agreement absolves it or protects it from such direction and/or obligation. 19.1 At this stage, it is relevant to recall and note that foregoing discussion has brought out, inter alia, that (i) the respondents are 'workman' within the meaning of the said term defined under section 2(s) of the Act; and (ii) by virtue of, the terms of the agreement under which the petitioner purchased the unit/undertaking (where the respondents were employed/working prior to permission) as a going concern, the petitioner is 'successor' or at least 'assign' of the original employer (the unit/undertaking acquired by it) who was party to the dispute (i.e. in the approval applications as well as in the reference cases) and the petitioner itself was a party opponent in the reference cases; (iii) therefore in light of section 18(3)(c) of the Act the award dated 20.10.2010 are binding to the petitioner and it is under legal and statutory obligation to comply and implement the award (if it is not set aside). 19.2 Therefore, the petitioner's contention on the premise that it has no obligation to reinstate the concerned workmen because (i) their names are not included in the list supplied by the vendor-company and (ii) because the concerned workman were not on the roll of the vendor-company on 18.1.2007 fails. Thus, there is no reason or justification available to the petitioner-company to neglect or not comply the direction of the learned Labour Court by virtue of award dated 22.10.2010. 20. So as to succeed in its aforesaid contentions, the purchaser-company has relied upon the decision in case of Anakapalle Cooperative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. (supra). However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the said decision does not help the case of the petitioner/purchaser-company. The set of facts of the said case arise in light of the provisions of Section 25FF of the Act. The issue which was before the Hon'ble Apex Court is mentioned in paragraph No. 1 of the said decision and they are summarized thus. The set of facts of the said case arise in light of the provisions of Section 25FF of the Act. The issue which was before the Hon'ble Apex Court is mentioned in paragraph No. 1 of the said decision and they are summarized thus. "The principal question which arises in this appeal has relation to the scope and effect of s. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act). An industrial dispute between the appellant, Anakapalla Co-operative Agricultural & Industrial Society, and the respondents, its workmen, was referred by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad, under s. 10(1)(d) of the Act on December 7, 1960. The respondents who were in the employment of Vizagapatnam Sugar and Refinery Ltd. (Hereinafter called the Company) claimed that they were entitled to re-employment in the said concern which had been purchased by the appellant, and since their demand for re-employment by the appellant was not accepted by it, they represented to the State Government that the said demand should be adjudicated upon by an Industrial Tribunal. That is how their demand for re-employment came to be referred under s.10(1)(d)." 20.1 Thus, essentially the matter before the Hon'ble Apex Court was with regard to the scope and effect of Section 25FF of the Act. In the said proceedings, one of the contention which was raised by the vendor was that it cannot be said to be successor. The said aspect is noted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No. 4 of the said decision which reads thus: "4. The next contention raised by the appellant was that it was not a successor-in-interest of the Company and as such, under industrial law, the claim made by the respondents for re-employment of the permanent and the seasonal employees was not sustainable. The Tribunal has held that the appellant is a successor-in-interest of the Company and so, it has come to the conclusion that the demand for re-employment of the said specified employees was permissible under the industrial law." 20.2 The aspect mentioned in paragraph No. 4 of the decision is discussed and decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No. 9 of the decision. 20.3 Above quoted narration of the issue (as mention in paragraph No. 1 of the judgment which was under consideration before Hon'ble Apex Court) involved in the said decision and above quoted observations in paragraph No. 4 of the decision and further observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraphs No. 9 and 10 of the said decision bring out that Hon'ble Apex Court considered the issue in light of and with regard to Section 25FF and in the process Hon'ble Apex Court considered the question as to whether the industrial concern before the Court can be said to be "successor in interest" or not in light of, and for the purpose of, Section 25FF and that, therefore, the said decision does not assist the petitioner's case in present petition and in view of the difference between set of facts involved in the said decision vis-à-vis the facts involved in present case, it emerges that the said decision is not of any assistance to the petitioner, more particularly because in present case, relevant section is Section 18(3)(c) and this matter is required to be considered in the light of Section 18(3)(c) of the Act and not in the light of Section 25FF of the Act. 20.4 In present case, the petitioner company's obligation arises in light of section 18(3)(c) because it is by virtue of the said provision, the petitioner company is legally and statutorily obliged to comply the direction issued by the learned Labour Court as contained in the award dated 20.10.2010. 20.5 So far as the provision under Section 18(3)(c) is concerned it employs the expression 'successor' as well as 'heirs' as well as 'assigns'. Thus, the said provision and its scope are wider than that of Section 25FF which covers only 'successor in interest'. 20.6 Another decision on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon is the decision in the case of Workman of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board (supra). The said decision also does not render any assistance to the petitioner/purchaser - company in view of the fact that even in the said case, the binding nature of the decision/award passed by the learned tribunal of Labour Court, as provided for by Section 18 was not under consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The said decision also does not render any assistance to the petitioner/purchaser - company in view of the fact that even in the said case, the binding nature of the decision/award passed by the learned tribunal of Labour Court, as provided for by Section 18 was not under consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court. In the said case also, the obligation of the board was examined in light of Section 25FF of the Act and in light of the said provision, Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held that the liability of the Board would be to the extent as contemplated under Section 25FF of the Act. 21. In the result and in light of foregoing discussion and for the reasons mentioned above all contentions of the petitioner fail and they cannot be sustained. 21.1 The foregoing discussion has established that (a) there is no reason or justification or material in light of which the award dated 22.10.2010 can be faulted or declared bad in law and can be set aside. The petitioner has failed to make out any case. Therefore, the relief prayed for cannot be granted; and (b) the obligation to comply and implement the direction to reinstate the workmen rests, in light of section 18(3)(c) of the Act (and also on account of the effect of orders dated 14.5.2009 as well as in light of the provisions in the agreement dated 18.1.2007) on the petitioner; (c) even the agreement dated 18.1.2007 is clear on this count, however, even if it is assumed that it is not clear, then also by virtue of the decision and direction by orders dated 14.5.2009 and section 18(3)(c) of the Act, the obligation to reinstate the workmen, is on the petitioner. 22. The petitioner has not even claimed/alleged that the respondent No. 2 committed breach of the clause 6.06 and has not alleged that complete details of pending litigation was not given by the respondent No. 2, however, if at all the purchaser - company has grievance against the vendor on that count and if at all the petitioner/purchaser-company has any claim or right in law against the vendor for alleged non-disclosure of said fact then also (in light of section 33 and section 18(3)(c) of the Act) the petitioner cannot be avoid or escape its obligation to comply the award dated 22.10.2010 and/or the order dated 14.5.2009. Besides this in light of the orders dated 14.5.2009 (which have attained finality) and the meaning and effect of rejection of approval applications, the workmen are deemed to be in service and that therefore also the petitioner cannot escape his obligation. 22.1 On this count it is appropriate to refer below quoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand & Another, 1978 2 SCC 144 : "...... Where the Tribunal entertains an application for approval under Section 33(2)(b) on merits, it applies its mind and considers whether the dismissal of the workman amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice and whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer for the dismissal of the workman. If the Tribunal finds that either no prima facie case has been made out or there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, it would refuse to grant approval and reject the application on merits. Then of course the dismissal of the workman would be void and inoperative, but that would be because the Tribunal having held that no prima facie case has been made out by the employer or there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, it has refused to lift the bank. ... ..." 22.2 In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court made distinction between the cases where the learned Labour Court or the learned Tribunal decides the approval application on merits and rejects such application under section 33(2)(b) of the Act on merits and thereby refuses to grant approval order of discharge or dismissal after adjudicating the case on merits and the cases where no application under Section 33(2)(b) (though required) is not made or where such application is submitted but is subsequently withdrawn. 22.3 In the decision in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited v. S.N. Modak, AIR 1966 SC 380 , Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: "... ... ... It is also settled that if approval is granted, it takes effect from the date of the order passed by the employer for which approval was sought. If approval is not granted, the order of dismissal or discharge passed by employer is wholly in invalid or inoperative, and the employee can legitimately claim to continue to be in the employment of the employer notwithstanding the order passed by him dismissing or discharging him. If approval is not granted, the order of dismissal or discharge passed by employer is wholly in invalid or inoperative, and the employee can legitimately claim to continue to be in the employment of the employer notwithstanding the order passed by him dismissing or discharging him. In other words, approval by the prescribed authority makes the order of discharge or dismissal effective; in the absence of approval, such an order is invalid and inoperative in law." 22.4 Subsequently, the issue related to the cases where approval is not granted and effect of, considered in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (supra), wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that 'If the approval is not given nothing more is required to be done by the employee as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. ... ...' 22.5 Thus, in view of the fact that in present case, the approval applications filed by the company were rejected after adjudication on merits vide order dated 14.5.2009 passed in the approval applications, the concerned workmen are deemed to be in service. 22.6 Consequently, for this reason also there is no justification to set aside the award dated 22.10.2010 passed by the learned Labour Court in above mentioned reference cases. It is pertinent that the said awards dated 22.10.2010 passed in above mentioned reference cases rests, inter alia, on the orders dated 14.5.2009 passed in approval applications (whereby the learned Tribunal rejected the approval applications). When the said decision dated 14.5.2009 passed by the learned Tribunal in approval applications has attained finality and when even in present petition, the said orders dated 14.5.2009 in approval applications are not challenged by present petitioner and when the concerned workmen, as a result of and by virtue of said orders dated 14.5.2009 in approval applications, are deemed to be in service question of setting aside the awards dated 22.10.2010 does not arise and the petitioner has failed to make out any case to interfere with the said awards dated 22.10.2010. Actually, by impugned awards the reinstatement of concerned workman which, until the award dated 22.10.2010 came to be passed, was in 'deemed' state (i.e. the factum of reinstatement of concerned workman which, until the award dated 22.10.2010 was deemed to exist and reinstatement was 'deemed' to have been effected) is merely transformed into direction to reinstate by the award dated 22.10.2010 and the said 'deemed state' of reinstatement is metamorphosized into state of direction to reinstate the concerned workman and thereby the state of suspended animation is lifted inasmuch as the concerned employees, who were deemed to be in service (see Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhomi Vikas Bank Ltd. case) by virtue of orders dated 14.5.2009 passed by the learned Tribunal rejecting the approval applications on merits, are now directed to be actually reinstated by virtue of the impugned awards dated 22.10.2010. For this reason also this Court does not find any justification to set aside impugned awards. 23. So far as the final directions are concerned, the learned Labour Court has taken into account the provisions in the agreement dated 18.1.2007 and in light of relevant provisions the learned Court has clarified that the liability to pay wages for the period upto 17.1.2007 will be of the vendor and liability to pay wages for the period after 17.1.2007 shall be of the purchaser. Thus, the provisions under the agreement are taken into account and given effect to. 23.1 The vendor company i.e. respondent No. 2 has declared that it has already paid the amount which it is obliged to pay by virtue of the directions contained in award dated 22.10.2010. The said submissions and declaration by the respondent No. 2-company i.e. vendor is not disputed by the purchaser - company i.e. by the petitioner - company. So far as the direction to reinstate the workman is concerned, as discussed earlier, the petitioner company is bound by the award dated 20.10.2010 and obliged to comply the said direction and the petitioner's contentions or objections against the awards dated 22.10.2010 and the direction issued thereby, are not sustainable and deserve to be rejected and are accordingly rejected. 24. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the petitions, except SCA Nos. 3587/2011, 3593/2011, 3590/2011 and 3592/2011, fail and deserve to be rejected and are hereby rejected. 25. 24. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the petitions, except SCA Nos. 3587/2011, 3593/2011, 3590/2011 and 3592/2011, fail and deserve to be rejected and are hereby rejected. 25. So far as the SCA No. 3588/2011 is concerned, the said petition is filed against the order dated 14.5.2009 passed by the learned Labour Court in Complaint No. 22/2004. Learned Counsel for the petitioner/purchaser - company fairly conceded the fact that the said petition is not maintainable and deserves to be disposed of in light of the order dated 18.3.2011 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 3603/2011 and also in view of the fact that the petitioner/purchaser company has (after the said order dated 18.3.2011) challenged (in SCA No. 3587/2011) the award passed by the learned Labour Court in Reference (LCN) No. 18/2005. For the said reasons, the said petition, as rightly submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, does not deserve to be entertained and is not maintainable. Therefore, the said petition is disposed of in light of the statement by learned advocate for the petitioner and in light of the order dated 18.3.2011 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 3603/2011 and also in view of the fact that the petitioner has by separate petitions challenged the final award in the reference case. Consequently, the captioned petitions are rejected and hereby disposed of. Orders accordingly. Rule is discharged.